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Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the subject of this thesis – joined-up ICT innovation in the 
public sector. The first section demonstrates that scientists and policy makers fully 
agree that ICT innovation should be a joint effort involving multiple public sec-
tor actors. To solve today’s urgent social problems, specific government agencies 
have to jointly rethink and improve practices – including their ICTs. However, as 
section two demonstrates, there are some severe barriers to joined-up ICT innova-
tion. Evaluation studies consistently show that government agencies often fail to 
realize cooperative change. The third section provides a review of literature that 
attempts to explain the difficulties. The conclusion is that current public admin-
istration theories merely provide a fragmented picture of determining variables. 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework is introduced as it aims to overcome this theo-
retical fragmentation. The framework offers a broad overview of all kinds of fac-
tors that determine policy change. A confrontation between the variables of the 
model and innovation literature reveals strong similarities, which indicate that the 
model can also be applied to ‘innovation’. The fourth section identifies a critique of 
the social subsystem of the model. Social capital theory is introduced in order to 
address this critique as it can contribute to the operationalisation of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework and hence strengthen its explanatory value. In section five, 
the unit of analysis is confined to a specific joined-up ICT innovation, namely the 
joint development of electronic identification systems. Section six defines the 
central research question, which combines the key elements: (a) the difficulties 
of joined-up ICT innovations, (b) the use of the Advocacy Coalition Framework to 
explain those difficulties and (c) social capital theory to enhance the framework. 
The chapter concludes with the theoretical and social relevance of the study. 
1.1  JOINED-UP MODELS Of ICT INNOVATION
Over the past few decades, joined-up or cooperative models of government have 
become the dominant “Leitbild” in public administration literature. Academic 
papers repeatedly underline the generic premise that in today’s complex society 
governments will only be able to attain public value if their separate institutions 
increasingly cooperate (e.g. Pröpper, 2000; Fountain, 2001; McLaughlin et al., 2002; 
Peterson, 2003; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Goldsmith, 2004; Osborne and Brown, 
2005). Goldsmith (2004:7) for instance argues: ‘In many ways, twenty-first century 
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challenges and the means of addressing them are more numerous and complex 
than ever before. Problems have become more global and more local as power 
disperses and boundaries (when they exist at all) become more fluid. […] The tra-
ditional, hierarchical model of government simply does not meet the demands of 
this complex, rapidly changing age.’ 
According to several scholars a radical modernisation of government organisa-
tions is needed and various publications have accordingly explored and/or 
described new forms of networked government (Fountain, 2001; Goldsmith et 
al., 2004). Castells (1996) contends that new information and communication 
technologies create the potential for a shift towards more flexible, adaptive and 
interactive organisation systems and networks.1 Edelenbos and Klijn (2007:25) 
state: ‘It is not surprising that in public administration, many writers see a trend 
from government to governance in which public actors increasingly (have to) use 
more horizontal, instead of vertical, forms of steering and work together with 
other public actors and private actors in networks to achieve policy outcomes.’ 
Moreover, in the past few years scientists increasingly identified new, user-gener-
ated forms of government in which public value is primarily delivered by citizens 
themselves.2 There are increasingly examples in which citizens are empowered 
by ICTs to create public services which hitherto were provided by governments. 
An example is the online community PatientsLikeMe, consisting of patients who 
share personal healthcare data in order to gain an improved understanding of 
medical issues, such as the effects of certain medicine.3 
Whereas some scholars predominantly focus on the fundamental reconsideration 
of organisation principles, others more specifically stress the need for the joint 
creation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) by separate 
government agencies (e.g. Ling, 2002; Osborne and Brown, 2005; Burt and Taylor, 
2006; Soeparman, 2006; Snijkers, 2006). According to these scholars government 
agencies should jointly rethink and improve ICTs – in other words, cooperatively 
conduct ICT innovations. Snijker (2006:54-5), for instance, argues that the joint 
development of an information architecture by Belgian social security agencies 
can enhance government efficiency and effectiveness and increase customer 
orientation. Soeparman et al. (2006:159-60) describe how the joint development 
of a novel information system by separate Dutch police forces can contribute to 
more effective policing and law enforcement. Huijboom and Van Staden studied 
1 Years ago, Hayek (1945) already argued that traditional command and control organisations 
(e.g. government bureaucracies), face difficulties with the vast amount of information and 
knowledge needed to take well-considered decisions.
2 See Frissen et al. (2008), for example: ‘Naar een “User Generated State?” De impact van 
nieuwe media voor overheid en openbaar bestuur’, research commissioned by the Dutch 
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, The Hague and Frissen (2010), ‘Health 2.0, “It’s 
not just about medicine and technology, it’s about living your life,”’ a background study pub-
lished by the Council for Public Health and Health Care upon recommendation of ‘Health 
2.0’, The Hague. 
3 http://www.patientslikeme.com, See also Huijboom, N.M. et al, (2009), ‘Public Services 2.0: 
The Impact of Social Computing on Public Services’, edited by Punie, Y, Misuraca, G., Osimo, 
D., JRC-IPTS EUR 2408 EN, Luxembourg: European Communities. 
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the creation of a shared electronic patient record in the Andalusian healthcare 
sector and came to the conclusion that the new method of sharing data enhanced 
the quality of patient information (2005:25). Although several of these scholars 
emphasise that attention should be paid to the risks of increased cross-agency 
innovation and cooperation (e.g. privacy infringements) the large majority con-
tends that future government organisations cannot innovate in isolation. The call 
for joined-up ICT innovations by scholars can be found in many public areas (e.g. 
healthcare, education, policing) in a variety of Western democracies and at vari-
ous levels of government (e.g. national, regional and local). Hence, there seems to 
be a broad consensus among scholars on the need for joined-up ICT innovation. 
This scholarly emphasis on joined-up ICT innovation is echoed in government 
policies. Strategic plans of several Western governments reveal a recurring de-
mand for a cooperatively driven change of information and communication 
systems (e.g. Bekkers and Korteland; 2006, Driessen, 2006). Joined-up ICT innova-
tion is often perceived by policy makers as a means to deal with fragmentation, 
government ‘silos’ and functional differentiation – notions that have a strong 
negative connotation (e.g. Snijkers, 2006). A widespread and well-known example 
of a policy encompassing joined-up ICT innovation (as part of a fundamental in-
stitutional reform) may be the ‘online one-stop shop’ (Hagen and Kubicek, 2000). 
Many Western governments have defined strategies to improve the provision of 
services by integrating products and processes of several government agencies 
into one virtual (or physical) office (ibid, p. 7). The examples of these policies are 
manifold. In the Netherlands, for instance, local governments formulated pro-
grammes to create digital one-stop shops for businesses, where entrepreneurs 
can obtain integrated services from (departments of ) municipalities, chambers of 
commerce, the tax office, social security agencies and water districts.4 In the UK, 
strategies have been launched to create ‘online single points of contact’ for par-
ents of children with special needs.5 In Australia programmes have been created 
to establish virtual one-stop shops for overseas businesses that wish to invest and 
trade in Australia.6 Similar policies have been drafted in Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Spain as well (ibid.). 
While many governments have formulated strategies for joined-up ICT innova-
tions, evaluation studies show that they face substantial problems putting these 
policies into place. Illustrative in this respect may be the ‘Overheidsloket 2000’ 
(Government Office 2000) initiative in the Netherlands, which was introduced 
as early as in 1991 (initially under the name of ‘Overheid Service Centrum’).7 The 
4 For example, see http://www.antwoordvoorbedrijven.nl/, but also websites of municipalities, 
such as Groningen, http://gemeente.groningen.nl/ondernemen/bedrijvenloket, Eindhoven 
http://www.eindhoven.nl/ondernemersplein.htm and Amsterdam http://amsterdam.nl/
ondernemen.
5 National Audit Office, (2001), ‘Joining Up to Improve Public Services,’ report by the Comptrol-
ler and Auditor General. 
6 See http://newsroom.nt.gov.au/2004/20041022_ph_trade.shtml
7 The concept of OL2000 is described by the programme office OL2000 in several reports such 
as ‘Het loket in volle gang’, ‘Tweede tussenbalans programma Overheidsloket 2000’, ‘Surfen in 
een hangplek‘, ‘Digitaal vastgoedloket voor bedrijven’.
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Overheidsloket 2000 programme embraced the concept of civic service centres; 
digital and physical service counters where citizens and businesses could receive 
integrated government services. In 2000 – after almost 10 years of pilots and 
broader implementation projects – there was only a very limited scale of integra-
tion of online (and offline) services (Kubicek, 2000:461-4). Researchers came to the 
conclusion that standardisation, legislation (as regards privacy, security, identi-
fication, etc.) and limited budgets were preventing organisations from ICT and 
process integration. After some more programmes and projects, today the Dutch 
government is still striving to achieve integrated online services, but up until now 
the results of these projects have been disappointing. The Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior stated in 2007 and 2008 in strategic policy 
reports that fragmentation continues to be a major problem in government ser-
vices.8 One of the high-priority actions for the future is, once again, the imple-
mentation of, as they referred to in these reports, online ‘single-points-of-contact’: 
digital counters where citizens can receive integrated services. 
1.2  DIffICULTIES wITH JOINED-UP ICT INNOVATIONS
A broader review of the literature reveals that not only ‘one-stop shop’ innovations 
meet substantial difficulties, but that more generally cross-agency cooperation 
seems to be problematic (e.g. Fountain, 2001; Moon, 2002; Chadwick and May, 
2003; Edmiston, 2003; Osborne and Brown 2005; Edelenbos and Klijn, 2007). For 
example, Fountain (2001:67-9) argues that: ‘Many networks are highly conflictual, 
mired in contractual disputes and lack of coordination’ and that ‘Despite these 
rationales for and determinants of networks, it has been shown that relatively few 
interorganisational networks succeed. Although rationality should lead to many 
forms of interorganisational networks, the failure rate of networks is reportedly 
high.’ Edelenbos and Klijn (2007:25) state that it is difficult to achieve joint decision 
making among actors, as complex interorganisational networks are ambiguous 
and unpredictable. Moreover, Edelenbos and Klijn argue that decision making is 
hampered by the unwillingness of actors to share information as their control over 
other actors is limited and they fear opportunistic behaviour. Osborne and Brown 
(2005) contend that the plural state – a public sphere in which governments, non-
profit and business sectors increasingly have to collaborate in the provision of 
public services – yields some important management challenges. 
Literature on public sector ICT innovation endorses and further concretises the 
generally perceived collaboration problems (e.g. Van Venrooij 2000; Osborne and 
Brown, 2005; Thaens, 2006; Bekkers and Homburg 2007). For example, Bekkers and 
Homburg (2007:377) conclude that: ‘An examination of recent assessments of the 
e-Government initiatives in general (Gartner, 2000; OECD, 2003) and the assess-
ment of e-Government practices in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
8 Ministry of Economic Affairs, (2007), ‘Nederland in Verbinding, de ICT Ambitie van 
Nederland’,The Hague and Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2008), ‘Nationaal 
Uitvoeringsprogramma Dienstverlening e-overheid’, Burger en Bedrijf centraal (Citizen and 
Business Central Services, The Hague.
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the Netherlands show that the lack of cooperation between these back offices is 
still a major problem.’ In a study on interorganisational electronic service delivery 
in the Netherlands, Van Venrooij (2000) demonstrates that the most important 
barriers to the integration of government back-office systems concern coordi-
nation problems due to an ambiguous distribution of tasks and legally defined 
competences among the back offices. The plurality of the actors, interests at stake 
and the lack of a common vision or sense of urgency about the necessity to join 
forces prevent separate institutions from cooperation. Thaens et al. (2006:95), who 
studied networked computerisation in the Dutch social security sector, identified 
several barriers to effective collaboration between involved stakeholders. Critical 
problems were the uncertainty on the division of responsibilities, the lack of a 
shared perspective on the advantages and necessity of information sharing, and 
mutual distrust between stakeholders. 
In addition, European evaluation, status quo and benchmark studies reveal that – 
compared to ICT innovations, which concern merely one organisation, joined-up 
ICT innovation seems to demonstrate a lack of progress. For instance, whereas 
e-Government benchmarks indicate that member states are making significant 
progress in the sophistication of online central services (offered by a sole organi-
sation), member states seem to be struggling with the development of so-called 
‘service clusters’ (jointly offered services by separate organisations). Both in 2007 
and 2009, European comparative e-Government studies9 showed that service 
clusters in particular had a low performance level (relatively low sophistication 
and low availability). In 2007 (European Commission Benchmark 2007:18), it was 
stated in the benchmark report that service clusters (compared to the single ser-
vices of one central provider) are typically offered by multiple providers, whose 
setting is more heterogeneous and complex and one of the key reasons for sig-
nificantly slower progress. The European Commission came to the more general 
conclusion in another 2007 report that despite comprehensive policies and sub-
stantial investments in several countries, government projects that attempted to 
streamline or integrate processes revealed serious deficiencies in the process.10
1.3  THE ADVOCACy COALITION fRAMEwORK AS 
ExPLANATORy MODEL 
Although several researchers have been occupied by the question which barriers 
hamper joined-up ICT innovation in government, a complete answer to this ques-
tion has not been found yet. It seems that, although some important pieces of the 
complex puzzle have been identified, some crucial elements of the explanation 
are still missing. The question of initiatives that fail to cooperatively realise change 
9 European Commission, (2007), ‘The User Challenge, Benchmarking The Supply Of Online 
Public Services’, 7th Measurement, Brussels, and European Commission, (2009), ‘Smarter, 
Faster, Better e-Government’, 8th Benchmark Measurement, Brussels.
10 European Commission, (2007), ‘European e-Government 2005-2007: Taking stock of good 
practice and progress towards implementation of the i2010 e-Government Action Plan’, 
Brussels. 
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has predominantly been approached from an institutional or technological view-
point. Explanatory models that have been used to describe obstacles are often 
highly technologically, organisationally or regulation-oriented (Heeks, 1999; Ho, 
2002; McClure, 2000; Lam, 2005; Ebrahim and Zahir, 2005; Gilbert and Balestrini, 
2004). Frequently mentioned barriers include: 
•	 Fragmented technical infrastructure (e.g. the lack of electronic data ex-
change between agencies, lack of standards and integrated platforms;
•	 Limited budgets;
•	 Existing fragmented structure (functional differentiation);
•	 Management of the project (failing leadership, missing ownership, lack of 
implementation guidance);
•	 Lack of or inflexible legislation (e.g. digital signature legislation, privacy leg-
islation).
Moreover, a review of literature reveals that theories on drivers and barriers for 
joined-up ICT innovation in the public sector are highly fragmented while dis-
persed between scientific disciplines. A large body of literature is available, for 
example, in the field of technology, which focuses on the joint development of 
technological standards by separate organisations and the realisation of interop-
erability between distinct information systems (e.g. Mori et al., 1998; Guijarro, 2007; 
Pirnejad et al., 2008; Gottschalk, 2009; Peristeras et al., 2009). Technological barri-
ers that are repeatedly mentioned concern the incompatibility of architectures, 
platforms and infrastructures. Furthermore, a great deal of public administration 
literature emphasises managerial and organisational factors (e.g. Allen et al., 
2001; Kinder, 2002; Dawkins, 2006; Grant et al., 2007; Klievink et al., 2009). Several 
scientists mention institutional barriers and stress the need for growth models, 
the redesigning of processes and new governance structures. Managerial factors 
that are often mentioned are failing leadership, ambiguous responsibilities and 
lack of coordination. In the legal area, numerous scholarly papers have identified 
regulatory challenges, such as privacy threats, liability and accountability issues 
(e.g. McMillen, 2004; Roberts, 2004; Sarathy, 2006; Clarke, 2009). 
However, in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of what ham-
pers joined-up ICT innovation in the public sector, an overarching model which 
integrates several variables is needed. Although public sector innovation litera-
ture provides several models that identify multiple variables (e.g. Osborne and 
Brown, 2005), generic models that integrate a broad spectrum of factors while 
cross-cutting scholarly disciplines are scarce. A model that does capture a large 
variety of factors is Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (e.g. 1993, 1996, 
2007). The model consists of economic, cultural, sociological, political, technologi-
cal, legal and institutional factors that affect policy change. It reveals, for example, 
the constraints to policy change generated by systemic governing structures, 
fundamental value systems and legal arrangements. Although the model’s unit 
of analysis is ‘policy change’, it can also be applied to ‘innovation’, as factors men-
tioned in innovation literature are largely consistent with factors captured by the 
framework (similar factors are mentioned by e.g. Pollit and Bouckaert, 2000; Peled, 
2001; Osborne and Brown, 2005; Loos, 2006; Schedler and Proeller, 2007). More-
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over, policy change can be perceived as a specific type of innovation (and thus 
change), namely a government’s change of strategy. 
Another reason why the Advocacy Coalition Framework is suitable for studying 
joined-up ICT innovation is that it focuses on network – more precisely coalition 
–structures and thus uses a multi-stakeholder perspective. Various empirical stud-
ies have demonstrated that the framework is appropriate for explaining complex, 
multi-actor changes and thus for investigating processes of cross-agency innova-
tions (see, for instance, Parsons, 1995; Eberg, 1997; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996; 
Grin and Hoppe, 1997; Fenger and Klok, 2001). In particular the socio-cultural 
variables addressed by the framework may uncover mechanisms that influence 
joined-up ICT innovation. A dominant element of the framework is the subsystem 
– a network of actors who form coalitions, share certain values and beliefs and 
can broker between diverse groups. The social dynamics within the subsystem 
may yield new insights into barriers and incentives for joined-up ICT innovation 
since these more sociological factors are often underexposed in traditional public 
administration literature. 
1.4 SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORy AS AN ENHANCEMENT Of THE 
ADVOCACy COALITION fRAMEwORK
A study of the application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, however, also 
reveals that there are some limitations to the use of the model (Malony, 1994; 
Schlager, 1995; Kim et al., 2008). Most critics mention the need for the further 
operationalisation of the subsystem as the dynamics within and specific charac-
teristics of the subsystem (e.g. the type and strength of relationships, level of trust 
and sharing of values between actors) have been defined rather abstractly and 
thereby remain vague. An important objection to the framework is that it fails 
to distinguish between the more important and less important policy actors in a 
given policy area because it neglects the distinction between insiders and outsid-
ers. Another criticism shared by several scholars is the framework’s inability to 
account for the possibility that a policy domain may be structured by harmonious 
and stable relationships among actors. Both objections point to the need for a 
further operationalisation of involved participants and their relationships. 
A theory which provides this operationalisation is social capital theory (e.g. 
Bourdieu, 1983; Fountain, 2001; Lin, 2001; Klijn, 2002). Social capital can be under-
stood as the whole of an individual’s durable social connections and the potential 
benefits that may be gained through these social connections (such as access to 
finance, knowledge and power, e.g. Bourdieu, 1983). Obviously, people’s social 
capital is not restricted to the organisation they work for; they have ties with peo-
ple inside and outside the organisation. Funding, knowledge, expertise, but also 
opinions, values, decision power and ideas can flow between connected people. 
The characteristics of the relationships between actors (e.g. type of relationship, 
strength of the tie, level of trust) affect the intensity and type of collaboration be-
tween actors and subsequently may stimulate or hamper certain flows of resourc-
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es (e.g. Fountain, 1997). Huijboom and Van Staden (2005), for instance, found that 
general practitioners involved in a collaborative development of an electronic pa-
tient record, used their personal strong ties with hospital physicians to influence 
opinions and to gain access to powerful decision makers. The reciprocate flow of 
opinions, influence, trust and the brokerage of healthcare professionals between 
separate groups highly determined the outcome of the joint initiative. 
Overall, it seems that social capital theory can bring the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work one step further as it takes social factors into account, not only at a subsys-
tem level, but also at a relational and individual level. In addition, social capital 
theory reveals the social dynamics at play within the subsystem over time. Social 
capital theory demonstrates that resources flow between actors, that positions 
within the network change constantly, that new relationships are built and that 
others fade. The Advocacy Coalition Framework, meanwhile, considers the sub-
system to be rather stable, and yet it reinforces social capital theory by explaining 
the context in which cross-agency collaboration takes place. The Advocacy Coali-
tion Framework does not only identify socio-cultural factors, but also economic, 
legal and technological factors, for example. Consequently, the conceptual model 
applied in this research integrates the Advocacy Coalition Framework and social 
capital theory, which is be further elaborated on in the next chapter. 
1.5  CONfINING THE UNIT Of ANALySIS
The general concept of ‘joined-up ICT innovations’ is too broad to be studied in 
one PhD research. To be able to draw valid conclusions about factors that influ-
ence joint ICT innovation processes, a more specific unit of analysis has to be 
defined. The subject of this thesis is a particular type of joined-up ICT innova-
tion, namely the cooperative development of an electronic Identity Management 
(eIDM) system used by various individual government institutions. An eIDM 
system is a tool for electronically and officially proving one’s identity during his/
her interaction with businesses or governments. It enables end-users to access 
secured databases (e.g. bank accounts), to sign electronic documents (e.g. tax 
forms) and to obtain digital products (e.g. building permits). eIDM systems are the 
selected joined-up ICT innovation in this research paper since many governments 
trumpet the virtues of eIDM systems as key enablers for advancing electronic ser-
vice delivery to citizens and businesses in the coming years.11 The development of 
a national eIDM system can be perceived as a joint process since in many coun-
tries separate government institutions collaborate to develop one eIDM solution 
for all e-Government services. In addition, the development of an eIDM system 
can be perceived as an innovation as it entails the development, introduction and 
incorporation of (a set of ) new information and/or communication technologies, 
11 See, for instance, European Commission, (2007) ‘European e-Government 2005-2007, Taking 
stock of good practice and progress towards implementation of the i2010 e-Government 
Action Plan’, Brussels, and European Commission, (2009), ‘i2010 e-Government Action Plan 
Progress Study’, Brussels. 
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which over time will represent a substantial break with the past.12 Although eIDM 
technologies have already been developed in the private sector, the application 
of those systems in the public sector requires further technological development. 
The implementation of eIDM systems results in a substantial break with the past 
since it necessitates changes in legislation, skills, processes and products. 
1.6  RESEARCH qUESTION
The aim of this research is to gain a better understanding of the occurrence of 
joint ICT innovations – more specifically the development of eIDM systems – in 
the public sector by means of an integrated model of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework and social capital theory as a theoretical lens. This central research 
goal can be subdivided into three research objectives: 
•	 To develop a conceptual integrated framework of advocacy coalition and 
social capital factors that influence the occurrence of joined-up ICT innova-
tions – namely eIDM systems – in the public sector;
•	 To test and further develop the conceptual framework by applying it to con-
crete cases of joined-up ICT innovations, namely the development of eIDM 
systems in the public sector;
•	 To reflect on the existing Advocacy Coalition Framework and social capital 
theory, and to provide recommendations for further academic research and 
for policy makers. 
The following overall research question can be defined to meet these goals:
 
How can an integrated model of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and social capi-
tal theory explain the occurrence of joined-up ICT innovations – in particular eIDM 
systems – in the public sector?
 
This central research question can be divided into the following sub-questions: 
•	 Combination of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and social capital theory 
in a new explanatory framework:
1. How can the Advocacy Coalition Framework be used to explain the occur-
rence of joined-up ICT innovations in the public sector? 
2. How can social capital theory be used to explain the occurrence of joined-up 
ICT innovations in the public sector?
3. How can the Advocacy Coalition Framework and social capital theory be 
integrated into one model that explains the occurrence of joined-up ICT in-
novations in the public sector?
•	 Application of the explanatory framework in tangible cases: 
4. How can the integrated model explain concrete cases of the occurrence of 
joined-up ICT innovations, namely the development of eIDM systems in the 
public sector?
12 For a typology of public sector innovations see e.g. Thaens (2006) and Bekkers et al. (2006).
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5. How do the variables of the integrated model become manifest in concrete 
cases of the occurrence of joined-up ICT innovations, namely the develop-
ment of eIDM systems in the public sector?
•	 Reflections on the explanatory framework: 
6. Which conclusions can be drawn regarding the usefulness of the integration 
of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and social capital theory?
7. Which scientific recommendations can be made regarding the further devel-
opment of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and social capital theory?
8. Which policy recommendations can be made regarding the creation, imple-
mentation and diffusion of joined-up ICT innovations in the public sector?
 
The research is divided into three main parts; a theoretical and methodological 
part (chapters 2, 3 and 4) in which research questions 1 to 3 are addressed. An 
empirical part (chapters 5 to 8) in which research questions 4 and 5 are answered. 
And a reflective part (chapter 9) in which research questions 6 to 8 are addressed. 
1.7  SOCIAL AND SCIENTIfIC RELEVANCE Of THE RESEARCH
The scientific relevance of this research lies in its contribution to the further 
development and integration of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and social 
capital theory. The research yields an integrated model of these concepts that 
is tested and reflected upon by means of eIDM innovation cases in the public 
sector. Although the study is practically oriented, the acquired knowledge from 
case studies will be valuable for public administration. The Advocacy Coalition 
Framework – a dominant theoretical model in public administration literature – 
is further operationalised by means of social capital theory. Thereby, critique to 
the model is addressed (e.g. Maloney et al, 1994, Kim and Roh, 2008). In addition, 
social capital theory is examined and structured, and theoretical propositions are 
empirically tested. As stated in previous sections, social capital theory is relatively 
recent; as yet, there is no clear-cut answer as to how social capital variables affect 
innovation, let alone joined-up ICT innovations in government (e.g. Franke, 2005; 
Kasaa, 2007; Nooteboom, 2009). This research tries to gain more insight into the 
mechanisms of social capital in specific situations of public sector innovation. The 
aim of integrating the Advocacy Coalition Framework and social capital theory is 
not to deliver a generic model for innovation in the public sector. As the theoreti-
cal framework is used in a limited number of cases, no statements can be made 
about the general implications and application of the model (Leeuw, 1999:186-7). 
Nonetheless, the integrated model will stimulate the further development of a 
more generic model to explain joined-up innovations in government. 
 
The study has social relevance because it seeks to provide insight into a variety of 
obstacles that hamper government innovations. An improved understanding of 
the manifestation of social factors has particular added value, since these factors 
often remain underexposed in public sector literature (e.g. Considine, 2009). The 
research exposes the social processes that can hamper or drive specific innova-
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tions, and it shows managers and professionals of government agencies how to 
influence these social processes. The chance to influence innovation projects is 
particularly relevant now that several studies have indicated that the returns on 
investments in ICT innovations in the public sector are limited. In the Netherlands, 
the National Audit Office, for instance, stated in their 2007 report ‘Lessen voor ICT 
projecten bij de overheid’ that many ICT innovations in government fail to suc-
ceed. The disinvestment in ICT projects is estimated at four to five billion euros 
per year.13 The more governments are able to realise the initial goals of technologi-
cal innovations (such as increased efficiency, effectiveness, customer satisfaction 
or democratic participation), the lower the costs for society. In addition to this 
economic argument, successful innovations by governments build the trust of 
citizens and entrepreneurs in government.14 Since people’s trust in government 
is declining rapidly, effective innovation projects can promote a positive image 
of government, which – in turn – may stimulate citizen engagement in the public 
domain. 
1.8 STRUCTURE Of THE THESIS
Chapter two explores in more detail the theories introduced in this chapter and in-
corporates them into a single theoretical framework which can be used to explain 
joined-up ICT innovations in the public sector. It presents theoretical propositions 
based on a broad review of literature related to the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work and social capital theory. Chapter three explores the specific ‘joined-up ICT 
innovation’ case to test the integrated model, namely the joint creation of an eIDM 
system. This chapter also examines the perceived need for eIDM systems, the 
status quo of these systems in European member states and the key barriers for 
eIDM implementation. Chapter four outlines the methodology for testing the in-
tegrated framework. This chapter argues, in particular, that a multiple case-study 
research design can generate more insight into the factors that affect joined-up 
ICT innovations in the public sector. Furthermore, this chapter also provides a 
selection of cases to empirically examine the tenability of the integrated frame-
work. Chapters five to eight describe the joint development of eIDM systems by 
government agencies in Austria, Belgium, Finland and Malta, respectively. Each of 
these chapters explains the chronological events in the innovation process, the 
influence of the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s parameters and events, and the 
impact of social capital variables. The thesis ends with the conclusions presented 
in chapter nine. This last chapter provides a cross-case analysis of the influence of 
the framework’s factors applied in the cases and evaluates the validity of the theo-
retical propositions. The final sections of the concluding chapter define research 
challenges and policy recommendations. 
13 Nationale Rekenkamer, (2007), ‘Lessen voor ICT projecten bij de overheid’, Den Haag.
14 See, for example, Barnes (2000) and Moon (2003).
Noor BW 7.indd   19 08-09-10   12:07
Noor BW 7.indd   20 08-09-10   12:07
21
2
The Advocacy Coalition 
framework and social capital: 
a theoretical lens 
This chapter explores in more detail the two theories introduced in the first 
chapter – the Advocacy Coalition Framework and social capital theory – and 
incorporates them into a single theoretical framework that can be used to ex-
plain joined-up ICT innovations in the public sector. The proposition is that social 
capital theory can contribute to enhance the explanatory power of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework. The criticism of several scientists on the framework (e.g. 
Maloney et al., 1994; Cairney, 1997; Kim, 2008) shows that one of the most impor-
tant limitations of the Advocacy Coalition Framework is that it does not reveal the 
micro-dynamics of policy subsystems. Here, social capital theory has added value 
when it unravels and explains the mechanisms and characteristics of relationships 
between members of policy coalitions. In the first three sections of this chapter, 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework will be described and its main limitations will 
be reviewed. The fourth to sixth sections explain social capital theory and the 
dominant connections between the Advocacy Coalition Framework and social 
capital theory. The seventh section consolidates the two theories and presents an 
integrated analytical model that can be used to study the occurrence of joined-up 
ICT innovations. The chapter concludes with theoretical propositions which will 
be empirically tested in chapters five to eight. 
2.1 THE ADVOCACy COALITION fRAMEwORK
The Advocacy Coalition Framework is a conceptual model that explains stability 
and policy changes within a policy subsystem that have occurred over a decade 
or longer (Sabatier, 1993; Sabatier and Weible, 2007; Kim et al., 2008). Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith introduced the framework in the early 1990s, and since its introduc-
tion the model has been applied in many studies (Sabatier and Weible, 2007:190). 
According to Sabatier, the framework has at least four basic premises (Sabatier, 
1993:16): 
[…] (1) that to understand the process of policy change – and the role of policy-oriented 
learning therein – requires a decade or more; (2) that the most useful way to think about 
policy change over such a time span is through a focusing on ”policy’ subsystems”, that 
is, the interaction of actors from different institutions who follow and seek to influence 
governmental policy decisions in a policy area; (3) that those subsystems must include an 
The ACf and social capital: 
a theoretical lens 
Noor BW 7.indd   21 08-09-10   12:07
THE ACF  AND SOCIAL  CAP ITAL :  A  THEORET ICAL  LENS  
22
intergovernmental dimension, that is, they must include all levels of government (at least 
for domestic policy); and (4) that public policies (or programs) can be conceptualized in 
the same manner as belief systems, that is, as sets of value priorities and causal assump-
tions about how to realize them.
 The Advocacy Coalition Framework emphasises shared ‘belief systems’ as the core 
drivers behind coalitions, the ‘role of information and learning’ as a motivator of 
policy change, and the role of the ‘policy broker’ in mediating between conflicting 
coalitions (Sabatier, 1999; Schlager and Blomquist 1996). The following figure pres-
ents Sabatier’s general overview of the framework (Sabatier and Weible, 2007:202): 
The central line of reasoning underlying the model is that policy making occurs 
among specialists within policy subsystems (right box, figure 1), but that the 
behaviour of specialists is affected by factors in the broader political and socio-
economic system (left boxes). Relatively stable parameters (left upper box), such 
as fundamental socio-cultural values, affect external events (left lower box), such 
as changes in public opinion. The relatively stable parameters also affect the long-
term coalition opportunity structures (central upper box), i.e. the institutional 
structures that provide windows for coalition formation. For instance, basic con-
stitutional rules shape the institutional structures (e.g. degree of consensuality of 
the democratic system), which in turn impact opportunities for coalition forma-
tion. Both the long-term coalition opportunity structures and the external events 
yield short-term constraints and resources of actors (central lower box), which in 
turn affect the policy subsystem. The elements (boxes) of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework will be further elaborated upon in the following sections. 
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Figure 1. Advocacy Coalition Framework, Sabatier and Weible, 2007:202
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Sabatier et al. argue that ‘policy making in any political system or policy subsystem 
is affected by a variety of social, legal and resource features of the society of which 
it is part’ (Sabatier, 2007:191). These features can be relatively stable parameters or 
more dynamic external events. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith recognise four stable 
parameters, namely (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993:20): 
1. Basic attributes of the problem area (or ‘good’). Various characteristics of 
goods, such as excludability, affect institutional (policy) options. As Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith argue (ibid, p.20): ‘For example, ocean fisheries and large 
underground aquifers give rise to common pool problems that markets can-
not deal with efficiently and that make them candidates for government 
regulation (Ostrom, 1990).’ 
2. Basic distribution of natural resources. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (ibid, p. 
21) note that: ‘The distribution of natural resources strongly affects a society’s 
overall wealth and the viability of different economic sectors, many aspects 
of its culture, and the feasibility of options in many policy areas.’ 
3. Fundamental cultural values and social structure. A country’s dominant cul-
tural values and social structure affect policy options. Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (ibid, p.21) explain this parameter by stating that, for instance, ‘large-
scale nationalisation of the means of production is a viable policy option in 
many European countries, but not in the United States.’
4. Basic legal structure. In most political systems, basic legal norms are quite 
resistant to change and affect the extent of policy-oriented learning, and 
thus change. 
 
The external events that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith distinguish are: 
1. Socio-economic conditions and technology. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(ibid, p.22) contend that: ‘Changes in these areas can substantially affect a 
subsystem, either by undermining the causal assumptions of present poli-
cies or by significantly altering the political support of various advocacy co-
alitions.’ 
2. Changes in public opinion (this parameter has been added in more recent 
publications, e.g. Sabatier and Weible, 2007:202). Swaying public opinion can 
affect the willingness of politicians and policy-makers to make certain deci-
sions. 
3. Systemic governing coalitions. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (ibid, p.22) argue 
that: ‘Changes in the dominant coalition at a given level of government, i.e. 
‘critical elections’ (Burnham 1970), normally require that the same coalition 
controls the chief executive’s office and both houses of legislature. Such 
changes in the system-wide governing coalition are quite rare.’ 
4. Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems. A subsystems is not 
fully autonomous (ibid, p.23); it may be significantly impacted by the deci-
sions and strategies from other policy sectors (e.g. the federal strategy of 
the United States in the 1970s to become ‘energy independent’ substantially 
impacted the policies of some local subsystems). 
 
The relatively stable parameters change within a decade or so and thus rarely 
provide the direct impetus for behavioural or policy change within a policy 
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subsystem (Sabatier and Weible, 2007:193). They are, however, very important in 
establishing the overall socio-economic context within which subsystems must 
operate; a more wealthy society, for instance, may have more resources for a cer-
tain policy than a less prosperous society. The relatively stable parameters more 
directly affect the long-term coalition opportunity structures. Long-term coalition 
opportunity structures are determined by the relatively stable parameters in the 
sense that fundamental values and basic constitutional structures provide a basic 
set of (e.g. legal and ethical) rules for coalition formation. For instance, in West-
minster democratic systems, where decision making is rather centralised, there 
may be less incentives to form a coalition. In addition, the relatively stable pa-
rameters affect external events because basic socio-economic structures, values 
and legislation may contribute to the cause of an external event. For instance, the 
rules of a financial system may contribute to a crisis within the financial system. 
Whereas stable parameters generally are not a direct incentive for policy change, 
external events can shift agendas, focus public attention and attract the attention of 
key decision makers (Sabatier and Weible, 2007:199). The most important effect of 
external shocks to the system is the redistribution of resources or the opening and 
closing of venues within a policy subsystem, which can lead to the replacement 
of a dominant coalition by another coalition (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
Several external events may take place simultaneously and together form a strong 
driver for the reallocation of resources and subsequently put pressure on existing 
policy subsystems. For instance, when the internet bubble burst, it affected the 
opinion of professionals and the public about investments in the emerging inter-
net economy and subsequently also the allocation of (financial) resources. This, 
in turn, affected the existing policy beliefs on internet-based economic models. 
As a set of variables that affects the subsystem and its constraints and resources, 
the long-term coalition opportunity structures have not always been part of the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework. This category of variables was added to the 
model in 2007 by Sabatier and Weible (2007:1999) to address the criticism that 
the model was too much of an American pluralist product with empirical origins. 
The coalition opportunity structures mediate between stable system parameters 
and the subsystem and consist of two variables (based upon Lijphart, 1999), 
namely: ‘degree of consensus needed for major policy change’ and ‘openness of 
the political system’. In general, the higher the degree of consensus required, 
the more incentive coalitions have to be inclusive (rather than exclusive), to seek 
compromise and share information with opponents and generally to minimise 
devil shift.15 The argument holds that in centralised corporate regimes (contrary 
to more decentralised countries), participation is restricted to a small number of 
central authorities. To summarize (Sabatier and Weible, 2007:200), pluralist coali-
tion opportunity structures tend to have moderate compromise norms and open-
15 A devil shift is, according to Sabatier and Weible (2007:194), ‘the tendency for actors to view 
their opponents as less trustworthy, more evil and more powerful than they probably are’ 
(see also Sabatier, Hunter, and McLaughlin, 1987 and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999).
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decision systems. Westminster systems tend to have weak compromise norms 
and relatively restricted participation norms. 
The short-term constraints and resources of the subsystem actors affect the dynam-
ics within the subsystem in the sense that constraints may hamper, and a certain 
resource allocation may support or hinder, a certain policy change. Although most 
research focuses on the operationalisation of the content of the belief systems 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007:201), Sewell (2005) and Weible (2005) have explored 
possible coalition resources. Based on these explorations, Sabatier and Weible 
(2007:201) present a typology of policy-relevant resources that actors can use to 
influence public policy. The six types of resources they distinguish are: formal le-
gal authority to make policy decisions, (supportive) public opinion, information, 
mobilisable troops (members of the attentive public who share the beliefs of the 
actor), financial resources and skilful leadership. However, Sabatier and Weible 
argue that even though these resources can be conceptualised rather easily, op-
erationalising them and then aggregating them across resource types has proven 
to be extraordinarily difficult (2007:203-4).
Within the policy subsystems, actors can be aggregated into a number of advocacy 
coalitions composed of people from various governmental and private organisa-
tions who share a set of normative and casual beliefs and who often act in concert 
(Sabatier and Jenkins, 1993:18). According to Sabatier et al. (Sabatier and Weible, 
2007), the set of policy participants includes not only the traditional ‘iron triangle’ 
of legislators (Heclo 1978; Kingdon 1995), agency officials and interest-group 
leaders, but also scholars and journalists who specialise in specific policy areas. 
At a certain moment in time, several coalitions adopt a strategy envisaging one 
or more institutional changes that members feel will progress policy objectives. 
Conflicting strategies from various coalitions are normally mediated by a third 
group of actors – termed ‘policy brokers’ by Sabatier – whose main concern is to 
reach a compromise that will reduce conflict within the subsystem. These social 
processes result in decisions by government authorities that yield specific rules, 
resource allocations and appointments, which, in turn, produce policy outputs at 
the operational level. These outputs have a variety of impacts on the identified 
problems as well as various side effects. 
Sabatier and Weible (2007:194) underline several fundamental assumptions regard-
ing the interaction between actors of the policy subsystem. Firstly, they stress the 
difficulty of changing normative beliefs and the ‘tendency for actors to relate to the 
world through a set of perceptual filters composed of pre-existing beliefs that are 
difficult to alter.’ According to Sabatier and Weible, actors from different coalitions 
are likely to perceive the same information in very different ways, leading to distrust. 
Actors tend to view their opponents as less reliable, more evil and more influential 
than they probably are, a phenomenon Sabatier and Weible call the ‘devil shift’ 
(ibid, p. 194). This, in turn, intensifies ties with members of the same coalition and 
exacerbates conflict across competing coalitions. The framework conceptualises a 
three-tiered hierarchical belief structure. At the broadest level are deep core beliefs, 
very general normative and ontological assumptions, for instance, about the prior-
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ity of fundamental values such as liberty and equality. At the next level are policy 
core beliefs, which, for example, entail beliefs regarding the proper role of gov-
ernment. The third level consists of secondary beliefs that are relatively narrow in 
scope, and address, for instance, detailed rules and budgetary applications within 
a specific programme. Although normative beliefs are very resistant to change,16 
Sabatier et al. (ibid, p. 204) argue that internal shocks to the subsystem (e.g. a major 
corruption incident) in particular may substantially affect policy beliefs. 
The process of policy change is iterative in the sense that the implemented policy 
may impact external events and this, in turn, will impact the constraints and re-
sources of the subsystem actors and the dynamics within the policy subsystem. 
For instance, a certain policy impact (e.g. limited reduction of carbon emission) 
may affect public opinion (e.g. attention to effectiveness of environmental policy 
instruments) and this, in turn, may affect the constraints and resources of sub-
system actors (e.g. investments in new environmental programmes) and subse-
quently the policy subsystem (change of policy priorities). 
2.2 THE ADVOCACy COALITION MODEL AND JOINED-UP 
ICT INNOVATIONS
Although Sabatier’s model explains the occurrence of policy change in the public 
sector, it goes far to clarify the occurrence of joined-up ICT innovations in govern-
ment as well. ICT innovation can be perceived as a specific type of policy change, 
namely the development of a programme to apply a new information and/or 
communication technology and the implementation of the new technology.17 
Moreover, the central premises of the Advocacy Coalition Framework can be found 
in literature on ICT innovation. Perez (2003), for instance, contends that the pro-
cess and impact of ICT innovations can only be studied if the technology has been 
introduced, developed and implemented for at least some decades – a hypothesis 
that is in line with Sabatier’s first basic premise (see previous section).18 Other basic 
premises can be traced back to innovation literature as well. For example, there is 
a rapidly growing body of literature which points to the diversity of stakeholders 
involved in government innovation processes (see, for example, Peled, 2001; Loos, 
2006; Termeer, 2006; Thaens, Bekkers and Van Duivenboden, 2006). This finding is 
in line with the second and third premise of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 
which argue that policy change should be perceived through policy subsystems 
in which various actors from different institutions and levels of government par-
16 Sabatier and Weible (2007) argue that deep core and policy belief are more resistant to 
change than secondary beliefs, which are much narrower.
17 See also Considine, M. et al. (2009): ‘We have considered innovation to be a characteristic 
form of policy development and governance, […].’
18 Perez argues that institutionalised behaviour and structure change slowly. New institutional-
ism claims that radical transformation only occurs as a result of comprehensive external 
shocks, performance crises or large gaps between existing structures and underlying reali-
ties. 
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ticipate. The last premise of the Advocacy Coalition Framework – that policy can 
be conceptualised as belief systems (a set of value priorities and assumptions on 
how to realise them) – can in particular be found in literature on culture and inno-
vation. Various studies perceive certain institutional innovations (e.g. new public 
management reforms) as a cultural phenomenon, in other words as a reflection of 
the socio-cultural values of the actors involved in the innovation process (see for 
instance Schedler and Proeller, 2007, but also Rogers, 1995). 
In addition, various socio-economic parameters identified by Sabatier have been 
recognised in innovation literature. Rogers (1995:222) speaks of the perceived 
attributes of innovation as a parameter for innovation adoption. According to 
Rogers, perceived attributes of innovation, such as relative advantage, compat-
ibility and complexity, are among the variables that determine the innovation 
adoption rate. This is largely in line with the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s as-
sumption that basic attributes of the problem (or policy) area affect policy options 
and subsequent change. The influence of fundamental cultural values and social 
structures (the third parameter of the framework) on innovation processes has 
in particular been described in innovation adoption literature (e.g. Waarts and 
Everdingen, 2005; Erumban and De Jong, 2006; Steers et al., 2008). Several scien-
tists have argued that innovation adoption depends on a country’s fundamental 
cultural values. The fourth parameter of the framework – the basic legal structure 
– can also be found in innovation literature. Legislation as obstruction to innova-
tion is mentioned by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000:34) who argue that innovation 
may require a change of existing legislation, which takes time and could thus form 
an obstacle to innovation.
Finally, several of the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s external events have been 
mentioned as determining variables by innovation scientists. Pollitt and Bouck-
aert (2000:25-7), for instance, mention socio-economic forces (the first external 
event identified by Sabatier et al.) as dominant variables for innovation.19 Entman 
(1997) comprehensively describes the effects media and changes in public opin-
ion may have on innovation processes – the second external event of the frame-
work. In addition, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) mention pressure from citizens as 
an event which may affect innovation processes. Pollitt and Bouckaert (ibid, p. 
31) also recognise changes to systemic coalitions – the third external event – as 
an important factor that may influence (institutional) innovation processes. They 
contend that political parties have certain ideas that may affect the direction, de-
velopment or implementation of an innovation. For example, a party may decide 
to reduce bureaucracy through institutional innovation. In conclusion, almost all 
premises and parameters of the Advocacy Coalition Framework can be found in 
innovation literature. 
 
An important reason to use the Advocacy Coalition Framework to analyse innova-
tion processes is that it adds value to existing innovation literature. This added 
19 Considine, M. et al., (2009:30) also point to several external pressures for innovation, includ-
ing socio-economic changes. 
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value is threefold, namely: (1) the integration of the above-mentioned variables 
into one model, (2) the intergovernmental dimension and (3) the focus on the 
social dynamics in the subsystem. Whereas other theories use a limited set of 
variables and therefore are merely capable of explaining part of the change pro-
cess, the Advocacy Coalition Framework tries to capture all (whether sociological, 
political or economic) variables and thereby provide a full picture of factors that 
determine the change process. Furthermore, the focus of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework is on intergovernmental interaction and therefore formal institutional 
borders of organisations do not constrain the explanation of the occurrence of 
change (as is the case in other theories). The Advocacy Coalition Framework uses 
a network perspective and is therefore able to reveal the effect of interaction be-
tween actors from different agencies on the occurrence of change. And, the third 
added value of the model is that social dynamics in subsystems is the central fac-
tor to explain change – a factor that is mentioned in innovation literature though 
it does not play a central role in it (see Edelenbos and Klijn, 2007:27, for example). 
2.3 LIMITATIONS Of THE ADVOCACy COALITION 
fRAMEwORK
Even though the Advocacy Coalition Framework has proven to be very valuable 
for studying change in policy networks, it has also received some fundamental 
criticism (see the comprehensive review by Kim and Roh, 2008). Firstly, several 
scholars, such as Maloney et al. (1994), argue that the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work fails to distinguish more important from less important actors in a given 
policy area because it ignores the distinction between insiders and outsiders in 
coalitions. In addition, the Advocacy Coalition Framework does not account for 
the possibility that a policy domain may be structured by harmonious relation-
ships among participants, as the iron triangle (a popular concept which shows the 
solid relationships among congressional committees, government agencies and 
interest groups) and policy community concepts (stable and close relationships 
among policy actors) demonstrate.20 
Fundamental criticism was also voiced by Schlager (1995) who contends that the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework fails to identify ‘collective action’ problems. Even 
in cases in which members of the subsystem face substantial conflicts of interest, 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework assumes highly coordinated actions of the 
coalition members. Kim et al. (2008:657) argue that: ‘Members of a coalition may 
not share the same benefits or the same costs, thus they may experience conflict 
in deciding on their collective action.’ In addition Kim et al. (ibid, p. 657) argue that 
‘even though the actors in a coalition cooperate over time, the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework ignores the factors that lead coalition members to coordinate their 
activities. As some scholars have indicated, coordinated behaviour among policy 
20 See, for example, Marsh, (1998) and Rhodes, (1990). As the term ‘community’ implies, the 
relationships are best characterised by closed village communities knitted together by such 
things as confidence and common calculations. 
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actors may require preconditions such as shared norms, mutual trust, respect and 
interdependency.’21 
 
Lastly, several scientists argue that by focusing on belief systems the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework disregards coalitions between actors with different beliefs 
systems (Kim et al., 2008). The hierarchy of belief systems in the framework implies 
that there cannot be a coalition between two subsystem members who do not 
share deep core and policy core beliefs. However, empirical studies yield various 
examples of coalitions consisting of members with different belief systems. Re-
search conducted by Cairney (1997), for instance, demonstrates that both femi-
nists and conservative politicians – who did not share deep core beliefs - joined 
a coalition to regulate the availability of pornography (see also Hann, 1995). In 
addition, Kim et al. argue that: ‘Major issues among coalitions may lie in secondary 
aspects of beliefs, not in their deep core or policy core beliefs.’ In cases in which 
actors share deep core and/or policy beliefs, they may still join different coalitions 
due to differences in secondary beliefs. For instance, when governmental agen-
cies and material interest groups are involved, deep core beliefs may not be stable 
enough to guide the selection of policy core and secondary beliefs. Involved par-
ties may perceive their policy interests as more important than their core beliefs 
(e.g. see Knoke and Pappi, 1996 and Laumann and Knoke, 1987). 
 
In reviewing the three main limitations of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, it 
becomes clear that the most fundamental criticism concerns the design of the 
policy subsystem (see right box in figure 1 of section 2.1), and, more specifically, 
the ‘policy arena’. By depicting three key elements of the policy arena – namely, 
coalitions, belief systems and brokers – the Advocacy Coalition Framework does 
not do justice to the complexity of the interpersonal relationships within the actor 
network. The character of the relationships between actors, the mechanisms of 
mutual influence and the flow of resources between actors remain unclear when 
using the Advocacy Coalition Framework – despite the fact that several scientists 
have proven the crucial effect of relational features, such as the strength of the 
relationships, group closure and mutual trust (e.g. Granovetter, 1973; Portes, 
1998; Coleman, 1988). This is exactly the field in which social capital theory has 
explanatory value. Social capital theory reveals the flow of resources between 
actors based on formal and informal interpersonal relationships within a certain 
network of actors. In social capital theory, the focus is not on coalitions but on 
interpersonal connections between actors who may participate in and withdraw 
from multiple coalitions. It is not the values and interaction of coalition partners 
that is central but the values and interactions of individuals. In other words, the 
social capital theory looks at group dynamics from a more micro level than the 
advocacy coalition theory and therefore may contribute to a further explanation 
of policy processes. The following section will outline social capital theory. 
21 See, for example, Fenger, M. and P. Klok, (2001).
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Proposition 1: Social capital theory can substantially enrich the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework in the sense that it reveals the effect of network characteristics and dy-
namics on the innovation process. 
2.4 THE ORIGINS Of SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social capital has become an established concept in social research in the last two 
decades (e.g. Westlund, 2006; Castiglione et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2008). Although 
its early theoretical focus was on sociology, over time it has been applied to vari-
ous other scholarly disciplines, such as politics and economics (Castiglione et al., 
2008:1). In politics, the focus of study has been primarily on the effects of social 
capital on political participation and institutional performance (e.g. Putnam, 1993 
and 2000). For example, in various political studies, social capital is seen as a way 
to predict or assess political performance. The economic research largely focuses 
on the effects of cooperation between economic agents and more generally 
the reduction of transaction costs (e.g. Becker, 1974; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; 
Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Seen in economic terms, social capital is an input of the 
production function; it has the capacity to (positively or negatively) influence the 
total productivity factor (Castiglione et al., 2008:7). In the social sciences, many 
studies have been carried out on the relation between social capital, social co-
hesiveness, community support and life satisfaction (e.g. Warren, 2001; Hooghe, 
2008). In these studies, the notion of social capital is interpreted more normatively 
in the sense that social capital is perceived as a positive aspect of society that 
needs to be stimulated to enhance citizens’ (social) quality of life. 
The broad application of the notion has resulted in multiple definitions and inter-
pretations of the concept. In fact, scholars still disagree on the precise meaning 
of the concept (Castiglione, 2008:13). The term itself, or equivalent alternatives, 
increasingly appeared from the 1950s onwards (Seely et al., 1956; Jacobs, 1961; 
Loury, 1977). Jane Jacobs, for instance, mentioned the term in her 1961 book The 
Death and Life of Great American Cities while referring to the value of a network 
of human relationships within cities or neighbourhoods, which provides mutual 
support, ensures safety and fosters a sense of civic responsibility. However, she 
did not explicitly explain or define social capital. One of the first comprehensive 
formulations of the notion of social capital was provided by Pierre Bourdieu (1983), 
who distinguishes between three forms of capital: economic, cultural and social 
capital. He defines social capital as (ibid, p. 248): ‘The aggregate of the actual or 
potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more 
or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or 
in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members 
with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a credential which entitles 
them to credit, in the various senses of the word.’ 
 
Bourdieu perceives social capital as the whole of durable social connections of an 
individual and the potential benefits that could be gained through those social 
connections (such as access to finance, knowledge and power). However, sev-
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eral scholars confronted Bourdieu’s definition with the work of Granovetter (e.g. 
1973, 1974) who demonstrated that the strength (or durability) of ties is variable. 
Granovetter stated in his article ‘The strength of Weak Ties’ that ‘most network 
models deal, implicitly, with strong ties, thus confining their applicability to 
small, well-defined groups’ (Granovetter, 1973:1360). He defines the strength of an 
interpersonal tie as ‘a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the 
emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding) and the reciprocal services 
which characterise the tie. Each of these components of the strength of a tie is 
somewhat independent of the other, though the set is highly interrelated’ (ibid, p. 
1361). He argues that weak ties are more likely to link members of different small 
groups than strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups. 
‘Intuitively speaking […] whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger number 
of people, and traverse greater social distance, when passed through weak ties 
rather than strong ties’ (ibid, p. 1366). 
Coleman’s work is also frequently cited in that respect. He focuses on the social 
structure of relationships (Portes 1998:2-3) and defines social capital as (Coleman 
1988:98 and 1990:302): ‘A variety of entities with two elements in common: they 
all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of 
actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure.’ In his first es-
say on social capital, Coleman examined the role of social capital in the creation of 
human capital. He studied the possible use of social capital for the acquisition of 
educational credentials. However, Portes (1998:5-6), who compared several defini-
tions and applications of social capital by leading scholars, stated that Coleman’s 
definition of social capital fails to clearly distinguish between ‘(a) the possessor of 
social capital, (b) the sources of social capital and (c) the resources’, and his defini-
tion may therefore lead to confusion regarding the term’s use and scope. More 
generally, Portes (ibid, p. 2-3 and 22) concludes that the use of social capital as an 
umbrella concept encompassing variables that are linked to social capital – such 
as shared values and institutional contexts – may impede a clear-cut operational 
analysis of the mechanisms of social capital and consequently lead to confusion 
regarding its ends and means and/or cause and effect. 
 
A broad interpretation of the term social capital can also be found in the influ-
ential work of Robert Putnam (e.g. 1993 and 2000). In his publications, he refers 
to social capital not only as an individual’s set of social connections, but also as 
specific norms and values – such as trustworthiness, reciprocity, fellowship, sym-
pathy and good will – that can determine relationships between people and the 
merits for a community as a whole that should derive from social connections 
(e.g. Putnam, 2000:19-21). Putnam stretches the term social capital by capturing 
the norms and values and the consequences of personal relationships in the term 
social capital and by considering social capital as both an individual and a social 
asset. Moreover, he does not have a technical and neutral, but normative under-
standing of social capital; the presence of social capital in a society – according to 
his interpretation – will benefit it as a whole in the sense that it is more efficient 
than a distrustful society (ibid, p. 21). In his own words: ‘If we don’t have to balance 
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every exchange instantly, we can get a lot more accomplished. Trustworthiness 
lubricates social life.’
 
However, one could also argue that generalised reciprocity is a collectively shared 
value or belief in helping each other out that prevails in a certain society or not, 
and that may evoke a general feeling of trust, the presence or absence of which 
will obviously affect the well-being of the citizens and the society as a whole. 
But this value can exist independently from social capital interpreted as social 
connections.22 Ties between people can develop out of shared altruistic values, 
such as solidarity, as well as more selfish motivations, or it can be compelled by 
necessity. In other words, the absence of a general feeling of reciprocity does not 
automatically imply that people are not connected. Theoretically, it may well be 
the case that while generalised reciprocity is low in a given society, connected-
ness is simultaneously high, because people’s self-interest forces them to enter 
into certain relationships. 
 
Substantial contributions to an improved understanding of the notion of social 
capital have been provided by Lin (e.g. 2001, 2008). Lin defines social capital as 
(2001:25): ‘Resources embedded in one’s social networks, resources that can be 
accessed or mobilized through ties in the networks.’ Through these kinds of so-
cial connections or through social networks in general, an individual may bor-
row or acquire another individual’s resources, such as their skills, knowledge or 
financial capital (Lin, 2008:51). Subsequently, these cultural, social and/or financial 
resources can generate a return for the actor. In other words, social networks are 
infrastructures with nodes and links, and resources can flow through these links 
(see also Westlund, 2006:6). Elaborating on this, the resources present in the net-
work and the flow of resources depend on the features of the nodes, links and the 
network, the characteristics of which are interrelated. An individual can possess 
certain resources, (such as knowledge) and have a certain position and reputation 
(e.g. Westlund, 2006; Castiglione et al., 2008). A relationship can be strong or weak, 
it can be based on profession or kinship and it can have a certain level of trust, 
shared norms and beliefs. And a network can be characterised by density, coali-
tions, broker’s positions or value systems. Lin’s definition (2008:51) will be used for 
the present research as his formulation provides the most clear-cut and neutral 
understanding of the notion of social capital, thereby facilitating a straightfor-
ward operationalisation of the concept. 
2.5 THE INfLUENCE Of SOCIAL CAPITAL ON INNOVATION 
PROCESSES
In recent decades, many scientists have linked social capital theory to the occur-
rence of innovations (Porter, 1990; Fountain, 1997; Rutten, 2007; Partanen, 2008; 
Hulsink et al., 2008; Considine et al., 2009). Most scholarly contributions can 
22 The term bounded solidarity is also used to refer to generalized reciprocity within a certain 
society. See, for example, Portes (1998:8) and Coleman (1990:273-82).
Noor BW 7.indd   32 08-09-10   12:07
THE ACF  AND SOCIAL  CAP ITAL :  A  THEORET ICAL  LENS  
33
be found in private sector literature. In the 1980s, several scholars stressed the 
emergence of spatial clusters and regional innovation systems, pointing out that 
functioning innovation networks are significant for national successes in a world 
of increased globalisation and competition (e.g. Lundvall 1992; Freeman, 1987; 
Porter, 1990). Castells (1996:419-21) also emphasised the importance of communi-
cation networks in shaping new ‘milieux of innovation’. Rutten et al. (2007) argue 
that since innovation is increasingly a network effort, embeddedness and social 
capital help to explain how and why regional networks of innovating companies 
are successful. According to Rutten et al. (2007:1838), it makes sense to speak 
about regional innovation systems, ‘since ‘geographies of knowledge’ show that 
it is more effective to exchange tacit forms of knowledge in face-to-face relations 
and that spatial proximity is helpful for face-to-face relations.’ However, Florida 
(2002:273) contends that social capital theory provides little explanation for re-
gional innovation growth. He argues that ‘both the human capital and the cre-
ative capital theories are much better at accounting for such growth.’ Yet, Florida 
(ibid, p. 277) recognises that weak ties are ‘critical to the creative environment of 
a city or region because they facilitate the rapid entry of new people and rapid 
absorption of new ideas.’ 
One particular sector which received much scholarly attention is the biotechnology 
industry (e.g. Powell, 1996; Fountain 1997; Traore et al., 2003; Gay et al., 2005; Noot-
eboom, 2006; Casper, 2007; Stuart et al., 2007). Powell et al. (1996) were among the 
first to apply a social network approach to analyse the emergence of collabora-
tion and competition in the biotechnology sector. The central premise emerging 
from the empirical findings of Powell et al. is that in many of the biotechnology 
industries, today’s networks of inter-firm collaboration are characterised by cycles 
of mutual learning. Hulsink et al. (2008:18) argue that: ‘Collaboration allows the 
firms to carry out research and development and create new alternatives, while 
simultaneously mitigating the costs, risks and problems associated with such an 
exploration route.’ By exchanging, sharing and assimilating expertise and experi-
ence, these biotechnology firms continuously enhance their absorptive capacity 
(ibid, p.16). Fountain (1997) demonstrated the effect of social capital on innovation 
by describing two case studies: the US biotechnology sector and Silicon Valley. 
According to Fountain, social capital – in the form of linkages between people of 
different organisations – enhances innovation in the sense that these networked 
organisations have a more efficient use of human and technical resources than 
organisations with a low level of social capital (Fountain 1997). 
Another area which received specific attention is the small and medium business 
sector (Davenpoort, 2005; Partanen, 2008; Hulsink et al., 2008, Zeng et al., 2010). 
Several scholars have recognised an efficient and effective use of social networks 
as a key driver in the production and implementation of innovations by small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). Hulsink et al. (2008) argue that particularly in SMEs, 
innovation processes transcend the boundaries of a firm. They state that (ibid, 
p.3): ‘External parties may be sources of inspiration and/or they may contribute to 
the implementation of innovations. Many SMEs have insufficient organisational 
resources, knowledge or capabilities to develop innovations by themselves.’ These 
Noor BW 7.indd   33 08-09-10   12:07
THE ACF  AND SOCIAL  CAP ITAL :  A  THEORET ICAL  LENS  
34
are – according to Hulsing et al. – all reasons why smaller firms may seek col-
laboration with larger parties. Several scholars (e.g. Westlund et al., 2008) point 
to the role of universities in stimulating innovation and their cooperation with 
regional businesses (such as SMEs) and government. In addition, theories such as 
the ‘Triple Helix’ emerged, which emphasises knowledge transfer within society 
(e.g. Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000). The triple helix concept is a spiral model of 
innovation, based on social processes, proximity and learning rather than purely 
technical and economic factors (Doloreux and Parto, 2004). The overall premise of 
the theory is that universities need to become flexible institutions that can meet 
changing demands by active participation in collaborative networks. 
More recently, social capital theory and social network analyses have been in-
creasingly applied to public sector innovation (Martin, 2000; Borins, 2001; Walker 
et al., 2004; Huijboom, 2005; Walker, 2007; Considine et al., 2009). In his study of 
innovation strategies in Australian local government, Martin (2000:9), for instance, 
describes how networks facilitate the building of trust and free flow of informa-
tion between actors of separate organisations. Martin (ibid, p.9) contends that 
networks ‘play a role in mitigating environmental uncertainty and promoting 
social learning of adaptive responses among linked organisations.’ Walker (2007:6) 
demonstrates how government practitioners have access to proven ideas and 
strategies through their professional networks, which use of their network stimu-
lates the development and diffusion of innovation. Borins (2001:317) contends that 
innovation diffusion is greatly stimulated by inter- and intra-organisational learn-
ing through conference attendance, workshops and other knowledge-sharing 
platforms. The book of Considine et al. (2009) provides a comprehensive insight 
into networks, innovation and public policy. They argue that networks are crucial 
to innovation and more important than other variables that could be expected to 
impact innovation substantially. According to Considine et al., networks provide a 
viable and robust way of describing and understanding the links between struc-
tural and individual elements of the innovation. 
In reviewing all the studies, it appears that most studies agree on two aspects, 
namely (1) that there is a relation between the presence of social capital and the 
innovativeness of (networks of ) organisations and (2) that – unfortunately – re-
search show highly contradictory results regarding the precise impact of social 
capital. The contradictory results are often attributed to the macro level on which 
social capital is studied or the lack of operationalisation of the notion. Kasaa 
(2007:27), for instance, argues that different research results can be explained by 
the lack of distinction between various dimensions of social capital (e.g. trust, 
norms and ties). Franke (2005:5-6) argues that social capital theory risks losing its 
explanatory power when there is not a proper distinction between the various 
dimensions. Nooteboom (2007:29) concludes that the concepts of and the rela-
tions between social capital, institutions and trust are riddled with ambiguity and 
confusion. Dolfsma et al. (2009) argue that the concept of social capital remains a 
black box since the mechanisms that constitute it remain underdeveloped. Con-
sequently, to increase the understanding of social capital impact on innovation 
processes, the following sections categorize and elaborate on the five dominant 
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network and tie characteristics (closure versus openness, strong versus weak ties, 
heterogeneity versus homogeneity, broker’s position and low- versus high-trust 
relationships) and subsequent mechanisms described in literature. 
2.5.1 Network closure
In his study, Bourdieu (1983) emphasises on the social capital of elite groups and 
the closure of groups.23 He argues that networks are the product of an endless 
effort of order to produce and reproduce lasting, useful relationships that can 
secure material or symbolic profits (Bourdieu, 1983:249-50): 
The network of relationships is the product of investment strategies of the individual 
or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social 
relationships that are at once necessary and elective, implying durable obligations sub-
jectively felt (feelings of gratitude, respect, friendship, etc.) or institutionally guaranteed 
(rights). Through the introduction of new members into a family, a clan, or a club, the 
whole definition of the group, i.e. its fines, its boundaries and its identity, is put at stake, 
exposed to redefinition alteration, adulteration. 
Bourdieu argues that networks are selective in adopting new members into the 
group, that networks try to bring together individuals that are as homogeneous 
as possible in all the pertinent respects in terms of the existence and persistence 
of the group. 
 
Several scholars argue that mechanisms of group closure affect the innovative 
capacity of a group. In private sector innovation literature this has been frequently 
referred to as a lock-in effect (e.g. Uzzi, 1997; Kaiser, 2003; Hulsing, 2008; and Van 
der Vliest, 2009). Hulsink (2008:5-6), for instance, argues that network closure can 
be seen as a less positive side of the networks as organisations can cause a lock-in 
in the sense that they have limited access to new ideas and strategies. Uzzi (1997) 
referred to the disadvantages of the over-embeddedness of relationships, namely 
that firms may have limited access to new knowledge and hence find it harder 
to adapt to new circumstances. Van der Vliest et al. (2009:217), who studied in-
novation management in the construction industry, came to the conclusion that 
group closure may hamper the diffusion of innovations. For instance, a manager 
who is strongly tied to a cohesive group of peers may be less able to adapt his or 
her communication network to change and thus influence innovation diffusion. 
Also in public sector literature, several scholars refer to mechanisms of group 
closure (Teske et al., 1994; Newman et al., 2001; Considine et al., 2009). Teske et al. 
(1994) investigated bureaucratic entrepreneurship within the United States local 
government and Newman et al. (2001) examined innovation in local governments 
in the United Kingdom. Both studies suggest that networks may have a constrain-
23 Group closure can be as much of a network mechanism as group openness. Density or 
weakness of ties and networks are characteristics of a tie or network. However as the group 
closure mechanism is more frequently mentioned to have an impact on innovation, it will be 
the focus of this section. 
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ing influence by encouraging conformity to dominant perceptions of appropriate 
behaviour, and thus patterns of connectedness can explain roadblocks impeding 
change (see also Considine, 2009:56). Overall, scholars argue that in the case of 
group closure the interaction between members of the group and members of 
other groups is limited, which also restricts the exchange of new ideas, paradigms 
and knowledge. The mechanisms of confirmation, reproduction and consolida-
tion of existing values, norms and ideas within a group imply a limited stimulus 
for alteration and thus a low degree of innovativeness. 
 
However, several academics argue that group closure may not only hamper, but 
also stimulate innovation. Van der Vliest et al. (2009:217), for instance, argue that 
network closure may enable the diffusion of innovation. Rogers (1995:241) identi-
fied the compatibility of an innovation with the norms and values of an actor as 
an important factor enabling the adoption of the innovation. When an innovation 
is highly compatible with the strong values and beliefs of a closed community, 
it is likely to diffuse quickly within the community. In addition, once the pater 
familias, or the opinion leader, of a closed group has adopted an innovation, the 
speed of the diffusion within the group can be high because of the reproduction 
mechanisms within the group. 
That norms and belief systems play an important role in government innovation 
is confirmed by Considine et al. (2009)) and Martin (2000). Martin (2000:9), for in-
stance, states that local governments ‘pay more attention to the way neighbour-
ing, and similar local governments address new issues than to benchmarking and 
reviewing their own process in isolation’ (see also Considine 2009:54). By observ-
ing comparable agencies, government practitioners create a frame of references 
through which they assess the relevance, appropriateness and actions needed for 
certain innovations. Newman (2001:65-67) et al. refer to this mechanism as they 
describe how informal values, beliefs systems or prevailing ‘logics of appropriate-
ness’ institutionalised, which in turn shaped the behaviour of members and prac-
titioners of local governments. Yet, the effects of these institutionalised norms on 
innovation were not uniform (see also Considine, 2009:55).
More clarity about the mechanism of group closure – or it opposite group open-
ness – and its impact on the innovation process can be gained by using the 
logic of Lin’s argumentation (1986, 1990, 1992). According to Lin, the question of 
whether a network’s openness or closure can generate access to resources or help 
accomplish a certain goal (e.g. innovation) depends on prevailing interests (Lin, 
2001:27). Lin argues that (ibid, p.27):
For preserving or maintaining resources (i.e. expressive actions), denser networks may 
have a relative advantage. Thus, for the privileged class, it would be better to have a closed 
network so that resources can be preserved and reproduced (e.g. Bourdieu 1983/1986) or 
better for a mother to move to a cohesive community so that her children’s security and 
safety can be assured (Coleman 1990). On the other hand, for searching and obtaining 
resources not presently in people’s possession (i.e., instrumental actions), such as looking 
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for a job or a better job (e.g. Lin, Marsden, Flap, Burt), accessing and extending bridges in 
the network should be more useful. 
Building on Lin’s argumentation, group closure and group openness can both 
stimulate and hamper the innovation process, depending on the specific innova-
tion goal at a given moment in time. 
 
Proposition 2: Group closure encourages the reproduction of ideas and hence pro-
vides limited access to new ideas and strategies and limits the creation of innovations. 
Proposition 3: Group closure stimulates the diffusion of innovations that are highly 
compatible with the norms and values of the closed group.
2.5.2 Strength of the ties
The question of whether weak or strong ties enhance innovation is also quite con-
troversial and often related to the discussion about open and closed networks 
(e.g. Kaasa, 2007; Hulsink et al., 2008; Considine, 2009). The difference between the 
two, however, is that whereas the strength or weakness of a tie refers to the inten-
sity of a relationship between two people, the closure or openness of a group says 
something about the culture inside a group. Closure or openness is embedded in 
the attitude of its group’s members, which, in turn, is based on the group’s values 
and norms. Hofstede (1991:188-91) identified six dimensions of culture, one of 
which is open versus closed systems. In the open system, members consider both 
the group and its people open to newcomers and outsiders; almost anyone would 
fit into the group, and new members soon feel comfortable within the group. In 
the closed system, people seem closed and reserved; only specific people fit into 
the group, and more than a year is needed for new members to become fully 
fledged members. Depending on the extent to which the culture of a group is 
open or closed, members are more or less open to deviant ideas and newcomers 
and have a certain degree of tolerance towards people’s otherness. 
The strength of ties, on the other hand, says something about the intensity of the 
relationship between two people, which is a combination of the amount of time 
they spend together, the mutual emotional involvement, the intimacy (mutual 
confiding) and the degree of reciprocity which characterises the tie (Granovet-
ter, 1973:1361). The strength of ties is also referred to as relational embeddedness 
(Hulsink et al., 2008:15). Existing literature distinguishes between relational and 
structural embeddedness; relational embeddedness refers to the characteristics 
of relationships, while structural embededness refers to the structure of the net-
work. Whereas relational embeddedness says something about the strength of 
ties, structural embeddedness may, for instance, refer to centrality or a position 
rich in ‘structural holes’ (see also section 2.5.4). 
 
Most scholars agree that the strength of ties may affect innovation processes (e.g. 
Granovetter, 1973; Ruef, 2002; Kaasa, 2007; Hulsink et al., 2008; Considine, 2009; 
Van der Vliest, 2009). As illustrated before, Granovetter (1973) argues that weak 
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ties extend to a larger number of individuals, and thus innovations can be dif-
fused among a larger number of people when passed through weak rather than 
strong ties. In addition, several scholars argue that weak ties support, enable and 
accelerate information exchange and decrease the cost of information search 
(e.g. Kaasa, 2007). Kasaa (2007:9) argues that weak ties seem particularly beneficial 
when it comes to gaining access to know-how with the help of ‘know who’, i.e. 
information about who knows what (e.g. Gregersen and Johnson, 2001; Lundvall, 
2006). Furthermore, a network of weak ties increases the opportunities for radical 
breakthroughs as it is more likely for unusual combinations of creative ideas and 
thoughts to emerge in these networks (Subramaniam and Youndt, 2005). 
Most of the scholars who emphasise the strength of weak ties in innovation pro-
cesses describe a specific innovation stage, namely the stage of idea creation or 
the spreading of information in the diffusion phase. However, in other innovation 
phases, strong ties may stimulate the innovation process. Burt (1987 and 1999), for 
instance, argues that the formation of a normative understanding of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of an innovation and the decision to purchase and/or 
start using an innovation of a person are (among others) based on the opinion of 
his peers and friends. Peers, because of imitation behaviour (see also Rogers, 1995) 
and cohesion, because of mutual recognition. Consequently, people may more 
easily adopt new ideas, products or ways of working when adopted by someone 
they identify with (e.g. peers and friends) and with whom they often have closer 
ties, as opposed to people they do not identify with. Thus, whereas weak ties may 
stimulate the spreading of information, strong ties may support the actual adop-
tion of the innovation by individuals.
The difference in relevance between strong and weak ties may also depend on 
the degree of uncertainty in the innovation process. Burt (1987), who emphasises 
the influence of peers and friends, studied the adoption of a new drug by general 
practitioners, the precise effects of which were still highly uncertain. As it turns 
out, people are likely to be more autonomous in their decision to adopt it or not 
if it entails a more mature innovation, the impact of which has been underpinned 
by considerable evidence. Similarly, Hulsink et al. (2008:14) argue that strong ties 
are more likely to be useful in situations characterised by high levels of uncer-
tainty and insecurity, for instance radical innovations. In these complex settings, 
individuals rely on close relationships in order to reduce uncertainty. Krackhardt 
(1992) has elaborated on strong ties by arguing that commitment, loyalty and 
friendship within an organisation will be critical to that organisation’s ability to 
deal with disruptive changes, such as a crisis. 
In conclusion, both weak and strong ties can stimulate innovation, depending on 
the innovation stage and the level of uncertainty. In stages where bridges have 
to be built between separate organisations – for instance in the initiation or the 
development phase – and uncertainty about the innovation outcome is high, 
strong ties may positively influence the innovation process. However, in stages 
of information dissemination – for instance when the innovation has to be dif-
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fused – and uncertainty is low, weak ties may have a stimulating effect on the 
innovation process. 
Proposition 4: Weak ties extend to a larger number of individuals, and thus informa-
tion on innovations can be spread among a larger number of people when passed 
through weak rather than strong ties. 
Proposition 5: Strong ties may stimulate the creation and adoption of highly uncer-
tain innovations. 
2.5.3 Heterogeneity of the network
Many contemporary scholars refer to Schumpeter’s work The theory of economic 
development: an inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interests, and the business cycle 
(1934:65-6) in which Schumpeter argues that innovation results from the recombi-
nation of knowledge held by the partners with whom they collaborate (e.g. West-
lund 2006; Considine et al., 2009). Several scholars argue that a certain degree 
of heterogeneity among participants in an innovation is a prerequisite for the 
development of new ideas, approaches or products. In their research on innova-
tions in SMEs, Hulsink et al. (2008:16) found that ‘firms with a more heterogeneous 
mix of partner alliances enjoyed faster revenue growth and tended to obtain 
more patents’ than firms with a more homogenous mix of partners (and were thus 
considered more innovative). Edelenbos et al., (2009:5) also stress the importance 
of a wide variety of contacts. In their publication on collaboration in governance 
networks, they argue that managers with more varied contact with actors in the 
network stand a better chance of achieving a positive outcome. 
Gelauff (2003) and Cohen and Fields (2000) argue that the pervasive presence of 
heterogeneous ties in Silicon Valley is one of the crucial explanatory factors that 
explain Silicon Valley’s great innovative power. Frequent job changes and varying 
alliances enable a fast exchange of information and hence an ongoing rejuve-
nation of ideas and constant acquisition of knowledge. Multi-disciplinary, inter-
sectoral, but also internal exchanges between the operational and top level of 
organisations stimulate the gaining of new insights. For cross-agency innovation 
this would imply that the most innovative joint projects would be undertaken by 
the most heterogeneous forms of cooperation. Considine et al. (2009:191) found 
in their study on innovation in four municipalities that the interpersonal networks 
for seeking advice and strategic information varied across governments by the 
amount of homogeneity displayed. Actors in some municipal governments had a 
higher diversity of ties while actors in other governments were mostly connected 
to people like themselves. Considine et al., however, are not conclusive about the 
effects these differences have on the innovative performance of municipalities. 
Proposition 6: Heterogeneity of the subsystem enhances the innovative capacity of 
the subsystem.
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2.5.4 Broker’s position in the network 
Burt (1992, 1999) underlines the competitive advantages with regard to informa-
tion diffusion that individuals can obtain by having or taking a strategic posi-
tion in a certain social structure. Individuals can act as bridges between diverse 
social groups by having strong ties with people from diverse groups – they can 
bridge structural holes and therefore have access to information that is more 
additive than overlapping (Burt, 1992:25-30). They carry information across the 
social boundaries between groups and thus play a role in brokering information 
between groups. These so-called opinion brokers – are brokers twice over (Burt, 
1999). As Burt explains (ibid, p.11): 
 
Firstly, opinion leaders are brokers in the sense that their influence is between, rather than 
within, groups. Within groups, contagion is by equivalence, not cohesion. Cohesion mat-
ters across groups. […] Second, opinion leaders are brokers in the sense that they are a 
transition between the two network mechanisms responsible for contagion. The two-step 
flow of communication is a compound of two very different network mechanisms; conta-
gion by cohesion through opinion leaders gets information into a group, then contagion 
by equivalence triggers adoption within the group. 
Thus opinion brokers are not leaders within the groups as much as brokers be-
tween groups. 
 
In the past decade, several scholars have discussed the brokerage, not only of in-
formation, but also other resources, such as human capital. Hulsink et al. (2008:15-
6), for instance, mention both knowledge brokerage and human-resource bro-
kerage. They state that centrality in a network can bridge specialised knowledge 
within different groups. In addition, they argue that structural holes allow entre-
preneurs to bring together people who are not yet connected. Another point they 
make is the relative advantage the broker has, as he or she is – more than others 
– able to control and influence information flows and the connecting of people. 
Hulsink et al. also relate the structural hole theory to innovation processes, argu-
ing that: ‘Since new information and the ability to find new knowledge appears 
to be crucial to innovation, the structural hole argument has great potential.’ Van 
der Vliest et al. (2009:213) point to the brokerage of ‘potential adopters’ , arguing 
that those who are able to bridge the gaps between networks are able to get 
their ideas adopted more easily and consequently are better able to spread their 
innovations more rapidly. 
Considine et al. (2009) examined the relation between the position of individuals 
in the network and the extent to which they are perceived to be innovators. They 
construct their premises on the theory that new connections are made based 
on popularity, which is a function of longevity. Considine et al. argue that (ibid, 
p.53) ‘Popularity attracts new ties, so those actors with many connections make 
more new connections than those with fewer links’ – a phenomenon referred to 
a preferential attachment by Barabasi (2002). The question Considine et al. pose 
is whether innovators are popular in networks with many ties or have a limited 
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number of connections that are more strategic. Their empirical evidence shows 
that normalised in-degree centrality for the strategic information network is a 
significant predictor of recognition as an innovator in two of the four cases they 
studied (2009:196). In other words, if you are an innovator then you are probably 
also someone many people approach for strategic information. In addition, Consi-
dine et al. (2009:185) conclude that innovators are not all concentrated in the most 
senior positions in all governments, but are spread across a vaster hierarchy. Thus, 
the hierarchic position seems to matter less than the strategic position within the 
network. 
Edelenbos et al. (2009), who analysed the network management strategies of ‘net-
work managers’, stress that network managers operate in a divided power struc-
ture. They state that (ibid, p.3): ‘From a network perspective, the power of an actor 
depends on the range of resources available to him and the extent to which he 
is dependent on the resources of other actors ( Scharpf, 1978).’ The more involved 
and mutually dependent on each other’s resources actors are, the more equal the 
power division in the network. Elaborating on this, one could argue that – in a 
situation in which people are equally dependent on each other’s resources – the 
power of a person with a central position in the network (e.g. through bridging 
structural holes) is greater than of a person with a less central position in the net-
work, since the central person has access to more additive resources. However, 
Edelenbos et al. note that (ibid, p.3) – even in situations of unequal power division 
(e.g. unequal dependency and/or centrality of certain actors), powerful actors 
have limited authority as they do not have ‘direct authority regarding the way 
other actors use their resources.’ 
In conclusion, bridging positions may impact the innovation process in the case of 
joint innovations. Opinion brokers can stimulate the exchange of knowledge, the 
involvement of people, the creation of consensus and the harmonisation of opin-
ions. However, opinion brokers may also use their strategic position to obstruct 
an innovation, e.g. mobilise opponents, prevent knowledge exchange and use 
strategic information to hinder the innovation process. 
Proposition 7: Brokers have a significant influence on the direction innovation takes 
and can hamper or stimulate the innovation process. 
2.5.5 Interpersonal trust
Even today, scientists greatly disagree on the question whether trust is a require-
ment of social capital or a variable. Whereas Ahn and Ostrom, (2008:73) for in-
stance identify trustworthiness as one of the three basic forms of social capital 
(the other two being networks and institutions), Lin uses a more technical and 
less normative definition of social capital in which trust – or mutual recognition 
– is a feature of a relationship between two persons (2001:131 and 147-9). In Lin’s 
view, social capital can be understood as resources embedded in a social structure 
that can be accessed and/or mobilised in purposive actions (Lin, 2001:29). Various 
levels of trust can exist in the social structure, and thus trust can be perceived as a 
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variable. Although scholars disagree about the relation between the concepts of 
social capital and trust, they do agree about the importance of trust in situations 
of cross-organisational cooperation (e.g. Sabel, 1993; Lane and Bachmann, 1998; 
Castells, 1996; Wehmeyer et al., 2001, Klijn; 2002, Nooteboom, 2006; Edelenbos and 
Klijn, 2007). They also point to the fact that there are many different conceptions of 
trust, and there is a generally accepted conceptual understanding. Hence, in the 
following sections an overview will be provided of important theoretical contri-
butions on the definition and mechanisms of trust in collaborative environments.
There are many interpretations of the notion trust (e.g. Edelenbos and Klijn, 
2007:29). Some perceive trust as an expectation (see Lane and Bachmann, 1998; 
Rousseau et al., 1998); others consider trust to be the cement of society (Fuku-
yama, 1995) or a container concept that is closely related to shared norms and 
rules (see, for instance, Putnam 1995). However, to be able to conduct empirical 
research, a clear-cut definition of the concept is needed. Edelenbos and Klijn, who 
compared several definitions of trust in scholarly contributions, identified three 
key characteristics of trust, namely vulnerability, risk and expectations (2007:29): 
−	 The first dominant characteristic of trust is vulnerability. When an actor trusts 
another actor, he or she is willing to assume an open and vulnerable posi-
tion. He or she expects the other to refrain from opportunistic behaviour 
even if there is the possibility that the other will show this behaviour (Deakin 
& Michie, 1997; Deakin & Wilkinson, 1998). […]
−	 The second dominant characteristic is risk (Chiles & McMackin, 1996). Trust 
plays an important role in ambiguous, unpredictable and risky situations. In 
risky situations, trust is a precondition for undertaking any action (Gambetta, 
1988a, 1988b; Lane & Bachmann, 1998). […] 
−	 The third dominant characteristic is expectations. The concept of trust pre-
sumes a stable positive expectation (or prediction) of the intentions and mo-
tives of other actors (Lane & Bachmann, 1998). Trust reduces unpredictability, 
complexity, and ambiguity in interactions because one can anticipate (some 
of ) the behaviour of the other actor (Zucker, 1986).
Although most concepts of interpersonal trust share these three common ele-
ments, theorists have conflicting views on the social grounds on which trust may 
be based (Lane, 1998:4). These theoretical differences are predominantly caused 
by a different approach to human nature (e.g. the extent to which mankind is 
seen as being rational). Some theorists (mainly economists) perceive trust as a 
rational assessment by an individual of the chance that the other will act in an 
opportunistic way (e.g. Williamson, 1993, Preisendörfer, 1995). In this perspective, 
human action (and also trust in certain behaviour of the other) is based on a ratio-
nal calculation of the costs and benefits and chance of opportunistic behaviour. 
According to these theorists, a person is only willing to trust the other in situations 
in which he or she expects that – based on a cost-benefit calculation – the other 
will not act in an opportunistic way. This instrumental approach of trust, how-
ever, has received considerable criticism. Most critics contend that rational actor 
theories neglect the unpredictability of future behaviour and incompleteness of 
information, which hamper a clear-cut assessment of costs and benefits (Lane, 
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1998:5). Whereas Axelrod (1984) and Coleman (1990), for instance, assume that 
actors share expectations about the future, more sociological accounts would 
stress that the unfolding of the future is in itself uncertain. As trust is built incre-
mentally, and the relationship may change in an unpredictable direction, neither 
gains nor losses can ever be calculated with certainty. In other words, in every 
relationship there are uncertainties which require a basis of trust for certain hu-
man interaction and action. As Bradach and Eccles put it (1989:108): ‘The future is 
rarely preordained; magnitude and timing of the trustee’s response is influenced 
by social norms which complicate calculation: and, most importantly, the first step 
in “a game without history”, taken in the face of incomplete information about the 
trustee, requires a one-sided precommitment from the trust or based on mere 
beliefs/expectations about the trustee.’ 
However, there is a third theoretical stream of scientists who contend that the 
grounds for trust will vary with the social context of trust and/or that the nature 
of trust will vary with the stage a relationship has reached (Lane, 1998:4). These 
theorists use a multidimensional concept of trust based on a combination of 
theoretical viewpoints. Common combinations are cognitive trust with value, or 
emotion-based trust (e.g. Barber 1983; Lewis and Weiner, 1985), and a combina-
tion of calculative with either cognitive or morally based trust (Dasgupta, 1988, 
Chiles and McMackin, 1996). In both these theoretical approaches of trust, com-
mon cognitions are considered to have a determining influence on the presence 
or absence of trust. Cognitions, defined as ‘the rules that constitute the nature 
of reality and the frames through which meaning is made’ (Scott, 1995:40), are 
embodied in the expectations people have of the social order in general and of 
specific interaction with others. Cognitions form a basis for interpersonal trust or 
distrust in the sense that individuals base their expectations of others’ behaviour 
towards shared social norms. Zucker (1986), for instance, argues that expectations 
are based on social rules that provide a general framework for behaviour. In ad-
dition, Zucker contends that the stronger the common social framework of rules 
and routines (e.g. due to social homogeneity), the more likely it is that trust will 
develop spontaneously. 
Most theorists argue that levels of interpersonal trust and trustworthiness are 
not static but dynamic; e.g. trust and trustworthiness can appear and disappear 
(Zucker, 1986; Lindenberg, 2000; Nooteboom, 2002). The literature on the subject 
pays particular attention to the construction of trust (Nooteboom, 2002:89). Sha-
piro (1987:625) argues that: ’Typically (…) social exchange relations evolve in a 
slow process, starting with minor transactions in which little trust is required be-
cause little risk is involved and in which partners can prove their trustworthiness, 
enabling them to expand their relation and engage in major transactions.’ Other 
scholars have endorsed this line of reasoning (e.g. Smith Ring and Van de Ven, 
1992). McAllister (1995) for instance identified two phases of trust development; in 
the first phase trust is cognition-based and in second stage affect-based. Lewicki 
and Bunker (1996) elaborated on this while distinguishing between three stages; 
calculus-based, knowledge-based and identification-based trust. Nooteboom 
(2002:90) proposes the following three stages of the evolution of trust:
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1. Stage of control in the absence of trust. In this stage, trust is absent, which 
forces individuals to assess the competences and opportunism of the other. 
One way in which people try to limit the risks is by taking small steps.
2. Stage of assessing trustworthiness and creating tolerance levels of trust. In 
this stage, the involved persons mutually obtain more knowledge and expe-
rience, which forms the basis for setting tolerance levels of trust. 
3. Stage of widening tolerance levels, on the basis of identification. In this 
stage, the tolerance levels of trust are widened as a result of identification 
and empathy. 
Interpersonal trust can not only increase over time but also decrease (Noot-
eboom 2002:92). A decline of trust between two individuals can occur if one of 
the involved parties does not live up to the expectations of the other. However, 
Zucker (1986:59) argues that those disappointments in the other do not necessar-
ily terminate the trust. According to him, ’A violation of expectations produces a 
sense of disruption of trust, or profound confusion, but not of distrust. Distrust 
only emerges when the suspicion arises that the disruption of expectations in one 
exchange is likely to generalize to other transactions. To distrust, then, implies 
an attribution of intentionality that continuous throughout all interactions or 
exchanges, at least of a particular type.’ Nooteboom (2002:93) argues that a joint 
solution of a conflict can strengthen trust in several ways. On the one hand, it may 
result in a learning process, which confirms the value of the relation and thereby 
increases mutual commitment. Moreover, the fact that the relation survived the 
conflict may increase interpersonal trust. On the other hand, a violation of ex-
pectations can result in mutual recrimination and suspicion, particularly between 
people who have a weak tie. 
Although the research area of trust and networked innovation is relatively recent, 
several theorists have argued that the presence or absence of trust can have a 
determining influence on the occurrence of networked innovation (e.g. Lane and 
Bachmann, 1998; Van de Ven 1999; Fountain, 2000; Nooteboom, 2006; Kaasa, 2008). 
In the conception phase of a network innovation, the sharing of (multidisciplinary, 
inter-sectoral and/or inter-level) expertise is an important driver for the creation 
of new ideas. If personal or company interests – such as intellectual property – are 
not contractually arranged, the risks high and the balance of power unequal, then 
a high level of trust is needed to share expertise within the network. Trust may 
also be a prerequisite in the implementation phase of joint innovations. Often 
the interests of involved parties are divergent or even conflicting, rendering the 
risks for involved parties (poor return on investments or reputation damage) high. 
Trust is then a precondition for the ability to bridge deviating interests and foster 
willingness to take joint risks. In the diffusion phase, trust may be less important 
as a determinant as the risks may be lower because the impact and the outcome 
of the innovation may be less uncertain. 
Nooteboom (2006:2-4) argues that trust is relevant in relation to the following 
three basic problems underlying collaborative innovation: 
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1. Because of its explorative nature and strong interdependencies, collabora-
tive innovation can imply substantial risks and uncertainties for involved ac-
tors (both individuals and organisations). As various partners are involved in 
the innovation, there can be a lack of mutual understanding, or ‘absorptive 
capacity’. This might be particularly the case in process innovation, where 
knowledge and competencies are being developed. Business models are 
new and a common language still has to be developed. On the one hand, 
cognitive distance and heterogeneity is needed in order to innovate (to 
combine knowledge) and, on the other hand, cognitive distance can ham-
per effective collaboration. Nooteboom (2006:3) speaks in this regard of ‘the 
optimal cognitive distance’; large enough to yield novelty, yet time small 
enough to develop a mutual understanding. 
2. A second problem of collaborative innovation identified by Nooteboom 
(ibid, p.3) is the risk of ‘spillover’. He argues that ‘competitive advantage 
from commercially valuable new knowledge or competence may ‘leak’ to 
competitors.’ Although this problem seems not to exist in the public sector, 
there may be other forms of competition between public sector agencies. In 
cases of conflicting interests public sector agencies may use knowledge in 
a strategic way, e.g. to strengthen their position in relation to other public 
sector agencies. 
3. Dependence on partners is mentioned by Nooteboom (ibid, p.3) as the third 
risk in networked innovation. When separate organisations jointly innovate, 
they depend on the efforts and investments of the other during the innova-
tion process, but may also be dependent on them when the innovation is 
implemented (e.g. if they jointly use the new product or share processes). 
The dependence on partners limits organisations’ ability to develop their 
own strategies, take their own decisions and act in their own interest. 
Nooteboom argues that trust may be needed to cooperatively innovate in a 
network of organisations. He states (2006:4) that in order ‘to deal with risks we 
can try to impose control, but control is never perfect, especially in innovation. In 
innovation there is too much uncertainty to manage risks completely by contract, 
monitoring and control. Innovation requires creativity, which requires freedom 
of action. And where control ends we need trust.’24 In conclusion, depending on 
the number and significance of risks, presence of interdependencies, control 
mechanisms and/or contractual arrangements, trust may serve as an enabler of 
joint innovation. 
Proposition 8: Trust supports high-risk innovation processes and can be partly com-
pensated by interdependencies, control mechanisms and/or contractual arrange-
ments. 
24 However, Nooteboom also contends that trust should not be unconditional, since a solid 
ground for trust may be lacking (e.g. due to intense competition).
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2.6 PHASE SPECIfICITy Of SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The former sub-sections show that most of the social capital variables – e.g. open-
ness of the network, strength of the tie, heterogeneity of the network, level of 
trust – may have a different effect in each of the innovation stages. This diver-
sification has also been recognised by Nesta et al. (2004), who conducted social 
capital research in the pharmaceutical industry and found that the contribution of 
different types of partners and agreements to knowledge creation is linked to the 
stage of innovation development, and that therefore, innovation networks should 
be phase-specific. The different stages of innovation should call for a ‘differentiated 
set of actors with a specific division of innovative labour’ (Nesta et al., 2004:3). 
One of the key stages where these different types of external relationships may 
influence organisational performance is product development. Product develop-
ment activities rely on the acquisition and synthesis of new knowledge (Cohen 
and Leventhal, 1990). External ties may be a vital source of diverse information 
that can spur this type of activity within firms. However, in the implementation 
stage external ties may be less important. Gabby and Leenders (1999) also argue 
that social capital that is beneficial in some phases of a process may not be helpful 
in later phases.
Hence, for the present research on the manifestation of social capital it is impor-
tant to distinguish between various innovation phases. Schroeder, Van de Ven, 
Scudder, and Polley (1986, 1989) examined the processes of diverse technical and 
administrative innovations and made a distinction between three phases: the 
initiation period, the developmental period and the implementation period (e.g. 
Van de Ven et al., 1999:23). In the initiation period, people are engaged in a variety 
of activities that set the stage for innovation (Angle and Van de Ven, 1989). Knowl-
edge is being built, acquired and exchanged, agendas are being influenced and 
coalitions formed. This stage of innovation can be characterised by a relatively 
high level of uncertainty; the necessary resources, the parties involved, and the 
characteristics, outcome and impact of the innovation are rather unclear. In the 
second stage of the innovation, the developmental period, parties start to actually 
develop the innovation. More concrete feasibility studies are carried out, crucial 
decisions (for instance on investments and the specifications of the innovation) 
are made and experts start to develop and test prototypes of the innovation. In 
the implementation period, the innovation is put in place in the sense that it is 
integrated into existing processes and procedures of participating organisations. 
The implementation of the innovation may require the alteration of existing legis-
lation, structures, processes and products. 
Van de Ven et al. (1999) do not define diffusion as a distinct stage in the innovation 
process, despite the fact that the diffusion stage contains a number of specific 
characteristics and therefore can be perceived as a separate phase (e.g. Rogers, 
1995:168-71). In the diffusion phase, the innovation is fully mature and it starts be-
ing adopted by various actors. As Rogers argues (Rogers, 1995:5): ‘Diffusion is the 
process in which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over 
time among the members of a social system.’ Since the diffusion stage appears to 
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be a crucial fourth innovation stage, the present research distinguishes between 
the initiation, development, implementation and diffusion stages. 
It is important to note – however obvious it may seem – that innovations cannot 
be considered linear processes in the sense that each step or phase has a clear 
beginning and end and will be followed by a subsequent step or phase. Innova-
tion entails a complex and multi-dimensional process that cannot be reduced to 
clear-cut linear stages (e.g. Smits, 2000). In addition, the innovation process has 
to be considered as being something iterative (see also Sabatier for innovation 
policy processes, 1993); a continuous cycle of ideas, development, implementa-
tion, diffusion. Nevertheless, categorising innovation stages in research can help 
to structure, recognise and identify the mechanisms of various variables that af-
fect the innovation. In the present research, the distinction between innovation 
stages is used to compare and analyse the influence of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework and social capital variables on joined-up ICT innovations. 
2.7 TOwARDS AN INTEGRATED fRAMEwORK
Previous sections have shown that unravelling network characteristics and dy-
namics may contribute to the operationalisation of the subsystem of the Advoca-
cy Coalition Framework. When integrating the Advocacy Coalition Framework and 
social capital theory, particularly the policy subsystem element of the framework 
changes (see right box, figure 2 below). Coalitions and belief systems as depicted 
by Sabatier et al. (2007:202, see also figure 1, paragraph 2.1) can be considered 
as the network characteristic described in social capital theory as ‘group closure’. 
Group closure describes the extent to which actors form cliques (and thus coali-
tions) and the extent to which they share certain frames of references (and thus 
belief systems), which shape their behaviour (see also section 2.5.1). The policy 
brokers as described by Sabatier are more generally referred to as ‘brokers’ in 
social capital theory since they do not only bridge policy, but also knowledge 
and human resource gaps. In addition to the coalitions, belief systems and the 
broker’s position established by Sabatier, social capital theory also identifies other 
network and tie characteristics that influence the policy or innovation process, 
namely the strength of the ties, their heterogeneity and the level of interpersonal 
trust. 
The network and tie characteristics yield certain actor strategies. Group closure, 
for instance, can cause conformity to dominant perceptions, while heterogeneity 
can generate multi-disciplinary or inter-sectoral collaboration and the broker’s po-
sition may be used to reach consensus. Based on the strategies chosen by (groups 
of ) individuals, certain decisions by government authorities are made which, in 
turn, generate institutional rules, resource allocations and appointments. With re-
gard to resource flows, there is another difference between the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework and social capital theory. Whereas Sabatier et al. perceive resources as 
characteristics of a coalition, social capital theory attributes resources to individu-
als. Individuals can participate in several coalitions at the same time (or in no co-
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alition at all), and hence they can use their resources, depending on their interests 
and goals, to cause certain resource flows. The rules, resource flows and appoint-
ments result in certain policy outputs and impacts, which, in turn, may affect the 
policy subsystem and/or cause external events. For instance, a limited reduction 
of carbon emission may affect public opinion (disappointment about the policy 
instruments used) and may change the network and tie characteristics since new 
parties may be involved to increase the environmental policy’s effectiveness. 
The present research applies this model to a network in a specific sector, rather 
than to a nation or society as a whole. However, the framework factors (param-
eters and events) as initially described by Sabatier et al. (1999) are mostly applied 
on a macro (national) level (e.g. Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair, 1993, Sabatier and 
Brasher, 1993). When joined-up ICT innovations are the study’s unit of analysis, 
these parameters and events have more explanatory power if they are considered 
on a meso (sectoral) level. For instance, in the development of electronic health-
care records, it is not the general legislative framework, but the specific healthcare 
regulation that is relevant. In addition, it is not the gross national product that is 
most crucial, but the availability of resources in the healthcare sector. And it is not 
only the general norms and value systems in society that are interesting (e.g. aver-
age level of trust citizens have in governments), but also tangible values within 
the healthcare sector (e.g. extent to which innovations are valued). 
This application of the model on a meso level yields another change since the 
‘long-term coalition opportunity structures’ of the model (see top centre of box in 
the traditional Advocacy Coalition Framework, depicted in figure 1, paragraph 2.1) 
is a macro variable. Sabatier et al. use this element of their model to distinguish 
between various democratic systems, such as the UK’s Westminster model and 
more consensual systems, such as the Dutch one. This variable may yield certain 
governing structures in a specific sector (e.g. the involvement of civil society 
groups such as trade unions) but is not a characteristic of a sector. It is a charac-
teristic of a nation’s democratic system. Therefore, this element will not become 
part of the framework in this research, but it may become manifest through the 
involvement of certain actors in the policy subsystem. In other words, the object 
of study in this research is not a nation’s democratic system, but the involvement 
of actors in the policy subsystem, which can be more pluralistic in consensual 
systems and less diverse in Westminster systems.
In summary, the central line of reasoning underpinning the model is that the 
relatively stable parameters (e.g. available resources, existing legislation) and ex-
ternal events (e.g. economic changes and changes in public opinion) will provide 
constraints and/or resources and therefore also the context for innovation in the 
subsystem. In the subsystem, network and tie characteristics will determine the 
innovation strategies, and these, in turn, affect the decisions, rules, resource al-
locations, appointments, innovation outputs and impacts. Figure 2 below gives an 
overview of the integrated model used for the present research. 
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2.8 THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS
The following propositions on the integration of social capital theory and the Ad-
vocacy Coalition Framework and the mechanisms of social capital theory can be 
derived from previous sections: 
1. Social capital theory can substantially enrich the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work in the sense that it reveals the effect of network characteristics and 
dynamics on the innovation process.
2. Group closure encourages the reproduction of ideas and hence provides lim-
ited access to new ideas and strategies and limits the creation of innovations. 
3. Group closure stimulates the diffusion of innovations that are highly com-
patible with the norms and values of the closed group.
4. Weak ties extend to a larger number of individuals and thus information on 
innovations can be spread among a larger number of people when passed 
through weak rather than strong ties. 
5. Strong ties may stimulate the creation and adoption of highly uncertain in-
novations. 
6. Heterogeneity of the subsystem enhances the innovative capacity of the 
subsystem.
7. Brokers have a significant influence on the direction innovation takes and 
can hamper or stimulate the innovation process.
8. Trust supports high-risk innovation processes and can be partly compensat-
ed by interdependencies, control mechanisms and/or contractual arrange-
ments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Integrated model of Advocacy Coalition Framework and social capital theory
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As becomes clear from the overview of theoretical propositions, most assump-
tions formulated concern social capital theory (seven out of eight – propositions 2 
to 8). This focus on social capital results from the fact that most scholarly criticism 
of the Advocacy Coalition Framework concerns the subsystem (see section 2.3), 
and social capital theory is used in this thesis to further operationalise the sub-
system of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. In addition, – as stated in sections 
2.4 and 2.5 – social capital theory is very recent, so its propositions still need to 
be tested. Consequently, a dominant focus is on the subsystem and social capital 
theory. The following chapter explores a specific case of joined-up innovation, 
namely the joint development of eIDM systems in the public sector. 
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3
eIDM systems 
in the public sector 
This chapter introduces and examines in detail the specific case of joined-up ICT 
innovation in the public sector. More specifically, the case selected is the coopera-
tive development and implementation of an electronic Identity Management sys-
tem (often referred to as eIDM system) by various government agencies. The first 
section explains the ‘joint’ and ‘technological innovative’ character of this case. 
The second section describes the perceived need for eIDM systems. The ambition 
of governments to develop one shared solution for all government transactions is 
discussed in the third section. The fourth section provides insight into the status 
quo of eIDM systems in European countries. The question of which barriers hinder 
the take-up and implementation of eIDM systems in European countries will be 
addressed in the fifth section. The final section concludes with the premise that 
revealing the influence of social capital may help to further explain the limited 
progress made in various countries.25 
3.1 EIDM SySTEMS AS JOINED-UP ICT INNOVATIONS 
The cooperative development and implementation of an electronic Identity Man-
agement (eIDM) system by various different government institutions has been 
chosen as the specific joined-up ICT innovation to be studied in this research. 
An eIDM system is a means of electronically and officially proving one’s identity 
in his/her interaction with businesses or governments. It enables end-users, for 
instance, to access secured databases (e.g. bank accounts), to sign electronic 
documents (e.g. tax forms) and to obtain digital products (e.g. building permits). 
There are multiple types of eIDM systems; examples are an electronic identity card 
(smart card) or a username and password. eIDM systems have been chosen as the 
innovation case in this research, firstly, because the creation of eIDM systems will 
be crucial for governments and their clients to fully exploit the potential of ICTs. 
Over the past few years, more and more governments have recognised that eIDM 
systems are key innovations for the further development of electronic services 
to citizens and businesses. Several studies demonstrate that by applying eIDM 
systems governments can make a significant step forward in their attempt to 
25 All websites mentioned in this chapter have been accessed between September 2009 and 
February 2010.
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provide digital services in the sense that they can provide transactional services 
and thereby decrease transaction costs for both providers and users (the next 
section provides a more comprehensive explanation of the importance of eIDM 
systems).26 
Secondly, eIDM systems have been selected as the specific case to be studied as it 
meets the criteria of a joined-up ICT innovation in the public sector. In the introduc-
tory and theoretical chapter of this study ‘joint’ is defined as a cross-border inno-
vation. In other words, an innovation that is collectively implemented by several 
organisations. Most European member states are developing and implementing 
a national eIDM system for the identification of citizens and businesses, a process 
that multiple institutions have undertaken in collaboration with each other. The 
development of a national eIDM system can thus be considered a joint project. 
In addition, the development of an eIDM system can be perceived as an ‘ICT in-
novation’ as it entails the development, introduction and incorporation of (a set 
of ) new information and/or communication technologies, which over time repre-
sents a substantial discontinuity with the past. Although eIDM technologies have 
already been developed in the private sector, the application of those systems 
in the public sector requires further technological development since technical 
requirements for eIDM use in the public sector differ from the requirements for 
eIDM use in the private sector (e.g. due to privacy regulations). New technology 
has to be developed, and so this process can be characterised as an ICT innova-
tion. Furthermore, the implementation results in a substantial discontinuity with 
the past since it reforms government processes and products. The introduction 
of an eIDM system in government not only implies a change of the identification 
and authentication process, but also the digitalisation of paper-based back-office 
processes.
3.2 THE PERCEIVED NEED fOR EIDM SySTEMS
Electronic systems that manage identification are generally perceived by Western 
governments as a cornerstone of the implementation of all kinds of e-Government 
services, for both citizens and businesses.27 As the demand for online government 
services has been growing over the years, the need for secure online identification 
of persons and organisations has become more urgent. In addition, an increased 
need has emerged for the verification of formal application requirements, such as 
the date on which a formal document has been submitted. Registered letters are 
still required in many formal exchanges between citizens or businesses and public 
administrations, which makes a digital ‘time stamp’, guaranteed by a third trusted 
26 See, for instance, European Commission, (2007) ‘European e-Government 2005-2007, Taking 
stock of good practice and progress towards implementation of the i2010 e-Government 
Action Plan’, Brussels and European Commission, (2009), ‘i2010 e-Government Action Plan 
Progress Study’, Brussels. 
27 See, for instance, EU policy, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/e-Govern-
ment/policy/key_enablers/eid/index_en.htm.
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party (much the same service as provided by post offices with registered letters) 
crucial to stimulate the take-up of online services. 
The development and take-up of eIDM systems across Europe is heavily stimulat-
ed by the European Commission. Besides creating a road map for a pan-European 
eIDM framework by 2010, the European Commission has funded studies on eIDM 
progress made by member states and large-scale pilots of eIDM implementations. 
The European Commission writes the following about eIDM systems:28 ‘A reliable 
system of eIDM means citizens, businesses and government departments (even 
in different Member States) can identify themselves and certify their transactions 
accurately, quickly and simply. Widespread confidence in eIDM will enable the 
day-to-day transactions between public agencies and people and businesses to 
move on-line. That move will lead to gains in efficiency in public services, and 
corresponding gains in time and money for citizens and businesses through sim-
plifying their dealings with government agencies. Making sure that systems are 
interoperable is also a critical part of reliable eIDM. EU-supported ICT projects aim 
to help regions and member states develop e-Government services which, while 
meeting local needs, are capable of working with systems from other regions and 
countries in Europe – something that member states working in isolation would 
struggle to achieve otherwise.’ 
The types of eIDM systems are as versatile as the organisations (e.g. governments, 
but also banks, employers, airlines) that implement them. Not surprisingly, there 
is no common agreement on the definition of an ‘eIDM system’. Yet, Preneel (2005) 
et al. proposed the following definition for an identity management system 
(IDM system) based on various descriptions in literature: ‘The organisational and 
technical infrastructure used for the definition, designation and administration 
of identity attributes.’29 Adding an ‘e’ of electronic to Preneel’s definition adds a 
limiting factor to the definition: the technical infrastructure used for the defini-
tion, designation and administration of identity attributes. Preneel et al. (2005) 
also developed a typology of IDM solutions containing three key categories: 
smart cards, biometrics, and unique identifiers.30 Smart-card solutions work with 
a pocket-sized card that provides information about the card holder’s identity. 
Solutions that use biometrics identify people by recognising intrinsic physical 
or behavioural traits. Unique identifiers are for the most part serial numbers that 
refer to a specific person or business. Obviously, these three categories do not do 
justice to the broad range of existing solutions. Yet, it is beyond the scope of this 
research to fully describe all possible solutions. 
28 See, for instance, European Commission, (2006), ‘A Roadmap for a pan-European eIDM frame-
work by 2010’, Brussels. 
29 European Commission, (2005), ‘Common Terminological Framework for Interoperable Elec-
tronic Identity Management’, consultation paper, Brussels. 
30 https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/modinis-idm/twiki/bin/view.cgi/Main/SolutionCatego-
ries
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3.3 SHARED EIDM SySTEMS 
Examining the policies of European member states’ development and implemen-
tation of eIDM systems makes it clear that most governments are striving to create 
one eIDM solution for all transactions between citizens or businesses and govern-
ment.31 In policy documents on the development of the Dutch eIDM system DigiD 
(once called the National Authentication Facility), the Dutch government stresses 
the need for one solution for all government transactions: ‘Although there are 
many good eIDM initiatives by different government organisations, we face the 
risk of burdening citizens with dozens of passwords, usernames and codes.’32 The 
objective of the Ministry for Investment, Industry and Information Technology of 
the Maltese government is to develop an eIDM system that can be used for vari-
ous e-Government services.33 In Belgium, the government’s strategy is to create a 
basic eID application for persons that supports various interactions with govern-
ments, such as the submitting of declarations at the online tax office, placing a for-
mal request for a building permit or accessing personal (e.g. healthcare) records.34 
Reviewing the various eIDM policy documents of European member states makes 
it clear that the vast majority of governments aim to develop a basic eIDM system 
that is used by multiple government organisations. 
The ‘one solution for all government transaction’ ambition of European govern-
ments implies that separate government organisations have to jointly develop 
and implement an eIDM system. Within European member states, governments 
have applied several cooperative models to create an eIDM system. Some gov-
ernments created inter-departmental working groups to develop a - by various 
ministries - shared eIDM solution. In other instances informal networks emerged 
which tried to establish a basic eIDM system in a more informal way. Whereas the 
cross-agency eIDM project of the Maltese government was highly coordinated 
by one central actor (the Ministry for Investment, Industry and Information Tech-
nology), in the Netherlands an informal eIDM advocacy group emerged in which 
government practitioners of several social security agencies (e.g. Social Security 
Bank, BKWI, Tax Office) participated.35 
Several studies on the progress made by European countries in developing and 
implementing a shared eIDM system show that – although many member states 
have had an eIDM policy since the 1990s – the vast majority of countries have not 
yet reached the stage of having a fully developed and adopted eIDM system.36 
It seems that the process towards a jointly accepted solution is complex and 
31 See, for instance, the country profiles of the IDABC eID Interoperability for PEGS programme.
32 BKWI, (2003), ‘Op weg naar een Nationale Authenticatie Voorziening’, Amsterdam.
33 IDABC, (2007), ‘European e-Government Services, eID Interoperability for PEGS, National 
Profile Malta’, Brussels.
34 See, for instance, IDABC, (2007), ‘European e-Government Services, eID Interoperability for 
PEGS, National Profile Belgium’, Belgium.
35 See, for instance Huijboom (2007).
36 See, for instance, European Commission, (2007), ‘European e-Government 2005-2007, Taking 
stock of good practice and progress towards implementation of the i2010 e-Government 
Action Plan’, Brussels.
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cumbersome. Several barriers to a joint development of an eIDM system have 
been mentioned in the relevant literature, among which a missing regulatory 
framework, the lack of interoperability of applications and privacy concerns.37 
The following two sections, respectively, discuss the current status quo of eIDM in 
European member states and the key barriers to eIDM development and imple-
mentation. 
3.4 STATUS qUO Of EIDM SySTEMS IN EUROPE
As stated in the second section of this chapter, eIDM is repeatedly specified as one 
of the key enablers for electronic government in several EU policy documents. In 
2005, the EC’s i2010 Strategy stressed that e-Government Identity Management 
in EU member states should be addressed and that particular attention should 
be paid to interoperability issues as well as future needs, without ignoring differ-
ences in legal and cultural practices and the EU framework data protection (Euro-
pean Commission, 2005).38 The e-Government Action Plan, building on the i2010 
Strategy, set the following objective: ‘By 2010 European citizens and businesses 
will be able to benefit from secure and convenient electronic means, issued at 
local, regional and national levels, and complying with data protection regula-
tions to identify themselves to public services in their own or in any other Member 
States’ (European Commission, 2006).39 
EU member states have agreed on a roadmap for ‘the implementation of national 
eIDM systems, the development of a common eID framework for the equal treat-
ment of national solutions, and the development of eID role management, per-
sonal data ownership models and federated eID management, ensuring mutual 
recognition of national eIDs in Europe by 2010’ (European Commission, 2007:53).40 
This ambition has been translated by many governments into national policy. A 
survey among European member states carried out by (among others) the Danish 
Technological Institute (DTI) and the TNO Research Institute reveals that no less 
than 92% of the member states have defined eIDM policies.41 Despite this high 
number of countries with eIDM policies, merely 32% of these countries had been 
able to fully realise their eIDM policy in 2007. In addition, the DTI and TNO survey 
shows that there are great differences between countries regarding the pace with 
37 See, for instance, Backhouse (2006).
38 European Commission, (2005), ‘i2010 – A European Information Society for growth and em-
ployment’, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels. 
39 European Commission, (2006), ‘i2010 eGovernment Action Plan: Accelerating eGovernment 
in Europe for the Benefit of All’, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions, Brussels.
40 European Commission, (2006), ‘A Roadmap for a pan-European eIDM framework by 2010’, 
Brussels. 
41 European Commission, (2007), ‘European e-Government 2005-2007, Taking stock of good 
practice and progress towards implementation of the i2010 e-Government Action Plan’, Brus-
sels.
Noor BW 7.indd   55 08-09-10   12:07
E IDM SYSTEMS IN  THE  PUBL IC  SECTOR  
56
which they implement their policies. Four stages of the ‘eIDM innovation process’ 
can be distinguished, namely: (1) conceptual design phase, (2) development/roll-
out phase, (3) update/review phase and (4) consolidation phase.42 
Member states in the conceptual design phase have not yet deployed any large-
scale eIDM solution, but are still examining the available options. The develop-
ment/roll-out phase consists of the actual development and deployment of the 
solution. Member states in this phase have (virtually) completed the design work, 
but have not yet established a significant user base, nor are popular and publicly 
accessible services available yet. In the third, update/review phase, existing eIDM 
solutions are being reviewed and modifications/updates are being considered. 
This is typically the case with member states that have implemented basic solu-
tions (e.g. username/password portals) some years ago, and which are now refin-
ing such solutions, e.g. through the integration of a public key infrastructure (PKI) 
or smart card technology. In the fourth and final stage, the consolidation phase, 
only minor changes to the existing eIDM infrastructure are considered, but the 
infrastructure itself is fairly mature, and presents a longer-term solution. 
The following table, from the e-Government Action Plan Progress Study of the 
European Commission,43 gives an overview of the phases in which the national 
eIDM systems of European governments found themselves in 2009: 
42 MODINIS (2006), ‘Study on Identity Management in e-Government, The Status of Identity 
Management in European e-Government Initiatives’; MODINIS, (2007), ‘Study on Interopera-
bility at Local and Regional Level’; and European Commission, (2007), ‘European e-Govern-
ment 2005-2007, Taking stock of good practice and progress towards implementation of the 
i2010 e-Government Action Plan’, Brussels.
43 European Commission, (2009), ‘i2010 e-Government Action Plan Progress Study’, (SMART 
2008/0042), Brussels. 
Table 1. Phases of eIDM systems for each member state. Source: e-Government Action Plan Progress Study, European 
Commission, 2009
Conceptua l/
Design = 5 
Development/ 
Roll-out = 7 
Update/review = 10 Consolidation = 8
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Greece 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Hungary (2007:  
conceptual / design)
Latvia
Lithuania 
Poland (2007:  
conceptual/ design)
Slovakia (2007:  
conceptual / design)
Malta
UK 
Germany (2007: 
development / roll-out)
France
Iceland 
Ireland 
Luxembourg (2007: 
conceptual / design)
Norway
Portugal (2007: 
development / roll -out )
Slovenia
Netherlands
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
Italy
Spain
Sweden
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The table shows that in 2009 around 59% of the European member states (Croatia, 
Iceland and Norway excluded) had an eIDM system rolled out, and approximately 
30% had a completely developed eIDM system in place. In their study, the Euro-
pean Commission concludes that there have been barely any significant changes 
in the development stages of countries’ eIDM systems since 2005. As they state in 
their 2007 progress report:44 ‘In general, this [lack of progress] can be explained by 
the fact that the development and implementation of eIDM projects are relatively 
complex and entail considerable time for development and implementation.’ 
3.5 KEy BARRIERS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION Of EIDM 
SySTEMS
Evaluation studies show that the limited progress made with the implementa-
tion of eIDM systems in European countries is related to a number of barriers af-
flicting almost all eIDM projects. The most frequently mentioned barriers have a 
technical character. Backhouse (2006:568), for instance, discusses the problem of 
fragmented identifiers; every database has its own identifiers, and this multiplicity 
obstructs the cross-matching and cross-referencing of the stored information. In 
other words, identities used in one system may be useless in another. In addi-
tion, many technical standards have to be taken into account when deploying 
an integrated e-Government IDM solution.45 In most countries the various sectors 
have different standards, and a major challenge is to find a technical solution that 
respects the large number of choices that already have been made. 
In addition, legal difficulties have been recurrently identified as barriers to a 
shared eIDM system. The technical concepts of several national eIDM solutions 
of European member states require a new regulatory framework. For instance, 
delegating authorisation can be technically simple but may imply a change in ex-
isting legislation.46 Moreover, many European member states report that privacy 
legislation forms a constraint for the development of an eIDM system. European 
regulation also requires all the European member states to have legislation on 
privacy (see, for instance, Backhouse, 2006:270). An additional problem to the 
legal demand for the protection of privacy is that there does not appear to be any 
manner to objectively gauge the reliability and trustworthiness of most electronic 
identification mechanisms. This is not only a privacy problem (people stealing 
someone’s identity – often referred to as identity theft), but also an organisational 
one, since the service provider is not able to determine whether the outcome of 
an entity authentication process is sufficiently reliable to allow a user access to 
its services. 
44 European Commission, (2007), ‘European e-Government 2005-2007, Taking stock of good 
practice and progress towards implementation of the i2010 e-Government Action Plan’, 
Brussels. 
45 https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/modinis-idm/twiki/bin/view.cgi/Main/KeyIssues
46 https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/modinis-idm/twiki/bin/view.cgi/Main/KeyIssues
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This brings us to the last type of barrier that is frequently mentioned: organisa-
tional difficulties. Many e-Government services allow the user to delegate certain 
authorisations to another user. It may be difficult to manage such a system, as it 
needs to be made absolutely clear which activities are covered by the delegation, 
and therefore policies are often needed that are equally transparent.47 Further-
more, government agencies, which already have put an eIDM system into place, 
will be inclined to defend their choice, as they have made substantial investments 
to develop the solution. Lastly, in a joint development of an eIDM system, there 
may be a long dispute about the funding and responsibilities of and influence on 
the development and implementation of the eIDM solution. 
3.6 MISSING SOCIAL fACTORS
Most studies on drivers and barriers for the development and implementation 
of eIDM system noticeably focus primarily on technical, legal and organisational 
incentives and barriers. However, social factors also may have a significant influ-
ence. As stated in the previous chapters, the interpersonal relations between 
governments of separate government agencies may influence the innovation 
process. For example, Van den Broek (2008) discovered, during his study on the in-
fluence of strong and weak ties on the development of the eIDM system VETUMA 
in Finland, that strong ties between government practitioners of separate govern-
ment agencies were used to expand the number of partners who supported the 
development of VETUMA. As van den Broek states: ‘Most of the stakeholders in the 
core network knew each other quite well before the cooperation, especially the 
members from the metropolitan municipalities. This resulted in an informal and 
constructive atmosphere and cooperation mainly based on trust.’
 
Research by Van Dijk (2007) shows that the Dutch eIDM system, DigiD, was 
launched by an advocacy group of several government organisations in the social 
security sector. Although the Dutch Ministry of the Interior was already devel-
oping a national eIDM solution, based on PKI technology, the advocacy group 
decided to develop a solution themselves, with the aim of diffusing the solution 
among partners and making it the national standard. The main reason to develop 
an eIDM system themselves was that the members of the advocacy group found 
the PKI solution of the Ministry too complex. The DigiD system of the advocacy 
group was rapidly disseminated through the networks of the members of the 
advocacy group. Van Dijk concludes that one of the key factors stimulating these 
kind of – what he calls chain – innovations is the interpersonal network of the 
participants in the joint innovation, both at a strategic and operational level (ibid, 
p. 53). 
Social capital factors, such as existing ties, the strength of the ties and the pres-
ence or absence of trust, thus seem to affect the innovation process of the joint 
development of eIDM systems. However, how these factors precisely influence 
47 https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/modinis-idm/twiki/bin/view.cgi/Main/KeyIssues
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the innovation process in its different phases remains unclear. In this thesis, four 
cases are selected in which a shared eIDM system has been developed by several 
partners in the public sector. For each of the cases, the influence of social capital 
variables – within the broader Advocacy Coalition Framework – is examined. How-
ever, first the methodology of the case studies is explained in the next chapter. 
Noor BW 7.indd   59 08-09-10   12:07
Noor BW 7.indd   60 08-09-10   12:07
61
4
Methodology 
 
 
The theoretical propositions defined in the final section of the second chapter are 
empirically tested in the case of joint eIDM systems, as described in the previous 
chapter. This fourth chapter of the study outlines the methodology used for the 
empirical testing of the propositions. The first section outlines and substantiates 
the chosen research strategy of the case study. The main argument put forward 
is that Sabatier et al. (1993) emphasise the importance of case-study research 
when applying the Advocacy Coalition Framework and that – in addition – case-
study research supplements the predominantly quantitative research in the social 
capital field. Case-study research provides a more in-depth and therefore more 
profound understanding of the concrete manifestation of social capital. The num-
ber of case studies needed to test the theory are explored in the second section. 
The third section selects four case studies of joint eIDM innovation in the public 
sector based on selection criteria. The justification of cross-country comparative 
research as applied in the present research is provided in section four, and section 
five provides insight into the triangulation strategy used for the data collection. 
Multiple methods of data gathering are used, such as desk research, a tie assess-
ment and interviews. The chapter concludes in sections five and six with a descrip-
tion of the data analysis and the case format used. 
4.1  A MULTIPLE CASE-STUDy RESEARCH DESIGN
Whereas many scholars do not explicitly articulate the methodology that has to be 
used to apply their conceptual framework, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) have 
published an overview of their preferred research methodology for the applica-
tion of the Advocacy Coalition Framework.48 They contend that the hypotheses 
generated by the framework are best tested by conducting case-study research 
(1993:57), i.e. a longitudinal examination of a single instance or event (e.g. occur-
rence of specific policy change or innovation). Traditional case studies, consisting 
of document research, interviews and analyses of others’ studies, for example, 
do most justice to the complexity and the great variation of (e.g. legal, cultural, 
financial and political) factors identified by the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 
48 See, Sabatier, et al. (1993).
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and thereby are most eligible to assess the impact of those factors and test the 
assumptions underlying the framework. 
In addition, it can be argued that case-study research is needed to advance social 
capital theory. There are many studies that mathematically model or quantitatively 
measure elements of social capital (Erdös and Rényi, 1959; Cowan and Jonard, 2002; 
Watts, 1999; Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Mason et al., 2005). These scholarly con-
tributions provide valuable insight into specific mathematical rules (such as the 
maximum number of handshakes that separates two people) or (causal) relations 
between social capital and the achievement of specific goals (such as personal at-
tainment). However, they can be supplemented by a more empirical understanding 
of the various mechanisms of social capital in the innovation process. Klijn (2002:277), 
for instance, argues that as regards the variable trust in particular case studies may 
provide a better understanding of its dynamics and development. Although there 
are ample theories on trust in the relevant literature, an analysis of tangible cases 
is needed in order to reveal the actual manifestation and impact of trust within 
networks. Case-study research can also contribute to increased insight into the 
concrete mechanisms of other social capital variables. The case-study method can 
function as a magnifying glass and reveal micro dynamics in the process (e.g. inter-
dependencies and coalition formation) and the consequences of these dynamics 
(e.g. decisions made and activities undertaken). The empirical evidence generated 
from the case studies can be used to explain certain innovation outcomes and to 
test and sharpen the propositions advanced in theory. Consequently, the research 
method of the multiple case-study approach will be applied in this research. 
 
A well-known critique of the case-study method is that it is difficult to draw gen-
eral conclusions from a limited number of case studies (e.g. Leeuw, 1999). How-
ever, focusing on the mechanisms of Advocacy Coalition Framework and social 
capital variables makes it possible to define some general theoretical propositions 
(Yin, 1994:10). The Advocacy Coalition Framework and social capital theory, as ex-
pounded in the second chapter, is used as a template for comparing the empirical 
results of the cases studies. For each theoretical proposition, a verification of theo-
retical replication take places, that is, an analysis of the confirmation or rejection 
of the proposition by various cases. If some of the cases refute a proposition, the 
theory will have to be modified. This replication logic has to be distinguished from 
the sampling logic normally used in surveys (ibid, p. 47). According to the sam-
pling logic, a larger pool of respondents (or subjects) is represented by a smaller 
number of respondents (or subjects). In the replication logic – by contrast – the 
focus is not on the replication of samples (e.g. the number of cases found) but 
on the replication of theory in specific cases (e.g. theoretical mechanisms, ibid, 
p.10). The case study does not represent a ‘sample’, and the goal of this research 
is not to enumerate frequencies – in other words to statistically generalise – but 
to expand theory and subsequently analytically generalise (see also Lipset, Trow, 
and Coleman, 1956, pp. 419-20). 
 
In order to be able to analytically generalise theory, ‘the most similar cases’ are 
selected, cases which are as analogous as possible – except for the independent 
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variable social capital. All selected cases concern jointly developed and imple-
mented eIDM systems by government institutions of Western democracies. As 
a result, independent variables that may influence the innovation process – not 
being social capital variables – are as stable as possible. For instance, as all cases 
entail the same kind of ICT innovation (namely, electronic identification manage-
ment systems), technological variables that may influence the innovation process 
(such as limitations of identification techniques) are in all cases present or absent. 
The same goes for institutional factors. As all cases concern the development and 
implementation of eIDM systems by government agencies, institutional factors 
that may influence the innovation process (such as a lack of commercial incen-
tives) are most similar in all cases. In addition, legal factors are as stable as possible 
since the implementation of eIDM systems generates comparable legal questions 
in all cases (e.g. privacy infringements), and thus these legal aspects may affect 
the innovation process in a similar way. 
The cases, however, vary on the independent variable social capital, since this 
variation may reveal specific social capital mechanisms in the subsystem of the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework and thereby optimally support the testing of the 
propositions (in particular propositions 2 to 8). More specifically, cases are se-
lected that vary with regard to dimensions ‘the general level of trust within the 
society’ and ‘the extent to which a democracy can be labelled as consensual’ (for 
an elaboration of these dimensions, see section 4.3 of this chapter). This is done 
because the precise manifestation of social capital in innovation processes may 
be different in a low-trust society than in a high-trust society or in a consensual 
or majoritarian state. For instance, whereas in low-trust countries actors may be 
inclined to rely on existing strong ties, in high-trust countries cooperation be-
tween actors with weak ties may emerge more spontaneously. In addition, dif-
ferentiation in the consensual or majoritarian state models may reveal different 
manifestations of trust, ties and network positions. While opinion brokers may be 
needed in consensual networks to mediate between interests, their position may 
be less strong in majoritarian networks. The following picture provides an over-
view of the independent variables that are relatively stable and the independent 
variables that differ in the cases: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Overview of dependent and independent variables 
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Figure 3. Overview of dependent and independent variables
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As explained above, technological, institutional and legal variables (left-hand side 
of the figure) that may influence the joint innovation process (centre of the figure) 
are kept relatively stable and cases will vary on two macro socio-cultural dimen-
sions, namely ‘high/low trust societies’ and ‘consensual/majoritarian democracies’ 
(right-hand side of the figure). By varying these two macro dimensions, it is highly 
likely that social capital variables within the Advocacy Coalition Framework sub-
system – such strength of the ties within the network – will also differ. Although all 
independent variables (technological, institutional, legal and social capital) influ-
ence the dependent variable of ‘joint innovation process’, social capital patterns 
will be the most visible since all other variables are as stable as possible. 
4.2  NUMBER Of CASES STUDIED
An important question that has to be answered when a multiple case-study ap-
proach is used, is the number of case studies that have to be analysed in order 
to be able to analytically generalise theory. There is no common agreement in 
the literature on the number of cases needed for a multiple case-study approach 
(Patton, 1990: 148). Yet it is generally accepted that the number of cases can be 
determined based on a) depth of the of the case-study inquiry, b) the extent to 
which cases differ, and c) the extent to which theories are explorative or fully de-
veloped (Shakir, 2002; Yin, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994). An indication of the 
precise number of cases needed can be generated by combining the work of Yin 
(1994), Shakir (2002) and Patton (1990). If the focus of the research is narrow, the 
difference between cases limited, and if the theories rival each other, the number 
of cases needed is between three and four. If the research is broad, the difference 
between cases high and the theories slightly different, then the number of cases 
required is between six and eight.
To start with the depth of the case studies: whereas a smaller number of cases 
is sufficient for in-depth research, a larger number is required for a broad study 
(Shakir, 2002: 194). This is because the aim of in-depth studies generally is to 
thoroughly scrutinise a complex of variables in a specific situation, whereas the 
aim of broad studies is to compare the manifestation of only one or two variables 
in multiple situations or events. The second indicator is the extent to which the 
independent variables differ on variables other than the variable of interest. If the 
cases differ on many variables (other than the variable being studied), it is more 
difficult to analyse the precise effect of the variable of interest than is the case 
when other variables are relatively stable (Yin, 1994:46-50). The varying factors 
Table 2. Indicators for the number of case studies needed, based on Yin, Shakir and Patton
Indicator 3-4 case studies 6-8 case studies
Depth of the study High Low
Differences between cases Low High
Development of theory Explorative Largely developed
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are mutually interrelated, and more case studies are needed to reveal interrela-
tions and variations. The last indicator for choosing the appropriate number of 
case studies is the extent to which the theory has been developed (Yin, 1994:50). 
If a theory slightly differs from another theory (and is thus a largely developed 
theory), more evidence (confirmation by multiple cases) is required than when 
theories are highly divergent and theoretical exploration is needed. 
 
Applying these indicators to the present research makes it clear that three to 
four case studies are needed to be able to analytically generalise the proposi-
tions outlined in the theoretical chapter of this research. The depth of the study 
is high; a complex of 13 variables (eight parameters and events of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework and five social capital variables) has to be examined for 
each case study. Furthermore, the differences between cases in terms of variables 
that are not subject of the study are low. As stated in the previous section, cases 
will be selected which are as analogous as possible; which entail similar types of 
ICT innovation, in similar public service sectors and which have relatively stable 
contextual factors. Finally, social capital theory – used to operationalise the sub-
system of the Advocacy Coalition Framework – is highly explorative. Theoretical 
propositions are disputed, and thus the theory is far from being fully developed. 
In conclusion, when comparing the research characteristics with the indicators it 
becomes clear that three to four cases should be sufficient to be able to apply an 
analytical generalisation. 
4.3 SELECTION Of THE EIDM CASES
As stated in the previous section, the propositions described in the theoretical 
chapter are tested in four cases of joint development of an eIDM system by sev-
eral governmental institutions. As most governments aim to develop one eIDM 
system for the whole public sector, it is important to select eIDM cases from dif-
ferent countries. In addition, to keep contextual factors (e.g. institutional struc-
ture, legislative framework) as stable as possible, Western countries are selected 
that are part of the European Union. In this section, the selection of four cases of 
implemented eIDM systems in European countries is based upon selection criteria 
generated from the Advocacy Coalition Framework and social capital theory, as 
expounded in the theoretical chapter. 
The first criterion originates from one of the premises of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework and requires that the case studied has to have occurred in the (recent) 
past. One of the key assumptions of the Advocacy Coalition Framework is that a 
time frame of a decade or more is necessary in order to understand the process of 
policy change. This criterion implies that the innovation has to have reached a cer-
tain stage of maturity. In other words, innovations that are still in the development 
phase cannot be selected since the influence of Advocacy Coalition parameters 
and social capital variables can only be assessed if the innovation is sufficiently de-
veloped and implemented. This criterion shortens the list of potential cases since 
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the e-Government Progress Study of the European Commission (2009)49 revealed 
that only the following countries have reached the stage of a full roll-out:
Another study of the European Commission on eIDM systems, however, shows 
that the Swedish eIDM system used for interactions between governments and 
businesses or citizens is not a system created by the government, but by private 
organisations.50 As the present research’s unit of analysis is joined-up ICT innova-
tion by public sector agencies, Sweden is outside the scope of present research and 
thus cannot be selected as a case study.51 In addition, the National Self-Assess-
ment Questionnaire of Malta, which has been used for the European Commission 
Progress Study, reveals that the Maltese eIDM solution in 2009 occurred in be-
tween the review and consolidation phases since a large number of services were 
already available through the eIDM system and many government institutions 
had put the national eIDM system to use.52 Moreover, in other studies the Maltese 
eIDM system is recognised as being fully mature and in the consolidation phase. 
In a report by the European Commission (July 2009)53 specifically on eIDM systems 
in European member states, it is stated, for example, that ‘the Government of 
Malta has launched the eID as a software-based solution including a Non-Qual-
ified Certificate based on PKI technology and capable of producing an advanced 
electronic signature.’ Therefore, Malta will be added to the list of potential cases. 
49 European Commission, (2009), ‘i2010 e-Government Action Plan Progress Study’, (SMART 
2008/0042), Brussels. 
50 IDABC, (2007), ‘European e-Government Services, eID Interoperability for PEGS, National 
Profile Sweden’, Brussels.
51 IDABC, (2009), ‘European e-Government Services, Study on Mutual Recognition of eSigna-
tures: update of Country Profiles, Malta country profile’, Brussels.
52 The maturity of the Maltese eIDM system has been confirmed by the eID Interoperability 
for PEGS study (Update of Country Profiles study, Malta Country Profile) of the European 
Commission (July 2009), which states the following about Malta: ‘To date, a very high 
percentage of the most widely used public services for citizens and businesses are being 
offered through the internet or mobile applications’ and that the ‘massive rollout of eServices 
through the portal, requiring eID as an authentication tool, has streamlined the horizontal 
integration of eServices.’ 
53 IDABC, (2009), ‘European e-Government Services, Study on Mutual Recognition of eSigna-
tures: update of Country Profiles, Malta country profile’, Brussels.
Table 3. Consolidation phases of eIDM systems in European Countries. Source: EC, 2009
Consolidation = 8
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
Italy
Spain
Sweden
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The second criterion can be derived from social capital theory, namely a differentia-
tion in the socio-cultural system of the country. Several scientists have argued that 
the precise manifestation of social capital factors (e.g. group closure, strength of 
ties, trust) depends on a society’s specific socio-cultural characteristics. Fukuyama 
(1996:28), for instance, contends that: ‘Social capital is not distributed uniformly 
among societies. Some show a markedly greater proclivity for association than oth-
ers, and the preferred forms of association differ. In some, family and kinship con-
stitute the primary form of association; in others, voluntary associations are much 
stronger and serve to draw people out of their families.’ In this respect, he makes a 
distinction between low-trust and high-trust societies. The country-specific differ-
ence in the social characteristic of trust results in diverse manifestations of social 
capital in the sense that in high-trust countries people generally are more open to 
the cooperation with new partners, whereas in low-trust countries people more 
strongly rely on existing ties (Fukuyama, 1997:27). Fukuyama explains this as follows: 
‘Another term that I will use widely throughout this book is spontaneous sociability. 
[…] In any modern society, organisations are being constantly created, destroyed 
and modified. The most useful kind of social capital is often not the ability to work 
under the authority of a traditional community or groups, but the capacity to form 
new associations and to cooperate with the terms of reference they establish.’ 
It would therefore be interesting for the present research to differentiate the vari-
able of trust. It is highly probable that an examination of both low- and high-trust 
countries will reveal diverse social capital mechanisms. Whereas in high-trust 
countries spontaneous cooperation between weak tie partners may emerge, in 
low-trust countries organisations may be inclined to rely on existing strong ties. 
An important indicator that reflects the general level of trust within a country is 
the level of trust citizens have in other citizens. Several extensive studies have 
been conducted in this area. A leading study in this field is the World Values Sur-
vey, which pinpoints ‘trust in others’ as one of the indicators.54 Of the countries 
that have an eIDM system in place, the following data can be collected from the 
World Values Survey, representing the average trust citizens had in fellow citizens 
between 1981 and 2007: 
54 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
Table 4. Average trust of citizens between 1981 and 2007. Source: World Values Survey 2009
Most people can be trusted Can’t be too careful Total
Average 35.8 % 64.2 % 33136 (100%)
Austria 32.8 % 67.2 % 2707 (100%)
Belgium 31.5 % 68.5 % 5405 (100%)
Denmark 58.3 % 41.7 % 3037 (100%)
Estonia 24.0 % 76.0 % 2961 (100%)
Finland 55.5 % 44.5 % 2543 (100%)
Italy 31.4 % 68.6 % 5185 (100%)
Malta 18.8 % 81.2 % 1801 (100%)
Spain 34.2 % 65.8 % 9497 (100%)
Noor BW 7.indd   67 08-09-10   12:07
METHODOLOGY   
68
Another socio-cultural aspect of differentiation that can generate a variety of 
manifestations of social capital is the extent to which a country has a tradition 
in consensual decision making. In other words: the practice of involving many 
parties that try to come to a shared understanding and agreement. In countries 
with these kinds of consensual models of decision making (often referred to by 
the term ‘polder model’), the structure of the network, the positions within the 
network and characteristics of ties may be different from countries in which a few 
parties play a dominant role. In this respect, Lijphart (1999) made a distinction 
between consensus democracies and ‘Westminster’ democracies. In consensus 
democracies, multiple parties (e.g. minority parties) are involved in the process, 
which focuses strongly on achieving a compromise between those parties. 
Whereas in Westminster models, the majority parties (for instance in the parlia-
ment) strongly influence the outcome of a decision process. 
In consensus democracies, social characteristics of innovation networks – such 
as strength of the ties, heterogeneity of the network, relational trust and posi-
tions within the network – may differ from the social network characteristics of 
innovation networks in Westminster democracies. For instance, in a network of 
partners whose ambition is to achieve a compromise, more trust may be needed 
than in networks where the governing majority decides. In addition, consensual 
networks may be more heterogeneous than majoritarian networks since more 
(e.g. minority) parties are involved. Also positions within these networks may dif-
fer; whereas the broker’s position in consensual networks may be important for 
mediating between interests, this may be less relevant in majoritarian networks. 
In conclusion, the level of trust, positions, strength of the ties of people in net-
works where parties try to achieve consensus between all parties, may differ from 
the level of trust, positions and strength of the ties of people in networks where 
few parties are dominant. 
Lijphart (1999) has defined two dominant dimensions in which the consensual 
democracy differs from the Westminster democracy: the executive-parties dimen-
sion and the federal-unitary dimension. The executive-parties dimension indi-
cates how easy it is for a singly party to take complete control of the government. 
The federal-unitary dimension indicates the influence of local parties on national 
policy. The foremost important indicator for assessing whether a democracy is 
consensual or majoritarian is the effective number of parties (Lijphart, 1999:63): 
‘This first difference can also be seen as the most important and typical difference 
between the two models of democracy because it epitomizes the contrast be-
tween concentration of power on the one hand and power-sharing on the other.’ 
The following table shows the effective numbers of parties in the countries that 
have an eIDM system in place and is based on Lijphart (ibid, pp. 76-7):55
55 Estonia was not covered by Lijphart and is therefore not part of the present research.
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Confronting the level of trust with the extent to which a democracy is consensual 
generates the following framework for selecting cases:
The vertical axis represents the level of trust citizens of a nation have in others 
(measured between 1981 and 2007), ranging from 0% to 70% (generic) trust in 
others. The horizontal axis represents the average effective number of a nation’s 
parliamentary parties (measured between 1945 and 1996) ranging from one to 
five. The horizontal dotted line depicts the average percentage of trust of the 
seven countries selected so far (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Malta 
and Spain) and the vertical dotted line the average number of effective parties of 
these seven countries. 
As argued above, a significant variation on both axes is desirable as it may reveal 
diverse manifestations of social capital. Consequently, the countries which will be 
studied in the present research are: 
Table 5. Lijphart 1999, effective number of parliamentary parties, 1945-96.
Mean Lowest Highest Number of elections
Finland 5.03 4.54 5.58 15
Italy 4.91 3.76 6.97 14
Denmark 4.51 3.50 6.86 21
Belgium 4.32 3.45 6.51 17
Spain 2.76 2.34 3.02 7
Austria 2.48 2.09 3.73 16
Malta 1.99 1.97 2.00 6
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Figure 4. Confrontation level of trust and consensus between democratic systems
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•	 Malta (MT in figure 4 above), relatively low level of trust and majoritarian 
democratic model.
•	 Austria (AT); relatively medium level of trust and majoritarian democratic 
model. 
•	 Belgium (BE), relatively medium level of trust and consensual democratic 
model (Belgium is chosen instead of Italy as it will be difficult to collect 
sound data for the Italian case due to language barriers). 
•	 Finland (FI), relatively high level of trust and consensual democratic model.
4.4 CROSS-COUNTRy COMPARATIVE RESEARCH
As described in the previous section, cases are selected that vary on the macro 
socio-cultural dimensions ‘high/low trust countries’ and ‘consensual/majoritarian 
democracies’ and hence (similar) innovations are studied that were implemented 
in different countries. The main reason for conducting cross-national research is 
(as mentioned above) that a comparison of the manifestation of social capital 
in different countries can reveal a broader range of distinctive characteristics of 
social capital and therefore advance social capital theory. Besides this motiva-
tion, which focuses specifically on theory development, there are more generic 
reasons for choosing an internationally comparative method for the present 
research. For example, Jreisat (2005:232) argues that cross-national comparison 
extends our knowledge of how to explore, reflect and better understand universal 
public administrative action, behaviour and attributes. Comparative information 
and analyses can reveal global patterns and regularities in public administrative 
systems and therefore have a balancing effect that reduces internalised biases 
and prejudices. A more practical reason for conducting cross-country research is 
provided by Liou (2000:8), who argues that: ‘Learning about systems of admin-
istration and governance through comparative studies is a prelude to selecting 
and adopting best practices to improve performance in all government systems 
around the world.’ This line of argument has also been put forward by Khademian 
(1998:273), who argues that knowledge and information generated by the com-
parative method improves the capacity of government practitioners to observe, 
learn, and improve managerial performance. 
Nevertheless, comparative research has often been criticised, particularly in the 
past two decades (Jreisat, 2005:234). There are three basic criticisms. Firstly, some 
critics blame comparative public administration studies for failing to deliver the 
promised advantages: for lacking a ‘clear identity’ and remaining ‘ambiguous’ 
(Henry, 1995; 32-3; Van Wart and Cayer, 1990) or because it ‘began to fumble and 
fail in actual practice and as an academic discipline’ (Subramaniam, 2000:557). 
Secondly, comparativists are accused of attempting to create grand theories 
which are too general to be scientifically useful. Early models – such as the agraria-
industria model of Riggs (1957), which describes the transition from an agrarian 
towards an industrial society and subsequent change of public administrations 
– often capture gross distinctions between societies and are perceived by some 
scholars as having little relevance to reality. A third persistent criticism is that 
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comparative administration research remains conceptually fragmented and lacks 
synthesis (Jreisat, 1975).
Jreisat (2005: 237) addresses these problems by offering several solutions for deal-
ing with these three criticisms. The problem of ambiguous research results, lack of 
clarity (first dominant criticism) can, according to Jreisat (2005:237), be solved by 
carefully defining the unit of analysis of the cross-country comparative research. 
As Jreisat states: ‘Directly or indirectly, defining the unit of analysis marks research 
boundaries, tools and necessary data – all important functions in developing in-
tegrated conceptual schemes for cross-cultural analysis.’ A precise formulation of 
the unit of analysis makes it possible to clearly define what should be compared, 
which diminishes the risk of ambiguous research results. Ambiguity can also be 
reduced by selecting ‘most likely’ cases, except for the variables which are to be 
studied (Hendriks, 2007:77). The second problem with cross-national research can 
be resolved by using what Jreisat calls ‘middle-range concepts’, instead of broad 
theories, to explain dynamics within public administrations. Middle-range con-
ceptualisations (concepts which merely capture a few, specific hypotheses instead 
of many general hypotheses) enhance the specificity and relevance of findings 
(Jreisat, 2005:238). It is more difficult for the individual researcher to respond to 
the last criticism since the realisation of synthesis in comparative administration 
will be a matter of future harmonisation of research practices and a responsibility 
of the research community as a whole. 
In terms of the present research, the unit of analysis is very specific, namely: the 
joint development of eIDM systems by governments. The innovation process of a 
tangible ICT innovation – eIDM system – in four countries is examined. In addition, 
the risk of ambiguous research results has been reduced since the cases studied 
are ‘most likely’ cases – all variables except for the social capital variables will be as 
similar as possible. Furthermore, the model used in the present research focuses 
specifically on the explanation of change processes in public administrations and 
captures a well-delineated set of parameters. In all cases, the same set of clearly 
defined factors will be studied, which increases the comparability of the cases. In 
conclusion, by (a) defining a very specific unit of analysis, (b) selecting most likely 
cases, and (c) using a tangible model to explain specific research findings, the 
dominant problems with comparable research are addressed and advantage can 
be taken of the enrichment of the research results. 
4.5 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALySIS
The case-study approach usually relies on three basic data-gathering methods, 
namely: document search, direct observation and systematic interviewing (Yin, 
1994:8). However, as the subject of this research is an innovation that has occurred 
in the (recent) past (see premise 1 of Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework in 
chapter 2), the method of direct observation is not applicable. Yet, to gain empiri-
cal evidence that is as sound as possible the research is not limited to document 
research and interviewing, but also assesses the presence and strength of ties 
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between involved actors. By using these various empirical foundations, triangula-
tion takes place in the sense that findings and conclusions are corroborated by 
three types of sources, namely: documents, interviews and an assessment of the 
presence and nature of ties. 
Three types of information are gathered to test the propositions as defined in chap-
ter 2: (a) general information about the innovation process, output and impact, (b) 
data on the parameters and events of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, and (c) 
data on the social capital variables (see figure 5 below). The general information 
on the innovation process, output and impact provides an overview of how the 
process unfolded and what the results of the process were (e.g. the successive 
steps taken during the innovation process, the actors involved in the process and 
the crucial decisions made). The data on the parameters and events and their 
manifestation give insight into the influence these factors had on the innovation 
process in the subsystem. Data on the social capital variables and their manifesta-
tion - network characteristics (e.g. closure, strength of the ties, heterogeneity of 
the network, the broker’s positions and level of trust) and dynamics (strategies, 
decisions and resource flows) – yield information about how those variables af-
fected the innovation process. 
A combination of the data on the parameters and events (section b in figure 5 
above), the social capital variables (section c) and the innovation process and 
results (section a), provides evidence to endorse or reject the first proposition, 
namely: 
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•	 Social capital theory can substantially enrich the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work. 
In addition, data on the social capital variables (section c) and the innovation 
process and results (section a) can be used to confirm propositions two to eight, 
namely: 
•	 Group closure yields the reproduction of ideas and hence provides limited access 
to new ideas and strategies and limits the creation of innovation. 
•	 Group closure stimulates diffusion of innovations, which are highly compatible 
with the norms and values of the closed group.
•	 Weak ties extend to a larger number of individuals and thus information on 
innovations can be spread among a larger number of people when passed 
through weak rather than strong ties. 
•	 Strong ties may stimulate the creation and adoption of highly uncertain innova-
tions. 
•	 Heterogeneity of the subsystem enhances the innovative capacity of the subsys-
tem.
•	 Opinion leaders have a significant influence on the innovation direction and can 
hamper or stimulate the innovation process.
•	 Trust supports high-risk innovation processes and can be partly compensated by 
interdependencies, control mechanisms and/or contractual arrangements. 
For each of the information types, specific methods have been applied to collect 
data, namely: 
•	 Innovation process, outcome and impact (section a in figure 5). General infor-
mation on the innovation process, outcome and impact – e.g. the succes-
sive steps, decisions made and actors involved – has been predominantly 
gathered through desk research, examination of e-Government websites and 
interviews. Documents which have been examined are (among others) policy 
documents, impact studies, benchmarks and user surveys. Several govern-
ment websites have been consulted and studied, such as electronic service 
portals and eIDM websites. During the interviews, questions were posed on 
(amongst others) the strategies applied, decisions taken and innovation out-
come (for the full interview format see Appendices). The data has been struc-
tured by using the typology of innovation phases outlined in section 2.6, 
namely the initiation, development, implementation and diffusion phase. 
•	 Advocacy Coalition Framework parameters and events (section b in figure 5). 
Data on the Advocacy Coalition Framework parameters and events have 
mainly been collected through desk research and interviews. Documents 
which have been examined are (amongst others) technical descriptions of 
the innovation, government budgets, annual reports, policy documents, leg-
islation, reports on socio-economic developments, newspapers and cham-
ber documents. During the interviews, questions were posed on (amongst 
others) the impact of parameters (e.g. a certain media attention to the inno-
vation) on the dynamics within the subsystem and innovation process. The 
data has been structured along framework parameters. 
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•	 Social capital variables (section c in figure 5). Data on the social capital 
variables have been gathered through desk research on the actor profile, as-
sessment of the presence and strength of ties and interviews. The professional 
profile of actors has been studied by using (online or offline) curricula vitae. 
The presence and strength of ties was assessed at the start of each interview 
while using a map depicting all relevant actors involved in the various stages 
of the innovation. The interviewees were asked if all relevant actors were 
covered by the map (if not, new actors were added), whom he or she knew in 
each innovation stage and how strong the relationship was with the persons 
he or she knew (weak, medium or strong tie). The distinction between weak, 
medium and strong tie was based on indicators such as amount of time spent 
together and emotional involvement (for a full overview of the indicators see 
interview format in Appendices). In addition, the interviewees were asked for 
each person they knew what level of trust (low, medium or high) they had in 
the other. The distinction between low, medium and high level of trust was 
based on indicators such as expected opportunistic behaviour, reciprocity 
and interdependencies (see Appendices). During the interviews, questions 
were posed on (amongst others) the impact of social capital variables on the 
innovation process. 
In each case study, the data collection commenced with desk and internet re-
search, after which research gaps were identified and filled with information 
generated by the interviews and tie assessment. The data-gathering process had 
a second iteration round in the sense that – based on the first-draft case descrip-
tion (which resulted from the first round of desk research, interviews and tie as-
sessment) – a second round of data collection took place (through desk research, 
interviews and tie assessment). Furthermore, for each case study the chain of 
evidence was identified and key informants reviewed the draft description of the 
innovation process. The evidence has been structured and confronted with the 
propositions as defined in chapter 2. All case studies have been carried out in the 
same way (replication logic), using the same theoretical lens, case-study protocol, 
questionnaires and method to assess actors and relationships. The data derived 
from the case studies were collected in a case-study database.
In order to ensure the validity of the research, a pilot case study has been con-
ducted and used to reveal inadequacies of the initial research design. The Dutch 
eIDM system was chosen as the pilot case and carried out before the other cases 
studies started. The pilot case has been methodologically evaluated. The main 
conclusion of the evaluation was that the methods chosen yield sound data for 
testing the theoretical propositions. However, to further increase the solidity of 
the methodology some alterations have been made. Firstly, as the sensitivity of 
the subjects discussed during the interviews was high (e.g. level of trust in oth-
ers), and hence some actors were reluctant to participate in the research, it was 
decided to make the interview reports confidential and not to publish names of 
respondents in the thesis. Secondly, the pilot case study showed that the tie as-
sessment – which initially was conducted by using a closed questionnaire – ap-
peared to be a complicated exercise that could be best conducted while using 
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a map depicting all actors. The reason for this was that the a map provides the 
respondent with a structured overview of key actors involved in each innova-
tion stage, which decreases the chance that actors and/or ties will be neglected. 
Thirdly, changes have been made to the interview format as certain questions on 
the interrelations between factors of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the 
social capital variables appeared to be missing. 
The data resulting from the desk research, tie assessment and interviews have 
been analysed along the three key data elements (see previous section, figure 7); 
(a) general information on the innovation process, (b) parameters and events of 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework and their manifestation, and (c) social capital 
variables and their manifestation. An assessment was made for each of the cases 
to establish whether the theoretical propositions (see section 2.7) were endorsed 
or rejected by the case studies. Subsequently, a cross-case-study analysis of the 
endorsement or rejection of propositions was conducted and conclusions have 
been drawn for each of the propositions. Rival propositions have been tested 
with the empirical data in order to assess if there are alternative explanations (not 
captured by the conceptual framework used) for the occurrence of the joined-up 
ICT innovations. Finally, the most significant findings have been addressed and 
key conclusions have been drawn. To increase the added value of the research 
findings, further reflection was given to the applied model, and future research 
challenges and policy recommendations were defined. 
4.6 CASE fORMAT 
In the next chapters, five to eight, the four cases selected (Austria, Belgium, Fin-
land and Malta) are described by way of the following case format: 
•	 Introduction. Cases start with an introduction to the specific eIDM innova-
tion. This section provides general information on the innovation process, 
output and impact. The data is structured along the four innovation stages; 
the initiation, development, implementation and diffusion phase. 
•	 Advocacy Coalition Framework parameters and events. Next, the relative stable 
parameters (e.g. attributes of the eIDM system, distribution of resources, cul-
tural values and social structure) and external events (e.g. changes in socio-
economic conditions, changes in public opinion and governing coalitions) 
are outlined. 
•	 Social capital variables. The third section of each chapter describes, for each 
of the innovation stages, the network characteristics (network closure, 
strength of ties, heterogeneity of the network, broker’s position and inter-
personal trust) and subsequent network dynamics. 
•	 Overall conclusions. The final section of the empirical chapters will draw 
overall conclusions about the influence of the parameters, events and social 
capital variables on the innovation process. 
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The Austrian Bürgerkarte 
 
The first case of a joint development of an eIDM system by several Austrian gov-
ernment agencies will be described in this fifth chapter. As mentioned in the last 
section of the previous chapter, the empirical chapters consist of four main parts. 
In the introductory section, the innovation process is chronologically described 
along the innovation stages (initiation, development, implementation and diffu-
sion). Conclusions are drawn about the application of strategies, decision making 
and the outcome and impact of the innovation. The second section will present 
evidence found regarding the impact of Advocacy Coalition Framework param-
eters and events. Each sub-section draws a conclusion about the specific effects 
of the variable. The influence of social capital variables is explored in the third 
section. For the five dominant network and tie characteristics (network closure, 
strength of ties, heterogeneity, broker’s position and levels of trust) an overview is 
provided of the perceived impact by involved actors. The sub-sections of this third 
section conclude with an overview of the key impacts of the specific variable. The 
fourth (and final) section draws conclusions about the influence of the framework 
variables.56 
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This first section describes the successive innovation stages of the Bürgerkarte 
development. For each innovation stage (initiation, development, implementa-
tion and diffusion), the most important actors involved, strategies applied and 
decisions made are outlined. The last part of this section provides a summary of 
the key actors, strategies and decisions and provides insight into the outputs and 
impacts of the innovation process. 
5.1.1 Initiation phase
The strategic decision to implement e-Government services in Austria dates back 
to the mid-1990s.57 In 1995, Austria launched an Information Society initiative. A 
56 All websites mentioned in this chapter have been accessed between September and 
December 2009.
57 http://www.zenc.nl/uploads/29/54/2954d277fd8e53ab168d1ae55d8c85a2/egovernment_
in_austria.pdf
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year later, the federal ‘Information Society Report; an Austrian Strategy and Ac-
tion Plan’ was published. The publication was followed by a general agenda under 
the name Information Society Action Plan that was coordinated by the Federal 
Chancellery. In 1999, the e-Europe initiative of the European Commission put the 
Information Society high on the Austrian political agenda. In the same year the 
e-Signature Act was prepared, and in spring 2000 the e-Europe initiative led to 
an initiative called ‘e-Austria in e-Europe’.58 The idea for the Bürgerkarte was con-
ceived in those years, during which the Austrian information society was highly 
promoted by the Austrian government. One of the interviewees stated about 
the onset of the Bürgerkarte: ‘The very first idea to develop an eIDM system for 
government services came up around 1999. Reinhard Posch, university profes-
sor at the Graz University of Technology, had been involved in the writing of 
the e-Signature directive at the European level and was also an advisor of the 
Hauptverband [Austrian Social Security Agency]. The paper-based social security 
identification system had to be replaced by a smart-card, and the idea was to 
incorporate the Bürgerkarte into this new card, which would grant access to all 
government services.’
In 1999, the Austrian Secure Information Technology Centre (A-SIT) was founded 
by the Austrian Ministry of Finance, the Austrian National Bank and the Graz 
University of Technology.59 One of the main reasons to institute A-SIT was the 
European e-Signature directive, which demanded the establishing of a national 
Confirmation Body.60 A-SIT was chaired by top officials of the three founding 
organisations; Arthur Winter, Andreas Ittner and Isidor Kamrat; scientific director 
of A-SIT was professor Posch.61 On 20 November 1999, the Austrian government 
officially decided to use smart-card technology in order to simplify administrative 
processes for citizens.62,63 In 2000, the federal Ministry for Public Service and Sports 
(BMÖLS) set up the Task Force e-Austria, existing of leading experts, to implement 
the ‘e-Austria in e-Europe’ project.64,65 The objectives of the task force were to ad-
vance the use of ICT in government and public administration and to coordinate 
the implementation of the e-Europe actions.66 Professor Posch was in charge of 
e-Government in the task force.67 Significant e-Government projects identified by 
the task force were the development of the one-stop service portal www.help.
gv.at and the development of an eIDM system.68
58 http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/ISG/documents/Austria_000.pdf
59 Frauenhofen, (2006), ‘Study PKI and Certificate Use in Europe’, Brussels. http://www.jipdec.
or.jp/archives/ecom/report/Study_on_PKI_2006_in_EUROPE-FINAL.pdf
60 http://www.a-sit.at/pdfs/About_ASIT_2009_en_MH.pdf 
61 http://www.a-sit.at/de/allgemein/asit_organigramm.php
62 http://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/22.pdf
63 The Cabinet Council decided to enhance the health-insurance card with electronic signa-
tures. 
64 http://www.eipa.eu/files/repository/eipascope/scop2001_Special_ENGLISH.pdf
65 See also http://www.austria.gv.at/site/6507/default.aspx
66 http://www.sibis-eu.org/files/D4-2_Annex.pdf
67 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/foi/library/epr.pdf
68 http://www.sibis-eu.org/files/D4-2_Annex.pdf
Noor BW 7.indd   78 08-09-10   12:07
THE AUSTR IAN BüRGERKARTE  
79
One of Task Force e-Austria’s key recommendations was to institute an Informa-
tion and Communication Technologies (ICT) Board, which would be responsible 
for the coordination, planning and implementation of e-Government solutions 
between the federal government, the provinces and local authorities.69 This board 
was established in June 2001,70 and the members of the ICT Board consisted of the 
chief information officers (CIOs) of the ministries, who were nominated by their 
respective ministers. The ICT Board was headed up by the federal Chief Informa-
tion Officer (IT-Koordination des Bundes), Reinhard Posch, who was nominated 
by the federal government.71 Working groups were formed to provide advice and 
assistance to ministries, provinces, cities and local authorities. One of those work-
ing groups handled the development of an eIDM system for government services 
to citizens. The initial idea within the eIDM working group was to use the e-Card 
of the Austrian Social Security Agency as a Bürgerkarte. The paper-based social 
security identification system would be replaced by a smart card (the e-Card), 
which, according to involved actors, provided the opportunity to integrate and 
launch the Bürgerkarte. 
5.1.2 Development phase 
Several respondents reported that there were important problems in the e-
Card project, the difficulties of which also hampered the development of the 
Bürgerkarte. For example, one of the interviewees stated: ‘At the Hauptverband 
[Social Security Agency], the first procurement round [of the e-Card] failed for 
some reason. In addition, there was fierce resistance from the Chamber of Doc-
tors. By introducing the new card, their actions would become more transparent. 
The new card would, for instance, register the number of patients a general prac-
titioner would see in one hour. While the Hauptverband was struggling with their 
project to replace the paper-based identification system by a smart card, the idea 
of a general Bürgerkarte for all government interactions gained importance at the 
federal level. Reinhard Posch became federal CIO and the idea came up to make 
the Bürgerkarte solution card-independent and thus also independent from the 
implementation of the Hauptverband card. Hence, the Bürgerkarte project would 
not suffer from the lack of progress being made in the Hauptverband project.’ 
In 2000, the federal Ministry for Public Service and Sports (BMÖLS) together with 
A-SIT published the first version of the Bürgerkarte white paper.72 The idea of an 
open Bürgerkarte concept was laid down in the white paper as follows:73 ‘Das 
Konzept Bürgerkarte beschreibt keine physische Karte, sondern definiert nur jene 
Rahmenbedingungen, die notwendig sind, um einen Signatur Token im e-Gov-
ernment einsetzen zu können. Damit ist die Teilnahme am „Konzept Bürgerkarte“ 
69 http://www.digitales.oesterreich.gv.at/site/6507/default.aspx
70 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=1305
71 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/foi/library/epr.pdf
72 http://www.buergerkarte.at/regain/file/D:/webs/at.buergerkarte.downloads/Weissbuch-
Buergerkarte.20020515.pdf?index=main
73 http://www.swe.uni-linz.ac.at/teaching/lva/ss04/projektstudium/prost246.556/Literatur-Linz/
Posch%202002.pdf 
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allen offen. Bereits jetzt ist absehbar, dass der Bürger unter mehreren Angebo-
ten an Chipkarten wählen können wird. Interessensvertretungen, Kammern und 
privatwirtschaftliche Unternehmen planen bereits die Ausgabe von Chipkarten, 
die dem Konzept Bürgerkarte entsprechen.’ 
In 2001,74 the ICT Strategy Unit was established (Stabsstelle IKT-Strategie),75 which 
was headed by the federal CIO Reinhard Posch and fell under the direct responsi-
bility of Minister Susanne Riess-Passer76 of BMÖLS, and from 2002 (after the elec-
tions) directly under the Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel.77 The ICT Strategy 
Unit existed of three sub-units: a technical unit that developed applications, a 
public relations unit responsible for the marketing of the applications and an ad-
ministrative unit that dealt with internal procedures. Several respondents pointed 
to the ICT Strategy Unit’s independent position. One of them, for instance, stated: 
‘We had a special position; did not have to answer to any of the top officials, only 
to professor Posch and the chancellor. We did not even reside in the Chancellery; 
we worked at a Regus office – some building where businesses can rent rooms.’ 
In 2001 and 2002, the ICT Strategy Unit developed the PKI infrastructure for the 
Bürgerkarte. 
The provision of certificates was mandated to a company called A-Trust in 2002, 
which is a shared-service provider consisting of several Austrian banks and com-
panies and thus far the only accredited and certified trust centre in Austria, accord-
ing to the 1999 signature law and the European e-Signature Directive 1999/93/EG 
(EU 1999).78 The inspection of Bürgerkarte certificates, signature-creation devices 
and underlying infrastructure was mandated to A-SIT.79 In 2002, the Austrian gov-
ernment also established the Central Residents Register (CRR).80 Every person 
residing in Austria is registered in the Central Residents Register and is assigned 
a unique personal identification number (PIN), called a CRR number. Any person 
who does not fit in the register can be registered with the Supplementary Register 
74 http://www.fidis.net/resources/deliverables/interoperability/int-d42000/doc/7/
75 ftp://ftp.freenet.at/beh/buergerkarte-grundlagen.pdf
76 Suzanne Riess-Passer was minister of the Federal Ministry for Public Service and Sports from 
2000 to 2002, during the first-term chancellery of Wolfgang Schüssel. 
77 http://www.redactielab.nl/files/Beelden/DTP%20-%20PDF/KJD23-art%20Posch.pdf, Schüs-
sel was Austrian Federal Chancellor from 4 February 2000 to 11 January 2007. See http://
de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfgang_Sch%C3%BCssel#Bundeskanzler_von_2000_bis_2007
78 http://www.a-trust.at/html/erstinfos.aspx?guid=433030075&extrag={26774648-30D7-4BD9-
A75D-A283603566CF}#frage8: ’A-Trust ist ein österreichisches Trust Center, das technisch 
und organisatorisch voll den hohen Anforderungen des Signaturgesetzes entspricht. 
A-Trust kann sich daher auch “Akkreditierter Zertfizierungsdiensteanbieter” nennen und 
das Bundeswappen führen. […] Daneben bietet A-Trust eine volle Palette von einfachen 
Zertifikaten für den Einsatz abseits der qualifizierten digitalen Signatur laut Signaturgesetz 
an, z.B. Serverzertifikate und Amtssignaturzertifikate. Das Unternehmen A-Trust befindet sich 
im Besitz österreichischer Banken/Geldinstitute, Industrieunternehmen und Kammern.’
79 http://www.a-sit.at/pdfs/About_ASIT_2009_en_MH.pdf
80 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VB3-4T0FF98-2&_
user=603085&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_search-
StrId=1000783862&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000031079&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_
userid=603085&md5=760f6e330ab3db93172ff6a6db3d9531
Noor BW 7.indd   80 08-09-10   12:07
THE AUSTR IAN BüRGERKARTE  
81
(SR) and receive a PIN. This PIN is one of the key identifiers used by the application 
of the Bürgerkarte concept.81
5.1.3 Implementation phase
The first pilot project with the Bürgerkarte concept was launched in 2002 by the 
Austrian Computer Society (Osterreichische Computergesellschaft).82 Electronic 
ID cards were issued by the Austrian Computer Society from 24 February 2003 
onwards, in cooperation with A-Trust and the ICT Strategy Unit of the Federal 
Chancellery.83 Various respondents stated that the ICT Strategy Unit faced diffi-
culties in finding an appropriate carrier (card) for the solution. One of them, for 
instance, reported: ‘At that time, we [the ICT Strategy Unit] were desperately seek-
ing a card that could accommodate the function of a Bürgerkarte. The Hauptver-
band’s e-Card wasn’t a success, and so we needed another opportunity to realise 
the Bürgerkarte concept.’ Another interviewee reported: ‘The Austrian Computer 
Society got involved because Mr. Posch chaired one of the working groups – 
the group about IT and security. We had some meetings about the Bürgerkarte 
concept. […] We organised a press conference to launch the new card with a 
Bürgerkarte function.’
Although there has not been an official evaluation of this first implementation of 
the Bürgerkarte, the interview reports reveal that the team involved in the imple-
mentation faced some substantial problems. One of the respondents explained: 
‘There were a lot of technical problems. The members of the society who wanted 
to activate the Bürgerkarte function found it very difficult to get the software 
running. Even the IT professionals had problems with it.’ And another actor: ‘The 
usability of the system was low back then. It was very complicated to install the 
card reader and even to purchase a card reader as there were only few companies 
which sold card readers. There were large thresholds for society members to use 
the Bürgerkarte concept.’ And: ‘People had to pay around 40 euros to obtain a 
certificate with which they could identify themselves. Of course no citizen was 
willing to pay these costs.’
In 2004, the MasterCard of several Austrian Banks and the student chip card of the 
Vienna University of Economics and Business were prepared for the Bürgerkarte.84 
In the same year, the Austrian Parliament passed e-Government legislation estab-
lishing a legal framework for the Bürgerkarte.85 In 2005, a mobile application for 
citizen authentication was made available as well as the e-Card of the Social Se-
curity Agency, which included the option of activating the Bürgerkarte function.86 
81 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/4486/5584
82 http://www.rechtsprobleme.at/doks/burgerkarte-gerstbach.pdf
83 http://www.epractice.eu/en/news/284155
84 http://www.rechtsprobleme.at/doks/Bürgerkarte-gerstbach.pdf
85 Parycek et al. (2004). 
86 ‘A1 Signatur: der Mobilfunkbetreiber Mobilkom Austria bietet mit der A1 Signatur einen 
serverbasierten Dienst für die Verwaltungssignatur an. Ander sals bei den kartenbasierten 
Lösungen wird bei der A1 Signatur nach dem Ausfüllen des Formulars ein nur einmal ver-
wendbarer und zeitlich beschrankter SMS-Code an den Handybesitzer geschickt. Durch die 
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By the end of 2005, the contracts of the employees of the ICT Strategy Unit were 
terminated. The Federal Chancellor decided that it was no longer necessary to 
have a taskforce with a specific position since most of the development work had 
been carried out. It was decided to continue some of the work in a unit called 
Chief Information Office, which fell under the Federal Chancellery, to add some 
new tasks to this office and to mandate the technical work to a newly established 
unit of the Graz University of Technology, called EGIZ. The Chief Information Office 
focused on law, organisation, international relations and project management, 
while EGIZ handled the technical development of e-Government applications.87 
In autumn 2005, the ICT Board was replaced by the ‘Digital Austria’ platform, 
which also represented the counties and municipalities.88 The main tasks of the 
platform were (and still are) strategic decision making, priority setting of common 
e-Government projects and the coordination, monitoring and communication of 
these activities.
5.1.4 Diffusion phase
Although the MasterCards of several banks, the e-Card, the Austrian Computer So-
ciety Member Card and the student chip card of the Vienna University of Econom-
ics and Business were prepared for the Bürgerkarte, in 2007 citizen enthusiasm for 
the concept was still far behind expectations. Despite the efforts to improve the 
usability of the software and making it freely available from 2004 onwards,89 in 
March 2007, a mere 20,000 Bürgerkarten had been activated, whereas the govern-
ment had planned for 50,000 by 2006.90 Of the 8.2 million e-Cards that had been 
issued by October 2006, only 8,500 citizens used the opportunity to enhance their 
card with the Bürgerkarte signature, even though it was at no cost.91
In order to further stimulate the diffusion of the Bürgerkarte among citizens and 
service providers, the Federal Chancellery undertook several actions. In 2008, a 
large campaign was launched to encourage students to use their student ID cards 
as Bürgerkarte by giving them free card-readers. However, here too the acceptance 
rate was lukewarm, especially since many students were against the new e-Voting 
system, which they thought endangered their privacy. In 2008 and 2009, test trials 
for e-Voting for the Austrian Student’s Association (Österreichische Hochschüler-
schaft (ÖH)) were introduced, which led to protests from the involved students.92 
Besides the e-Voting initiative, the Federal Chancellery undertook several other 
korrekte Eingabe eines zusätzlichen PINs und dem SMS-Code wird die Signatur automatisch 
durchgefuhrt.’
87 http://www.redactielab.nl/files/Beelden/DTP%20-%20PDF/KJD23-art%20Posch.pdf
88 http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288171
89 http://www.fidis.net/resources/deliverables/hightechid/int-d36000/doc/31/
90 http://www2.argedaten.at/php/cms_monitor.php?q=PUB-TEXT-ARGEDATEN&s=18047gle
91 http://www.jipdec.or.jp/archives/ecom/report/Study_on_PKI_2006_in_EUROPE-FINAL.pdf
92 Survey results are inconclusive. The ÖH committee was against e-Voting, the Austrian 
ministry speaks of a 82% approval rate for e-Voting among students, but surveys within 
the general public in 2007 and 2008 indicated a rejection of e-Voting. According to a 2008 
survey, 60% or the surveyed population was negative about e-Voting (http://futurezone.orf.
at/stories/277927/).
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actions to spread word of the Bürgerkarte concept. They participated in e-Govern-
ment conferences to explain and promote the Bürgerkarte among service provid-
ers. A-SIT published many flyers and instruction videos93 on the Bürgerkarte.94,95,96 
In order to inform citizens, the Bürgerkarte website97 was launched, containing 
information on how to obtain, activate and use the Bürgerkarte. 
Since January 2008, the e-Card of the social security institutions has fully replaced 
– due to amendments98 in the Austrian e-Government legislation – traditional 
signatures.99 The amendments also provided a simplification of the issuance 
process of the Bürgerkarte. According to the new legislation, apart from issuance 
of a new Bürgerkarte by public authorities, other alternatives have been legally 
approved, such as issuance by the online services portal of the Austrian Fiscal 
Authority FinanzOnline100 or by automated teller machines. In November 2008, 
the first version of the new online Bürgerkarte middleware MOCCA (Modular 
Open Bürgerkarte Architecture)101 was released at the open-source platform www.
egovlabs.gv.at.102 One of the aims of using this new middleware was to lower user 
thresholds by making the software more user-friendly. MOCCA allows implement-
ing Bürgerkarte-based authentication at websites without requiring the installa-
tion of software at the user’s computer.103 
Despite all those efforts, today the take-up by service providers and citizens is 
still disappointing. In November 2009, a mere 120,000 Bürgerkarte certificates 
had been issued and around 15 government services were available through the 
Bürgerkarte concept.104 According to some interviewees, the marketing of the 
Bürgerkarte was not effective enough. One of them stated: ‘Public administration 
is not well suited for marketing and campaigning products. It has always been 
difficult in terms of budgetary restrictions. Now and then we have an article or 
advertisement in the newspaper, but we cannot spend huge amounts.’ According 
to others however, there are other explanations for the limited take-up: ‘Although 
the software very much improved over time and card readers became more avail-
able – nowadays many laptops have a card reader integrated – the take-up still 
has been limited. […] There are several causes. An important one is the fact that 
the frequency of interaction between government and citizen is very low. Citizens 
93 http://www.a-sit.at/de/dokumente_publikationen/videos/index.php
94 http://www.a-sit.at/de/dokumente_publikationen/flyer/index.php
95 http://www.a-sit.at/de/dokumente_publikationen/praesentationen/index.php
96 http://www.a-sit.at/pdfs/20051205_Leitold-ADV-24-Seiten.pdf, e.g. during the 2002 e-
Government Conference in Vienna.
97 http://www.buergerkarte.at/en/index.html
98 http://www.digitales.oesterreich.gv.at/site/cob__27037/5236/default.aspx
99 http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288173
100 https://www.bmf.gv.at/EGovernment/FinanzOnline/
101 MOCCA – ‘Modular Open Bürgerkarte Architeture ist ein vom E-Government Innovation-
szentrum (EGIZ) gestartes Projekt zur Implementierung einer freien, modularen, open-source 
Bürgerkartenumgebung (BKU).’
102 http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288168
103 http://www.egiz.gv.at/
104 See also European Commission, (2009), ‘eID Interoperability for PEGS, Austrian Country 
Profile’, Brussels.
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have on average 1.2 yearly contact moments with government agencies. For many 
citizens this is too low to make the effort to activate the Bürgerkarte.’ 
The future diffusion of the Bürgerkarte concept is coordinated by the Chief 
Information Office of the Federal Chancellery, which is also responsible for the 
maintenance and further development of the Bürgerkarte concept.105 In the com-
ing years, the Chief Information Office will intensify their focus on promoting the 
Bürgerkarte. More services will be offered, which the office expects to stimulate 
citizens to activate the Bürgerkarte function. Another major priority is the partici-
pation of the Austrian government in European projects such as STROK. One of 
the involved actors stated in this respect: ‘Now that the mobile signature has be-
come available, we expect a further take-up by citizens. The fact that technology 
– such as card readers – is more mature and widely available will also stimulate 
take-up. In addition we expect the first cross-border services to be available by 
using the Bürgerkarte by the end of next year.’
5.1.5 Conclusions
As the previous sections have demonstrated, the dominant actors in the 
Bürgerkarte project were the ICT Strategy Unit of the Federal Chancellery (respon-
sible for the project), A-SIT (inspection and approval of Bürgerkarte certificates) 
and A-Trust (provider of Bürgerkarte certificates). Other actors involved were 
service providers and organisations that produce or issue eIDM carriers (such as 
the Social Security Agency, which provides the e-Card). The principal strategy of 
the ICT Strategy Unit was to develop an ‘open’ eIDM concept; a solution which 
can be applied to various eIDM carriers (such as smart cards and mobile phones). 
The decision to make the Bürgerkarte an open concept was largely caused by the 
difficulties in the e-Card project of the Social Security Agency, whose card was 
initially the sole carrier of the Bürgerkarte. As the Federal Chancellery feared a 
lack of progress in the e-Card project, it decided to make the Bürgerkarte carrier-
independent. 
Furthermore, the ICT Strategy Unit’s approach appeared to be highly technology 
driven. A dominant feature in the innovation process of the Bürgerkarte concept 
was the technical design of the solution. The technological ambitions of the ICT 
Strategy Unit – responsible for the development of the Bürgerkarte – were high 
compared to the eIDM ambitions of other European member states. In later stages 
of the innovation, more attention was paid to the usability and the marketing 
of the Bürgerkarte. The ICT Strategy Unit also decided to change the financing 
model and decrease the costs for citizens of obtaining the Bürgerkarte function. 
In the past few years, the focus has shifted towards the extension of the num-
ber of electronic services available through the Bürgerkarte. In June 2009, the 
105 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VB3-4T0FF98-2&_
user=603085&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_search-
StrId=1090110470&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000031079&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_
userid=603085&md5=b345d0ab93053ea6e50118980b670861
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Bürgerkarte could be used106 for around 15 electronic government services, and 
in November 2009 around 120,000 Bürgerkarte certificates had been issued (ap-
proximately 1.5% of the Austrian population). Whereas the outcome of the innova-
tion process is a highly mature eIDM system, the impact has been limited due to 
the small number of services available, a small user base and limited use by the 
citizens who have a Bürgerkarte. 
5.2 PARAMETERS AND EVENTS Of THE ADVOCACy 
COALITION fRAMEwORK
The influence of the Advocacy Coalition Framework parameters and events are 
explored in this section. An assessment is made for each parameter and event to 
discover whether and how the parameter or event affected the joint innovation 
process. 
5.2.1 Attributes of the good
The Bürgerkarte was developed to enable citizens to securely access electronic 
public services and to electronically sign formal documents.107 Key in the Austrian 
eID concept is that there is not just one single type of card which can be used as a 
Bürgerkarte.108 Basically, any card supporting secure electronic signature technol-
ogy that can store personal data is suitable as a Bürgerkarte (e.g. student chip 
card, bank cards, national health insurance e-Card). The concept also applies to 
mobile phones. Thus, multiple cards (and mobile phones) issued (or sold) by dif-
ferent entities can include the Bürgerkarte function. 
Irrespective of the carrier used (chip card, mobile phone or USB equipment), 
the chosen medium has to meet certain security requirements as defined in the 
Bürgerkarte policy.109 For example, the carrier has to support qualified signature, 
certain identification technology and enable data storage. A personal identifier, 
called the ‘source PIN’, is stored on the card. This source PIN is derived from the 
person’s unique identification number (ZMR number as stored in the Central Reg-
ister of Residents) and serves as the basis for generating sector-specific personal 
identifiers. A person’s source PIN can be controlled only by the legitimate holder 
of the Bürgerkarte, and cannot be stored directly in applications. To enhance data 
protection, both the ZMR number in the source PIN and derivation of the sector-
specific personal identifier from the source PIN are encrypted.
106 See also European Commission, (2009), ‘eID Interoperability for PEGS, Austrian Country 
Profile’, Brussels.
107 http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288173
108 http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288173
109 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32296
Noor BW 7.indd   85 08-09-10   12:07
THE AUSTR IAN BüRGERKARTE  
86
All citizens aged 18 years and older who reside in Austria and are listed in the 
Central Register of Residents are entitled to a Bürgerkarte.110 Possessors of a 
Bürgerkarte-prepared card (such as a health insurance card or bank card), can 
activate the Bürgerkarte function. If a citizen does not have a prepared card, he 
or she can purchase a qualified signature, which can be used as a Bürgerkarte, at 
the certification service provider A-Trust. The activation process depends on the 
actual token used:
•	 Bank cards require the activation of a qualified certificate. A request for the 
certificate can be made on the internet. Registration requires physical pres-
ence at a registration office (banks, notaries) and identification by means of a 
photo ID.
•	 The health insurance card (e-Card) can be activated at a registration office 
(social insurance organisation) where the applicant has to be physically 
present and identify him/herself by means of a photo ID. Activation can also 
occur on the internet, but then the user needs a registered letter, which he 
or she can obtain at a post office while identifying him/herself by means of a 
photo ID. 
•	 To register a mobile phone as a Bürgerkarte, the application is made via the 
internet. Registration requires physical presence at a registration office of the 
mobile phone service provider and identification by means of a photo ID.
The interviews reveal that some attributes of the Bürgerkarte solutions have im-
pacted the dynamics in the subsystem and/or the innovation outcome. Firstly, 
various respondents argued that the fact that the Bürgerkarte is an open concept 
has impacted the number of card providers involved in the development phase. 
Instead of one, there are up to ten card providers in Austria that have incorpo-
rated the Bürgerkarte function into their card (e.g. Social Security Agency, banks, 
universities, Austrian Computer Society). One of the respondents, for instance, 
said about this: ‘When we saw that the e-Card project of the Hauptverband [Social 
Security Agency] did not make any progress, we decide that it would be best if 
the Bürgerkarte concept would be open; that it could be applied to any card. As a 
result, the number of potential carriers of the Bürgerkarte increased substantially. 
[…] Compared to other eIDM solutions in European member states, the involve-
ment of so many card providers is quite unique.’
Secondly, several interviewees stated that the complexity of the identification 
scheme and subsequent implementation was one of the reasons why service pro-
viders were reluctant to join up. One of them, for instance, explained: ‘At a certain 
point in time, there was a study which indicated that the average number of yearly 
interactions between citizen and local government was 1.2. […]. This, combined 
with the burden to implement the system, resulted in a limited willingness of the 
regions and municipalities to implement the system.’ Another actor involved: ‘The 
regions and the municipalities find the use of the source PIN and sector specific 
numbers inefficient. For them it is very complicated to implement this system. 
110 https://www.eid-stork.eu/index.php?option=com_processes&act=show_
process&Itemid=60&id=312
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Today, the large majority has not implemented it yet.’ And: ‘We had discussions 
with local service providers who do not understand why we developed this kind 
of scheme. […] We have to convince them that there is a need for it. They say that 
they already have a register that contains citizens’ data. We try to convince them 
that on a large scale it makes sense: it enhances data protection.’
Thirdly, the cumbersome (re)activation procedures of the Bürgerkarte function are 
generally perceived by involved actors as hindrances for user adoption: ‘Although 
the software very much improved over time and card readers became more avail-
able – nowadays many laptops have a card reader integrated – the take-up still 
has been limited. […] There are several causes. One is the fact that the Bürgerkarte 
is not only an identification system, but also an e-Signature system. Until 2008, it 
was stated in the Signature Act that in case of loss of the code, one had to activate 
it again in person. In other words: the code could not be sent by email. In addition, 
the average number of e-Goverment transactions per citizen on a yearly basis is 
very low. People easily forget their code and the efforts to reactivate it are too 
high in relation to the frequency of use. The Bürgerkarte is a brilliant concept, but 
too complicated.’
In conclusion, it seems that, on the one hand, the open technical concept of the 
Bürgerkarte solution increased the number of card providers involved, but, on the 
other hand, that the complexity of the implementation and (re)activation resulted 
in limited adoption by service providers and citizens. 
5.2.2 Basic distribution of resources
Since the annual reports of the Federal Chancellery, the Social Security Agency, 
A-Trust and A-Sit are not open to the public, it is difficult to estimate the costs 
of the Bürgerkarte concept. Yet, interviews and articles in newspapers reveal the 
following budgets and costs for citizens: 
•	 On the government side, budgets were available at the Federal Chancellery 
to establish the ICT Strategy Unit and at Hauptverband to create the new 
national health insurance card. One of the interviewees said the following 
about the budget of the Federal Chancellery: ‘We had a budget for around 
25 employees and a few million euros to develop the Bürgerkarte Strategy.’ 
Another respondent: ‘There is a budget at the Federal Chancellery for people 
working on e-Government and a low budget for the procurement of exper-
tise.’ About the national health insurance card it was stated that: ‘The produc-
tion of the e-Card cost about 100 million euros.’
•	 Several respondents stated that the investments made by A-Trust amounted 
to about 25 million euros, the costs of which comprised budgets for the es-
tablishing of the certification organisation. 
•	 The federal Ministry of Science and Research invested 900,000 euros in the 
e-Voting project. The card readers provided to students cost around 100,000 
euros, personnel expenses around 88,000 euros, the software for the e-
Voting platform around 66,000 euros, the certification around 54,000 euros, 
Noor BW 7.indd   87 08-09-10   12:07
THE AUSTR IAN BüRGERKARTE  
88
15,000 for the voting website, 74,000 for a study on the e-Voting project and 
50,000 for the evaluation of the e-Voting project.111 
•	 The interviews reveal that the software to implement the Bürgerkarte sys-
tem into the systems of the service providers was provided to them free of 
charge. However, they did not receive any financial support for the integra-
tion of the software into their systems. 
•	 In the early years of the Bürgerkarte innovation, the cost for the citizens to 
obtain a Bürgerkarte function, certificate and accompanying devices was 
around 100 euros. Die Presse calculated in February 2002 that ‘A signature 
card costs about 60 euros (826 S), and the digital signature is valid for one 
year. Extending the period of validity by one more year costs 15 euros. The 
cost for card readers starts at 33 euros.’112
The distribution of resources has impacted the dynamics in the subsystem in 
several ways. Firstly, many respondents stated that there have been recurrent 
discussions between the Federal Chancellery, A-Trust and the banks on the financ-
ing model of the Bürgerkarte. One of the interviewees, for instance, explained: 
‘We have had many talks with the banks and A-Trust about the Bürgerkarte. Back 
in 2000, the business case for them was to gain money by selling Bürgerkarte 
certificates to citizens [by A-Trust]. However, citizens were not willing to pay and 
the take-up was low.’ Another respondent: ‘The idea of the banks was that the 
Bürgerkarte solution would help them to make internet payments more secure. 
However, they concluded that – compared to the phishing problem – internet 
fraud was only a minor problem. Then the idea was that the banks could gain 
money through the purchase of the Bürgerkarte certificates by A-Trust. The banks 
invested around 25 million in A-Trust. The take-up lagged behind and the willing-
ness of banks to be involved decreased.’
Secondly, various respondents argued that the costs of the Bürgerkarte for citi-
zens, in combination with the disappointing take-up by citizens, led to many dis-
cussions between involved parties. In 2005, a new cost structure was agreed upon. 
One of the actors involved, for instance, reported: ‘It took several long disputes 
but eventually the discussion was settled. The financial construction would be 
managed by the chancellery and various players, such as the Hauptverband [So-
cial Security Agency], the Federal Chancellery and the Ministry of Finance would 
be part of the deal. […]. Eventually they all agreed that they had to find another 
financing model for the Bürgerkarte in order to decrease the costs for citizens. Af-
ter many discussions, the idea was that every Austrian citizen would pay a certain 
amount for the e-Card and that 10 euros of this amount would be used to make 
the Bürgerkarte chip on the e-Card and to provide citizens with certificates.’ 
Thirdly, several interview reports reveal that the lack of financial resources to im-
plement the system at the local level prevent local authorities from participating. 
One of the involved persons, for instance, stated: ‘The municipalities and regions 
111 http://diepresse.com/home/bildung/universitaet/504293/index.do
112 Die Presse, 5 February 2002, ‘Elektronische Signatur: Ab heute im Postamt erhältlich.’
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could download technical specifications on a website, but the federal government 
did not offer any support for implementing the software into existing infrastruc-
ture. They got modules to prove citizens’ identities, but nobody told them how to 
use the modules. They have to finance the implementation themselves, which is 
one of the central reasons why they are reluctant to join-up.’
In conclusion, the basic distribution of resources affected the dynamics in the sub-
system in the sense that there were many negotiations between involved parties 
on the funding of the Bürgerkarte concept. In addition, the costs of the Bürgerkarte 
for service providers and citizens were perceived as being too high in relation to 
the benefits of the system, which made them reluctant to adopt the system.
5.2.3  Fundamental cultural values 
Key fundamental values that contributed to the definition of eIDM issues in the 
subsystem and the shaping of the eIDM innovation can be found in leading 
policy documents on e-Government and eID. The most influential policy docu-
ment is the ‘Bürgerkarte White Paper’, the first version of which was published 
in 2000 and the final version in 2002.113 This document was jointly produced by 
BMÖLS and A-SIT, two dominant actors in the subsystem. This document stresses 
the achievement of several public values. Firstly, the authors of the white paper 
perceive technology as an enabler for improved services to citizens and businesses. 
The document states that the Bürgerkarte concept is an enabler for the integra-
tion – and hence increased effectiveness – of separate e-Government initiatives: 
‘Aktivitäten der elektronischen Verwaltung entstehen nebeneinander und oft 
ohne enge Koordination. Das Konzept Bürgerkarte als ein zentrales Element des 
e-Government hat besonderen Bedarf, mit anderen Aktivitäten abgestimmt zu 
werden. Die elektronische Signatur erlaubt die wirksame Trennung der Bereiche 
Anwendung, Portal, Heranführung und Bürger, die ihrerseits eine wichtige Basis 
für weitere Veränderungen aufgrund von Technologieentwicklung ermöglicht.’
Furthermore, the white paper pays close attention to the security of the solu-
tion. In the introduction to the document, it is contended that the security of 
the Bürgerkarte concept is a fundamental requirement for both citizens and 
the government. In addition, it is stated (section 2.1.1) that the use of secure 
electronic signatures in communications with the administration is crucial and 
that the application of certain technologies – in particular asymmetric cryptog-
raphy, hash procedures and certification – can provided the required security 
level: ‘Der Einsatz sicherer elektronischer Signaturen in der Kommunikation mit 
der Verwaltung ist das Schlüsselelement für die Gewährleistung der Sicherheit 
im e-Government. […]. Dabei werden folgende Elemente notwendig: (1) Public-
Key-Kryptographie, auch als asymmetrische Kryptographie bezeichnet, stellt die 
mathematische Grundlage dar, (2) Hash-Verfahren gewährleisten Integrität der 
Daten und erlauben einen effizienten Signaturerstellungsprozess (3) Zertifikate 
113 http://www.buergerkarte.at/regain/file/D:/webs/at.buergerkarte.downloads/Weissbuch-
Buergerkarte.20020515.pdf?index=main
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binden die technischen Elemente wie kryptographische Schlüssel an die Identität 
des Signators.’
The third central element in the white paper is technology. Although most respon-
dents consider the white paper’s most important aim to convince top officials and 
policy makers of the need for the Bürgerkarte solution and its key features (such 
as the openness) the document is rather detailed on the technological design 
of the Bürgerkarte. Section 2.3 of the paper sets out the technical details of the 
solution and other sections also contain technical details. For instance, on the 
use of (international) technical standards: ‘Die Schnittstelle des Security-Layer 
unterstützt die Erstellung sowie die überprüfung von elektronischen Signaturen 
nach zwei gängigen international standardisierten Formaten: Cryptographic 
Message Syntax (CMS) und XML-Signature Syntax and Processing (XMLDSIG).’ The 
technological orientation of the document may be caused by the fact that three 
of the five authors (including the first author, professor Posch) have a technical 
background (information processing and IT security). 
Various interviewees have stated that in particular the technological orientation 
and the perception that security is one of the major concerns affected the in-
novation process and the outcome of the innovation. One of them, for instance, 
argued: ‘Privacy and security are important values in Austria, and thus also in the 
group which developed the system. We [the ICT Strategy Unit] wanted to develop 
something which would be accepted by the Austrian citizens and created a highly 
secure system. As the technological experts were dominant in the unit, with 
Posch as the chief expert in information processing and IT security, the project 
also focused heavily on technologies.’ And someone else: ’I guess the fact that key 
persons valued technology and security highly shaped the innovation to a large 
extent. We have a system which is highly secure and which consists of the newest 
technologies.’ Others relate the technological orientation to the limited take-up 
of the Bürgerkarte: ‘The Netherlands has their DigiD system, which makes use of a 
username, password and SMS authentication. Although DigiD is perceived as un-
safe here [in Austria] compared to the Bürgerkarte, the take-up up is much higher. 
The advantage of DigiD is that it is easy to obtain, activate and use. It seems that 
there is a tension between highly secure and complex systems and usability and 
subsequent take-up.’ 
Overall, one can conclude that the technological orientation and privacy concerns 
have affected the features and subsequent impact of the innovation. 
5.2.4 Basic legal structure
The main legal framework for the eID card consists of the following legislation:114
•	 The Electronic Signature Act, which came into force on 1 January 2000. 
The act legally recognises electronic signatures that meet certain security 
114 https://www.eid-stork.eu/index.php?option=com_processes&act=show_
process&Itemid=60&id=312
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requirements and provides some evidence-based value to less secure elec-
tronic signatures. Furthermore, the law makes requirements of enterprises 
issuing qualified certificates and defines the conditions for the acceptance of 
certificates of foreign origin. 
•	 The e-Government Act was enacted in 2004 and is the overall legal basis for 
Austrian e-Government. Regarding eIDM, the law defines the Bürgerkarte 
concept and its use in the public sector using sector-specific PINs and in the 
private sector using private sector-specific PINs. Important principles are: 
freedom of choice between means of communication; ensuring legal pro-
tection by creating appropriate technical means and unhindered access to 
information.
•	 The Source PIN Register Regulation was enacted on 2 March 2005. Part four 
deals with electronic representation. It defines the activities of the source 
PIN Register Authority that are necessary to implement the Bürgerkarte con-
cept and the creation of the identity link or electronic representation.
•	 The Supplementary Register Regulation, August 2005, defines the operation 
of the Supplementary Registers as including natural or legal persons not 
covered by existing registers.
•	 The Federal Act on Registration of 1991, last amended in 2006; the law defines 
the Central Register of Residents.
•	 The Administrative Signature Regulation was enacted in April 2004 and 
stipulates that the technical requirements for the Bürgerkarte, in an interim 
period until end of 2007, need not be based on qualified signatures. 
Amendments115 in e-Government legislation in 2008 led to the adoption of e-
Cards, issued from January 2008 onwards, which can be used as a fully fledged 
replacement of traditional signatures.116 The same legislation amendments also 
provide simplification of the issuance process for the Bürgerkarte. Accordingly, 
apart from the issuance of the new Bürgerkarte by public authorities, other al-
ternatives are now possible, such as issuance by the online services portal of the 
Austrian Fiscal Authority, FinanzOnline, or by automated teller machines.
Various interviewees stated that the strict requirements of the legal framework (e-
Signature law, which changed in 2008) affected the adoption of the innovation by 
citizens and businesses. Until 2008, Austrian law required that citizens who had lost 
their code reactivate it in person, a requirement that has been generally perceived 
as a threshold for take-up by citizens. One of the respondents, for instance, stated: 
‘There are several causes [for the limited take-up by citizens]. One is the fact 
that the Bürgerkarte is not only an identification system, but also an e-Signature 
system. The e-Signature Act stated that in case of loss of the code, you have to 
activate it again in person. In other words: they cannot send it to you by e-mail.’
However, the interview reports of several respondents also show that legislation 
did not substantially affect the dynamics within the subsystem or the innovation 
115 http://www.digitales.oesterreich.gv.at/site/cob__27037/5236/default.aspx
116 http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288173
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outcome. One of these respondents reported: ‘At a certain point, we heard that a 
legal basis for the Bürgerkarte was needed. We wrote it in a few months. We had 
one legal specialist, and he was doing most of the work together with Reinhard 
Posch and another employee of the ICT Strategy Unit. It passed very smoothly 
in parliament.’ Another actor involved stated: ‘Of course there were some legal 
questions, for instance how to translate the legal requirements of the offline world 
into the digital world. This does not only concern communication with citizens 
and businesses, but also the internal administration of government bodies. For 
instance, there were questions on the authenticity of documents in electronic file 
systems. Most of these kinds of questions were solved quite easily.’
In conclusion, it appears that the strict requirements of the legal framework (in 
particular the e-Signature legislation) may have limited citizen take-up since the 
threshold for obtaining, activating and re-activating the Bürgerkarte was too 
cumbersome. However, there is not any sound evidence outlining the impact 
of the legal framework on interactions between actors of the subsystem or their 
strategies.
5.2.5 Changes in socio-economic conditions and technology
During the Bürgerkarte’s innovation process, one of the most important changes 
in the socio-economic conditions of Austrian society was the burst of the internet 
bubble in 2001. In the years 1998, 1999 and 2000, the annual GDP growth in Austria 
was 3.6%, 3.3% and 3.7%117 respectively (see figure 6 below). In 2001, 2002 and 2003, 
growth dropped to 0.5%, 1.6% and 0.8%. The Austrian economy recovered in the 
years 2004 to 2007 with respective growths of 2.5%, 2.5%, 3.5%, and 3.5%. 
117 http://www.indexmundi.com/austria/gdp_real_growth_rate.html
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A second socio-economic change during the innovation process was the evolution 
of technology applied in the Bürgerkarte solution. Whereas at the onset several of 
the technologies used for the Bürgerkarte development were relatively immature 
and had limited availability, today most of these technologies are widely used and 
mature. For instance, in the late 1990s, the costs of card readers were relatively 
high, they could only be purchased at a very limited number of companies and 
the software that supported the card readers suffered from teething problems.118 
Today, many companies sell card readers for much lower prices and their use has 
substantially increased. 
A last major socio-economic change is the current economic crisis. Although the 
opinions of economists on the precise impact of the current economic crisis differ, 
no one would argue that we have not been in a global economic recession since 
2008. In Austria, for example, GDP growth in 2008 was 2%, whereas in 2009 it was 
-3.8% (see figure 6 above).
Interviews reveal that there are differences in the perceived impacts regarding 
the influence of the economic and technological developments over time. Firstly, 
most respondents stated that the burst of the internet bubble at the beginning 
of the 21st century did not have a significant impact on the innovation process. 
These statements are endorsed by research carried out by the European Commis-
sion, which provided an overview of e-Government budgets in European coun-
tries in 2000, 2001 and 2002.119 The study demonstrates that – despite the burst 
of the internet bubble – the e-Government budgets of the Austrian government 
increased between 2000 and 2002, from 760 million euros in 2000, to 785 million 
in 2001 and 812 million in 2002. In addition, interview reports reveal that – com-
pared to other e-Government investments – the costs of the development and 
implementation of the Bürgerkarte was not perceived as being substantial. One of 
the interviewees for instance explained: ‘The e-card would be rolled-out anyway 
and the extra money needed to add the Bürgerkarte function to the e-Card was 
relatively limited.’
Regarding the evolution of technology applied in the Bürgerkarte concept, sev-
eral respondents stated that the ambitious technological targets the Austrian 
government set by applying smart-card technology and asymmetric encryption 
(elliptic cryptography) yielded a limited take-up by citizens since the technology 
was highly immature and therefore difficult to use. Some of them expect the 
take-up to increase now that the technology is more mature, easier to use and 
widely available (e.g. card readers). One of them stated: ‘I think professor Posch is 
118 This was not only the case in Austria, but also in other countries. See, for instance, Srivastava 
(2005). 
119 European Commission, (2006), ‘e-Government Economics Project (eGEP)’, Expenditure Study 
Final Version, Brussels, http://82.187.13.175/eGEP/Static/Contents/final/D.1.3Expenditure_
Study_final_version.pdf. The only publicly available data on public administration ICT and 
e-Government expenditure in Europe are those presented in the EITO (European Informa-
tion Technology Observatory) 2002 edition, which contains a monographic section on 
e-Government.
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a genius in technology, but he was too early. The technology was immature. It was 
not a case of plug and play when we started to implement the concept. Over time, 
the technology became more mature and this evolution of technology may boost 
the take-up.’ However, there is no sound evidence at the moment that this take-up 
will take place the coming years.
Furthermore, several interviewees expect that the current economic crisis will 
have an impact on e-Government budgets since cutbacks are expected. Accord-
ing to one of the interviewees: ‘The focus will continue to shift towards more ef-
ficiency and effectiveness as government budgets are likely to decrease in the 
coming years. This may impact the Bürgerkarte project in the sense that here too 
the focus will be on the concept’s increased efficiency.’ However, no sound conclu-
sions can be drawn as regards the impact of the current economic crisis on the 
Bürgerkarte project.
To summarize, although respondents expect socio-economic conditions, such as 
the current economic crisis and the increased maturity of certain technologies, 
to impact the dynamics of the subsystem and/or the take-up of the innovation, 
currently there is no sound evidence of these impacts. 
5.2.6 Changes in public opinion
Public opinion on the Bürgerkarte is most clearly voiced in the media, such as 
national newspapers. Over time, several newspapers have published articles on 
the Bürgerkarte project. The newspaper Die Presse120 published over 70 articles 
mentioning the Bürgerkarte. In 2001, the majority of these newspaper articles 
concerned the introduction of the social security chip card (later on e-Card), the 
yearly costs of this card and privacy concerns related to the introduction of the 
Bürgerkarte. Die Presse, for instance, reported the following in November 2001: 
‘Eine Jahresgebühr von rund 500 Schilling (36,3 Euro) für die Sozialversicherungs-
Chipkarte, die ab 2003 den Krankenschein ersetzen soll, hatte der Gesund-
heitssprecher Erwin Rasinger (VP) in der “Presse” gefordert. Dieser Vorschlag stößt 
auf Ablehnung in den übrigen Parteien […] Kritik äußert der Sozialsprecher auch 
daran, daß die Erweiterung der Chipkarte in Richtung “Bürgerkarte” geplant sei. 
Dabei könne es auch datenschutzrechtliche Probleme geben, meinte Öllinger.’ 
In 2002 the first articles emerged on the Bürgerkarte as e-Signature solution for 
digital interaction between government and citizen. Die Presse wrote (Febru-
ary 2002): ’Bereits möglich sind Gewerbeanmeldungen und Sozialversicher-
ungsanträge via Internet. Die Datakom Austria, Tochter der Telekom Austria (TA), 
die die erste digitale Signatur am Markt bereitstellt, erwartet bis Jahresende etwa 
50.000 verkaufte Zertifikate.’ Newspapers also reported about difficulties in the 
procurement of the new social security chip card and the limited take-up of the 
Bürgerkarte ‘Das Interesse an der im Vorjahr angekündigten Signatur ist noch ger-
120 http://diepresse.com/
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ing, bestätigt Josef Ferstl, Geschäftsführer von A-Trust. […] Bisher konnten erst 
10.000 Zertifikate über die Wirtschaftskammer in Umlauf gebracht werden.’ 
Several articles were published on the introduction of the online tax service in 
2003, an application that did not make use of the Bürgerkarte solution. Die Presse 
wrote in January 2003: ‘Februar 2003 wird es zudem möglich sein, Steuererklärun-
gen an das Finanzamt zu übermitteln bzw. personenbezogene Grunddaten wie 
Adresse oder Bankverbindung zu ändern. Nach Angaben des Finanzministeriums 
braucht der Steuerzahler die Bürgerkarte dafür nicht.’ Newspapers also wrote 
about the e-Voting pilot at the University of Vienna and the second procurement 
round for the social security chip card. 
From 2004 on, the Bürgerkarte concept was increasingly criticized. Newspapers 
reported that the concept had failed to break through and published new ex-
pectations regarding its take-up. Die Presse, for instance, wrote in May 2004: ‘Als 
Anbieter der Bürgerkarte werden ab dem Sommer auch die Banken fungieren. 
Zwischen 3,2 und 3,5 Millionen Bankomatkarten würden im Sommer turnusmäßig 
ausgetauscht, sagte dazu der E-Business-Leiter der BAWAG, Robert Krickl. Die 
neuen Karten seien dann mit Bürgerkarten-Funktion ausgestattet.’
Fewer articles were published in 2005 and 2006 about the Bürgerkarte. In 2007, 
2008 and 2009, most of these articles concerned the e-Voting project, which led 
to protests among students as they found the process cumbersome and insuffi-
ciently secure. In addition, newspapers continued to write about the low take-up. 
In November 2009, Die Presse wrote: ‘[..] dabei nur wählen könne, wer über eine 
Bürgerkarte verfügt. Von denen seien aber allenfalls 100.000 im Umlauf.’ 
The majority of respondents stated that changes in public opinion did not have a 
substantial impact on the dynamics of the subsystem or the innovation strategy. 
One of them, for instance, stated: ‘The student protest during the e-Voting project 
did not affect our work. There will always be some people who do not agree with 
the policy.’ Another respondent: ‘We did not really discuss the negative publicity 
on the e-Voting project in our team. But I regularly wondered why we did not send 
any counter messages. The system was easy to defend.’ Another respondent: ‘The 
discussions in the newspaper did not have a real impact. It did not change our 
strategy.’ Someone else: ‘There were not any press releases that had a real impact; 
there was no critical message with a real basis. We did not have to change. Public 
opinion is important but it is more a question of how to influence public opinion 
in such a way that take-up increases.’
On the other hand, most of the interviewed people were not satisfied with the 
extent to which the Federal Chancellery had tried to influence public opinion. One 
of them, for instance, stated: ‘Public administration is not well suited for market-
ing and campaigning products. It has always been difficult in terms of budgetary 
restrictions. Now and then we have an article or advertisement in the newspaper, 
but we cannot spend a huge amount.’
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Overall, no evidence has been found that the many articles on the Bürgerkarte 
concept and project in the newspapers (e.g. Die Presse) significantly affected the 
dynamics of the subsystem. 
5.2.7 Systemic governing coalitions
There have been several changes to systemic governing coalitions in the Austrian 
Bürgerkarte case. Over time, the number of card and service providers grew, the 
national ICT platform changed names several times (e.g. Task Force eAustria, ICT 
Board and Digital Austria) and involved more members (today regions and mu-
nicipalities are also represented). Yet, the core actors of the Bürgerkarte project 
remained relatively stable. Those responsible for the Bürgerkarte project from 
early 2000 up to today have been the federal CIO and his strategic team, the ICT 
Strategy Unit (nowadays called Chief Information Office). Other key actors, such 
as A-SIT and A-Trust, still have the same role (the inspection and issuing of certifi-
cates, respectively). 
Although the federal CIO kept his position during this period of time, there were 
some changes within his strategic team. In June 2003, Christian Rupp, former e-
Business representative of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, was appoint-
ed federal Executive Secretary for the e-Government initiative of the Austrian gov-
ernment, which also covered the Bürgerkarte project.121 Rupp was appointed to 
directly report to the chancellor about the progress of the e-Government projects. 
In addition, in 2005 the contracts of the employees of the ICT Strategy Unit were 
terminated; several of them changed jobs and some new employees were hired. 
It was decided to continue some of the work in a unit called the Chief Information 
Office, which, unlike the former ICT Strategy Unit, was part of the hierarchy of the 
Federal Chancellery. The office received some new tasks, and the technical work 
was mandated to a newly established unit of the Graz University of Technology, 
called EGIZ. From 2005 on, the Chief Information Office focused on law, organisa-
tion, international relations, programme project management and ICT infrastruc-
ture, and EGIZ on the development of technical e-Government applications.122
The interviews reveal that the impact of new players was relatively limited. Firstly, 
although several interviewees suggested that the appointment of Rupp was an 
attempt to counterbalance the power of the federal CIO, most of them also stated 
that his appointment did not substantially affect the federal CIO’s degree of influ-
ence. Secondly, the large majority of respondents stated that the termination of 
the contract of some employees of the ICT Strategy Unit and the new position 
of the unit in the hierarchy of the chancellery did not significantly affect the dy-
namics of the subsystem or the innovation outcome since the Bürgerkarte project 
had already progressed to such a degree (diffusion stage) that the role of the unit 
became less important. One of them, for instance, stated: ‘From 2005 onwards 
121 http://diepresse.com/home/wirtschaft/economist/207581/index.do?from=suche.intern.
portal
122 http://www.redactielab.nl/files/Beelden/DTP%20-%20PDF/KJD23-art%20Posch.pdf
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[the time that the taskforce ended], we only needed to further implement and 
disseminate the innovation. All important decisions had already been made, so 
we did not need the special position anymore, and neither did the change of em-
ployees have a significant effect.’
To summarize, although the composition of the unit’s team members responsible 
for the Bürgerkarte changed several times during the project and the influence of 
the strategic unit decreased over time, these changes did not substantially impact 
the direction or outcome of the innovation. 
5.2.8 Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems
Over time, there have been three subsystems, the decisions, policies or strategies 
of which were related to the Bürgerkarte project, namely: the subsystem of local 
authorities, the (national) political subsystem and the European subsystem. 
Firstly, as regards the subsystem of local authorities, the IT Cooperation Agree-
ment (1998) between the federal state and regions was related to the Bürgerkarte 
project since the federal state and regions agreed on increased cooperation in 
e-Government projects.123 It was stated in this agreement that: ‘Der Bund und die 
Länder stellen bereinstimmend fest, daß zwischen ihnen im Bereich der Informa-
tionstechnologie (IT) eine verstärkte Kooperation erforderlich ist, um 
•	 den steigenden Anforderungen an die Öffentliche Verwaltung bei der Infor-
mationsverarbeitung gerecht zu werden und
•	 sich bei unterschiedlichen IT-Verfahren dem Bürger und der Wirtschaft ge-
genüber einheitlich zu präsentieren.
Damit soll die bereits in weiten Bereichen positive Zusammenarbeit zwischen den 
IT-Verantwortlichen des Bundes und der Länder nicht nur fortgeführt, sondern 
vertieft und konkretisiert werden.’ The areas in which the parties would cooperate 
were amongst others: standardisation, government intranet and application of 
web technology. Although not explicitly mentioned, the Bürgerkarte project can 
be understood as one of the means for applying web technology. 
Secondly, there were issues raised by the subsystem of (national) political par-
ties related to the Bürgerkarte project. From 1995 to 1999, the SPÖ (‘Socialists’) 
and ÖVP (‘Conservatives’) were in power during the initial drafting phase of the 
Bürgerkarte concept. From 1999 to 2006, the ÖVP and FPÖ (‘Liberals’) were in 
power, and the ÖVP and SPÖ were in power from 2006 onwards. Throughout the 
process, the ÖVP has always been the biggest promoter of the Bürgerkarte and e-
Government. Even though the FPÖ is currently very critical about the Bürgerkarte, 
especially with respect to privacy protection (and against assigning every citizen a 
life-long ID number), it did not oppose it during the initial phase. In the mid-2000s, 
the SPÖ also expressed concerns about the Bürgerkarte, mainly focusing on the 
high costs, but the SPÖ finally voted together with the ÖVP in favour of the con-
123 http://reference.e-Government.gv.at/uploads/media/IT-Koop--Bund-Laender.html
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cept. The only (major) party that was constantly sceptical about the Bürgerkarte, 
was the Green Party, which was opposed to it throughout the whole process.
The third relevant subsystem is the European Commission. The Commission has 
been engaged in eIDM issues since the late 1990s. The Information Society and 
Media department has an e-Government unit, whose name changed in 2007 to 
‘ICT for government and Public Services’. The unit regularly organises meetings 
with the e-Government subgroup, in which all member states are represented. In 
addition, the unit established expert groups, one of which focuses on eIDM. At the 
European level, there were several EU projects and directives on eIDM systems. 
In 1999, the European directive on electronic signatures went into force.124 The 
directive laid down the criteria for legal recognition of electronic signatures in 
European member states. In 2004 and 2005, the European MODINIS project aimed, 
among other things, at assessing the states quo of eID systems in European mem-
ber states and the exploration of possible European eID systems.125 In 2005 IDABC 
launched the eID Interoperability for PEGS programme, the objective of which was 
to analyse the eID and authentication interoperability requirements.126 In 2008 the 
STORK project was launched, which aims to establish a European eID Interoper-
ability Platform that will allow citizens to establish new e-relations across borders 
by presenting their national eID.127 In addition, Cap Gemini publishes an annual 
benchmark on e-Government progress in the European Union member states.
The interview reports show that the three different subsystems yielded different 
levels of impact. According to the majority of respondents, the impact of the local 
entities on the dynamics within the subsystem has not been substantial. One of 
them, for instance, states: ‘The cooperation between the regions and municipali-
ties was quite good actually. However, there was not much cooperation between 
the local and the federal levels in the Bürgerkarte project.’ Another interviewee 
stated: ‘The regions and municipalities have not been involved in the conception 
phase of the innovation. They became involved in 2004 in the e-Government 
board, but then the Bürgerkarte project was already in the implementation 
phase. I think that this is one of the reasons for the low take-up by regions and 
municipalities; they were not involved in the early discussions of the specifica-
tions and requirements of the Bürgerkarte. Now they are not interested; it is not 
their project. Using the Bürgerkarte concept yields no benefits for the regions and 
municipalities.’
In addition, most of the respondents stated that politics (e.g. chamber questions) 
did not significantly affect the dynamics of the subsystem. One of them, for in-
stance, explained: ‘Yes, of course there were chamber questions and political fuss 
about the Bürgerkarte project. But it did not have a real impact. There were some 
privacy issues and there was the student protest. But these incidents did not cause 
any discussions within our team. The expertise was in our unit and we knew that 
124 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/l24118_en.htm
125 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/modinis/index_en.htm
126 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/6484
127 https://www.eid-stork.eu/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1
Noor BW 7.indd   98 08-09-10   12:07
THE AUSTR IAN BüRGERKARTE  
99
what we were doing was right. The Bürgerkarte concept is very secure.’ However, 
some report that the e-Government push by Federal Chancellor Schüssel created 
all kinds of opportunities within the subsystem to develop and implement the 
innovation. One of them, for instance, stated: ’e-Government was very high on 
Schüssel’s political agenda. He was a strong driver behind the Bürgerkarte. It was 
thanks to Schüssel that there was a federal CIO, the ICT board and the ICT Strategy 
Unit.’ 
Furthermore, according to several respondents, actions within the European sub-
system have affected the dynamics of the Bürgerkarte subsystem. One of the in-
volved persons stated: ‘Professor Posch was heavily involved in the writing of the 
electronic signature directive, and later on he became chair of the expert group 
of the European Commission on eIDM systems. He and his university department 
are also involved in all kinds of other projects, such as STORK. Posch’s involve-
ment definitely impacted the Bürgerkarte innovation. Our system is fully in line 
with the European requirements, and we will be among the first countries whose 
eID system can be used abroad.’ According to several respondents, the Capgemini 
benchmarks also had an impact: ‘In 2001 or 2002 we were ranked about 13th. This 
really bothered Schüssel. He said that he wanted to be in the top three within 
two years. This really gave a boost to the e-Government projects, including the 
Bürgerkarte project.’
In conclusion, it appears that the strong involvement of the federal CIO in Euro-
pean projects has influenced the dynamics of the subsystem and the outcome of 
the innovation. From the onset, the European e-Signature directive was a leading 
factor in the subsystem for the Austrian eIDM concept.
5.2.9 Conclusions
Regarding the parameters of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, it appears that 
the dynamics of the subsystem, the innovation process and the take-up of the 
innovation have been affected by the following parameters and events: 
•	 The attributes of the Bürgerkarte concept affected the number of card pro-
viders involved in the innovation. In addition, the complexity of the identi-
fication scheme and the cumbersome (re)activation process resulted in its 
limited adoption by service providers and citizens.
•	 Inadequacies in the financial model, which were caused by flaws in the dis-
semination model (limited take-up by service providers and end-users), 
impacted the dynamics of the subsystem in the sense that it led to much 
negotiation between involved parties and eventually to new funding and 
cost models. 
•	 The importance attributed by developers of the Bürgerkarte solution to val-
ues such as security and the use of advanced technology impacted the features 
of the innovation and resulted in limited take-up – and thus impact – of the 
innovation. 
•	 The basic legal structure did not substantially affect the dynamics of the sub-
system, but did affect the innovation impact.
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•	 There is no sound evidence that the changes in socio-economic conditions 
and technology affected the dynamics of the subsystem.
•	 There is no evidence that the many articles about the Bürgerkarte concept and 
project in the newspapers (e.g. Die Presse) significantly affected the dynam-
ics of the subsystem, innovation output or impact.
•	 The governing coalitions did not substantially change over time. The changes 
in the CIO’s strategic team, and the changed position of the strategic team, 
did not have a substantial impact on the dynamics of the subsystem or in-
novation.
•	 Strong involvement of the federal CIO in the European subsystem affected the 
outcome of the innovation in the sense that the set requirements and de-
veloped ideas within the European subsystem were used in the Bürgerkarte 
subsystem. 
5.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES
This section draws conclusions for each of the social capital variables regarding 
the influence of social capital characteristics on the dynamics of the subsystem 
and subsequently on the joint, technological innovation process. Each sub-sec-
tion concludes with an assessment of the influence of the specific variable on the 
innovation process, outcome and/or impact.
5.3.1 Openness versus group closure
Although the Austrian government chose to implement an open eIDM system, in 
the sense that all kinds of cards could act as carriers of the Bürgerkarte function, 
the number of participating parties during the idea and development phase was 
limited. Actors involved in the development of the concept, and the specifica-
tions and requirements of the Bürgerkarte, were the CIO, his ICT Strategy Unit and 
A-SIT. None of the service providers significantly contributed during this stage. 
Referring to the limited participation of the regions and municipalities, one of 
the interviewees stated: ’The regions and municipalities were not involved in 
the beginning of the innovation process. They became involved in 2004 in the 
e-Government board, but then the Bürgerkarte project was already in the imple-
mentation phase. I think that this is one of the reasons for the low take-up by 
regions and municipalities; they weren’t involved in the early discussions about 
the Bürgerkarte’s specifications and requirements. Now they are not interested; 
it is not their project. Using the Bürgerkarte concept yields no benefits for the 
regions and municipalities.’ Important service providers on the federal level were 
not actively involved either, such as the Ministry of Finance (e.g. tax declarations), 
the Ministry for Education, Arts and Culture (e.g. student registration, benefits), 
the Ministry of Economy, Family and Youth (e.g. child benefits). Although the 
CIOs of all ministries were represented in the ICT board, they did not significantly 
contribute to the definition of requirements of the Bürgerkarte system. Moreover, 
in 2003 the Ministry of Finance launched their online tax service, while using a 
different eIDM system than the Bürgerkarte solution. 
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In addition, several interviewees stated that the ICT Strategy Unit’s relative inde-
pendence reduced potential interference from other government entities (and 
hence caused group closure). One of the interviewees explained: ‘The Stabstelle 
[ICT Strategy Unit] was not part of the government hierarchy. The idea was to 
include people from several ministries in the Stabstelle, but to remain indepen-
dent. Professor Posch recruited employees from several ministries. This was not 
the normal recruitment procedure. Normally the superior of an employee has to 
approve the shift to another ministry, but in this procedure Mr. Posch could pick 
the employee he wanted from the ministries. He had interviews with several em-
ployees and chose the people who fitted the team. He selected the people who 
were very motivated to work on his team. […] We had a very close team.’ And an-
other person involved: ‘Not all ministries had someone who fitted the criteria and 
in these instances people were hired. […]We [the ICT Strategy Unit] had a special 
position; we did not have to answer to any of the top officials, only to professor 
Posch and the chancellor. We did not even reside in the chancellery; we worked 
at a Regus office – some building where businesses can rent rooms. We had an 
ambitious and tight team. Mr. Posch had a very independent position as he was 
not paid by the Federal Chancellery for his job as federal CIO, but by the university.’
A certain degree of group closure also existed since most technical experts in-
volved in the ICT Strategy Unit were from the Graz University of Technology, Mr. 
Posch’s Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications.128 One 
of them explains: ‘Before I joined the Stabstelle [ICT Strategy Unit], I worked for 
professor Posch’s institute. Arno was also from the institute and Herbert worked 
for A-SIT. A-SIT is closely connected to Mr. Posch’s institute. A-SIT is even located 
in his institute. The official address of A-SIT is the same as the address of the In-
stitute for Applied Information Processing and Communications.’ The fact that 
most technical experts were working for the same institute may have influenced 
the chosen approach and type of eIDM solution since there was little external 
contribution and thus no room for alternative technical ideas. Some stated that 
the approach of the Bürgerkarte project was too technical: ‘Since we had a strong 
technical team and a strong technology-oriented leader [professor Posch], our 
approach may have been too technical and maybe we paid too little attention 
to issues such as awareness and innovation adoption.’ And: ’We [the ICT Strategy 
Unit] were technological pioneers; we were pushing the frontier of eIDM innova-
tion. For technicians it was rewarding and a lot of fun. We were running ahead; 
others, however, remained behind.’
In conclusion, group closure resulted in limited involvement of actors outside the 
core group, limited promotion of their interests and demands, and therefore also 
limited willingness of these actors to join up in later phases. 
128 http://www.iaik.tugraz.at/
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5.3.2 Strength of the ties
The vast majority of interviewees stated that the presence of existing ties played 
an important role in the innovation process. Overall, it seems that particularly dur-
ing the initiation and development process, strong ties played an important role 
in influencing opinions, providing access to strategic information, involving other 
parties and creating consensus between these parties. Several respondents stated 
that influencing opinions has predominantly been important at the higher levels 
of the hierarchy. One of them, for instance, stated: ‘At that time [1999], Posch was 
already very well connected. He had a good relationship with the federal chancel-
lor, Mr. Schüssel. He convinced Schüssel that IT and in particular IT Strategy is not 
something that one sources out. One may outsource the implementation of an 
ICT project but not the strategy. He convinced Schüssel of the importance of the 
ICT Strategy Unit, and this unit was established.’ 
Various respondents contended that ties can result in access to strategic informa-
tion. One of the interviewees, for instance, stated: ‘In the working groups [which 
fell under the ICT board], we prepared the decisions to be made by the ICT board. 
If we could not reach an agreement within the working group, we tried to use 
other ties or to build coalitions to get the innovation to move in a certain direc-
tion. For example, if we knew that the idea had four or five supporters, we tried 
to convince the sixth to come on board. In this sense we exerted pressure.’ And 
one of the respondents stated: ‘To be able to influence the decision process it is 
very important to know the agendas and interests of the parties involved. […] 
Ties are used to influence the innovation process. There are informal and formal 
processes; the working groups are formal, and there are all kind of informal bilat-
eral talks with key players in the field. One can arrange solutions informally and 
then confirm them formally. To me the informal processes seem to be even more 
important than the formal processes.’ 
Some other interviewees stated that strong and medium ties were used to involve 
parties. In addition, several respondents provided examples of the transferability 
of ties. For example, one of the statements made was: ‘I did not use my own ties 
that much, but the ties of Mr. Posch. […] Posch asked me to arrange a kick-off 
meeting and gave me a list of people whom should be invited. I started to call 
the people to invite them and one of the top officials of a ministry said to me ”Oh, 
that is very interesting. I will have a look at my calendar for the coming days. Call 
me back on Thursday.” When I hung up I thought: “I’m being given the runaround.” 
So I decided to have a coffee and passed Mr. Posch’s office. He was in his office, 
so I told the story and he laughed. When I came back from my coffee I was called 
by the top official who said that he would attend the kick-off. Obviously, Posch 
had contacted him.’ Weaker ties have also been used to involve stakeholders. An 
example is the participation of service providers. Both the Social Security Agency 
and the Austrian Computer Society have been involved through existing ties. One 
of the interviewees stated about the involvement of the Austrian Computer So-
ciety: ‘Both Alexander and Mr. Posch already knew many people there [Austrian 
Computer Society]. They were involved in the working groups. Of course, their 
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ties played a role in the involvement of the Austrian Computer Society. They sug-
gested to the Austrian Computer Society to become involved.’
In addition, diverse interview reports reveal that strong ties have been used for 
parties to reach consensus. A clear example is the strong cooperation between the 
Federal CIO and the Austrian Data Protection Commission (Österreichische Daten-
schutzkommission). One of the involved parties reported the following about this: 
‘We had already known each other for a long time back then. We worked together 
on several projects. We started to discuss the Bürgerkarte project informally. The 
threshold to start communicating about the project was very low and we subse-
quently started the cooperation.’ Someone else stated: ‘Mr. Posch and Ms. Kotschy 
[Data Protection Commission] have an excellent relationship. I consider them as 
friends. It helped the cooperation between them. Ms. Kotschy’s network at the 
federal Chancellery is also excellent. She has good connections with many legal 
experts there.’ And: ‘Without the close cooperation between Posch and Kotschy 
things would have been more difficult. Probably there would have been more 
resistance from privacy advocacy groups.’
And finally, it appears that strong ties were used to escalate a situation: ‘As the ICT 
Strategy Unit, we had a very good standing with the chancellor. In two or three 
instances we had such a difficult situation that we had to escalate to the chancel-
lor. The chancellor then solved the issue with the responsible minister.’
To summarize, the research findings show that both weak and strong interper-
sonal ties were used to influence opinions, to gain access to strategic information, 
to involve parties and/or to reach consensus.
5.3.3 Heterogeneity of the network
The heterogeneity of the group involved in the development of the Bürgerkarte 
concept was relatively low. Although the employees of the ICT Strategy Unit were 
recruited from several ministries, the profile of the employees was quite compa-
rable. Most of them were young, male, ambitious and had a specific interest in ICT. 
Someone stated about the ICT Strategy Unit: ‘We had a young team; most of us 
were like-minded people. We were young, enthusiastic, worked long hours.’ An-
other stated: ‘Posch, and therefore the ICT Strategy Unit, had a strong engineering 
perspective. Because of this focus on technology, we had a very interesting and 
sophisticated Bürgerkarte concept. The concept, however, did not work out be-
cause we did not involve other perspectives, such as of users or service providers.’
Overall, homogeneity of the group involved in the idea and development phase 
of the innovation process affected the characteristics of the innovation and sub-
sequently the dissemination and take-up of the innovation.
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5.3.4 Broker’s position
Notable is the central position of one of the actors of the network, namely pro-
fessor Reinhard Posch, who held several key positions in the network. He was 
federal CIO, scientific director of A-SIT, advisor at the Social Security Agency, head 
of the Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) 
at the Graz University of Technology129 and participated in the negotiations for 
the directive on a common framework for electronic signatures of the European 
Union.130 He was one of the best-connected persons of the Bürgerkarte subsystem 
(in terms of number of connections and access to high-level positions) and medi-
ated between the interests of several involved parties; for instance between his 
institute IAIK at the Graz University of Technology, A-SIT, the Federal Chancellery, 
the European Commission and some service providers, such as the Austrian Com-
puter Society (where he chaired a working group) and the Social Security Agency 
(where he was advisor). The majority of respondents contended that through this 
strategic position in the network Posch was able to significantly influence the in-
novation process. On of the actors explained: ‘When you have so many influential 
positions at the same time, you have a lot of strategic information about the inter-
est of the parties, which strengthens your position even more. You are able to 
steer the innovation in a certain direction. […] You are able to connect people 
from diverse organisations and their interests.’
The level of influence of people who had low connectivity within the Bürgerkarte 
subsystem is also interesting. An example is the position of the CEOs at A-Trust. 
Because A-Trust’s management changed several times during the project, and 
A-Trust was a private sector partner, they were merely weakly connected to the 
other actors within the subsystem. One of the CEOs explained his position as fol-
lows: ‘I was totally new in the network. I did not know a single person. A-Trust had 
all kind of problems, so what could I do? I made a business plan and started to 
build up my network. I had talks with Mr. Posch, someone at the Social Security 
Agency and Hans Zeger, and tried to build a relationship with them. […] I needed 
these relationships in order to promote the interests of A-Trust.’ There was one 
member of the ICT Strategy Unit who did not have any connections when he 
joined the unit. However, as he was Mr. Posch’s employee, he could use the latter’s 
ties. His strong tie with Mr. Posch strengthened his position within the subsystem, 
since these ties were transferred to him (transferability of ties). 
In conclusion, actors with a strategic position in the network were in a better posi-
tion to influence the direction of the innovation. 
5.3.5 Interpersonal trust
According to the majority of respondents, the level of trust between actors has 
significantly affected the dynamics of the subsystem and the innovation process. 
129 http://www.iaik.tugraz.at/
130 http://www.kuppingercole.com/speakers/268
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The ICT Strategy Unit can be characterised as a high-trust network. The majority of 
respondents involved in this unit have stated that the level of interpersonal trust 
was very high. One of them, for instance, explained: ‘We had an intimate coopera-
tion in the ICT Strategy Unit. We could really rely on each other. […] The meetings 
were informal; we did not always make minutes of the meetings. Sometimes we 
made minutes so as not to forget what we should do, but we didn’t do this to 
ensure that people would act as they had said. I never had the feeling that one 
of the members would act in an unreliable way.’ Someone else: ‘Of course we had 
a warming-up phase, but interpersonal trust grew very fast. In any case, the best 
idea prevailed, it did not matter who had the idea. We exchanged all information 
without restrictions. […] We needed this high level of trust since we worked in a 
high-risk environment. The technology was very new and the project could fail.’
The degree of interpersonal trust also played a bilateral role. One of the involved 
actors stated: ‘Posch and I have a very good relationship. Without the interper-
sonal trust, the cooperation would not have functioned. We had to bring the legal 
and technical work together, which is a challenging job. In those instances trust 
is needed. […] Trust is built on expectations, experiences, but also the sharing of 
values. If one harms the trust of the other party, the cooperation becomes more 
difficult; people become more careful and are less willing to exchange informa-
tion or to experiment together.’ And another actor: ‘The level of trust between 
Rupp and Posch was low. They tried to formally divide responsibilities in order to 
deal with the low-trust relationship. They separated their tasks. […] This may have 
impacted the innovation process in the sense that a closer cooperation between 
Rupp and Posch would have improved the eID concept on the one hand and en-
hanced the dissemination on the other hand.’
Several interviews reveal the connection between the level of trust needed and 
the presence of risks. In particular the political environment was perceived as be-
ing risky. A respondent explained: ‘The level of trust in the ICT Strategy Unit was 
very high; however, outside the unit it was much lower. In our interaction with 
other ministries we had to be very careful of what we said. There were conflict-
ing interests and matters can become politically sensitive. Before a meeting with 
people outside the unit we discussed what we could tell others and what not. We 
asked ourselves: is it the right time to raise this or that issue?’ There are several 
examples where trust was counterbalanced by formal agreements. One of the 
involved actors said: ‘In the ICT board, minutes were very important. The minutes 
were used as a kind of contract; a formal confirmation of the agreements reached. 
There were several instances where we had to refer to the minutes.’ 
The interviews also demonstrate that the necessary level of trust depended on 
the degree to which the interests of involved persons and/or organisations dove-
tailed or actors were dependent on each other. Someone explained: ‘I do not trust 
Mr. Posch. He is one of those people who changes his ideas very frequently. […] 
But we are all in the same boat: if A-Trust fails, the Federal Chancellery will fail too. 
We both want to make the Bürgerkarte innovation a success.’ In addition, the re-
spondents referred to hierarchy, which can be used as compensation for the lack 
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of trust: ‘I know Mr. Posch’s boss quite well. I do trust him [Mr. Posch’s boss]. When 
I do not agree with Mr. Posch, I can go to his boss and arrange things.’ And about 
interdependencies: ‘At first I did not trust him, but I made a deal with him. We 
now have an agreement: I will not talk about his certificate business [which may 
imply reputation damage], and he will not publish any negative articles about my 
company.’
In conclusion, the presence of interpersonal trust increased the willingness of 
actors to take risks and experiment. Low levels of trust were compensated by 
hierarchy, contracts, interdependencies or aligned interests.
5.3.6 Conclusions
It seems that the characteristics and dynamics within the subsystem significantly 
influenced the joint technological innovation. 
•	 Group closure mechanisms resulted in limited contributions by actors out-
side the ICT Strategy Unit, which decreased the inclusion of their interests 
and demands and subsequent willingness to adopt the system.
•	 Interpersonal ties affected the involvement of parties, the application of strat-
egies and decision making. 
•	 The homogeneity of the group affected the characteristics of the innovation 
and consequently the degree of willingness of certain parties to adopt the 
innovation. 
•	 The actors in the subsystem who had a strategic brokerage position had a 
greater influence on the innovation process than people with a less strategic 
position. 
•	 The presence of trust made actors more willing to take risks and to experi-
ment with new technology. 
5.4 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
Regarding the parameters of the framework used for this research, the following 
aspects appear to have influenced the dynamics of the subsystem, the innovation 
outcome and/or impact: 
•	 The attributes of the Bürgerkarte concept affected the number of card pro-
viders involved in the innovation. In addition, the complexity of the identi-
fication scheme and the cumbersome (re)activation process resulted in its 
limited adoption by service providers and citizens.
•	 Inadequacies in the financial model, which were caused by flaws in the dis-
semination model (limited take-up by service providers and end-users), 
impacted the dynamics of the subsystem in the sense that it led to much 
negotiation between involved parties and eventually to new funding and 
cost models. 
•	 The importance attributed by developers of the Bürgerkarte solution to val-
ues such as security and the use of advanced technology impacted the features 
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of the innovation and yielded a limited take-up – and thus impact – of the 
innovation 
•	 The basic legal structure did not substantially affect the dynamics of the sub-
system, but did affect the innovation impact.
•	 There is no sound evidence that the changes in socio-economic conditions 
and technology affected the dynamics of the subsystem.
•	 There is no evidence that the many articles about the Bürgerkarte concept 
and project in the newspapers (e.g. Die Presse) significantly affected the dy-
namics of the subsystem, innovation output or impact.
•	 The governing coalitions did not substantially change over time. The changes 
in the CIO’s the strategic team, and the changed position of the strategic 
team, did not have a substantial impact on the dynamics of the subsystem or 
innovation.
•	 Strong involvement of the federal CIO in the European subsystem affected the 
outcome of the innovation in the sense that set requirements and developed 
ideas within the European subsystem were used in the Bürgerkarte subsys-
tem. 
•	 Group closure mechanisms resulted in limited contributions by actors out-
side the ICT Strategy Unit, which decreased the inclusion of their interests 
and demands and subsequent willingness to adopt the system.
•	 Interpersonal ties were used to influence opinions, gain access to strategic 
information, involve parties and/or reach consensus. The use of the ties for 
these purposes affected the involvement of parties, the application of strate-
gies and decision making. 
•	 The homogeneity of the group involved in the development of the 
Bürgerkarte innovation affected the characteristics of the innovation and 
consequently the degree of willingness of certain parties to adopt the in-
novation. 
•	 One of the actors in the subsystem, who had a strategic brokerage position, 
had great influence on the innovation process since he could influence agen-
das, control the flow of information and act as a bridge between interests. 
•	 The presence of trust made actors more willing to take risks and to experi-
ment with new technology. 
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The Belgian BEPLIC 
 
This sixth chapter describes the case of the joint development of the Belgian 
eIDM system, the BELPIC. As mentioned in the last section of the methodologi-
cal chapter (chapter four), the empirical chapters consist of four main parts. The 
introductory section describes the innovation process chronologically along the 
innovation stages (initiation, development, implementation and diffusion). Con-
clusions are drawn regarding the application of strategies, decision making and 
the outcome and impact of the innovation. The second section presents evidence 
found regarding the impact of Advocacy Coalition Framework parameters and 
events. Each sub–section draws a conclusion about the specific effects of the vari-
able. The influence of social capital variables is explored in the third section. For 
the five dominant network and tie characteristics (network closure, strength of 
ties, heterogeneity, broker’s position and levels of trust) an overview is provided 
of the perceived impact by involved actors. The sub-sections of this third section 
conclude with an overview of the key impacts of the specific variable. The fourth 
(and final) section draws conclusions regarding the influence of the framework 
variables.131 
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In this first section, the successive innovation stages of the development of the 
BELPIC will be described. Of each innovation stage (initiation, development, 
implementation and diffusion), the most important actors involved, strategies ap-
plied and decisions made, are described. The last section of this section provides 
a summary of the key actors, strategies and decisions and gives insight into the 
outputs and impacts of the innovation process. 
6.1.1 Initiation phase
The initial thoughts about a Belgian eID were inspired by the European Commis-
sion’s preparations of the e-Signature directive.132 One of the respondents stated 
131 All websites mentioned in this chapter have been accessed between September and 
December 2009.
132 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/l24118_en.htm
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about the onset of the Belgian eID development: ‘The need to create an electronic 
identity card for Belgian citizens was addressed in 1998 by Jos Dumortier, an ICT 
and law professor at the Katholiek Universiteit Leuven who had been involved in 
the development of the European Commission’s e-Signature directive and also 
worked as an advisor to the Ministry of the Interior. He advised the Ministry of the 
Interior to start the implementation of the directive in time since a great deal of le-
gal and technical work had to be carried out.’ The National Register Department133 
of the Ministry of the Interior commissioned researchers of the ICRI134 and COSIC135 
departments of KU Leuven in 1999 to develop the legal framework and technical 
specifications for an electronic identity card for Belgian citizens. The proposals 
made by the ICRI and COSIC researchers on the legal framework and technical 
specifications were discussed within a working group which consisted, in addition 
to the researchers, of representatives of the National Register Department, the 
federal ICT agency Fedict and the Crossroads Bank of the Belgian Social Security. 
The Cabinet of Ministers formally decided to develop an electronic identity card 
on 22 November 2000.136 To assess the feasibility of the concept designed by KU 
Leuven, the National Register Department of the Ministry of the Interior com-
missioned the consultancy company CSC Computer Sciences in March 2001 to 
conduct a concept study.137 The aim of the study was to explore and assess the 
concepts and functional requirements of the future electronic identity card. 
Minister Duquesne of the Ministry of the Interior stated the following during a 
chamber meeting on 31 January 2002:138 ‘To assess whether an electronic identity 
card can serve this purpose [to provide citizens with access to e-Government ser-
vices], a concept study was commissioned. This study was integrally conducted by 
the consultancy company CSC, which has formally stated in their tender proposal 
to be fully independent of card producers and network operators. The advisory 
committee assigned to supervise the study consisted of representatives of the 
Ministry of the Interior, Fedict and the Crossroads Bank of the Social Security. The 
aim of the study was to assess the concepts and functionalities of the card. The 
second part of the project encompasses the definition of tender specifications for 
the production of the identity cards. The tendering procedures will be as transpar-
ent as possible.’ 
On 19 July 2001, a tangible plan to develop the BELPIC (the Belgian electronic 
identification card) passed the Cabinet of Ministers.139 The solution chosen for the 
BELPIC comprised an identity card with an electronic chip, which was PKI-based. 
The next step in the process was to start a public tendering process for building a 
133 http://www.ibz.rrn.fgov.be/index.php?id=141&L=1
134 http://www.law.kuleuven.be/icri/
135 http://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/
136 http://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/50/ic647.pdf
137 http://www.csc.com/. The project started on 20 March 2001, and the timeline of the project 
was four months; two months to carry out the feasibility study and two months to define 
the technical and functional requirements and specifications. The budget for the project was 
166,173 euros. 
138 http://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/50/ic647.pdf
139 http://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/50/ic647.pdf
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development structure for the BELPIC, the production of the card and the devel-
opment of certificates. The tendering process was coordinated by the Ministry of 
the Interior, which assigned the building of a development structure to the com-
pany Bull N.V. (bought by Steria in January 2002)140 and their consortium partners 
Belgacom, Telindus, Cevi, Ciger and Cipal, and the production of the cards and 
certificates to Zetes and Belgacom, respectively.141 
6.1.2 Development phase 
In January 2002 the building of the development structure by the Steria consor-
tium began. The infrastructure of the National Register (which administers the 
population data of all Belgian citizens) had to be modified to ensure a secure data 
exchange between involved parties (e.g. municipalities, certification authority).142 
The technical infrastructure of municipalities had to be modified for this purpose 
as well. Steria had to deliver the new infrastructures within six months. The project 
to develop the card and certificates, carried out by Zetes and Belgacom, respec-
tively, started in September 2002 and had a timeline of five months.143 Several 
respondents reported on alignment problems between separate (sub) projects. 
One of them, for instance, stated: ‘We had already started the development of the 
exploitation structure, though it was not clear yet which companies would pro-
duce the cards and certificates, and thus the precise characteristics of the cards 
and certificates wasn’t clear either. Because the building blocks of the BELPIC 
[infrastructure, cards and certificates] were not developed at the same time, there 
were many change requests for the architecture we developed.’ 
The majority of involved respondents stated that the timeline for the develop-
ment of the (elements of the) BELPIC was (too) tight. One interviewee, for instance, 
explained: ‘There was enormous time pressure on the project as the National 
Register Department wanted to present the first cards by 2003. To be honest, this 
was a mission impossible. The requirements were very high and the timeline was 
very short. By 2003, we did not have an accurate BELPIC solution working yet, but 
the card had to be launched.’ On 31 March 2003, the first electronic identity card 
was presented by Minister of the Interior Duquesne and Minister of Civil Service 
and Modernisation of the Public Authorities Van den Bossche during the ‘eID Con-
tactdag’. The Contactdag was organised for municipalities, businesses and citizens 
and was attended by over 1,300 people.144 
140 http://www.computable.nl/artikel/ict_topics/ictbranche/1329049/2379258/steria-laat-
nederland-links-liggen-in-overname-dienstentak-bull.html
141 http://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/50/ic647.pdf
142 http://www.elections.fgov.be/index.php?id=1314&no_cache=1&L=1.#irfaq_a_1_ba541 
143 The Cabinet of Ministers decided to assign these projects to Zetes and Belgacom 
on 27 September 2002. http://www.elections.fgov.be/index.php?id=1314&no_
cache=1&L=1.#irfaq_a_1_ba541 
144 http://webrrn.rrn.fgov.be/index.php?id=1314&no_cache=1&L=1&tx_irfaq_pi1%5Bcat%5D=
123#irfaq_a_1_149c4 
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6.1.3 Implementation phase
The Contactdag was also the start of the BELPIC pilot implementation in 11 mu-
nicipalities, namely: Borsbeek, Geraardsbergen, Jabbeke, Lasne, Leuven, Marche-
en-Famenne, Rochefort, Seneffe, Seraing, Tongeren and Sint-Pieters-Woluwe.145 
Various interview reports indicate that the selection of the pilot municipalities by 
the National Register Department was highly strategic. One of the respondents, 
for instance, stated about the selection: ‘It was important to achieve parity, to have 
an equal representation of the French, Flemish and German-speaking areas, small 
and larger municipalities and the various regions. In addition it was important to 
select those municipalities whose ambitions dovetailed with the BELPIC roll-out.’
Simultaneously to the pilots, the central government worked on the legal 
implementation of the BELPIC. In February 2003, the sectoral committee of the 
National Register146 was established to assess – in concrete requests for access to 
personal information – whether the requirements of the legislation concerning 
population registration and privacy law were met.147 More specifically, the com-
mittee assessed whether the purpose behind data access requests at the National 
Register was well-determined, clearly formulated and legitimate.148 The sectoral 
committee of the National Register is one of the six sectoral committees which 
make up the Belgian Privacy Commission.149,150 In March 2003, the 1983 and 1991 
National Register laws were amended so the National Register could be used as an 
authentic source of electronic identity data.151 To prepare for these modifications, 
the Privacy Commission had been asked for advice.
The pilot phase of the BELPIC was completed by the end of 2003, at which point 
around 55,000 electronic identity cards had been distributed by the pilot munici-
palities.152 Various respondents reported on the difficulties they faced during the 
implementation phase. One of them, for instance, stated about the involvement 
of their municipality: ‘We faced quite some challenges during the pilot project. 
The system developed by the supplier did not fit the ICT infrastructure of the 
municipality and there were many teething problems. The technology was not 
mature enough and over time we had to make many changes.’
145 http://www.juridat.be/cgi_loi/loi_N.pl?cn=2003032532 
146 http://www.privacycommission.be/nl/decisions/national_register
147 http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/pdf/50/2226/50K2226007.pdf
148 http://www.juridat.be/cgi_loi/loi_N.pl?cn=2007051542
149 http://www.privacycommission.be/nl/sectoral_committees
150 The committee consisted of the same members as the Committee of the Social Security 
Sector: http://www.ksz-bcss.fgov.be/nl/bcss/nodepage/content/websites/belgium/about/
committee.html
151 http://www.fidis.net/resources/deliverables/privacy-and-legal-social-content/d133-study-
on-id-number-policies/doc/12/
152 http://www.zdnet.be/news/38028/elektronische-identiteitskaart-vier-keer-duurder/
Noor BW 7.indd   112 08-09-10   12:07
THE BELG IAN BEPL IC  
1 13
6.1.4 Diffusion phase
On 20 March 2004, after a positive pilot evaluation conducted by the National 
Register Department, the decision to introduce the electronic identity card na-
tionwide was made by the Cabinet of Ministers and enacted by Royal Decree.153 
The Royal Decree of 1 September 2004 entails the decision to generally imple-
ment the electronic identity card in Belgium.154 The programme law of 9 July 2004 
supports the establishment of a governmental agency (staatsdienst) responsible 
for the management of the electronic identity cards.155 In 2004 Fedict156 became 
responsible for the management of the electronic identity card.157 In addition, the 
federal government organised training sessions for the employees of municipali-
ties and provided municipalities with extra human resources for the duration of 
three years.158 Technical support was provided by the BELPIC helpdesk, a unit of 
the National Register Department. 
The roll-out of the electronic identity card among the 578 municipalities (pilot 
municipalities excluded) was divided into three phases. In the first phase of Oc-
tober 2004, the electronic identity card was implemented in the first group of 
municipalities, while the second group was implemented in December 2004 and 
the third in February 2005.159 In 2005, a member of parliament posed questions on 
the implementation of the electronic identity card since, according to this person, 
municipalities were facing important installation problems.160 Minister Dewael 
answered that the arguments of the member of parliament were based on an 
incident in one municipality and that – according to his information – system fail-
ures were scarce and the system had been available for 99% of the time. 
In 2006 and 2007, criticism of the BELPIC increased. This negative attention was 
caused by (among other things) a study of Fedict on people’s internet use, e-
Government applications and eID.161 The report demonstrated that although 60% 
of Belgian internet users had an eID in 2006, its use was very low. Only 28% of in-
ternet users in possession of an eID had used it at least once.162 In 2008, the disap-
pointing use of eIDs was confirmed by a report issued by the Federal Government 
153 http://www.poureva.be/IMG/pdf/DOC_51_1371_021.pdf 
154 Belgisch Staatsblad, 15 september 2004.
155 http://www.verkiezingen.fgov.be/fileadmin/user_upload/ADIB/
jaarverslagen/2004/1_15_24_c_bevolking.pdf
156 An executive agency of the Ministry of the Interior established in 2001.
157 http://www.fedict.belgium.be/nl/
158 ‘Verantwoording van de algemene uitgavenbegroting’, 9 November 2005, http://www.
dekamer.be/doc/flwb/pdf/51/2044/51k2044003.pdf
159 http://www.dekamer.be/doc/flwb/pdf/51/2044/51k2044003.pdf
160 CRIV 51 COM 603 18/05/2005 Chambre-3e session de la 51e legislature 2004, kamer-3e zitting 
van de 51e zittingsperiode 45, http://www.dekamer.be/doc/ccri/pdf/51/ic603.pdf
161 http://www.fedict.belgium.be/nl/binaries/diversiteit_tcm167-16726.pdf
162 Fedict, (2007), ‘Fed-e View Citizen, Longitudinaal onderzoek naar internet en e-Government 
in België. De burger aan het woord’, pp. 21-2. The most important applications for which the 
eID was used in 2006 concerned entrance to public spaces, such as libraries and waste and 
recycling centres, and retrieval of official documents at local governments.
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Agency, Federale Overheidsdienst Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie.163 
The report demonstrated that in 2008 the card was not as successful as the Bel-
gian authorities had expected.164 Important conclusions were that the number of 
services accessible through eID was limited and only gradually growing, and that 
there was a limited willingness among end-users to install the card reader and 
software. In addition, the report concluded that there were crucial privacy ques-
tions and that the technological infrastructure lacked maturity. 
In 2009, the federal government started to intensify their communication to 
stimulate the take-up of the electronic identity card by citizens and businesses. 
Several eID road shows were organised by the Ministry of the Interior to promote 
the electronic identity card as a user-friendly and secure solution.165,166 In addition, 
a community event was organised in 25 municipalities during which informational 
videos were presented, and representatives of the Ministry of the Interior were 
present in a stand to provide the public with information on tangible applications 
of the electronic identity card. 
Although the Minister of the Interior stated in a 2009 chamber meeting that no 
statistics on the use of the Belgian eIDM solution were available,167 several studies 
strongly indicate that take-up was low. A survey among 1,000 employed Belgian 
citizens carried out by Indigov, for instance, showed that 1.8% of the BELPIC own-
ers in the reference group had used their card to sign an electronic form, and 
3.3% had used it for identification and authentication purposes.168 In addition, an 
overview of the online services accessible through eID on the federal eID website 
reveals that the number of services in November 2009 was still relatively low.169 
In some municipalities citizens can change their address while using their eID or 
retrieve a birth certificate. On police-on-web,170 citizens can report certain criminal 
offences and citizens can submit their tax declarations on tax-on-web.171 The eID 
website of the federal government mentions all kinds of future services of the eID, 
including e-Learning and e-Health applications. However, thus far these services 
have not been implemented. Moreover, a study carried out by Indigov in 2008 
163 Federale Overheidsdienst Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie, (2008), ‘Toekomst-
gerichte studie over de potentiële economische mogelijkheden van het gebruik van de 
elektronische identiteitskaart en de elektronische handtekening’, Brussels.
164 FOD Economie, K.M.O., ‘Middenstand en Energie’, 2008:6.
165 http://www.elections.fgov.be/index.php?id=2585&L=1
166 http://welcome-to-e-belgium.be/. During a road show, which was held in 70 municipalities, 
information to the public was provided in an eID bus. The bus provided citizens with an 
overview of current and future eID applications.
167 The Minister of the Interior stated in 2009 during a chamber meeting: ‘Er bestaan geen sta-
tistieken maar het gebruik van de toepassing TAX-ON-WEB geeft een indicatie. De jaarlijkse 
toename van het gebruik van deze toepassing biedt vertrouwen’: translation ‘There are no 
statistics available, but the use of the TAX-ON-WEB application gives us an indication. The 
annual increase of the use of this application inspires confidence.’ http://www.senate.be/
www/?MIval=/Vragen/SchriftelijkeVraagPrint&LEG=4&NR=3191&LANG=fr
168 Indigov, ‘SAP onderzoek: Belgen verdeeld over gebruik van eID op het werk’, Brussels, 3 
March 2010, http://www.sap.com/belux/about/press/press.epx?pressid=11809 
169 http://welcome-to-e-belgium.be/nl/home.php?nav=6
170 https://policeonweb.belgium.be/eloket/selectComplaintTypeAndAuthentication.action
171 http://ccff02.minfin.fgov.be/taxonweb/app/citizen/public/taxbox/home.do
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showed that a mere 30% of the local government used eID for the provision of 
online services.172 One of the respondents stated about the current dissemination 
of the eID: ‘There are still some important problems. The number of services is 
limited and also the use of eIDs by citizens. The service providers have to change 
their infrastructure in order to start using the eID and are not always willing to do 
so, especially because the use of eIDs by citizens is very low.’ 
Federal government policy documents state that one of the most important 
goals regarding the Belgian electronic identity card in the coming years will be 
the integration of the card with the social security (SIS) card and the subsequent 
stimulation of the use of the Belgian eID.173 
6.1.5 Conclusions
The most important actor involved in the BELPIC innovation was – and still is – the 
National Register Department of the Ministry of the Interior. This department initi-
ated the innovation and is still responsible for the solution and its dissemination 
today. At the onset of the innovation, other important players were the COSIC and 
ICRI departments of KU Leuven. They provided the National Register Department 
with legal and technological knowledge on eIDM systems. The suppliers of the 
infrastructure and the BELPIC card predominantly had a compliant role since the 
National Register Department was the project commissioner and exercised strong 
control over the project. The suppliers had to carry out the project according to 
the National Register Department’s strict requirements. In the implementation 
and diffusion phase, the municipalities and regions became involved as they had 
to implement the system designed by the National Register Department and the 
suppliers. The implementation of the BELPIC system was imposed by law, and 
therefore the role of the municipalities was also compliant. 
The strategy chosen by the National Register Department was to implement a 
highly secure smart card containing a qualified certificate and to make it obliga-
tory for municipalities to implement the system and for citizens to have a BEL-
PIC. This strategy ensured its implementation by municipalities and its diffusion 
among citizens. However, what was not ensured by this strategy, was the develop-
ment of services by municipalities and the actual use of the BEPLIC card by citi-
zens for electronic identification purposes. As illustrated in the previous section, 
over time several studies have shown that although almost all Belgian citizens 
have a BELPIC card, since it is obligatory, its use in terms of obtaining electronic 
services is low. In addition, the number of government services available through 
the BELPIC solution is also low. Consequently, one has to conclude that whereas 
the Belgian government has developed a highly secure and sophisticated eIDM 
solution, the impact of this innovation is as yet limited. 
172 ‘Gemeentelijke websites: de inhoud is er, nu de service nog’, 17 September 2008. http://
monitor.indigov.be/UserFiles/Persbericht_20080917_eGOV_Monitor.pdf
173 http://www.ibz.fgov.be/download/activiteitenverslag_2007/Instellingen%20en%20bevolk-
ing/55298%20Instell_Bevolk_NL.pdf
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6.2 PARAMETERS AND EVENTS Of THE ADVOCACy 
COALITION fRAMEwORK
This section explores the influence of the Advocacy Coalition Framework param-
eters and events. An assessment is made for each parameter and event to discover 
whether and how the parameter or event affected the joint innovation process. 
6.2.1 Attributes of the good
The federal government considers the BELPIC, Belgian Personal Identity Card, to 
be the most significant Belgian eIDM system, and it is meant to facilitate access to 
e-Government services for all Belgian citizens from the age of 12 years onwards.174 
Whereas the BEPLIC is currently mostly used for public sector applications, the 
solution is also available for take-up by the private sector. Other eIDM systems 
applied in the public sector are the social security card (SIS card) and the kids-ID 
(an eID card intended for children under the age of 12 years.).
The BELPIC card contains a chip with two certificates: one for authentication pur-
poses and one for qualified signatures, with only the latter being qualified. The 
card can be used by citizens to obtain electronic services in combination with a 
‘private key’; that is, a private four-digit PIN code. The PIN code is initialised ran-
domly when the card is first issued, but can be changed at will by the user. When 
accessing a government website to obtain a service that requires identification, 
the citizen has to insert his or her BELPIC card into a card reader. Subsequently, 
the citizen has to enter the PIN code (private key), which allows the government 
application to read out data from the BELPIC card and to compare the card data 
with data stored in the Belgian National Register. Based upon the information ex-
change between the BELPIC card and the Belgian National Register, the citizen is 
identified and/or authenticated to obtain the service and/or sign the document. 
Cards are issued by municipalities (which function in this regard as a so-called 
‘local registration authority’ on behalf of the National Register Department) and 
have a validity of five years. The price of the card varies from municipality to mu-
nicipality, but generally ranges between 10 and 15 euros. The cards are produced, 
initialised and personalised by the company Zetes, a card manufacturer. The cer-
tificates are managed by Belgacom, which functions as a certification authority, 
with Certipost (a joint venture between Belgacom and the Belgian Post) acting 
as the certificate service provider. By the end of 2009, all Belgian citizens above 
the age of 12 years had received an eID. Belgium is the only country adopting an 
opt-out strategy related to both certificates of the eID card, meaning that the cer-
tificates are activated as a default.175 Belgian citizens are obliged to have a BELPIC 
card. 
174 https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/modinis-idm/twiki/bin/view.cgi/Main/BelgianProfile 
Detailed information can also be found through the official Belgian eID website (http://eid.
belgium.be), which is available in Dutch, English and French.
175 http://www.ifib.de/publikationsdateien/outline_eID_special_issue_IIS_Sept_04.pdf
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An analysis of the interviews shows that in the development phase the specific 
attributes of the BELPIC innovation did not significantly affect the dynamics in 
the subsystem. Moreover, the characteristics of the subsystem seem to have sub-
stantially affected the features of the innovation. Although the BELPIC system is 
relatively complex compared to solutions chosen by other EU member states, this 
did not imply more negotiation, consensus-building or alignment of interests. The 
majority of respondents stated that actors involved were fairly efficient in devel-
oping the solution. As one interviewee stated: ‘We merely needed a few meet-
ings to draw up the concept and technical and legal specifications.’ And another 
person involved said: ‘Only five people were involved at the development stage of 
the technical and legal specifications. The decision makers knew the experts very 
well and knew that their visions of the technology needed were in line. This really 
accelerated the process.’ During the BELPIC concept’s first development phase, 
the group of people involved was small, the network dense and there was a high 
level of agreement on the goal and technical and legal requirements.
Yet, various interview reports demonstrate that in later stages of the innovation 
the service providers were reluctant to use the BELPIC solution to provide elec-
tronic services to citizens. One of the main reasons for their reluctance was that 
the features of the system required major changes to be made to municipal back-
office systems in order to create the online service. One of the actors, for instance, 
stated in this respect: ‘The municipalities are obliged to issue BELPIC cards. They 
are the local registration authorities, and the law decrees that they distribute iden-
tity cards. In the BELPIC’s case, the paper-based card was simply replaced by the 
digital card. Although they [municipalities] have to use the BELPIC to identify citi-
zens in offline or online processes, they are not obliged to create services that are 
supported by the BELPIC card. As it is quite complicated to implement the system 
for online services, the willingness of municipalities to create those services is lim-
ited. […] The same goes for other service providers, such as ministries. For them, 
there is even less incentive since they are not obliged to use the BELPIC card for 
offline or online identification. The SIS card is used for social security, for instance.’
Furthermore, evidence from formal documents and the interviews shows that 
the attributes of the systems did not play a role in whether citizens obtained an 
electronic identity card or not. As stated before, citizens are obliged to have an 
identity card, the paper version of which was replaced by an electronic identity 
card (the BEPLIC card). However, several studies show that the attributes of the 
system did play a role in the use of the identification and signature function of the 
BELPIC. A study by Fedict on citizens’ use of internet, e-Government applications 
and eID,176 showed that in 2006 use was very low. Even though 60% of Belgian 
internet users had an eID, a mere 28% of these users had used it at least once. 
Moreover, a survey carried out by Indigov revealed that a mere 1.8% of the 1,000 
respondents had used the BELPIC to sign an electronic form, and that 3.3% had 
used it for identification and authentication purposes.177 
176 http://www.fedict.belgium.be/nl/binaries/diversiteit_tcm167-16726.pdf
177 Indigov, ‘SAP onderzoek: Belgen verdeeld over gebruik van eID op het werk’, Brussels, 3.
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Overall, it seems that the system’s selected features were highly influenced by the 
ideas and vision of the few public officials and experts involved at the onset of 
the innovation. In addition, it appears that the specific attributes of the eID card 
did not affect the involvement of municipalities as issuers since they were legally 
obliged to issue the BELPIC card. Nor did the features impact the take-up of the 
BELPIC by citizens, since they were obliged by law to have a BELPIC. The character-
istics, however, decreased the willingness of service providers and citizens to use 
the eID system for online services or to sign documents. 
6.2.2 Basic distribution of resources
Based on document research, the following overview of costs related to the BEL-
PIC innovation can be generated: 
•	 The total funding needed to build the development structure was 17,804,648 
euros.
•	 The yearly operation costs were estimated at (in total) 2,325,434 euros.178 
•	 The cost of the card was estimated at 9 million euros. 
•	 Bull and their consortium parties received 9,966,710 euros from the National 
Register Department for the modification of the infrastructure (mainframe) 
of the National Register and for changing the RAPC software Registration 
Authority Personal Computer of municipalities. 
•	 The Belgacom and Zetes consortium received 7,837,937 euros from the Na-
tional Register Department for the development of certificates and the smart 
card, respectively. 
•	 The cost of the feasibility study was 166,173 euros (including VAT), the cost of 
which was paid by the National Register Department to the CSC consultancy 
company.
•	 The total budget for the pilot phase was 9,966,710 euros, and the budget for 
the roll-out phase was 8,398,024 euros.179
•	 The government responsible for the management of the electronic identity 
card had the following balance sheets in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 (more de-
tailed information can be found in the annual accounts published on www.
dekamer.be): 
178 http://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/50/ic647.pdf
179 http://www.senaat.be/www/?MIval=/publications/viewSTBlok&COLL=B&DATUM=11/14/20
06&DOSID=50346127&MINID=250&LEG=3&NR=79&VTYPE=svid&LANG=nl
Table 6. Annual accounts of the government agency responsible for eID cards
Annual accounts of the government agency responsible for electronic identity cards
Year Income Expenses
2004 13,100,000 €  € 4,129,000
2005  68,873,000 € € 52,262,000
2006 41,721,000 € € 42,267,000
2007 48,563,000 € € 54,095,000
2008 54,305,000 € € 62,420,000
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Interviews reveal that a scarcity of financial resources and cost management had 
an influence on the network dynamics in particular in the later stages of the in-
novation phase and not in the early development phase. Several interviewees 
stated that, in the late 1990s and the early years of this century, the e-Government 
budgets were considerably larger than in the past few years. One of them, for 
instance, stated: ‘The eIDM project started during the days of the e-Government 
hype. Back then, ministers considered it very important to have an e-Government 
policy, and subsequently there were large budgets for e-Government projects.’ 
As several interview reports point out, in the implementation phase the ICT bud-
gets of government bodies decreased, which resulted in more negotiation be-
tween parties. One respondent, for instance, stated: ‘There have been discussions 
about who should pay for the BELPIC’s communication campaign. They [govern-
ment agencies involved] were hitting the ball into the other court.’ According to 
this same interviewee, this shirking of investment responsibilities had an effect 
on the innovation process in the sense that ‘Communication and information is 
problem number one in the sense that there is a poor distribution of card readers 
and poor use of eID cards.’ Various respondents stated that the lack of resources in 
the diffusion phase also put pressure on the subsystem and affected the further 
development of the BELPIC solution. One of them for instance stated: ‘Currently 
there is no money for further development of the eID system. The kids-ID, which 
was developed after the BELPIC, does not contain any new technology; it is just a 
copy of the BELPIC. Of course the National Register Department wants to further 
develop the card and, for instance, explore the use of biometrics. But there is no 
money. He [government official] called me recently to ask if I could convince his 
superior to invest in new technology.’ And: ‘There are continuous negotiations be-
tween parties about the funding of these kinds of projects and existing financial 
relationships which affect the innovation process.’ 
In conclusion, the lack of resources in the BELPIC case affected the dynamics of the 
subsystem in the sense that there were recurrent negotiations about the allocation 
of resources. In addition, the lack of resources influenced the attributes of the innova-
tion as it limited the choice for technological options (e.g. application of biometrics). 
6.2.3  Fundamental cultural values 
The network of organisations involved in the development of the BELPIC general-
ly perceived ICT as an important means for improving public administration. This 
instrumental approach is reflected in several policy documents. The Crossroads 
Bank and Fedict, for instance, write in their paper ‘E-Government: the approach 
of the Belgian federal administration’ that (2003:4):180 ‘These technologies can 
serve a variety of different ends: better delivery of government services to citi-
zens (especially those living in remote or less densely-populated areas), improved 
dealings with business and industry, citizen empowerment through access to 
180 http://www.ksz-bcss.fgov.be/documentation/fr/documentation/Presse/2003%20-%20E-
Government%20paper%20v%201.0.pdf
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information and more efficient government management. The resulting benefits 
may be greater convenience, increased transparency and accountability in public 
decisions, revenue growth, less fraud and/or cost reductions.’ This document also 
states: ‘It is clear that the use of information and communication technologies 
is only a means to an end. The aim is to deliver better service to all stakeholders 
in government services. E-Government is a structural reform process based on 
a view of information as a strategic resource in all areas of government activity.’ 
That e-Government (and therefore eIDM systems) can be perceived as a structural 
reform process is repeated in the paper entitled ’e-Government’ by the Crossroads 
Bank (2004).181 The document gives an overview of the main requirements for an 
effective realisation of e-Government:
•	 the vision that information is a strategic production factor for governments
•	 a user-oriented re-engineering of business processes and the consolidation 
of value changes
•	 an interoperability framework
•	 an integrated information security policy
•	 a modified legal framework
In addition, the paper states that ‘government organisations pay enough atten-
tion to an effective and efficient management of information.’ According to the 
Crossroads Bank, this effectiveness and efficiency can be achieved by applying five 
basic principles: (a) information modelling (the exchange of information based on 
an information model), (b) registration of data in authentic databases and re-use 
of information, (c) management of information, (d) electronic exchange of infor-
mation and (e) data protection (Crossroads Bank 2004:2-4). 
The importance of an efficient e-Government policy and implementation is again 
stressed in the document entitled ‘User and Access Management in Belgian e-Gov-
ernment,’ written by Frank Robben (2009:1) from the Crossroads Bank,182 which ar-
gues that: ‘Efficient e-Government is not possible without integrated information 
management’ and that in Belgium a model is implemented consisting of five build-
ing blocks: ‘unique identification numbers, the electronic identity card, validated 
authentic sources, service integrators and sector committees for data protection.’ 
According to the representatives of the Belgian government, the use of this model 
does justice to both an efficient government and the protection of citizens’ privacy: 
‘By using these building blocks, user and access management is organised accord-
ing to a generic policy decision model. The objective is to illustrate that integrated 
e-Government is not necessarily incompatible with optimal protection of privacy.’
181 ‘E-Government’, in VRG-Alumni, Recht in beweging. 11de VRG-Alumnidag 2004, Antwerp-
Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2004, pp. 141-66. 
182 ‘User and access management in Belgian e-Government’, in Printed proceedings ISSE 
(Information Security Solutions Europe) Conference 2009, Wiesbaden, Vieweg Verlag, to 
be published (together with J. Dumortier). https://www.law.kuleuven.be/icri/frobben/
publications/2009%20-%20User%20and%20access%20management%20in%20Belgian%20
e-government.pdf
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The prevailing of public management values is endorsed by the interviewees, who 
state that the main mission of the BELPIC was to ‘modernise the identification of 
natural persons and to enable citizens and businesses to obtain online services.’ 
In addition, the interviews demonstrate that the parties involved in the BELPIC 
solution shared some key values. Several interviewees, for instance, mentioned 
respect and non-intervention principles. One of the interviewees explained: ‘Each 
secretary general has his own autonomy. They do not interfere in each other’s pol-
icy domains.’ And another interviewee stated that: ‘In Belgium, the social security 
sector and the national register are two separate worlds, each with their own rules, 
funding and dynamics. Although there might be some data exchange between 
these sectors, they are highly independent from each other and do not accept 
any intrusion from other parties.’ A third interviewee: ‘For him [top official], formal 
responsibilities are very important. Something belongs to his responsibility or 
not, and he makes his decisions based on this.’ In addition, as regards the value 
‘respect’, several interviewees also mentioned ‘the loss of face’ as an important 
determinant for decisions made by top administrators. One of the interviewees 
explained this mechanism as follows: ‘Changing the system could imply a loss of 
face for the involved CEO of the government body; therefore they will only change 
plans if there is momentum to do so, for example if they can introduce the new 
system as a new version of the old one and not as a replacement of the old one.’
In conclusion, several values have affected the dynamics of the innovation pro-
cess. In particular non-intervention principles resulted in limited cooperation 
between ministries, and loss of face led to limited willingness of involved actors 
to change strategies. In addition, new public management principles were impor-
tant for the initiation and shape of the BELPIC solution. 
6.2.4 Basic legal structure
The main legal framework for the eID card is laid down in:183
•	 the law of 19 July 1991 regarding the National Registers and identity cards, 
which is the basic legal source;
•	 the e-Signature law of 2001 transposes the provisions of the e-Signatures 
Directive (but does not apply to authentication as such);
•	 the Royal decree of 25 March 2003 on identity cards, which introduced the 
basic provisions with regard to the eID card;
•	 the Law of 25 March 2003, modifying the law of 8 August 1983 establishing a 
National Register of natural persons and the law of 19 July 1991 regarding the 
National Registers and identity cards and modifying the law of 8 August 1983 
establishing a National Register of natural persons, which modernised these 
existing registers, in particular with a view to using them as an authentic 
source for electronic identity data;
•	 the Royal Decree of 5 June 2004 establishing a system of rights of access 
to and correction of the information which is electronically stored on the 
183 https://www.eid-stork.eu/index.php?option=com_processes&act=list_
documents&s=1&Itemid=60&id=312
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identity card and of the information stored in the National Registers or in the 
National Register of natural persons;
•	 the Royal Decree of 1 September 2004 related to the general introduction of 
the electronic identity card, through which the roll-out was extended out-
side of pilot municipalities.
Other relevant legislation includes:
•	 the Law of 16 January 2003 establishing a Crossroads Bank of Enterprises, 
modernising the trade register, establishing accredited enterprise counters 
and pertaining to diverse other provisions;
•	 the Law of 15 January 1990 establishing and organising a Crossroads Bank of 
social security;
•	 the Law of 9 July 2001 establishing certainty with regard to the legal frame-
work for electronic signatures and certification service providers.
As stated in previous sections, the BELPIC card is mandatory for citizens 12 years of 
age and older, and municipalities are legally obliged to issue BELPIC cards. In ad-
dition, the use of the eIDM system by private sector parties is restricted by the law 
of 19 July 1991, which states that private parties cannot access the National Reg-
ister or use the National Register number for internal information management. 
Exceptions are made for private organisations that received a specific mandate by 
law or by virtue of the sector committee of the National Register (a department 
of the Belgian Privacy Commission) to access the National Register and use the 
National Register number. Since the eIDM system largely depends on access to 
the National Register, using the National Register number as a unique identifier, 
the use of the eIDM system by the large majority of private parties is problematic. 
Although several interview reports reveal that (among other factors) the restric-
tions for private sector use of the BELPIC system hampers the take-up by private 
sector parties, the reports also reveal that the legal framework did not hamper the 
development of the BELPIC solution nor its use by public sector parties or citizens. 
Moreover, several respondents have stated that the drafting of new legislation went 
very smoothly. In the concept phase, the National Register Department, together 
with legal experts of KU Leuven, prepared the legal framework of the BELPIC. One of 
the interviewees, for instance, argued: ‘He [top official] was not only the CEO of Fe-
dict and the Crossroads Bank, but also the chairman of the Privacy Commission. He 
knew the views held by members of the Privacy Commission and could anticipate 
those views by addressing all the issues which he thought would be raised.’ Another 
interviewee stated that: ‘Of course the fact that he [top official] was [involved in the 
group that prepared the concept and] the chairman of the Privacy Commission had 
an effect on the quick adoption of new legislation. As I stated before, since everyone 
had their own competences, there was no conflict between design and legislation.’ 
Furthermore, the fact that the eID card is mandatory for citizens 12 years of age and 
older, has impacted the take-up of the eID card, but not the use of the eID system by 
citizens for obtaining online services. This use is voluntary and still rather low. In ad-
dition, the legal obligation of municipalities to issue the BELPIC card affected their 
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adoption of the card, but not their provision of online services supported by the 
card. As stated in previous sections, only the issuing of the card is obligatory. Sev-
eral respondents stated that - as the use of the BELPIC card for online identification 
purposes implies large-scale modifications of back-office systems – the willingness 
of municipalities to use the BELPIC for online service provision is limited. One of 
them, for instance, explained: ‘The municipalities are obliged to issue BELPIC cards. 
They are the local registration authorities, and it is arranged by law that they distrib-
ute identity cards. In the BELPIC case, the paper-based card was simply replaced by 
the digital card. Although they [municipalities] have to use the BELPIC to identify 
citizens in offline or online processes, they are not obliged to create services sup-
ported by the BELPIC card. As it is quite complicated to implement the system for 
online services, the willingness of municipalities to create those services is limited.’
In conclusion, it appears that the legal framework has affected the limited take-up 
by private sector parties (as use is restricted), affected the nationwide take-up of 
the card by municipalities and citizens (as it was obligatory), but did not affect the 
use of the card for online identification purposes by municipalities and citizens. In 
addition, the legal framework did not have a substantial impact on the dynamics 
of the subsystem (e.g. the drafting of new legislation), but the subsystem did have 
a significant impact on the drafting of new legislation. 
6.2.5 Changes in socio-economic conditions and technology
During the development, implementation and diffusion process of the BELPIC, 
one of the most important changes in Belgium’s socio-economic conditions was 
the burst of the internet bubble in 2001. In the years 1998, 1999 and 2000, the an-
nual GDP growth was 1.7%, 3.4% and 3.8%, respectively.184 In 2001, 2002 and 2003, 
the growth dropped to 0.8%, 1.5% and 1%. The Belgian economy recovered in the 
years 2004 to 2007 with respective growths of 2.8%, 2.2%, 3%, and 2.6%. 
184 http://www.indexmundi.com/belgium/gdp_real_growth_rate.html
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Another socio-economic change during the innovation process was the evolution 
of the technology applied in the BELPIC solution. Whereas at the onset several of 
the technologies used for the BELPIC development were relatively immature and 
had limited availability, today most of these technologies are widely used and 
mature. For instance, in the late 1990s, the costs of card readers were relatively 
high, they could only be purchased at a very limited number of companies and 
the software that supported the card readers suffered from teething problems.185 
Today, many companies sell card readers for much lower prices and their usability 
has substantially increased. 
A third socio-economic change in the Belgian society may be the current eco-
nomic crisis. Although the opinions of economists on the precise impact of the 
current economic crisis differ substantially, no one would argue that we have not 
been in a global economic recession since 2008. In Belgium, for example, the GDP 
growth in 2008 was 1%, whereas in 2009 it was -3.2% (see figure 7 above).
The large majority of respondents stated that the burst of the internet bubble at 
the beginning of the 21st century did not have a significant impact. These state-
ments are endorsed by research carried out by the European Commission, which 
provided an overview of the e-Government budgets in European countries in 
2000, 2001 and 2002.186 The study demonstrates that – despite the burst of the in-
ternet bubble – the e-Government budgets of the Belgian government increased 
between 2000 and 2002, from 776 million euros in 2000, to 857 million in 2001 and 
946 million euros in 2002. 
However, interviewees also mentioned another socio-economic impact, namely 
the United States’ fight against terrorism. According to several actors, the Belgian 
government was not willing to hire an American company for the provision of 
certificates as they were afraid that the United States could violate the privacy 
of Belgian residents in their fight against terrorism. In addition, the attacks on 
11 September affected the specific attributes of the good in the sense that the 
Belgian government applied enhanced cryptographies.
Some respondents stated that the evolution of the technology applied implied 
technical changes to the BELPIC solution. One of them, for instance, explained: 
‘Not all technical developments can be anticipated in such large projects. For 
instance, in the beginning we had two card readers on two serial ports: these 
were two separate devices. And as the technology evolved, the USB ports were 
introduced. Then we had a problem, because USB is one standard and therefore 
Windows could not handle two different card readers any more.’
185 This was not only the case in Belgium, but also in other countries. See, for instance, Srivas-
tava (2005).
186 European Commission, (2006), ‘e-Government Economics Project (eGEP)’, Expenditure Study 
Final Version, Brussels. The only publicly available data on public administration ICT and 
e-Government expenditure in Europe are those presented in the EITO (European Informa-
tion Technology Observatory) 2002 edition, which contained a monographic section on 
e-Government.
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Lastly, several interviewees expect that the current economic crisis will have an 
impact on e-Government budgets since it is likely that the government will face 
severe budget deficits and will have to make drastic cutbacks. One of the inter-
viewees explained: ’Cost control is one of the most important issues in today’s 
government, and I think this will become an even more important issue in the 
coming few years because of the economic crisis. […] This will have an effect on 
the BELPIC solution in the sense that the public administration will try to reduce 
the costs of the BELPIC. Currently the National Register wants to extend the card’s 
period of validity from five years to 10 years so that the costs of the card can be 
spread over 10 years instead of five years. Technically this is almost impossible.’ 
However, no sound conclusions can be drawn as to the impact of the current eco-
nomic crisis on the BELPIC project.
To summarize, it seems that in particular the evolution of the technology applied 
affected the innovation process in the sense that it raised new technical issues 
to be solved by the development team. Furthermore it seems that although 
respondents expect the current economic crisis to impact the dynamics of the 
subsystem, currently there is no sound evidence of this impact. 
6.2.6 Changes in public opinion
Public opinion on the BELPIC solution is most evident in prevailing media, such as 
national or regional newspapers. Over time, several Belgian newspapers have pub-
lished articles on the BELPIC project. In 2004, a few months after the launch of the 
identity card, critical articles about the introduction of the card appeared in some 
newspapers. The newspaper De Tijd, for instance, reported that the implementa-
tion of the electronic identity card would saddle citizens with expenses since the 
card would cost around 15 euros and the average life of a card would be half as 
long as the cards in use.187 In addition, local papers reported on the costs of the 
electronic identity card. De Gazet van Antwerpen, for instance, wrote about con-
flicts within the coalition of the Antwerp Council on the price of the identity card.188 
Between 2005 and 2007, there were not many newspaper articles on the Belgian 
eID solution. From 2008 on however, the number of articles increased. The news-
paper De Morgen published a critical review on the security of the electronic 
identity card in 2008.189 The newspaper used an evaluation report by KU Leuven 
and the Katholieke Hogeschool Sint-Lieven. According to De Morgen, there were 
videos on the internet that demonstrated how to hack the card’s chip. However, 
one of the authors of the evaluation report denied the existence of those video 
clips during a radio interview. The responsible Minister, Mr. Dewael, reacted to the 
article during a press conference and stated that until then no one had been able 
to hack the electronic identity card. The minister contended that the card is much 
187 http://www.zdnet.be/news/38028/elektronische-identiteitskaart-vier-keer-duurder/
188 http://www.gva.be/antwerpen/lier/prijs-elektronische-identiteitskaart-zorgt-voor-onenig-
heid.aspx, Muncipipalities have the authority to assess the price citizens have to pay for the 
card
189 http://www.nieuwsblad.be/Article/Detail.aspx?articleID=dmf13062008_003
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more secure than bank cards and that the security of the card’s technology was 
being constantly improved. 
In 2009, the electronic identity card received some mixed publicity. In March, 
one of the headlines of the newspaper De Morgen read: ‘Electronic identity card 
scarcely used’. The article not only exposed the card’s limited use, it also high-
lighted its opportunities, as put forward by the secretary of state Vincent Van 
Quickenborne, who was responsible for administrative burden reduction. In July 
2009, De Standaard reported that thousands of citizens had been given compen-
sation for having lost the chip in their electronic identity card and/or because the 
chip contained false information.190 The article in De Morgen stated that from 2004 
onwards, the government had received 50,600 complaints about the electronic 
identity card. 
Some success stories were also published in Belgian newspapers in 2009. For 
example, De Standaard published an article on the use of the electronic identity 
card by the railway company NMBS, which provides travellers with the possibility 
of using their electronic identity card as public transport card.191 The article stated 
that ‘the use of the electronic identity card reduces the administrative burden for 
citizens since travellers can buy a public transport ticket online. The ticket infor-
mation is automatically downloaded to his/her electronic identity card.’
According to the majority of interviewees, neither the positive nor the negative 
articles in the newspapers significantly affected the dynamics of the subsystem or 
the innovation process. One of the interviewees stated: ‘There just was not much 
discussion about the innovation process. The decision makers decided how to 
implement the BELPIC and subsequently implemented it that way. The concept 
had been thought through by a select group of persons who were really knowl-
edgeable on eIDM systems.’ Another involved person stated: ‘There were some 
negative articles, but these were rearguard actions. Those articles did not have 
any effect on the innovation process. There were some discussions; there were 
some questions, but the innovation process unfolded very smoothly.’ Another 
respondent explained: ‘The articles which stated that the security of the card is 
limited are not correct. Maybe it takes nine billion years instead of 10 billions years 
to hack the card, but it is still one of the most secure cards worldwide. Moreover, 
the card is so secure that concessions have been made regarding its usability. […] 
The criticism was purely theoretical; the articles did not affect the innovation pro-
cess at all.’ About the discussions on the costs of the cards, one interviewee stated: 
‘Today citizens have a card which is more expensive and expires earlier [than the 
previous card]. But this did not have an effect on the innovation process. This is 
the way it is, and citizens have to accept it.’
190 http://www.standaard.be/Artikel/Detail.aspx?artikelId=dmf20090713_069
191 http://www.standaard.be/Artikel/Detail.aspx?artikelId=dmf04062009_036
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Overall, no evidence has been found that the articles on the BELPIC solution and 
project in the newspapers have significantly affected the dynamics of the sub-
system. 
6.2.7 Systemic governing coalitions
During the innovation process, there have been several changes in the govern-
ing coalition. Firstly, in 2000 the CEO of Fedict was replaced by a new CEO. The 
first CEO of Fedict, who was involved in the development of the BELPIC concept, 
was also CEO of the Crossroads Bank and chairman of the Privacy Commission.192 
Whereas this CEO was very well connected within the BELPIC network, the new 
CEO had almost no ties with other actors in the subsystem. A second change in 
systemic governing coalitions was Steria’s takeover of Bull N.V.’s ICT department. 
Bull was assigned the project to build a development structure. And thirdly, dur-
ing the project the employees of the National Register Department and Fedict 
who worked on the BELPIC project changed several times. There have been sev-
eral changes in project manager, policy makers and public relations officials at 
both the National Register Department and Fedict.
Several respondents remarked that the CEO change at Fedict reduced Fedict’s 
influence the first year after the change, since the new CEO had far fewer connec-
tions in the network. One of the involved actors, for instance, stated: ‘In the begin-
ning, I had to use Frank Robben’s ties because he new all the important players in 
the field, whereas I hardly knew anyone. I came from outside the public sector. It 
was very important that I built up a network to increase my influence.’
In addition, the majority of respondents agree that Steria’s takeover of Bull’s ICT 
department did not have a substantial impact on the dynamics of the subsystem. 
One of the actors, for instance, explained: ‘It was just a change of name. The same 
people were on the same project, and so it did not make any difference. Besides, 
no other company was able to change the infrastructure. The mainframe of the 
National Register is a Bull mainframe and only a few people know how it works. I 
have been working on the mainframe for many years and I am one of the few who 
knows the system.’
Furthermore, interview reports reveal that the personnel changes at the National 
Register Department and Fedict did not substantially affect the innovation pro-
cess nor the direction of the innovation. One of the actors, for instance, stated: 
‘There were many changes within the National Register Department and Fedict. 
This weakened their position because the knowledge lay in the hands of the sup-
pliers and in the hands of their organisations. However, the top official at the Na-
tional Register Department did not change and had such significant influence on 
the process and direction of the innovation that the change of personnel did not 
192 See also http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval=/publications/viewTBlokDoc&DATUM=’03/
20/2003’&TYP=handeen&VOLGNR=2&LANG=nl, and http://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRA/
pdf/50/ac930.pdf
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have a real effect. There were just other people who carried out the work ordered 
by the top official.’
In conclusion, the several changes within the systemic governing coalitions did 
not substantially impact the direction or outcome of the innovation. 
6.2.8 Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems
Over time, there have been three subsystems, the decisions, policies and/or strat-
egies of which were related to the BEPLIC project, namely the subsystem of local 
authorities, the (national) political subsystem and the European subsystem.
In terms of the local subsystem, the autonomy of the Belgian local authorities 
in e-Government policy is generally quite substantial.193 To increase cooperation, 
however, the federal government, regions and municipalities came to a co-oper-
ation agreement for the development of a common platform for e-Government 
services in March 2001.194 The agreement obliges all parties to work together on 
common e-services that have the same navigation structure. In addition, the par-
ties agreed to increasingly use the same eIDM system and to start using authentic 
databases. The agreement defines the participating actors’ e-Government respon-
sibilities and tasks. A new agreement between the parties was signed in 2003,195 
in which they agreed to (among other things) establish a joint complaints office 
for citizens and businesses. Yet, interview reports reveal that despite these agree-
ments made on the use of the same (BELPIC) eIDM system, the application of the 
system by municipalities is still limited since the application of the system implies 
large-scale modification of back-office systems. 
The political subsystem was related to the BELPIC project because several min-
isters were responsible for e-Government policy and several parliamentarians 
posed chamber questions on the project. In 1999, the newly appointed Verhof-
stadt cabinet I published its policy statement,196 which marked the official political 
launch of e-Government in Belgium at a federal level.197 Initially, e-Government 
was part of a larger government reform, called the Copernicus project.198 One of 
the aims of this project was to simplify government processes through the use of 
ICTs. The Copernicus reform was led by Luc van den Bossche, Minister of Civil Ser-
vice and Modernisation of the Public Authorities.199 The responsibility of the de-
velopment of the BELPIC lay with Antoine Duquesne, Minister of the Interior. On 
31 March 2003, the interior minister and civil service minister officially launched 
193 Zenc, (2007), ‘E-Government in Belgium’, Den Haag. 
194 http://statbel.fgov.be/nl/ondernemingen/informatiemaatschappij/e_Government/index.jsp
195 http://www.kafka.be/doc/1216040510-2850.pdf
196 Parliamentary proceedings of the Belgian Chamber, Tuesday 12 October – Afternoon Ses-
sion. http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval=/Registers/ViewReg&COLL=H&PUID=33574986&TI
D=33606232&POS=47&LANG=nl
197 http://www.fedict.belgium.be/nl/binaries/OECD_e-Government_Studies_-_Belgium%20
final%20%5B1%5D_tcm167-27521.pdf
198 http://soc.kuleuven.be/io/ned/persberichten/persio/20051206_perstekst.pdf
199 http://www.politics.be/recensies/597/
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the BELPIC.200 On 12 July 2003, after the elections, Patrick Dewael became the min-
ister of the interior and responsible for the BELPIC until 2008 (in the Verhofstadt 
II, Verhofstadt III and Leterme I cabinets). After Dewael, two other ministers of the 
interior have been responsible, namely, Guido de Padt (2008-2009) and Annemie 
Turtelboom (2009-present). Several parties submitted chamber questions on the 
BELPIC project. In 2002, the Flemish Green Party posed questions on the tendering 
procedures of the BELPIC project.201 The Vlaams Blok posed questions in 2003 to 
minister Duquesne on delays in the implementation process of the BELPIC. Sev-
eral questions were posed in 2005 on the implementation of the BELPIC project 
and the burden for municipalities.202 In 2009, the Flemish Christian Democrats 
posed questions on the take-up of the BEPLIC innovation.203
The third relevant subsystem is the European Commission. The European Com-
mission has been engaged in eIDM issues since the late 1990s. The Information 
Society and Media Department had an e-Government unit, the name of which 
changed to ’ICT for Government and Public Services’ in 2007. The unit organised 
and still regularly organises meetings with the e-Government subgroup, which 
represents all member states. In addition, the unit established expert groups, one 
of which focuses on eIDM. At the European level, there were several EU projects 
and directives on eIDM systems. In 1999, the European directive on electronic sig-
natures went into force.204 The directive laid down the criteria that form the basis 
for legal recognition of electronic signatures. In 2004 and 2005, the European MO-
DINIS Project turned its focus, among other things, onto assessing the states quo 
of eID systems in European member states and the exploration of possible Eu-
ropean eID systems.205 In 2005, IDABC’s eID Interoperability for PEGS programme 
was launched, the objective of which was to analyse the eID and authentication 
interoperability requirements.206 In 2008, the STORK project was launched, which 
aims to establish a European eID Interoperability Platform allowing citizens to es-
tablish new e-relations across borders upon presentation of their national eID.207 
In addition, Cap Gemini publishes an annual benchmark on e-Government prog-
ress in the European Union member states.
According to the majority of interviewees, local government entities did not 
have a significant impact on the BELPIC innovation. One of the respondents, for 
instance, stated: ‘Some municipalities were experimenting with their own system, 
but a large majority did not have an eIDM system in place yet. […] The BELPIC card 
was mandatory, and the municipalities agreed to increasingly use the eID system. 
200 http://www.egov.vic.gov.au/topics-a-z/b/belgium-topics-a-z/e-Government-belgium-
archive.html
201 http://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/50/ic647.pdf
202 CRIV 51 COM 603 18/05/2005, Chambre-3e session de la 51e legislature 2004, Kamer-3e 
zitting van de 51e zittingsperiode 45, http://www.dekamer.be/doc/ccri/pdf/51/ic603.pdf
203 http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval=/Vragen/SchriftelijkeVraagPrint&LEG=4&NR=3191&LAN
G=nl
204 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/l24118_en.htm
205 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/modinis/index_en.htm
206 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/6484
207 https://www.eid-stork.eu/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1
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However, its actual use is limited as it is quite complicated for municipalities to 
implement the system and they may have other priorities.’
The interview reports reveal that the political subsystem did not have a significant 
effect on the dynamics of the subsystem. One of the respondents, for instance, ex-
plained: ‘The influence of parliament members and even ministers is limited. The 
power is with the administration. Politicians come and go, but top officials, such 
as the top official of the National Register Department, are here to stay. He has 
been there for over 30 years, knows all the files, the history of the files, he knows 
all the people. There were chamber questions but no major political incidents.’ 
One of the interviewees, however, did mention a political impact: ‘During the very 
early phase of the BELPIC, the idea was to integrate the SIS card with the BELPIC 
solution. But politically this was not feasible. […] I have made several attempts to 
convince the politicians of the need for integration [of both cards]. The majority 
of them agreed, but I could not convince the communications consultant of the 
Verhofstadt cabinet. He told the prime minister that they could not sell this idea 
to the public. […] Today the government regrets that the cards have not been in-
tegrated. […] The true political impact depends on the strength of the politician.’
According to several respondents, the European subsystem has affected the dy-
namics of the subsystem. A respondent stated: ‘Yes the European directive has 
played a role; this was the initial cause to start the project. […] Now that we have 
heavily invested in our eIDM system we want to exploit this as much as possible, 
also in Europe. We have a very prominent role in the STORK project.’ Another inter-
viewee: ‘Europe was a driver, a motor for the Belgian eID system. European policy 
is aiming for all European member states to have an electronic identity manage-
ment system in place, and it should be interoperable at the European level.’
To summarize, it appears that in one instance the political subsystem has affected 
the innovation process. This intervention has had a significant impact on the at-
tributes of the BELPIC solution (namely, it is not integrated with the SIS card). In 
addition, it seems that the involvement of one of the university professors in both 
the European Union and the Belgian federal government has influenced the dy-
namics of the subsystem and the outcome of the innovation. From the onset, the 
European e-Signature directive has been a driver for the Belgian eIDM concept.
6.2.9 Conclusions
As regards the parameters of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, it appears that 
the dynamics of the subsystem, the innovation process and the take-up of the 
innovation have been affected by the following parameters and events: 
•	 The specific attributes of the eID card decreased the willingness of municipali-
ties to use the eID system for online service provision and resulted in limited 
use by citizens.
•	 The lack of resources affected the dynamics of the subsystem in the sense 
that there were recurrent negotiations on the allocation of resources. In ad-
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dition, the lack of resources influenced the attributes of the innovation as it 
limited the choice for technological options (e.g. application of biometrics). 
•	 Several norms and values have affected the dynamics of the innovation pro-
cess. Non-intervention principles resulted in limited cooperation between 
ministries and the fear of loss of face led to limited willingness of involved 
actors to change strategies. In addition, new public management principles 
were important for the initiation and shape of the BELPIC solution.
•	 The legal framework resulted in limited take-up by private sector parties (as 
use is restricted), provided nationwide take-up of the card by municipalities 
and citizens (as it was obligatory), but did not affect the use of the card for 
online identification purposes by municipalities and citizens. 
•	 In particular the evolution of the technology applied affected the innovation 
process in the sense that it raised new technical issues that needed to be 
solved by the development team. Furthermore, there is presently no sound 
evidence that the current economic crisis will have an impact on the innova-
tion. 
•	 No evidence has been found that public opinion has significantly affected the 
dynamics of the subsystem, the innovation outcome or impact. 
•	 The several changes within the systemic governing coalitions did not substan-
tially impact the direction or outcome of the innovation. 
•	 In one instance the political subsystem affected the innovation process. This 
intervention had a significant impact on the attributes of the BELPIC solution 
(namely, it is not integrated with the SIS card). In addition, the involvement 
of one of the university professors in the European subsystem influenced the 
dynamics of the subsystem and the outcome of the innovation. 
6.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES
This section draws conclusions for each of the social capital variables regarding 
the influence of social capital characteristics on the dynamics of the subsystem 
and subsequently on the joint, technological innovation process. Each sub-sec-
tion concludes with an assessment of the influence of the specific variable on the 
innovation process, outcome and/or impact.
6.3.1 Openness versus group closure
Interview reports demonstrate that during the stage that defines the BELPIC solu-
tion’s features, the subsystem was relatively closed. One of the participating ac-
tors, for instance, stated: ‘Only five people were involved at the development stage 
of the technical and legal specifications. The decision makers knew the experts 
very well and knew that their visions on the technology were in line. This really 
accelerated the process.’ During the BELPIC concept’s first development phase, 
the group of people involved was small, the network dense and there was a high 
level of agreement on the goal and requirements of the innovation. In addition, 
interviews reveal that the decision makers of the National Register Department 
and the Crossroads Bank of the Social Security were determined (and had the 
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power) to realise their preferred concept. Once they had decided on the technical 
specifications of the solution, their willingness to modify the initial concept was 
limited. After the technical and legal specifications were described in a report by 
KU Leuven, one of the decision makers hired a consultancy company to carry out 
a feasibility study to examine the tenability of the concept and to provide them 
with recommendations for modifications to the concept.208 
However, one of the involved persons stated the following about this feasibility 
study: ‘From the kick-off meeting on it was clear to all of us that the only thing 
the project commissioners wanted was a confirmation of the concept developed 
by KU Leuven. They did not want a critical review of the system but ammunition 
to convince the Cabinet of Ministers to adopt the system.’ This determination of 
decision makers to implement their concept and to achieve progress in the imple-
mentation has been confirmed by another interviewee, who stated: ‘The positive 
aspect of such a strong control over the outcome of the innovation and limited 
willingness to change strategies is that it advances the innovation process in the 
sense that it speeds up progress. However, over time the technology evolved, 
and new insights emerged which were neglected by the decision makers. They 
perceive a change to the concept as a loss of face. What they might do in such a 
situation is wait for a strategic moment to introduce the new technology, which 
can be presented as the new version and not a replacement of the innovation.’ 
Elements of group closure were also present in the development phase. One of 
the interviewees stated: ‘The administration assigns the project to the party that 
is most able to support the goals of the administration. Of course they have to 
comply with formal rules for open tendering. However, one can choose to publish 
the call in such a way that only one party can actually find this publication. So the 
administration will have formally published the call, and at the same time they 
can hire the company they want to hire.’ Minister Duquesne reported the follow-
ing during a chamber meeting ‘Parts 1 and 2 of the contract were awarded to the 
company Bull N.V., who worked with the following sub contractors: Belgacom, Te-
lindus, Cevi, Ciger and Cipal. Bull was the only party to submit a proposal.’209 Other 
interviewees confirm Bull N.V.’s preferred position. One of them, for instance, re-
marked: ‘Bull had built the mainframe of the National Register and therefore had 
the appropriate knowledge to modify the infrastructure. The National Register 
just wanted to hire Bull, and so they did.’
Group closure effects can also be found in the pilot phase. Several pilot mu-
nicipalities had crucial criticisms of the system, questioned the feasibility of the 
national roll-out, and yet the National Register Department concluded the pilot 
phase with a positive evaluation (document is not available to the public). Ac-
cording to several actors involved, this evaluation was not based on the opinion 
of the municipalities or assessed by an independent external organisation. One of 
them, for instance, stated: ‘To be honest, there has not been a sound evaluation of 
208 http://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/50/ic647.pdf
209 http://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/50/ic647.pdf
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the pilot. Municipalities have not been approached for an evaluation; no external 
party has been contracted for the evaluation. The National Register Department 
itself decided that the evaluation was positive and communicated this to the min-
isters. Their most important aim was that the cabinet would decide to generally 
implement the electronic identity card by Royal Decree.’ 
In conclusion, group closure mechanisms in the design, early development and 
pilot phase have significantly affected the innovation process in the sense that 
the federal government determined to a large degree the attributes of the system. 
In addition, the features of the BELPIC solution do not seem to fully match the 
demand of the service providers and end-users. Increased involvement of service 
providers and (representatives of ) users in the very beginning of the project 
might have increased their willingness to adopt the BELPIC solution. 
6.3.2 Strength of the ties
Several respondents indicated that strong ties affected the early development of 
the BELPIC. One of them, for instance, explained that ‘strong ties have played a 
dominant role in the formation of the team that defined the features and require-
ments of the solution: ‘[The top official] knew [the law professor and key advisor] 
very well. They established ICRI together in the 1980s. [The top official] still lec-
tures at ICRI. […] The fact that people know each other smoothes the process. The 
people involved knew each other’s opinions, interests and behaviour. […] The top 
officials chose the people in their team who fitted their interests and ambitions.’ 
Various interview reports reveal that during the early development of the BELPIC 
solution, strong and medium ties were also used to (attempt to) influence opin-
ions. One actor, for instance, stated: ‘At the very beginning of the BELPIC project, 
the idea was to integrate the SIS card with the BELPIC solution. But politically this 
was not feasible. […] I have made several attempts to convince the politicians 
of the need for integration [of both cards]. The majority of them agreed, but I 
could not convince the communications consultant of the Verhofstadt cabinet. 
He told the prime minister that they could not sell this idea to the public because 
of privacy issues […].’ 
Furthermore, several respondents reported that strong and medium ties were 
used to involve municipalities in the pilot phase of the project. One of the re-
spondents, for instance, explained: ‘Behind the scenes, the National Register 
Department has used existing strong ties to get municipalities engaged in the 
pilot. Municipalities were not very willing to participate because they knew that 
they would face important challenges, such as teething problems in the system. 
[…] Political ties have been used to involve municipalities. An advantage for the 
National Register Department in using these ties is that they can closely moni-
tor the process and make an appeal to the loyalty of their connections in case of 
difficulties. […] Of course, other factors have played a role too. It was important 
to achieve parity, to have an equal representation of the French, Flemish and 
German-speaking areas, small and larger municipalities and the various regions. 
In addition, it was important to select those municipalities whose ambitions 
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dovetailed with the BELPIC roll-out.’ Another respondent stated: ‘The reason our 
city joined [the pilot project] is quite simple. Our mayor has been minister of the 
interior for years and knew him [top official] very well. These people can approach 
each other quite easily. In addition, he [top official] already had contacts at the KU 
Leuven and knew that the university wanted to be the shining light of knowledge 
in Belgium. He succeeded in convincing our mayor to join up.’ 
Various respondents provided examples of cases where strong ties were used to 
solve problems during the project. One of the actors, for instance, argued: ‘My net-
work is very important to me. To be honest I do not believe in formal structures. If 
there is a problem, one first discusses the problem bilaterally with everyone until 
he or she has reached some degree of consensus. Of course, this holds true for the 
BELPIC project as well. […] When everyone informally agrees, a formal decision 
can be made. […] It is essential that you know who you can approach. […] The 
person is the most important thing, not their position. Informal agreements are 
very important. They are made during lunchtime, informally, without minutes and 
without a third person. Trust is very important in these contacts.’ Furthermore, 
there have been several examples where problems have escalated through exist-
ing, mostly hierarchical ties. One of the involved actors explained: ‘There was this 
discussion between Fedict and the National Register Department on the question 
of whether the address [of a citizen] should be printed on the card. Fedict wanted 
the address printed on the card, and Vanneste wanted it on the card’s chip. This 
discussion took place one week before the launch, so we had to come to an agree-
ment. I called my minister and he came to an agreement with the minister Van-
neste worked with.’
Finally, several respondents stated that they used their strong ties to form a coali-
tion. One example is between the suppliers. One of the involved actors stated: 
‘Every time we have a meeting with the government we have a lunch in advance 
to prepare all discussions points. It is important that we agree on crucial issues so 
that we can take a stand during our discussions with the government.’
Overall, both weak and strong interpersonal ties affected the joint innovation pro-
cess in the sense that these ties were used to influence opinions, access strategic 
information, involve parties and/or solve problems and build coalitions.
6.3.3 Heterogeneity of the network
According to several respondents, the heterogeneity of the network was particu-
larly limited during the early stages of the innovation. A former Fedict employee 
explained: ‘Although the universities of Namur and Liege also have top experts 
on eIDM systems, these experts were not involved in the development of the eID 
concept. KU Leuven participated because government practitioners had strong 
ties with KU Leuven experts.’ In addition, no service providers were involved in the 
design phase who could have promoted the interests and demand of the service 
providers. One of the interviewees stated about the limited involvement of ser-
vice providers: ‘The municipalities were obliged to join up. They were the identity 
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card issuers, and the paper-based card was simply replaced by the digital card. 
However, other service providers, such as other ministries, were not obliged to use 
the eID system developed by the National Register Department. […] Although the 
characteristics of the system did not play a role for the municipalities [as they were 
forced to adopt it] the features did play a role for other service providers. Because 
the system is quite complicated to implement, their willingness to use it is limited.’
In conclusion, the homogeneity of the group involved in the design phase of the 
innovation process affected the characteristics of the innovation and subsequent-
ly the dissemination and take-up of the innovation.
6.3.4 Broker’s position
Strategic positions within the network have played a role in several instances. One 
of the actors who had a strategic position was the CEO of the Crossroads Bank. He 
was also chair of the Privacy Commission, (for some time) CEO of Fedict and lec-
turer at ICRI. One of the interviewees had the following to say about the process 
of building a legal framework and the position of the CEO of Crossroads Bank. ‘He 
[top official] was not only the CEO of Fedict and the Crossroads Bank, but was also 
the chairman of the Privacy Commission. He knew the views held by members of 
the Privacy Commission and could anticipate those views by addressing all the 
issues which he thought would be raised in advance.’ Another interviewee stated 
the following: ’Of course the fact that he [top official] was [involved in the group 
which prepared the concept and] the chairman of the privacy committee had an 
effect on a fast adoption of new legislation. As I stated before: as everyone had 
their own competences, there was no conflict between design and legislation.’
Low connectivity also appears to have had an impact on the dynamics of the 
subsystem. At a certain point in time, the CEO of Fedict was replaced by a new 
CEO. Several interviewees felt that the new CEO’s lack of a strong network in the 
public sector (since he came from the private sector) decreased the influence of 
Fedict for some time. The influence increased as the new CEO built up a network. 
One of the interviewees had the following to say about the new CEO’s ties: ‘He 
[new CEO Fedict] and his employees were quite new to the network; they did 
not have many ties within the network. He [new CEO] often had to use my con-
nections to achieve his goals. I have been in the Privacy Commission for 17 years 
and have dealt with many files. [New CEO] does not have a network in the Privacy 
Commission and asked me to bring him into contact with relevant persons.’ One 
of the new employees at Fedict explained: ‘I was totally new in the network and 
I became responsible for the eID project. That was quite a challenge. The people 
from the National Register Department acted like “why are you here?” The first 
meetings with the National Register were very difficult. I did not speak their lan-
guage; I did not know the informal positions of all these people, and whether their 
opinions were important. It took some time for me to consolidate my position and 
gain influence.’
Noor BW 7.indd   135 08-09-10   12:07
THE BELG IAN BEPL IC  
136
Also notable are the changes of positions of central persons within the network. 
One of the interviewees explained that the changing of position of a central per-
son affects the positions of the remaining actors within the subsystem: ‘What is 
important to know is that most ministers have been civil servants, and most of the 
top officials eventually become ministers. It is quite a closed network. Ministers 
are often former colleagues. […] After the elections in 1999, Dehaene left, and 
the network changed. This directly influenced my position as I could no longer 
influence the policy of other departments. Dehaene’s position changed, and con-
sequently mine did too. He and other members of the cabinet were given new 
positions, in the private sector, for example. The shift of positions also directly 
influenced my network in the sense that my influence in the government network 
decreased, while it increased in the private sector.’
In conclusion, actors with a strategic position in the network were in a better posi-
tion to influence the direction of the innovation. 
6.3.5 Interpersonal trust
The large majority of interview reports reveal that the lack of interpersonal trust 
affected the innovation process in the sense that the cooperation between or-
ganisations was difficult and cumbersome. One of the respondents, for instance, 
stated: ‘I do not trust him [top administrator] at all. He can act in very unexpected 
ways and displays opportunistic behaviour. […] As he has a severe lack of re-
sources he has tripled the price for database consultation. He tried to triple the 
price without consultation. One day, the cabinet made this decision following the 
elections, when there was a power vacuum. Now he sends me invoices for 2.5 to 
5 million euros, even though I can prove that the register can function on only 
a fraction of these costs. […] Unfortunately, he is not open to positive coopera-
tion. The Crossroads Bank, for example, could substantially save costs by using his 
infrastructure – which would save tax money – but he does not want to cooperate.’ 
According to several interviewees, this lack of trust also hampered the discussions 
about the integration of the SIS and the BELPIC card. 
In various cases where there was a lack of trust, contracts were used to create 
a stable situation. One of the involved persons, for instance, explained: ‘After a 
year of cooperation, we established a formal co-existence agreement. We made a 
detailed description of the areas the Crossroads Bank would cover and the areas 
Fedict would cover. We did this in order to prevent a situation in which we would 
encroach on each other’s territory. I, for instance, got the social security sector, 
while he [top administrator] got the economic sector. We distributed this agree-
ment to every minister so that they could not play us off against each other. Now 
we have a very strong cooperation.’
The interview reports indicate that the level of trust depends, among other 
things, on the extent to which values are shared between persons. One of the 
respondents, for instance, argued: ‘I have more in common with [top official X] 
than with [top official Y], and therefore my trust in [X] is higher. [X] and I are both 
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quite result- and practice-oriented, whereas [Y] has values such as loyalty and 
hierarchy. […] As I understand the reasoning of [X], I can predict his actions and 
trust that the innovation will go in a certain direction.’ In addition, several concrete 
situations in the BELPIC project show that interdependencies can compensate for 
trust. One of the respondents, for instance, stated: ‘Of course [the top officials] 
trusted us. We were highly dependent on them. If we would have acted in an op-
portunistic way, we would not have been assigned any new projects. Both [top 
officials] were very important for us, they were high-level clients and our entrance 
into the e-Government market.’ On the other hand, trust can also emerge from 
independency. One of the interviewees stated: ‘The commissioners of the proj-
ect trusted us because we were an independent party, because we did not have 
any specific interests. Our department at the university has a reputation of being 
independent, which can create trust. […] They will hire you if they want an inde-
pendent audit of a situation and may not hire you if they want a certain outcome.’ 
Several citations by respondents point to the fact that the level of trust also de-
pends on people’s personal skills and characteristics. The following statement 
attests to this: ‘A strong minister like Jean-Luc Dehaene will be able to defend 
a certain viewpoint. However, when I have to deal with a weak minister who 
changes opinion every day, I will give him the least information possible and will 
just try to realise the project. When I’m facing a strong minister, I will exchange 
views and explore the counter arguments of the opposition parties. As a top of-
ficial, you need a minister who is autonomous in his decisions, does not change 
as a result of each incident and has a stable policy. A strong minister can escalate 
issues and commands respect.’ Another interviewee stated: ‘I have been working 
as a researcher in this area for years and have built up a body of knowledge on this 
subject. The government has confidence in me as an expert. They know that I am 
aware of the latest developments.’
Finally, various respondents explained that more trust or compensation of trust is 
needed in cases where the interests at stake are high. One of them, for instance, 
argued: ‘Consolidating [our city] posed a serious risk in the sense that there was a 
real possibility that we would not be able to provide citizens with a new ID card, 
which could generate negative publicity and damage the reputation of the politi-
cians. […] The fact that our mayor personally knew the top officials of the federal 
government helped to overcome reluctance on our side. Our mayor trusted the 
top officials of the federal government to achieve this goal and knew that he 
could use his ties in case of problems.’ Another interviewee had the following to 
say about the political environment, risks and trust: ‘In politics a minor issue can 
provoke a major discussion. So you have to be very careful when acting in the 
political domain. In these risky environments, trust is needed in order to innovate. 
[…] With innovations, the outcome is unsure and thus trust is needed.’
To summarize, low levels of interpersonal trust hampered the innovation process 
but were also compensated by hierarchy, contracts or interdependencies. The 
presence or non-presence of interpersonal trust affected the joint innovation 
process in the sense that actors were more willing to take risks.
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6.3.6 Conclusions
It seems that the characteristics and dynamics of the subsystem significantly influ-
enced the joint technological innovation. 
•	 Group closure affected the joint innovation process in the sense that group 
closure mechanisms resulted in the limited involvement of actors outside 
the group, the limited promotion of their interests, and it therefore also de-
mands from these actors a limited willingness to join up in later phases. 
•	 Both weak and strong interpersonal ties affected the joint innovation process 
in the sense that these ties were used to influence opinions, access strategic 
information, involve parties and/or solve problems and build coalitions.
•	 The homogeneity of the group involved in the design phase of the innovation 
process affected the characteristics of the innovation and subsequently the 
dissemination and take-up of the innovation.
•	 Actors with a strategic position in the network were in a better position to 
influence the direction of the innovation. 
•	 The low level of interpersonal trust hampered the innovation process but was 
also compensated by hierarchy, contracts or interdependencies. The pres-
ence or absence of interpersonal trust affected the joint innovation process 
in the sense that actors were more willing to take risks.
6.4 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
Regarding the parameters of the framework used in this research, it appears that 
the following aspects have influenced the dynamics of the subsystem, the innova-
tion outcome and/or impact: 
•	 The specific attributes of the eID card decreased the willingness of municipali-
ties to use the eID system for online service provision and resulted in limited 
use by citizens.
•	 The lack of resources affected the dynamics of the subsystem in the sense 
that there were recurrent negotiations on the allocation of resources. In ad-
dition, the lack of resources influenced the attributes of the innovation as it 
limited the choice for technological options (e.g. application of biometrics). 
•	 Several norms and values affected the dynamics of the innovation process. 
Non-intervention principles resulted in limited cooperation between minis-
tries, and the fear of losing face led to the limited willingness of involved 
actors to change strategies. In addition, new public management principles 
were important for the initiation and shape of the BELPIC solution.
•	 The legal framework resulted in limited take-up by private sector parties (as 
use is restricted), provided a nationwide take-up of the card by municipali-
ties and citizens (as it was obligatory), but did not affect the use of the card 
for online identification purposes by municipalities and citizens. 
•	 In particular the evolution of the technology applied affected the innovation 
process in the sense that it raised new technical issues that needed to be 
solved by the development team. Furthermore, there is no sound evidence 
that the current economic crisis will have an impact on the innovation. 
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•	 No evidence has been found that public opinion has significantly affected the 
dynamics of the subsystem, the innovation outcome or impact. 
•	 The several changes within the systemic governing coalitions did not substan-
tially impact the direction or outcome of the innovation. 
•	 In one instance the political subsystem affected the innovation process. This 
intervention had a significant impact on the attributes of the BELPIC solution 
(namely, it is not integrated with the SIS card). In addition, the involvement 
of one of the university professors in the European subsystem influenced the 
dynamics of the subsystem and the outcome of the innovation. 
•	 Group closure affected the joint innovation process in the sense that group 
closure mechanisms resulted in the limited involvement of actors outside 
the group, the limited promotion of their interests, and it therefore also de-
mands from these actors a limited willingness to join up in later phases. 
•	 Both weak and strong interpersonal ties affected the joint innovation process 
in the sense that these ties were used to influence opinions, access strategic 
information, involve parties and/or solve problems and build coalitions.
•	 The homogeneity of the group involved in the design phase of the innovation 
process affected the characteristics of the innovation and subsequently the 
dissemination and take-up of the innovation.
•	 Actors with a strategic position in the network were in a better position to 
influence the direction of the innovation. 
•	 Low levels of interpersonal trust hampered the innovation process but were 
also compensated by hierarchy, contracts or interdependencies. The pres-
ence or absence of interpersonal trust affected the joint innovation process 
in the sense that actors were more willing to take risks. 
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7
The finnish 
VETUMA gateway 
This seventh chapter examines the third case of a joint development of an eIDM 
system, namely the VETUMA solution developed by Finnish government entities. 
As described in the last section of the fourth, methodological, chapter, the empiri-
cal chapters consist of four main parts. The introductory section chronologically 
describes the innovation process along the innovation stages (initiation, devel-
opment, implementation and diffusion). Conclusions are drawn regarding the 
application of strategies, decision making and the outcome and impact of the 
innovation. The second section examines evidence found regarding the impact 
of Advocacy Coalition Framework parameters and events. Each sub-section draws 
a conclusion about to the specific effects of the variable. The influence of social 
capital variables are explored in the third section. For the five dominant network 
and tie characteristics (network closure, strength of ties, heterogeneity, broker’s 
position and levels of trust) an overview is provided of the perceived impact by 
involved actors. The sub-sections of this third section conclude with an overview 
of the key impacts of the specific variable. The fourth (and last) section draws con-
clusions about the influence of the framework variables.210 
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This first section describes the successive innovation stages of the VETUMA devel-
opment. For each innovation stage (initiation, development, implementation and 
diffusion), the most important actors involved, strategies applied and decisions 
made, are outlined. The last part of this section provides a summary of the key ac-
tors, strategies and decisions, and provides insight into the outputs and impacts of 
the innovation process. 
210 All websites mentioned in this chapter have been accessed between September and 
December 2009.
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7.1.1 Initiation phase
In 2002, the idea to create an eIDM system was developed by two government 
practitioners from the municipalities of Vantaa211 and Espoo.212 One of the involved 
actors stated: ‘The actual impetus for the eID project was another project, which 
started in 2001. The city of Espoo had a large-scale project, called eEspoo, which 
aimed to deliver electronic services to citizens. […] We wanted to implement 
some healthcare and social services, which required a form of identification and 
authentication. […] We already had a close cooperation with the city of Vantaa; we 
had several e-Services commonly developed and we had similar needs.’ Another 
involved person explained: ‘I think the need for an eIDM system was mentioned 
during a meeting with Simo [government practitioner of Espoo]. There was some 
other project we [Vantaa and Espoo] were both in, and we noticed that in many 
projects there was a need for identification. […] We came to the conclusion that 
every municipality would need an eIDM system and that we could play a role in 
the development of a nationwide solution.’
The government practitioners of Espoo and Vantaa decided in 2003 to also involve 
the cities Helsinki213 and Kauniainen.214 One of the respondents stated: ‘We saw 
that it would be best if the [eIDM] solution would become a national solution 
and hence we had to cooperate with other cities. In Finland the central govern-
ment does not play a very strong role in e-Government policy at the municipal 
level. We [municipalities] are very autonomous, and we realised that we would 
not get any strict rules or clear directions from the central government.’ And a 
government practitioner from Helsinki involved in the process stated: ’I think I 
was called by Anne [government practitioner of Vantaa]. I knew her personally. Of 
course we were interested; we also needed an eIDM system.’ The informal project 
group not only decided to involve other municipalities, but also the central gov-
ernment. One of the initiators: ‘We realised that if we would build a national eIDM 
system, for all municipalities, we needed some kind of backing from the central 
government both financially and in terms of support so that our solution would 
be a national solution. So we decided to contact JUHTA215 [a public administration 
recommendation council established by the Ministry of the Interior].’216 
211 http://www.vantaa.fi/i_etusivu.asp?path=1
212 http://www.espoo.fi/
213 http://www.hel.fi/wps/portal/Helsinki_en?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Helsinki/en/Etusivu
214 http://www.kauniainen.fi/
215 http://www.jhs-suositukset.fi/web/guest/jhs
216 As it says on their website, ‘The Advisory Committee on Information Management in Public 
Administration, JUHTA, has been set up at the Ministry of the Interior to promote coopera-
tion in information management between the State and the municipalities. The Committee 
plans cooperation in information management, makes reports and studies, and draws up 
recommendations for the public administration.’ JUHTA is responsible for coordinating the 
development of information technology, information management and electronic services 
in the central and local government, promoting the use of ICTs in the public administration 
as well as setting standards and drawing up guidelines and administrative principles in its 
area of competence (‘JHS recommendations’: Reference Architecture for Online Services, 
Public Administration interfaces for information management, Finnish metadata standard, 
XML standards, etc.).’ 
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In addition, the founding members decided to involve the Information Society 
programme of the Prime Minister’s Office, which was established after the parlia-
mentary elections of March 2003.217 A respondent from the Ministry of the Interior: 
‘I was on the train from Tampere and my phone rang. It was Anne. I had known her 
for many years. She told me about their idea and asked if the central government 
would like to be a part of this. I found it a perfect idea. […] I contacted Katrina 
[from the Information Society Programme] to get her involved. I was a member 
of the Information Society Programme.’ And an employee of JUHTA stated about 
their involvement: ‘JUHTA’s aim was to enhance ICT cooperation between munici-
palities and between municipalities and the state. Of course, ultimately, the tax 
payers benefit from improved cooperation. The project dovetailed perfectly with 
JUHTA’s mission.’
2003 saw the enactment of both the Act on Electronic Services and Communica-
tion in the Public Sector218 and the Act on Electronic Signatures.219 The objective 
of the Act on Electronic Services and Communication in the Public Sector is to 
improve efficiency and speed of the services and communication, as well as infor-
mation security in the administration, in the courts, other legal entities and in the 
enforcement authorities by promoting the use of electronic data transmission.220 
It contains provisions on the rights, duties and responsibilities of the authorities 
and their customers in the context of electronic services and communication. 
The general purpose of the Act on Electronic Signatures is to promote the use of 
electronic signatures and the related supply of products and services. In addition, 
the act aims to enhance information security and data protection in the field of 
electronic commerce and electronic services.221 
7.1.2 Development phase
In 2004, a steering group and project group were established. The management 
group included representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Finance, 
the four initiating municipalities (Espoo, Vantaa, Helsinki and Kauniainen) and the 
Information Society Programme. The project group contained the municipali-
217 The Finnish Information Society Programme to promote information society in Finland was 
initiated in September 2003. The Information Society Programme focused on benefitting 
from the opportunities offered by the information society. The aim of the programme was 
to boost competitiveness and productivity, to promote social and regional equality and to 
improve citizens´ well-being and quality of life through effective use of ICTs. The Information 
Society Programme consisted of eight sub-sectors, among which electronic services in 
public administration. Management of the Programme Coordinating the Programme rests 
with the Prime Ministers´ Office. The Prime Minister leads the Ministerial Group (Prime Min-
ister, Minister of Transport and Communication, Minister of Education, Minister of Finance, 
Minister of Defence). The Programme Director’s Office has operational responsibility for 
the implementation of the programme and is assisted by a steering committee of different 
ministries and local authorities. http://www.tietoyhteiskuntaohjelma.fi/en_GB/index.html
218 http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/E0030013.PDF
219 http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2003/en20030014.pdf
220 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=28744
221 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=28744
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ties, and the overall project management was in the hands of the city of Vantaa. 
A JUHTA representative acted as project secretary for both groups. One of the 
project group’s key activities was the definition of tender specifications for the 
procurement of the eIDM system. A strategic document by the project group, 
published in February 2005,222 defined one of the leading requirements, namely 
that the VETUMA platform should support several electronic identification sys-
tems to provide services to citizens, such as the FINEID card, bank solutions (such 
as TUPAS), mobile and username and password authentication. Depending on the 
security level needed, a specific electronic identification system could be applied 
(stronger or weaker authentication). 
There were some important discussions within the project and management 
group during the development phase. One discussion concerned a project initi-
ated in 2004 by the Finnish Tax Administration, Ministry of Labour and the Social 
Insurance Institution of Finland223 – called KATSO224 – to develop an electronic 
identification platform. KATSO’s project goal was highly similar to that of the VE-
TUMA project, namely to develop an eIDM platform that uses several electronic 
identification solutions (such as the national smart cards and net bank identifica-
tion) to provide online services to citizens.225 In 2005, members of both projects 
held a meeting to explore a possible cooperation. At the time, the KATSO project 
had almost completed the procurement process.226 Several interviewees stated 
that although the objectives of the projects were comparable, it was not possible 
to cooperate due to decisions made in the KATSO tendering process. One of the 
respondents, for instance, explained: ‘Before VETUMA, there was the KATVE con-
sortium, which built the KATSO solution for the government. It was not possible 
for the municipalities to join up as only the organisations mentioned in the tender 
could use the solution.’ 
Another important issue in the project and management group was the VETUMA 
tendering procedure. If an ICT system is to be used by several organisations, 
Finnish law required these organisations to jointly submit a call for tenders.227 For 
central government, Hansel Ltd228 is the central procurement unit as defined in 
the Public Procurement Act. The Hansel office is responsible for carrying out the 
tendering processes related to state procurement operations and for making and 
maintaining related contracts. In 2005, however, there was not a central procure-
ment unit for municipalities. Several respondents have stated that this was one of 
222 Internal document of the cities of Espoo, Vantaa, Helsinki and Kauniainen; Lindblad-Ahonen, 
A. and T. Karakorpi, report on the governance and funding of VETUMA, February 2005, sec-
tion 2.2.
223 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/ict_psp/documents/eid_good_prac-
tices_modinis_study.pdf
224 https://www.tunnistus.fi/, Katso is an identification service for web services of member 
organisations.
225 http://cis.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/Japanese/society/conference1001/kiiski-paper.pdf
226 http://www.projectliberty.org/liberty/content/download/1008/7061/file/Nat_Brd_Taxes_
Finland.pdf
227 http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1992/en19921505.pdf
228 http://www.hansel.fi/en/activities/publicprocurement
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the problems the management and project group faced. One respondent: ‘Back 
then, we did not have a central procurement office, so we decided that Helsinki 
could have this role. I [government practitioner of Helsinki] sent a letter of intent 
to all municipalities, asking if they were interested in joining up. Around 60 mu-
nicipalities said that they were, and we included them in the contract.’ And some-
one else remarked: ’For the municipalities, that [procurement] was a problem. We 
had to ask every municipality to join the bid. If they wanted to join up they had 
to sign a letter of attorney that we could bid for them.‘ Eventually, Helsinki was 
able to publish the bid and in October 2005, Fujitsu was awarded the project.229,230 
Fujitsu developed the first version of VETUMA, and the first pilots were launched 
in the spring of 2006. Various respondents stated that there were not many prob-
lems during the technical development of the system. One of them stated: ‘The 
technical development went quite smoothly. The technical team did not face any 
severe technical problems. Some [infrastructural] problems were raised much 
later in the implementation phase, for instance the cumbersome process for citi-
zens to obtain the mobile identification solution.’ The first version was tested in 
a pilot group consisting of the municipalities of Oulu, Turku, Tampere, Pori and 
Mikkeli. Based on the evaluation, the system was improved, and its first services 
were ready for implementation. 
7.1.3 Implementation phase
One of the first electronic services that made use of the VETUMA platform was a 
payment system at municipal tennis centre in Helsinki in 2006.231 An involved gov-
ernment practitioner stated: ‘At the time, we already had some services that were 
ready to go into production. One of these services was in our Sports Department, 
for the online reservation and payment of tennis courts.’ Soon other municipalities 
started to use VETUMA to provide online services to its citizens. Fujitsu presented 
– in cooperation with the project group – the VETUMA solution during several 
municipal gatherings in Finland.232 In addition, the project group launched a web-
site providing municipalities with information on how to implement and use the 
VETUMA solution.233 The website contained background documentation, informa-
tion on the technical interface and a toolkit to integrate VETUMA into existing 
communication applications. Fujitsu taught municipalities how to use VETUMA 
in training sessions. 
Meanwhile, the project and management group held discussions on the struc-
tural ownership and financing of VETUMA. In the development and implementa-
229 http://www.fujitsu.com/fi/news/pr/20051214.html
230 See PowerPoint presentation by Tapani Puisto, Government IT-service center, State Treasury, 
page 2.
231 https://asp.innofactor.com/hki-liikunta/EnrolmentClient/calendarselect.aspx
232 See, for instance, http://www.huoltovarmuus.fi/documents/7/Verkkotunnistautuminen_
Jukka%20Keso.pdf
233 http://www.suomi.fi/suomifi/laatuaverkkoon/asiointi_ja_lomakkeet/sahkoinen_asiointi/
verkkotunnistaminen_ja_maksaminen/
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tion phase, the representative of the Information Society Programme had stated 
that the central government was willing to pay a substantial part of VETUMA’s 
development and implementation, but this programme would end in 2007.234 One 
of the respondents: ‘The central government was already involved, but we [the 
founding municipalities] did not know how much they wanted to invest in the 
system.’ And a representative of the Ministry of the Interior: ‘The Information Soci-
ety Programme invested around 400,000 euros, but that programme was destined 
to end in 2007. So the question was raised who would take over the ownership 
and continue to fund the VETUMA solution.’ Another actor: ‘The Information So-
ciety Programme was a temporary programme, just the first period of Vanhanen 
cabinet235 and lasted for four years. The management group had to decide what 
to do with the VETUMA project. It was decided during a meeting attended by the 
Information Society Programme, the Ministry of Finance and the State Treasury 
that valt-IT, a division of the Ministry of Finance, would own the project.’
In 2006, FICOM, a Finnish organisation for telecom operators, started to develop 
a mobile ID that could be applied through the VETUMA platform. Several systems 
were already integrated into VETUMA, such as the FINEID card identification, the 
TUPAS identification service of the banks, and the next step would be to integrate 
mobile identification into the platform. However, interview reports reveal that the 
FICOM implementation team faced several problems. One of the involved actors, 
for instance, explained: ‘We made a great effort to launch the mobile application, 
but the threshold for citizens to obtain it remained too high. For citizens it was 
a very cumbersome process. First you would have to go to the population office 
to get a certification for mobile identification. Then you had to go to the telecom 
operator to get the SIM card, which is PKI-based and makes use of the certificate. 
After that, you had to go to the police office for registration. I still do not under-
stand why people could not register at the population office. Anyway, the process 
was too much of a burden for citizens, and the take-up was low.’
In 2007, 15 government entities offered services236 for using the VETUMA platform, 
including:237 
•	 City of Helsinki, Sports Department, healthcare booking
•	 City of Turku, event calendar, healthcare booking
•	 City of Vantaa, e-Form services
•	 City of Jyväskylä, booking of facilities
•	 District Hospital of Helsinki (HUS), e-Form service
•	 The Finnish National Board of Education, online application for education
•	 The Finnish National Gallery, web shop
•	 State Treasury, online recruitment for central government vacancies
234 http://www.tietoyhteiskuntaohjelma.fi/en_GB/
235 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matti_Vanhanen%27s_first_cabinet
236 See http://www.vtv.fi/files/145/161_2008_Tunnistuspalvelut_NETTI.pdf
237 http://www.suomi.fi/suomifi/qualitytotheweb/e-Services_and_forms/e-Services/vetuma_
service/vetuma_service/VETUMA_service.pdf
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A statistical analysis by the Ministry of Finance showed that in 2007 over 80% of 
the citizens who used the VETUMA platform to obtain a government service used 
it in combination with the banks’ TUPAS online identification solution.238 
7.1.4 Diffusion phase
In January 2008, 34 government organisations had joined the VETUMA project.239 
The Ministry of Finance’s valt-IT unit, together with Fujitsu, continued to present 
the solution during seminars across Finland, to stimulate government organisa-
tions to join. An employee of the valt-IT unit of the Ministry of Finance explained: 
‘We provided information to government organisations through the website, but 
we also had large-scale conferences. These conferences were held twice a year, 
and every year one of the subjects was VETUMA. We presented the VETUMA solu-
tion and tried to convince government organisations to start using it.’ Another 
respondent: ‘Of course we struggled with the question how to get government or-
ganisations involved, how to get them to adopt the solution. What really worked 
was that we said in our presentations that until the end of the year joining would 
be for free and that next year service providers would have to pay a joining-up fee 
of 2,400 euros. Like a temporary offer. We extended the special offer several times. 
I guess the joining-up fee is still paid by the central government. But, anyway, it 
worked.’
On 16 January 2008, the National Audit Office published a critical report on 
electronic identification solutions developed by the Finnish government.240 The 
report stated that the development of online identification and authentication 
for services to citizens was inefficient due to a lack of central coordination and the 
presence of competition between several systems (e.g. VETUMA and KATSO). The 
report concluded that the development and operating costs of the identification 
services, covered by the audit, amounted to 40 million euros from 1999 to 2007, 
and that more efficient central coordination could have reduced this expenditure. 
According to the National Audit Office, a more uniform and streamlined opera-
tion and monitoring of online identity management is needed. In its report, the 
National Audit Office was also critical of the investments made in the FINEID card, 
the use and subsequent take-up of which was low compared to the TUPAS solu-
tion offered by the banks. 
The ownership of the VETUMA project moved in 2009 from the valt-IT unit of 
the Ministry of Finance to the State IT Service Centre of the State Treasury.241 The 
State IT Centre manages government-wide electronic services for municipalities, 
including the VETUMA platform. On 10 June 2009, a new public tendering pro-
238 http://b2cpro.vtt.fi/documents/seminar/b2c-pro-seminaari-mikkola.pdf
239 http://www.fujitsu.com/fi/services/sahkoinenasiointi/
240 http://www.vtv.fi/files/135/1622008_Metsahallitus_NETTI.pdf
241 http://www.statskontoret.fi/public/Default.aspx?culture=sv-
FI&contentlan=3&nodeid=15808, see http://www.ica-it.org/conf43/docs/Conf43_The_Sta-
tus_of_ICT_in_Governments_2009.pdf, page 4
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cedure was published for the further development of VETUMA.242 Plans called 
the VETUMA service to be made interoperable with other identity services (e.g. 
KATSO).243 The project was awarded to Fujitsu.244 According to the plans of the 
Finnish government, the VETUMA service will become the unique gateway for 
citizens to securely access e-Services. To achieve streamlined identification across 
all government organisations, in 2009 the Ministry of Finance drafted the ‘Secu-
rity Levels Programme’ in order to set up common IT security requirements and 
controls for all government agencies and service providers.245 The Security Levels 
Programme may strongly affect the eIDM strategies and landscape in Finland as 
all organisations will have to comply with these requirements starting in 2011.246 
On 1 September 2009, the Act on Electronic Authentication and Signatures came 
into force.247 The objective of the act is to create a set of common rules in order to 
provide strong electronic identification services and to promote the use of elec-
tronic signatures. All service providers offering eIDM services that are branded as 
’strong’ will fall under the supervision and control of the new regulations.248 Since 
the TUPAS solution is a paper-based token, and subsequently the security level 
is rather low, a new version of the TUPAS service is being considered today. In 
addition, a new Population Register Act, the amendments to the Passport Act and 
a totally new Identity Act will come into force in 2010.249 Most of these changes are 
not currently implemented in practice. Mobile PKI services will most likely appear 
soon on the Finnish eIDM market, as well as Open ID. The future of the FINEID 
card is still unclear. By the end of December 2009, Citizen Certificates had been 
issued to a total of 286,000 people.250,251 In March 2010, the service providers offer-
ing online services while using the FINEID card was around 35,252 and the number 
of service providers using the VETUMA gateway to provide electronic services 
(whether through the FINEID card, TUPAS or another system) was over 60.253,254 The 
242 http://www.hankintailmoitukset.fi/sv/notice/search/?all=1
243 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305
244 http://www.valtiokonttori.fi/Public/default.aspx?contentid=31569&nodeid=15830
245 http://www.vm.fi/vm/fi/04_julkaisut_ja_asiakirjat/03_muut_asiakirjat/20081103Lausun/
name.jsp and http://www.vm.fi/vm/fi/04_julkaisut_ja_asiakirjat/03_muut_
asiakirjat/20081103Lausun/02_TTT-kaesikirja-20081029.pdf
246 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305
247 http://www.epractice.eu/en/news/293726 and http://www.ficora.fi/en/index/viestintavi-
rasto/uutiset/2009/P_32.html
248 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305
249 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305
250 http://www.fineid.fi/vrk/bulletin.nsf/HeadlinesFineidEng/B3C0574372BB9B58C22576A-
8002B5CC9
251 In 2009, the TUPAS identification system still dominated Finnish eIDM practice. In July 2009, 
the use of TUPAS tokens as eID had reached 99% for obtaining obtain online government 
services http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305
252 See www.etu-klubi.fi/ and http://www.etu-klubi.fi/vrk/etuklubi/home.nsf/files/Palveluluet-
telo%2018/$file/Palveluluettelo%2018.9.2009.pdf
253 http://www.suomi.fi/suomifi/laatuaverkkoon/asiointi_ja_lomakkeet/sahkoinen_asiointi/
verkkotunnistaminen_ja_maksaminen/
254 http://www.suomi.fi/suomifi/laatuaverkkoon/asiointi_ja_lomakkeet/sahkoinen_asio-
inti/verkkotunnistaminen_ja_maksaminen/yleiset_materiaalit/VETUMA-palvelun_
tilanne_21_12_2009/VETUMA-palvelun_tilanne_21_12_2009.ppt#539,3,VETUMAa käyttäviä 
asiakkaita (t=tunnistus, m=maksatus)
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adoption of the TUPAS system was estimated at 4.2 out of 5.1 million citizens, and 
99% of the VETUMA transactions were supported by the TUPAS system.255 In 2009, 
the VETUMA gateway had an average of 40,000 transactions per month.256 
7.1.5 Conclusions
In the VETUMA case, the most important actors involved were the four founding 
municipalities: Espoo, Vantaa, Helsinki and Kauniainen. They were the main driv-
ers behind the VETUMA solution in the sense that they formed a strong coalition, 
convinced the federal government to become involved and gained the commit-
ment of many municipalities in the tender phase. On the federal level, the most 
important actors were the (temporary) Information Society Programme of the 
Prime Minister’s Office and the valt-IT unit and Treasury Department of the Minis-
try of Finance. Their role was predominantly to support the nationwide diffusion 
and the funding of the VETUMA solution. 
The most important strategy of the VETUMA coalition was to develop an ‘open’ 
eIDM concept, an identification gateway supported by several eIDM systems 
(such as the banks’ TUPAS solution, the FINEID card and mobile phones). The de-
cision to make VETUMA an open concept was primarily driven by the idea that 
citizen take-up citizens would increase since they could apply multiple identifi-
cation tools. Statistics show that whereas the take-up of the FINEID card is very 
low – in December 2009 around 286,000 citizens (of the 5.1 million) had a FINEID 
card – the actual penetration of the TUPAS system is very high (in 2009 the take-
up was estimated 4.2 out of 5.2 million citizens). Approximately 99% of all online 
authentications to e-Government services are done using TUPAS.257 In addition, 
in March 2010 over 60 service providers offered services through the VETUMA 
gateway, and in 2009 the monthly number of VETUMA transactions was around 
40,000. Although the take-up of the VETUMA system by both service providers 
and citizens seems significant compared to the other cases, its future use is unsure 
as new legislation may require the application of more secure systems than the 
widely used TUPAS solution, which could potentially decrease the user base and 
actual use of VETUMA. 
7.2 PARAMETERS AND EVENTS Of THE ADVOCACy 
COALITION fRAMEwORK
This section explores the influence of the Advocacy Coalition Framework param-
eters and events. An assessment is made for each parameter and event to discover 
whether and how the parameter or event affected the joint innovation process. 
255 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305
256 http://www.suomi.fi/suomifi/laatuaverkkoon/asiointi_ja_lomakkeet/sahkoinen_asio-
inti/verkkotunnistaminen_ja_maksaminen/yleiset_materiaalit/VETUMA-palvelun_
tilanne_21_12_2009/VETUMA-palvelun_tilanne_21_12_2009.ppt#542,6,Lajeittain 2009
257 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305
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7.2.1 Attributes of the good
VETUMA is an authentication and payment gateway service, which predominantly 
relies on the national eID card and the paper PIN-TAN TUPAS token.258 However, 
in principle the VETUMA service is open to any identification solution since it is 
a uniform programming interface for heterogeneous methods.259 The Finnish 
authentication concept allows the mapping of PKI-based and non-PKI-based au-
thentication solutions. The FINEID and the TUPAS solutions use the same identifi-
cation procedure. When using one of the identification tools through the VETUMA 
service, the VETUMA service sends a query to the Population Information System 
of the Population Office. Subsequently the user’s credentials are verified by the 
Population Office. 
However, the method of obtaining a FINEID or TUPAS identification token dif-
fers. Regarding the TUPAS solution, Finnish banks have a statutory obligation to 
authenticate their customers. At a bank office, the customer’s identity is verified 
while using an official identity document approved by the bank, such as a driv-
ing licence, personal identity card, passport or social insurance card with photo. 
The first TUPAS identifiers must be fetched in person to ensure reliable customer 
authentication. The TUPAS certification service is accessed through bank-specific 
TUPAS identifiers created and issued by a bank for their customers. The TUPAS 
token is a set of papers containing one-time passwords and verification numbers. 
For example, these can be a combination of a user ID and one-time passwords. 
Bank identifiers are always personal regardless of whether they are issued for use 
with private or business/corporate customers.
FINEID cards are issued by the local police, cost €48 and are valid for five years. Ap-
plicants have to identify themselves with an ID card, driving licence or passport.260 
The card contains user identity data such as full name, social security number, 
date and place of birth, gender, nationality and card validity data. The printed 
data is also stored electronically on the chip. The chip contains two user certifi-
cates, allowing the authentication of the citizen and the use of a qualified elec-
tronic signature. The authentication and signature PIN codes are individual and 
vary in length. Both are initially random, and users may change both PIN codes.
The TUPAS bank ID is most popular.261 From a user point of view, TUPAS authentica-
tion and signature present only a few limitations, since the service is accessible 
even from workstations that are not equipped with a smart-card reader and FI-
NEID middleware. By contrast, the procedures for obtaining the FINEID card are 
more cumbersome and relatively expensive. 
258 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305
259 http://www.observatory.gr/files/news_events/summit_presentations/Presentation%20
Timo%20Karppinen.pdf
260 http://www.fineid.fi/vrk/fineid/home.nsf/pages/0E9115B44F5D5FEAC225708C005014B8
261 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=29082
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Identification through the VETUMA platform works as follows:262 
•	 The user accesses an application which requires identification on a govern-
ment website. 
•	 The service application on the government website ensures that a certain 
language is used by the application and creates a request. 
•	 The VETUMA service ensures the validity of the request and opens the VE-
TUMA User Interface into the user’s browser.
•	 The user selects the appropriate method of identification, e.g. FINEID or TU-
PAS.
•	 The VETUMA service creates a request for the FINEID or TUPAS service, and 
the FINEID or TUPAS application performs the identification and creates and 
sends the response to the VETUMA service.
•	 The VETUMA service creates an identification response and sends it to the 
service application of the government website.
•	 The service application ensures validity of the response. 
Several interview reports reveal that the open concept of VETUMA impacted the 
number of actors involved. One of the involved actors, for instance, stated: ‘The 
VETUMA system is open to any identification tool, for instance the FINEID card 
or the TUPAS authentication, but also mobile identification solutions. The con-
sequence was that any online identity provider could join up with the VETUMA 
innovation. OpenID providers are likely to participate in the future as well.’
The interview reports also show that in some cases the implementation pro-
cedures for municipalities limited their participation. The VETUMA integration 
follows a process where the municipality has to sign contracts with different 
registry owners, such as the Population Office and the banks.263 After signing the 
contracts, the municipality has to integrate and test the VETUMA interface imple-
mented in the e-Service environment and has to comply with the service licence 
requirements, including technical security requirements. Interface integration is 
done using Fujitsu’s Software Development Kit or using the University of Helsinki’s 
open-source software. Several interviews reveal that the reaching of agreements 
with banks was a particularly difficult process. For example, one of the interview-
ees stated: ‘Every bank had its own agreement, and thus we had to negotiate with 
all banks separately. We had discussions with all banks. It would have been more 
efficient if it had been coordinated better.’ And another respondent: ‘When I en-
tered the project I had to design the rules of the game, because there were no 
clear rules. [….] One of the problems was the agreements with banks; we needed 
a framework agreement with each bank so that the municipalities would not have 
to negotiate with the banks themselves. However, there still is not one agreement 
for all banks.’
262 http://projectliberty.org/liberty/content/download/3171/21234/file/070423%20-%20Fin-
land%20-%20Nivala%20usecase.pdf
263 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305
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In addition, the majority of respondents agree that the features of the FINEID solu-
tion have limited citizen take-up. One of them, for instance, explained: ‘There are 
several reasons why the FINEID card is not very popular in Finland. Today, around 
6% of the population has such a card. One of the reasons is that it costs some 50 
euros, whereas people can use their online banking systems, which they often 
already have. TUPAS is de facto authentication. There are far more than four mil-
lion Fins with a bank authentication. In addition, it is quite a burdensome process 
to obtain a card. You have to go to the police office, and if you lose your PIN you 
have to go there again in person. Not to mention that you have to pay around 20 
euros for the card reader.’
Several interview reports show that the take-up of the mobile identification so-
lution was also low because of limited usability. One of the involved actors, for 
instance, stated: ‘We made a great effort to launch the mobile application, but 
the threshold for citizens to obtain it remained too high. For citizens it was a very 
cumbersome process. First you had to go to the population office to get a certi-
fication for mobile identification. Then you had to go to the telecom operator to 
get the SIM card, which is PKI-based and makes use of the certificate. After that, 
you had to go to the police office for registration. I still do not understand why 
people could not register at the population office. Anyway, the process was too 
burdensome for citizens, and the take-up was low.’ 
In conclusion, the features of the VETUMA services have impacted the dynamics 
of the subsystem in the sense that the open architecture of the solution increased 
the number of electronic identity providers involved in the innovation process. 
Furthermore, the difficult process of reaching an agreement with the banks in 
the early stages of the innovation slowed down the implementation. Finally, the 
characteristics of the FINEID identification solution and the mobile identification 
yielded a limited take-up of these specific identification systems since citizens find 
the procedure to (re)obtain the identification tool too burdensome and the price 
of the FINEID card too high. 
7.2.2 Basic distribution of resources
Although specific figures are not publicly available, a report by the National Audit 
Office264 revealed that the costs of the VETUMA service in the period from 2004 to 
2007 were around 270,000 euros (including costs for the development of some 
services and implementation). Over the years, the transaction costs (per identifi-
cation) increased from € 0.045 in 2005, to € 0.095 in 2006, €0.21 in 2007 and €0.56 
by the end of 2007. The rise in price by the end of 2007 was due to the termination 
of the contract with Fujitsu and new pricing by Fujitsu.
264 Valtiontalouden tarkastusviraston toiminnantarkastuskertomukset 161/2008, page 128.
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VETUMA customers (public sector organisation using VETUMA in its applications) 
pay the following costs for the use of the VETUMA service:265
•	 Opening fee of 2,400 euros; 
•	 VETUMA customers are responsible for paying for their own transactions 
costs.
However, the Finnish Ministry of Finance announced in 2007 that they would pay 
the opening fee and VETUMA transaction costs until the end of 2007,266 and in 
2008 they stated that they would pay these costs until the end of the year 2008.267 
Interviews reveal that in 2009 the central government also paid these costs. 
Regarding the costs of using external services (banks and payment services, mo-
bile operators), the Ministry of Finance published the following rules: 
•	 The VETUMA customer is responsible for all costs;
•	 The VETUMA customer will also pay for:
	 −	 Development/license fees of VETUMA-enabled service applications;
	 −	 	Internal administration costs (for example, maintaining a user register 
for password authentication).
Most of the initial service providers involved found the funding structure unclear. 
This lack of clarity affected the dynamics of the subsystem in the sense that there 
have been several discussions about the funding. However, the majority of re-
spondents did not perceive this to have a significant influence on the innovation 
process. One of them stated: ‘We had many discussions about the funding of the 
VETUMA service. The central government made several promises, but even in the 
procurement phase there was no [financial] solution. […] But we knew that one 
way or the other the funding would be arranged.’ Someone else: ‘Funding was 
an issue all the time. Every year we had to wait and see if there would be fund-
ing.’ And another actor: ‘The Information Society Programme invested about half 
a million. But at the time of the procurement, they [ISP] were still discussing the 
funding with the Ministry of Finance. They made a deal: ISP would pay the initial 
costs and the ministry would assume ownership and take care of future funding.’
Several suppliers stated that the financing of the project was not very attractive. 
One of them, for instance, stated: ‘Although we knew that the VETUMA project 
would not be economically attractive, we decided to bid for it. It was an important 
project for our authentication business. And thus we made a good price offer. […] 
Our offer was that we would not get any purchase price for the service we would 
develop, but that we could sell the training [joining fee] and charge the transac-
tion cost. The problem, however, was that there were not many transactions. […] 
We organised several road shows to attract organisations to use VETUMA.’ And 
someone of the central government: ‘Fujitsu was paying for the system and re-
ceived a joining fee, a fee for every transaction and for the development of extra 
265 http://www.suomi.fi/suomifi/qualitytotheweb/e-Services_and_forms/e-Services/vetuma_
service/vetuma_service/VETUMA_service.pdf
266 http://b2cpro.vtt.fi/documents/seminar/b2c-pro-seminaari-mikkola.pdf
267 http://www.suomi.fi/suomifi/qualitytotheweb/e-Services_and_forms/e-Services/vetuma_
service/vetuma_service/VETUMA_service.pdf
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functions. Fujitsu’s best earnings came from the joining fees. Until now [December 
2009], around 70 municipalities have joined [which totals 168,000 euros].’
The majority of service providers agree that the temporary financial compensa-
tion by the central government was an important incentive for joining up. One of 
the respondents, for instance, stated: ‘We were told that we could join the service 
and that the state would pay the joining fee and the transaction costs until the 
end of the year. Therefore we wanted to join up before the end of the year.’
To summarize, the basic distribution of resources affected the dynamics of the 
subsystem in the sense that there were many discussions between involved par-
ties on the funding of the VETUMA service, but these discussions have not signifi-
cantly affected the (e.g. direction of ) innovation. In addition, it appeared that the 
temporary compensation of the costs of service providers by the state were an 
important incentive for service providers to join up. 
7.2.3  Fundamental cultural values 
Values perceived as important by subsystem actors are best reflected by key 
policy or visionary documents produced by subsystem actors. However, in Finland 
there has not been a central document (e.g. a white paper or eIDM vision) outlin-
ing the Finnish eIDM vision.268 Although such generic documents were lacking, 
interviews reveal that subsystem actors shared several values that affected the 
innovation process. Firstly, the founding actors found it important to be among 
the front-running municipalities to apply e-Government strategies. Innovation, 
the use of new technologies, the creation of an information society – the actors 
considered all these to be crucial issues. One of the actors, for instance, stated: 
‘In our municipality we have always tried to be ahead when it comes to e-Gov-
ernment. We were among the first to implement an e-Payment system, we have 
projects on e-Democracy, e-Inclusion. We find it important to constantly improve 
our services.’ And someone else: ‘A few decades ago, we would not have thought 
that internet use would be so pervasive today. The development of technology 
provides all kinds of opportunities, and we are trying to reap the benefits. We find 
it important to keep pace with changes in society.’
Secondly, the majority of respondents stated that the main impetus for developing 
an eIDM system was to make residents’ everyday life easier by enabling citizens to 
obtain services online. One of the involved parties, for instance, stated: ‘The initial 
268 Identification systems have been mentioned in the National Knowledge Society Strategy. 
However, this document was published in 2007, at a time when the VETUMA service was 
already being implemented and thus did not significantly affect the innovation process. See 
http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288224 and http://www.tietoyhteiskuntaohjelma.
fi/esittely/en_GB/introduction/_files/11233297000000607/default/tietoyhteiskuntao-
hjelma_2006_en.pdf. In addition, JUHTA, a division of the Ministry of the Interior, published 
recommendations for an eIDM system some time before the VETUMA project started, but 
this document was not perceived as being important by key actors involved in the innova-
tion process. See http://www.jhs-suositukset.fi/web/guest;jsessionid=875F4890622BD0D74B
B891A137B32FC0 
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reason to start the eIDM project was the need for online identification in order to 
provide citizens with online services. For some services we need to know who is 
asking for the service, so we have to identify him or her. […] We were – and still 
are – convinced that obtaining online services saves citizens time. They do not have 
to travel to the government office and are not restricted by opening hours. This is 
an important added value since one of today’s scarcest commodities is time.’ The 
value of convenience for citizens has also been highlighted in several presentations 
about the VETUMA service by both cities and central government agencies. In the 
presentation by the city of Lahti, for instance, the most important aim in imple-
menting the system was to save time and costs for both citizens and government.269 
In conclusion, the interview reports reveal that one of the crucial factors for 
launching the project was the fact that the founding municipalities highly valued 
(technological) innovation. Although not explicitly mentioned in general visions 
and strategies, these values contributed to the initiation of the project. In addi-
tion, interview reports reveal that the value ‘convenience for citizens’ affected the 
functional and technical requirements of the solution. The participating parties 
deliberately decided to develop a gateway that supports several identification 
systems (e.g. the FINEID card, TUPAS system and mobile eIDM systems), to en-
hance the usability of the system. 
7.2.4 Basic legal structure
The main legal framework for the VETUMA service consists of the following 
legislation:270
•	 Identity Card Act (829/1999)271 and the population Information Act 
(507/1993).272 These acts give the Population Office the mandate to act as the 
Finnish government’s certification authority. 
•	 The Act on Electronic Signatures (14/2003),273 the Act on Electronic Services 
and Communication in the Public Sector (13/2003)274 and the Act on Electron-
ic Communication within Administration (13/2003). These acts establish the 
legal guidelines for personal identification and for the production of elec-
tronic signatures and services. On 1 September 2009, the Act on Electronic 
Authentication and Signatures came into force.275 The objective of the act is 
to create a set of common rules in order to provide strong electronic identi-
fication services and to promote the use of electronic signatures. All service 
providers offering eIDM services that are branded as ‘strong’ fall under the 
supervision and control of these new regulations.276
269 http://www.observatory.gr/files/news_events/summit_presentations/Presentation%20
Timo%20Karppinen.pdf
270 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305
271 Henkilökorttilaki 829/1999
272 http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/1993/19930507
273 http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2003/en20030014.pdf
274 http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/E0030013.PDF
275 http://www.epractice.eu/en/news/293726 and http://www.ficora.fi/en/index/viestintavi-
rasto/uutiset/2009/P_32.html
276 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305
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•	 The Personal Data File Act (523/1999)277 and the Act on the Openness of Gov-
ernment Activities (621/1999).278
•	 The Act on Register Administration (166/1996)279 and its corresponding De-
cree (248/1996)280 govern the powers of the Population Office. 
Finland has no specific regulations with regard to the process of authentication 
in general. The e-Signatures law (14/2003) transposes the provisions of the e-
Signatures Directive, but does not apply to authentication as such. 
Depending on the authentication method (FINEID or TUPAS), e-Government 
applications use either the FINUID or the SSIN as unique identifier. When using 
FINEID/FINUID authentication, there are no service provider-related privacy con-
cerns to overcome, thus no special regulations are directly involved.281 This is not 
the case when using TUPAS/SSIN authentication, where the handling and storing 
of the SSIN user by the service provider is regulated by the Personal Data File 
Act (523/1999). The act does not constitute a compliance framework that service 
providers contact for certification, but in case of a privacy data breach (disclosure 
of SSIN user), the service provider can be held responsible for negligence.
The large majority of respondents felt that legislation concerning electronic iden-
tification did not have a significant effect on the subsystem or the innovation. 
However, most of the respondents argued that procurement legislation had an 
important effect on both the dynamics of the subsystem and the innovation pro-
cess and outcome. One of them, for instance, stated: ‘ The basis for electronic iden-
tity had already been laid down in 2003 in the Electronic Signatures Act and some 
other acts. There were not many discussions on these acts. In Finland, for instance, 
we do not have severe privacy discussions. What has played a role, however, is 
the Procurement Act. The Procurement Act prohibited the VETUMA consortium 
from joining the KATSO solution [which was a similar service]. Every municipality 
that wanted to join had to do this before bidding. This was the reason why the 
consortium decided to develop their own solution, but now we have ended up 
with two similar solutions and a critical review by the National Audit Office.’ And 
someone else: ‘We discussed the joining up issue with KATSO, but it did not work 
out because of the procurement law. And we had the same discussions during the 
VETUMA tendering process, namely that service providers had to be involved in 
the tendering process. […] These discussions slowed down the process.’
Overall, it appears that it was not the electronic identity or privacy legislation, 
but the procurement law that affected the dynamics of the subsystem and subse-
quently the innovation process. The procurement law – and uncertainties resulting 
from diverse interpretations – prevented municipalities from joining the KATSO 
project, and the same lack of clarity hampered the VETUMA tendering process. 
277 http://www.tietosuoja.fi/uploads/hopxtvf.HTM
278 http://www.om.fi/23963.htm
279 http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/1996/19960166
280 Rekisterihallintoasetus (1996/248).
281 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305
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7.2.5 Changes in socio-economic conditions and technology
During the development, implementation and diffusion process of the VETUMA 
service, one of the most important changes in Finland’s socio-economic condi-
tions was the burst of the internet bubble in 2001. In the years 1998, 1999 and 
2000, the annual GDP growth was 5.2%, 3.9% and 5.1%, respectively.282 In 2001, 
2002 and 2003, growth dropped to 2.7%, 1.6% and 1.8%. The Finnish economy re-
covered in the years 2004 to 2007, with respective growths of 2.8%, 4.9% and 4.2%.
A second change was the evolution of technology applied in the identification 
systems supported by VETUMA. The FINEID card, for instance, requires the use of a 
card reader and card reader software. Whereas these technologies were relatively 
immature and had limited availability at the onset of the VETUMA development, 
today most of these technologies are widely used and mature. In the late 1990s, 
the costs of card readers were relatively high, they could only be purchased at a 
very limited number of companies and the software that supported the card read-
ers suffered from teething problems.283 Today, many companies sell card readers 
for much lower prices, and their usability has substantially increased. 
A third socio-economic change may be the current economic crisis. Although the 
opinions of economists on the precise impact of the current economic crisis differ 
substantially, no one would argue that we have not been in a global economic 
recession since 2008. In Finland, GDP growth in 2008 was 1%, whereas in 2009 it 
was -6.4% (see figure 8 above).
282 http://www.indexmundi.com/finland/gdp_real_growth_rate.html
283 This was not only the case in Finland, but also in other countries. See, for instance, Srivastava 
(2005). 
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The large majority of respondents stated that the burst of the internet bubble at 
the beginning of the 21st century did not have a significant impact. These state-
ments are endorsed by research carried out by the European Commission, which 
provided an overview of e-Government budgets in European countries in 2000, 
2001 and 2002.284 The study demonstrates that despite the burst of the internet 
bubble, the Finnish government’s e-Government budgets increased between 
2000 and 2002, from 584 million euros in 2000, 641 million in 2001, to 706 million 
euros in 2002. One of the interviewees explained: ‘I do not think that the burst of 
the internet bubble played any role in the innovation process. There were discus-
sions about the funding of the services but these were more about who is going 
to pay? And not whether the government is going to pay.’
In addition, most of the respondents agreed that technological changes did not 
significantly affect the dynamics of the subsystem or the innovation process. One 
actor, for instance, stated: ‘The VETUMA service is open to any electronic identifi-
cation solution, so any future solutions can be integrated.’
Furthermore, several interviewees expect the current economic crisis to have an 
impact on e-Government budgets since cutbacks are expected. According to one 
of the interviewees: ‘I do not think it will have an effect in the coming year [2010], 
but it is sure to have effect in the future since tax income will decrease dramati-
cally. However, for the government, things change with a delay. I think the effects 
will be apparent in two years.’ However, no sound conclusions can be drawn re-
garding the impact of the current economic crisis on the VETUMA project.
In conclusion, so far there is no sound evidence that the changes in socio-eco-
nomic conditions and technology affected the dynamics of the subsystem.
7.2.6 Changes in public opinion
Public opinion on the VETUMA solution is most clearly voiced in the media, such 
as national newspapers. Over time, several newspapers have published articles on 
the VETUMA project. In 2005, most articles were related to electronic identifica-
tion and e-Government in general. In particular, DigiToday,285 a Finnish newspaper 
specialised in ICT developments, reported on several e-Government issues. In 
December 2005, for example, it published an article on the launch of the e-Card 
in Austria.286 In 2006, several other newspapers published articles related to elec-
tronic identification or e-Government in general. It-viikko, for instance, reported 
in February 2006 that a Finnish member of the European Parliament found that 
284 European Commission, (2006), ‘e-Government Economics Project (eGEP)’, Expenditure Study 
Final Version, Brussels. The only data available to the public on public administration ICT and 
e-Government expenditure in Europe are those presented in the EITO (European Informa-
tion Technology Observatory) 2002 edition, which contained a monographic section on 
e-Government.
285 http://www.digitoday.fi/page.php?page_id=63
286 http://m.digitoday.fi/?page=showSingleNews&newsID=200517968
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government organisations in Finland had poor cooperation in the area of ICT.287 
In December 2006, the newspaper reported that the VETUMA service had won 
an award for being one of the best examples of how various government actors 
jointly work together on an ICT project.288 DigiToday published several articles in 
2006 on the positive results of the Information Society Programme289 and con-
cerns of the Green League on the security of electronic voting.290 
In 2007, several newspapers wrote about the termination of the Information 
Society Programme. It-viikko, for instance, published an overview of the results 
achieved by the programme.291 In the same year, more critical articles on VETUMA 
or related projects appeared in several newspapers. For example, DigiToday pub-
lished an article on the limited diffusion of the FINEID card.292 However, the article 
also mentioned some advantages of the VETUMA service, such as the possibility 
to electronically sign documents. In addition, in 2007 several articles appeared 
on tangible electronic services available through the VETUMA service. It-viikko 
reported on an experiment with patient data access by means of an electronic 
form and the VETUMA authentication solution.293 DigiToday published an article 
on the use of VETUMA by the Board of Education so people could sign up for 
secondary-school teacher training online.294 
In 2008, several newspapers reported on the critical report by the National Au-
dit Office concerning the development of electronic identification solutions by 
the government. The Helsingin Sanomat,295 for instance, gave a summary of the 
report’s main conclusions: the limited use of the FINEID card and the lack of a 
central coordination of electronic identification projects. In the same year, several 
articles appeared on new services launched by governments that make use of 
the VETUMA service. The newspaper Iltalehti,296 for instance, reported on the use 
of the VETUMA solution by the Hailuoto ferry (largest island of the northern part 
of the Gulf of Bothnia and a municipality of the county Oulu).297 In addition, most 
articles in 2009 related to the VETUMA services were on new services that use the 
solution. Helsingin Sanomat reported on new services in Helsinki,298 and Iltalehti 
287 http://m.itviikko.fi/?page=showSingleNews&newsID=2006763
288 http://www.itviikko.fi/ratkaisut/2006/12/20/fujitsun-vetuma-vei-voiton/200624006/7
289 http://www.digitoday.fi/data/2006/01/05/saavutukset-myonteisia-tietoyhteiskunnas-
sa/20063291/66
290 http://m.digitoday.fi/?page=showSingleNews&newsID=20064974
291 http://m.itviikko.fi/?page=showSingleNews&newsID=20073136
292 http://www.digitoday.fi/tietoturva/2007/01/11/mobiilitunnistus-tulee/2007799/66
293 http://www.itviikko.fi/ratkaisut/2007/10/02/vtt-vauhditti-tiedonsiirtoa-potilaan-ja-laakarin-
valilla/200724319/7
294 http://m.digitoday.fi/?page=showSingleNews&newsID=200712979
295 http://www.hs.fi/
296 http://www.iltalehti.fi/etusivu/
297 http://www.iltalehti.fi/oulu/200805237696949_ou.shtml
298 http://www.hs.fi/paakirjoitus/artikkeli/Talousongelmat+Ven%C3%A4j%C3%A4n+riesana/
HS20090204SI1MA010sx
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on the intentions of the Finnish government to use the service for vehicle regis-
tration.299 Iltalehti published some critical articles on electronic voting in 2008.300
The majority of respondents agree that the most critical articles on the conclu-
sions of the National Audit Office were those that dealt with the government’s 
various electronic identification projects. However, many also stated that the criti-
cism in the newspapers did not produce any significant effects either. One of the 
actors, for instance, explained: ‘To me it seems as if the audit is a kind of media 
happening. For newspapers this is news. But in my opinion, it did not have any ef-
fect. You just have been a bad boy.’ And someone else remarked: ‘No, it did not af-
fect the innovation. VETUMA is still a good service. And at the time, it was already 
put in place and used by service providers. And they are still using it.’ But some 
expect the report to have an effect on the future direction of electronic identity 
policy. For example, one of the respondents stated: ‘It was an issue in our depart-
ment because the secretary general had someone to answer to. But it wasn’t the 
minister. I think that in the long run it may have an effect. It may contribute to the 
integration of several separate electronic identification tools into one.’ However, 
as yet there is no sound evidence that the National Audit Report had an effect on 
the integration of several solutions. 
To summarize, until now there has been no evidence to confirm that newspaper 
articles on the VETUMA service have significantly affected the dynamics of the 
subsystem. 
7.2.7 Systemic governing coalitions
During the VETUMA innovation process, there were several changes in systemic 
governing coalitions. Firstly, the Finnish Information Society Programme, which 
ended in 2007, was initiated in September 2004 to promote information society in 
Finland.301 The project leader of the Information Society Programme was actively 
involved in the VETUMA innovation. She was in the management group of the 
innovation and played a key role in the funding of the solution. The Information 
Society Programme was temporary, and therefore in 2006 the question was raised 
which central government body would assume ownership of the VETUMA project. 
Eventually it was decided that the valt-IT unit of the Ministry of Finance would 
take over the project. Secondly, in 2009 the ownership of the VETUMA project was 
transferred from the valt-IT unit of the Ministry of Finance to the State IT Service 
Centre of the State Treasury.302 The State IT Centre manages government-wide 
electronic services for municipalities, including the online identification platform 
VETUMA.
299 http://www.iltalehti.fi/autot/2009110510549956_au.shtml
300 http://www.iltalehti.fi/paakirjoitus/200904109397625_pk.shtml
301 http://www.tietoyhteiskuntaohjelma.fi/en_GB/index.html
302 http://www.statskontoret.fi/public/Default.aspx?culture=sv-
FI&contentlan=3&nodeid=15808, see http://www.ica-it.org/conf43/docs/Conf43_The_Sta-
tus_of_ICT_in_Governments_2009.pdf, page 4
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According to a vast majority of respondents, when the VETUMA project under-
went a change of ownership, it did not substantially affect the dynamics of the 
subsystem or the innovation process. One actor, for instance, contended: ‘The 
discussion was about who would fund and have ownership, and not whether the 
government was going to fund and have ownership. […] The discussions were 
about financial preconditions, but it did not affect the cooperation or the innova-
tion process.’ Regarding the shift of ownership to the State Treasury, the majority 
of respondents also agree that it did not significantly affect the dynamics of the 
subsystem or the innovation process. An involved actor explained: ‘It did not have 
any effect; it was just an administrative change. The direction of the innovation 
did not change, neither did the funding principles. Moreover, some of the govern-
ment practitioners involved also moved from valt-IT to the State Treasury.’
Overall, the changes in governing coalitions did not appear to substantially im-
pact the direction or outcome of the innovation. 
7.2.8 Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems
Over time, there were three subsystems, the decisions, policies or strategies of 
which were related to VETUMA project, namely: the competing KATSO coalition, 
the (national) political subsystem and the European subsystem. 
Firstly, the local authorities were not – as in other case studies – ‘another’ sub-
system, since they were the initiators and therefore made part of the VETUMA 
subsystem. The competing KATSO coalition, however, was an important other 
subsystem. The KATSO coalition was a consortium of national actors who jointly 
developed a similar solution by the same name.303 The key government actors 
involved in KATSO were the Finnish Tax Administration, the Ministry of Labour 
and the Social Insurance Institution of Finland.304 KATSO’s project goal was largely 
similar to the goal of the VETUMA project, namely to develop an eIDM platform 
that makes use of several electronic identification solutions (such as national 
smart cards and net bank identification) in order to provide citizens with online 
services.305
Another subsystem that raised issues related to the VETUMA system was the na-
tional political system. During the early days, when the municipalities of Vantaa 
and Espoo were exploring ideas about the development of an electronic identi-
fication system in 2003, Matti Vanhanen was elected Prime Minister (June 2003), 
continuing the coalition government between the Centre Party (KESK), the Social 
Democrats (SDP) and the Swedish People’s Party, which was established by his 
predecessor. In 2007 – the phase during which the VETUMA service was developed 
and implemented – the Centre Party formed a coalition government with the Na-
303 https://www.tunnistus.fi/, Katso is an identification service for web services of member 
organisations.
304 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/ict_psp/documents/eid_good_prac-
tices_modinis_study.pdf
305 http://cis.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/Japanese/society/conference1001/kiiski-paper.pdf
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tional Coalition, Swedish People’s Party and the Green League. Matti Vanhanen 
continued as prime minister. Over time, several parliamentarians posed questions 
about the VETUMA innovation. In 2000, the Left Alliance party (VAS) criticised the 
FINEID card.306 The main criticism of the party was the limited take-up by citizens 
and the card’s five-year period of validity.307 In 2002, the Left Alliance party again 
posed questions on the limited use of the FINEID card.308 In 2002, the Centre Party 
stressed the importance of the development of a knowledge society and – as an 
inherent element of this – electronic government services to citizens.309 In 2005, 
the Left Alliance again raised questions about the FINEID card, its validity and 
limited take-up. The party also criticised the costs of the FINEID card for citizens. 
In 2006, the Green League wondered whether tangible results had been achieved 
by the Information Society Programme and addressed the need for more national 
coordination of e-Government projects and cooperation between government 
bodies.310 In October 2008, there was a large debate about the Finnish Informa-
tion Society and the conclusions of the National Audit Office on the government’s 
electronic identification projects.311 Several parties criticised the lack of a central 
coordination in these projects. 
A third subsystem relevant for the VETUMA innovation was the European Com-
mission. The European Commission has been engaged in eIDM issues since the 
late 1990s. The Information Society and Media department had an e-Government 
unit, whose name changed to ‘ICT for Government and Public Services’ in 2007. 
The unit organised and still regularly organises meetings with the e-Government 
subgroup, which represents all member states. In addition, the unit established 
expert groups, one of which is on eIDM. At the European level, there were several 
EU projects and directives on eIDM systems. In 1999, the European directive on 
electronic signatures went into force.312 The eID directive laid down the criteria 
that form the basis for legal recognition of electronic signatures. In 2004 and 2005, 
the European MODINIS Project turned it focus, among other things, onto assess-
ing the status quo of eID systems in European member states and the exploration 
of possible European eID systems.313 In 2005, the IDABC’s eID Interoperability for 
PEGS programme was launched, the objective of which aims to analyse the eID 
306 Finland was the first country in Europe to issue an electronic identity card, the FINEID card. 
The project started early in 1998, and the first card was presented to the Finnish Prime 
minister on 7 December 1999, as a way of starting the application phase. See http://www.
fidis.net/resources/deliverables/hightechid/int-d36000/doc/30/
307 http://www.eduskunta.fi/triphome/bin/thw/trip?${APPL}=utpptk&${BASE}=faktautpPTK&${T
HWIDS}=0.33/1263469833_279065&${TRIPPIFE}=PDF.pdf
308 http://www.eduskunta.fi/triphome/bin/thw/trip?${APPL}=utpptk&${BASE}=faktautpPTK&${T
HWIDS}=0.9/1263469569_209911&${TRIPPIFE}=PDF.pdf
309 http://www.eduskunta.fi/triphome/bin/thw/trip?${APPL}=utpptk&${BASE}=faktautpPTK&${T
HWIDS}=0.41/1263469421_196644&${TRIPPIFE}=PDF
310 http://www.eduskunta.fi/triphome/bin/thw/trip?${APPL}=utpptk&${BASE}=faktautpPTK&${T
HWIDS}=0.38/1263467498_334509&${TRIPPIFE}=PDF
311 http://www.eduskunta.fi/triphome/bin/thw/trip?${APPL}=utpptk&${BASE}=faktautpPTK&${T
HWIDS}=0.2/1263468182_461637&${TRIPPIFE}=PDF.pdf
312 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/l24118_en.htm
313 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/modinis/index_en.htm
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and authentication interoperability requirements.314 In 2008, the STORK project 
was launched, which aims to establish a European eID Interoperability Platform 
allowing citizens to establish new e-relations across borders upon presentation 
of their national eID.315 In addition, Capgemini publishes an annual benchmark on 
e-Government progress in the European Union member states.
As stated in previous sections, the KATSO consortium and solution did not affect 
the VETUMA consortium or innovation. The two electronic identity tools were 
developed totally separately from each other. This conclusion, among others, was 
made in the National Audit Office’s report on electronic identification solutions 
developed by the Finnish government.316 An involved actor explained: ‘Before 
VETUMA there was the KATVE consortium, which built the KATSO solution for the 
government. It was not possible for the municipalities to join up since only the 
organisations mentioned in the tender could use the solution. […] Consequently, 
the two solutions [VETUMA and KATSO] were developed separately from each 
other.’
Most of the respondents stated that politics (e.g. chamber questions) did not 
significantly affect the dynamics of the subsystem. However, some respondents 
argued that because certain subjects (such as the Information Society, the im-
proved cooperation among municipalities and increased central coordination of 
ICT projects) were high on Vanhanen’s political agenda, this stimulated the central 
government’s funding of the VETUMA solution. One of the actors, for instance, 
stated: ‘Although the central administration did not have a strong e-Government 
policy, the fact that cabinet members gave ICT great attention provided a basis 
of willingness on the part of government practitioners to be involved and try to 
fund it. […] However, there was not a single, specific minister who pushed the VE-
TUMA innovation. Vanhanen, for example, considered VETUMA just one of many 
ICT projects.’
The large majority stated that the European subsystem predominantly had a gen-
eral effect on Finnish e-Government, and in some instances specifically on the 
VETUMA innovation. According to several respondents, politicians and therefore 
practitioners of central government are interested in Finland’s e-Government 
performances in comparison with other European countries. In addition, Finnish 
law is affected by European law. One of the involved government practitioners, 
for instance, stated: ‘Of course we have to comply with European directives. Some 
of these directives concern subjects related to e-Government – such as the e-
Signature directive – and thus affect Finnish e-Government laws and policies.’
In conclusion, it appears that the national KATSO coalition did not affect the dy-
namics of the subsystem and the outcome of the innovation. In addition, the at-
tention cabinet members devoted to ICT subjects, cooperation between munici-
314 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/6484
315 https://www.eid-stork.eu/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1
316 http://www.vtv.fi/files/145/161_2008_Tunnistuspalvelut_NETTI.pdf
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palities and national coordination of ICT projects resulted in a basic willingness to 
invest in the VETUMA project. The Europe subsystem influenced e-Government 
legislation and policy in a more general way. 
7.2.9 Conclusions
Regarding the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the following parameters and 
events affected the innovation process: 
•	 The features of the VETUMA services impacted the dynamics of the subsystem 
in the sense that the open architecture of the solution increased the number 
of electronic identity providers involved in the innovation process. Further-
more, in the early stages of the innovation the difficult process of reaching 
an agreement with the banks slowed down the innovation process. Finally, 
the characteristics of the FINEID identification solution and the mobile iden-
tification resulted in a limited take-up of these specific identification systems 
since citizens find the procedure to (re)obtain the identification tool too 
burdensome and the price of the FINEID card too high. 
•	 The uncertainty regarding the basic distribution of resources affected the 
dynamics of the subsystem in the sense that there were many discussions 
between involved parties on the funding of the VETUMA service, but these 
discussions did not significantly affect the (e.g. direction of ) the innovation. 
In addition, it appeared that the temporary compensation of service-provid-
er costs by the state were an important incentive for service providers to join 
up. 
•	 Some of the shared values of the subsystem affected the innovation process in 
the sense that they were (amongst others) an impetus to launch the project, 
and some values shaped the features of the innovation. 
•	 In particular, the procurement law affected the dynamics of the subsystem 
and subsequently the innovation process. The procurement law – and the 
uncertainties resulting from diverse interpretations – prevented municipali-
ties from joining the KATSO project, and the same lack of clarity hampered 
the VETUMA tendering process. 
•	 So far, there is no sound evidence that the changes in socio-economic condi-
tions and technology affected the dynamics of the subsystem.
•	 Until now, no evidence has been found to suggest that public opinion on the 
VETUMA service significantly affected the dynamics of the subsystem. 
•	 The changes in governing coalitions did not appear to substantially impact 
the direction or outcome of the innovation. 
•	 The national KATSO coalition did not affect the dynamics of the subsystem 
and the outcome of the innovation. In addition, the attention cabinet mem-
bers devoted to ICT subjects, cooperation between municipalities and na-
tional coordination of ICT projects resulted in a basic willingness to invest 
in the VETUMA project. The European subsystem influenced e-Government 
legislation and policy in a more general way. 
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7.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES
This section draws conclusions for each of the social capital variables regarding 
the influence social capital characteristics have on the dynamics of the subsys-
tem and subsequently on the joint, technological innovation process. Each sub-
section concludes with an assessment of the influence of the specific variable on 
the innovation process, outcome and/or impact.
7.3.1 Openness versus group closure
Although the founding municipalities were open to any government organisa-
tion joining up – in fact, they deliberately involved other municipalities and the 
central government – they were relatively closed to other electronic identity ini-
tiatives. From the onset of the project, the intention of the informal project group 
was to make their solution a national solution. They were, of course, aware that 
other government organisations also needed an electronic identification tool to 
provide citizens and businesses with services, and they did not want to invest 
in something that would be overhauled later on by central government policy. 
Several respondents stated that their decision to involve Helsinki was strategic 
in the sense that the adoption of the VETUMA innovation by Helsinki would be 
an important reason to make VETUMA the national solution, since Helsinki had 
the largest population of all Finnish cities. One of the respondents, for instance, 
stated: ‘It was very important that Helsinki had climbed on board [of the VETUMA 
innovation]. Thanks to their involvement, we had a coalition representing one 
fifth of the Finnish population. Central government cannot say no to that. The 
central government did not have any choice – they had to come along.’
Some government actors who were initially outside the VETUMA coalition felt 
that they were forced to join up with the VETUMA and that they were poorly rep-
resented in the project. Various respondents stated that some municipalities felt 
as if they did not have a choice but to join it. One of the interviewees, for instance, 
stated: ‘Another group of larger cities, such as Tampere, Oulu, also collaborated 
on e-Government subjects. They saw the VETUMA innovation as just another e-
Government innovation initiated by the cities of the capital region [municipalities 
which initiated VETUMA]. They felt that the cities in the capital region – again – 
got all the funding from the central government for their e-Government projects.’ 
In addition, the VETUMA coalition had involved the Ministry of the Interior and 
the Prime Minister’s Office, but not Kuntaliitto,317 a Finnish association of local 
and regional authorities. Since the smaller municipalities in particular considered 
themselves well represented by Kuntaliitto, some of the smaller municipalities 
felt that their demand was not being heard by the VETUMA coalition. One of the 
respondents explained: ‘In general, the interests of smaller municipalities are bet-
ter promoted by Kuntaliitto than by the bigger cities. But Kuntaliitto was not part 
of the VETUMA group, and so some smaller municipalities felt that their interests 
were not being served.’ Someone else stated: ‘The involvement of Kuntaliitto 
317 http://www.kunnat.net/k_Kuntaliitto_peruslistasivu.asp?path=1;184;276;830
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would have slowed down the innovation process, and therefore for some of the 
founding municipalities it was not very attractive to involve them.’ 
Furthermore, there was a competing coalition consisting of the Finnish Tax Admin-
istration, the Ministry of Labour and the Social Insurance Institution of Finland,318 
which developed a similar system called KATSO.319 The KATSO project had started 
in 2004, and in 2005 there was a meeting between the VETUMA and the KATSO 
subsystem to explore possible cooperation. Although the large majority of inter-
viewees stated that the procurement law prevented both subsystems from coop-
eration, there were some respondents who stated that not only procurement law 
but also group closure mechanisms hampered cooperation between the subsys-
tems. One of these respondents, for instance, stated: ‘Of course the procurement 
law was a problem. But I had the impression that the law was also used as an 
excuse not to cooperate. Cooperation would have implied mutual adaptation. […] 
The law could have been interpreted in several ways and it was explained very 
restrictively; another interpretation would have supported cooperation.’ Another 
respondent: ‘Kuntaliitto wanted to adopt the KATSO solution. But they [some of 
the founding members] did not want to join. They said: “Interesting, but not for 
us.” […] I posed the question several times [whether the VETUMA parties could 
not or did not want to cooperate with the KATSO parties]. It was said that it was 
not possible, because of legislation. But – in my opinion – another reason was that 
Kuntaliitto and the big cities did not get along very well. And there were questions 
like “who would own the system”.’
Finally, group closure mechanisms can also be found in the sense that the initi-
ating parties were relatively closed to new ideas or directions of the innovation 
process. The majority of the respondents involved stated that after having defined 
the specifications of the system, the direction of the innovation was clear to all 
and largely unchangeable. One of the respondents said about the participation of 
new municipalities: ‘No, we were not afraid that municipalities that would join up 
would change the direction of the innovation. It simply worked like this: if you join 
such a group, you have to accept the purpose and decisions made by the group.’
Concluding, group closure affected the joint innovation process in the sense that 
not all interests of service providers that eventually became involved in the in-
novation were promoted in the early phases of the innovation. On the other hand, 
group closure mechanisms in the initiation phase of the innovation appeared to 
speed up the innovation process as it was easier to reach consensus. 
7.3.2 Strength of the ties
The large majority of interviewees stated that the presence of existing ties played 
an important role in the innovation process. 
318 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/ict_psp/documents/eid_good_prac-
tices_modinis_study.pdf
319 https://www.tunnistus.fi/. KATSO is an identification service for web services of member 
organisations.
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Particularly in the initiation and development process, powerful ties strongly in-
fluenced the involvement of parties and coalition building. In the initiation phase, 
several strong ties between government practitioners from municipalities – but 
also between government practitioners from municipalities and central govern-
ment – played an important role in the formation of the VETUMA coalition. The 
involved persons from Espoo, Vantaa, Helsinki and Kauniainen had known each 
other for a long time and had cooperated in several projects. In addition, the gov-
ernment practitioners from Vantaa and Espoo had strong relationships with some 
government practitioners from the central government. The vast majority stated 
that the strong ties between the persons involved had an important impact on 
the formation of the coalition. One of them, for instance, stated: ‘Yes, of course 
these personal strong ties helped to build the coalition. It was quite easy to get 
all the parties together. Moreover, we had already cooperated in several projects, 
so it was just a matter of discussing it and start it.’ In addition, several respondents 
stated that strong and medium ties were used to gain more general support for 
the innovation. One of these respondents, for instance, explained: ‘Strong, but 
also medium, ties have been important for creating a general basis of support for 
the VETUMA service. […] We have used many ties, at the operational but also at a 
higher level. Even at a major level. The ties used depended on the kind of support 
we needed. It works very informally. I could, for instance, ask someone: “please go 
talk to him or her for backing.”’
In the diffusion phase, however, the presence of (strong, medium or weak) ties 
appeared to be less relevant. The majority of respondents agreed that ties pre-
dominantly played a role in the early phases, whereas in the dissemination phase 
it became more important to make the innovation attractive for service providers 
to join up. One of the interviewees, for instance, explained: ‘Whereas in the initia-
tion phase we needed strong ties to create consensus about the characteristics 
of the innovation and to form a coalition, in the diffusion phase it was just a mat-
ter of providing municipalities with information. Existing contacts were not very 
important. We built a website with all the information, organised road shows and 
seminars. The most important thing in this [the diffusion] phase was to convince 
municipalities of the innovation’s potential. And of course the temporary [finan-
cial] compensation by the central government was an important reason for mu-
nicipalities to join up.’ And another respondent: ‘We joined up because it seemed 
like a good application to us. We gathered information through the website. We 
also contacted the person who was mentioned on the website to acquire some 
more information. Then we made the decision to join up, based on an assessment 
of the pros and cons.’
 
Several examples show that existing medium and strong ties were specifically 
used for the promotion of interests. One example is the mobile telecom industry’s 
lobby to change the procedures for citizens to obtain an identification application 
on their mobile phone. One of the actors involved in this lobbying process stated: 
‘Back then (2006), I contacted several top officials at ministries. I used the con-
tacts I had in these organisations. Most of them I knew quite well. I also called the 
director of the Information Society Programme. I knew her as I was a member of 
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the programme. We even arranged a meeting with the Minister of Transport and 
Communications. We told them that the process [to obtain an electronic ID] was 
too bureaucratic and that the law had to be changed. It took some hard lobbying. 
Especially the Ministry of the Interior and the police were difficult to convince. 
All in all, I guess the lobbying worked since a new signature law was enacted in 
September of this year (2009), which enables private companies to issue IDs.’
Several of the respondents stated that having medium and strong ties with other 
actors stimulated efficient cooperation in the development phase. One of these 
respondents, for instance, explained: ‘Yes it really helped that we knew each other 
well. We knew who had which expertise, who had which contacts and who had 
which skills. If there was a problem, I could easily assemble a group of people 
who could solve the problem. It made our team work very efficiently.’ In addition, 
several interviewees referred to ties that were used to gain access to strategic in-
formation. One of them, for instance, stated: ‘We did not know the exact interests 
and opinions of them [KATSO coalition], but he [government practitioner of the 
Ministry of Finance] knew some of them and contacted them to acquire some 
more information about their intentions.’ And someone else stated: ‘The fact that I 
have such a large network within governments helps me to understand why par-
ties do what they do. I know their motives, plans and strategies. It also helps me 
to choose my own strategy.’
There was one example in which ties were used to influence public opinion on 
e-Government projects. An involved respondent stated: ‘She [CEO of the Informa-
tion Society Programme] has worked for Talentum, a media company that pub-
lishes several journals and literature. She has contacts with newspapers and writes 
in a magazine about ICT and society. […] There were several occasions when she 
used her contacts to get public attention for a certain event or issue; for instance 
for the results of the Information Society Programme and the e-Government proj-
ects belonging to this programme.’
To summarize, both weak and strong interpersonal ties affected the joint innova-
tion process in the sense that these ties were used to form coalitions, to influ-
ence opinions, to gain access to strategic information, to involve parties and/or to 
reach consensus. However, existing ties were most relevant in the early innovation 
stages. 
7.3.3 Heterogeneity of the network
The heterogeneity of the actors involved was relatively high in the VETUMA inno-
vation process. Different kinds of service providers were involved, such as munici-
palities, a hospital, the National Board for Education and the National Gallery. In 
addition, several central government bodies participated, such as the Ministry of 
the Interior, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, 
diverse electronic identity providers joined up, such as the Population Register, 
banks and the mobile telecom industry. The early involvement of these actors re-
sulted in a broad adoption basis among Finnish government organisations. A re-
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spondent stated about the involvement of various parties: ‘As I said, the coalition 
group was rather determined about the technical requirements of the innovation 
and did not change their direction. On the other hand, the coalition was open to 
every party that supported the VETUMA idea. Moreover, in the beginning they 
created a sound basis with all kinds of parties, such as service providers, policy 
makers, suppliers of electronic identity solutions, which enabled them to achieve 
a nationwide roll-out of the innovation. Of course, there is still the other KATSO 
system, but VETUMA might win the race as they have a very solid and broad basis 
of government and private industry adopters.’
In conclusion, the heterogeneity of the group involved in the idea and develop-
ment phase of the innovation process increased the adoption basis of the innova-
tion.
7.3.4 Broker’s position
In several instances, actors had a broker’s role in the VETUMA innovation process. 
In the initiation phase, the government practitioner of Vantaa played a central role 
as she had the strongest ties with the other people in the coalition and used these 
ties to form the coalition. Several respondents stated that they were approached 
by the government practitioner of Vantaa to join up. In the procurement phase, 
the city of Helsinki had a formal broker’s role. According to Finnish procurement 
law, all actors who want to make use of the services developed by the winning 
supplier have to be involved in the tendering process. For procurement projects 
of the central government, the Hansel office arranged the joint tendering process. 
In the VETUMA case, Helsinki city was the intermediary party that arranged for the 
participation of all other municipalities. Also in the process of assigning the own-
ership of the VETUMA service one of the actors functioned as a broker. The pro-
gramme director of the Information Society Programme was in the management 
group of the VETUMA project and at the same time negotiated with contacts she 
had in diverse ministries about the ownership. 
The degree of influence of less connected actors within the subsystem was also 
interesting. At the onset of the innovation, the programme director of the Infor-
mation Society Programme, for instance, was relatively new in the network of mu-
nicipalities. She got involved thanks to a government practitioner of the Ministry 
of the Interior who was on the board of the Information Society Programme. She 
stated about her position: ‘I did not know the people from the municipalities, but 
it helped that I had worked for a municipality; I understood their language, prob-
lems and interests. In addition, I already had a strong network at the central level 
since I was the director of the Information Society Programme. In fact, my limited 
ties with the founding municipalities did not affect my position. I quickly got to 
know them, and cooperation went well.’ In the diffusion phase, several actors 
became involved who were not very well connected in the existing subsystem. 
Someone of the National Board of Education stated: ‘I did not know these persons 
before the National Board of Education decided to adopt the innovation. I have 
met several persons – Anne, for instance, since joining up. The fact that I did not 
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know anyone did not affect the position of the National Board of Education. We 
just kind of purchased the VETUMA service.’ 
It is worth noting that Kuntaliitto was established to develop joint services of local 
authorities, and thus it formally has a broker’s position.320 However, it was not able 
to use this position as it were not perceived by subsystem actors to be the right 
organisation to develop a national eIDM system. 
In conclusion, particularly in the initiation phase, actors with a strategic position 
within the network were able to influence the direction of the innovation. 
7.3.5 Interpersonal trust
According to the majority of respondents the existence of trust between actors 
predominantly played a role in the initiation phase of the VETUMA innovation. All 
actors involved in the early stages of the innovation stated that the level of trust 
between them was high. One of them, for instance, reported: ‘It was not just that 
we were geographically close, we also had a very high level of interpersonal trust. 
I was very sure that they would not play a trick on me. Of course, we had different 
interests and conflicting opinions, but we just discussed them. We did not have 
hidden agendas. The level of trust between us and the KATSO parties was lower, 
but still there was no distrust. We were a bit more careful about what information 
to provide. But in the core group we were very open towards each other.’ Various 
actors involved explained that in later phases the level of trust was lower, but that 
there was still a solid basis of interpersonal trust. One of them, for instance, said: 
‘At a certain point in time there was a conflict of interest and different opinions on 
the direction of the innovation. There was some friction and discussion, but we 
solved these problems.’ 
Some of the respondents related the level of trust to an efficient cooperation 
between parties. One of the respondents, for instance, stated: ‘Because we had 
trust, we did not need to put everything on paper. Everybody knew that I worked 
in an informal way, not on paper. Some institutes expect you to have all agree-
ments down on paper, but we did not. For instance, the State Audit Office wanted 
everything on paper. It is their role to watch government organisations and thus 
have a certain degree of distrust.’ Several interviewees pointed to the fact that the 
high level of trust in the initiation phase counterbalanced some uncertainties and 
risks. One of them explained: ‘As I mentioned before, for us it was not clear, even 
not in the procurement phase, how the project would be funded. We had many 
discussions about it, but we were very sure that Katrina would find a solution. We 
knew that she would arrange it, we trusted her. Without trust we would not have 
been able to rely on her promises.’ 
There were also some examples of people trusting each other in the sense that 
they were convinced that the other would act in an honest way, even though 
320 http://www.kunnat.net/k_Kuntaliitto_peruslistasivu.asp?path=1;184;276;830
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they did not trust the other person’s capabilities. One respondent explained it 
as follows: ‘I was not convinced that the Ministry of Finance would be able to ad-
equately continue the VETUMA innovation. I thought that it could be the end of 
the innovation because they did not have the expertise to advance it.’ Or, by con-
trast, that their trust was predominantly based on the expertise of the other and 
not so much on the feeling that the other would be act in an honest way. One of 
the respondents stated: ‘The most important thing in our relationship with Fujitsu 
was our trust in their expertise. We knew that they had done the job before and 
that they were able to deliver a good product. This was also one of the reasons to 
award Fujitsu the tender. […] Trust in the employees of Fujitsu was less relevant 
since we had a clear contract with Fujitsu with very detailed specifications.’
It also appeared that the level of trust was less relevant in later stages of the in-
novation. The majority of respondents involved in the diffusion stage said that 
the level of trust was not that relevant. One of them explained: ‘At the onset of the 
innovation, the level of trust was important as there were more risks. The innova-
tion could fail; the procurement phase was also quite risky because the complex 
regulations meant that we did not know if we were doing it by the book. There 
were several uncertainties. Whereas in the diffusion phase there was a clear-cut 
solution, and for the participating parties it was just a question of whether it was 
interesting to join or not. Trusting people was less important than trusting the 
solution.’ It thus seems that in the early stages of the innovation, there were more 
risks and uncertainties, which made trust more relevant. Someone else stated: 
‘Interpersonal trust did not play a role in our decision to adopt VETUMA. What 
was important for our decisions though is that we trusted the quality of the solu-
tion; that we thought it to be the best solution to provide online services to our 
clients. As the description of the functionalities of the system was very clear and 
also the service delivered by Fujitsu [e.g. training and toolkit] there were not many 
uncertainties or risks for us.’
Several respondents revealed that opportunistic behaviour can result in some-
one’s exclusion from the network. One of these respondents explained: ‘I could 
not mention someone I totally distrust. One knows that some people have their 
own interests, but this is not the same as distrust. I know that within my net-
work people who do not keep their promises or cheat will be excluded from the 
network. It is a very small, dense network, and people do not accept distrustful 
people.’ Someone else: ‘In the 30 years that I have worked for government, I have 
barely seen games and tricks. This is not the Finnish way to do business. Of course, 
often you do not agree with someone or there are conflicting interests, but then 
you talk about it or ignore it and move on. Of course dishonest and opportunistic 
people exist in Finland, but in many networks they will not be accepted.’ 
To summarize, the presence of interpersonal trust affected the joint innovation 
process in the sense that actors were willing to take risks and experiment in a 
high-trust environment. The presence of trust appeared to be more relevant in the 
early innovation stages than in the later innovation stages.
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7.3.6 Conclusions
It seems that the characteristics and dynamics of the subsystem significantly influ-
enced the joint technological innovation. 
•	 Group closure affected the joint innovation process in the sense that not all 
the interests of service providers were promoted in the early phases of the 
innovation. On the other hand, group closure mechanisms in the initiation 
phase appeared to speed up the innovation process since it was easier to 
reach consensus. 
•	 Both weak and strong interpersonal ties affected the joint innovation process 
in the sense that these ties were used to form coalitions, influence opinions, 
access strategic information, involve parties and/or reach consensus. How-
ever, existing ties were most relevant in the early innovation stages. 
•	 The heterogeneity of the group involved in the idea and development phase 
of the innovation process increased the adoption basis of the innovation.
•	 Particularly in the initiation phase, actors with a strategic position in the net-
work were in a better position to influence the direction of the innovation. 
•	 The presence of interpersonal trust affected the joint innovation process in the 
sense that actors were more willing to take risks. In addition, the presence of 
trust appeared to be more relevant in the early than in the later innovation 
stages. Furthermore, a high level of trust resulted in efficient cooperation 
between parties. Lastly, in some cases trust was predominantly based on the 
expertise of the other and not so much on the feeling that the other would 
act in an honest way. 
7.4 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
Regarding the parameters of the framework used for this research, the following 
aspects appear to have influenced the dynamics of the subsystem, the innovation 
outcome and/or impact: 
•	 The features of the VETUMA services impacted the dynamics of the subsystem 
in the sense that the open architecture of the solution increased the number 
of electronic identity providers involved in the innovation process. Further-
more, in the early stages of the innovation, the difficult process of reaching 
an agreement with banks slowed down the innovation process. Finally, the 
characteristics of the FINEID identification solution and mobile identification 
have resulted in a limited take-up of these specific identification systems 
since citizens find the procedure to (re)obtain the identification tool too bur-
densome and the price of the FINEID card too high. 
•	 The uncertainty regarding the basic distribution of resources affected the 
dynamics of the subsystem in the sense that there were many discussions 
between involved parties on the funding of the VETUMA service, but these 
discussions have not significantly affected the (e.g. direction of ) the inno-
vation. In addition, it appeared that the state’s temporary compensation of 
the costs made by service providers was an important incentive for service 
providers to join up. 
Noor BW 7.indd   172 08-09-10   12:07
THE F INNISH VETUMA GATEWAY  
173
•	 Some of the shared values of the subsystem affected the innovation process 
in the sense that they were (amongst others) an impetus for launching the 
project, and some values shaped the features of the innovation. 
•	 The procurement law in particular affected the dynamics of the subsystem 
and subsequently the innovation process. The procurement law – and un-
certainties resulting from diverse interpretations – prevented municipalities 
from joining the KATSO project, and the same lack of clarity hampered the 
VETUMA tendering process. 
•	 So far, there is no sound evidence suggesting that changes in socio-economic 
conditions and technology affected the dynamics of the subsystem.
•	 Until now, no evidence has been found suggesting that public opinion on the 
VETUMA service significantly affected the dynamics of the subsystem. 
•	 It appears that changes in governing coalitions did not substantially impact 
the direction or outcome of the innovation. 
•	 The national KATSO coalition did not affect the dynamics of the subsystem 
and the outcome of the innovation. In addition, the attention cabinet mem-
bers devoted to ICT subjects, cooperation between municipalities and na-
tional coordination of ICT projects resulted in a basic willingness to invest 
in the VETUMA project. The European subsystem influenced e-Government 
legislation and policy in a more general way. 
•	 Group closure affected the joint innovation process in the sense that not all 
the interests of service providers were promoted in the early phases of the 
innovation. On the other hand, group closure mechanisms in the initiation 
phase appeared to speed up the innovation process since it was easier to 
reach consensus. 
•	 Both weak and strong interpersonal ties affected the joint innovation process 
in the sense that these ties were used to form coalitions, influence opinions, 
access strategic information, involve parties and/or reach consensus. How-
ever, existing ties were most relevant in the early innovation stages. 
•	 Heterogeneity of the group involved in the idea and development phase of 
the innovation process increased the adoption basis of the innovation.
•	 Particularly in the initiation phase, actors with a strategic position in the net-
work were in a better position to influence the direction of the innovation. 
•	 The presence of interpersonal trust affected the joint innovation process in the 
sense that actors were more willing to take risks. In addition, the presence of 
trust appeared to be more relevant in the early than in the later innovation 
stages. Furthermore, a high level of trust resulted in efficient cooperation 
between the parties. Lastly, in some cases trust was predominantly based 
on the expertise of the other and not so much on the feeling that the other 
would act in an honest way. 
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The Maltese eID 
 
The last case concerns the joint development of an eIDM system by Maltese gov-
ernment authorities, which is examined in this eighth chapter. As mentioned in 
the last section of chapter four on the methodology of the present research, the 
empirical chapters consist of four main parts. The introductory section describes 
the innovation process chronologically along the innovation stages (initiation, 
development, implementation and diffusion). Conclusions are drawn regarding 
the application of strategies, decision making and the outcome and impact of the 
innovation. The second section presents evidence found regarding the impact of 
Advocacy Coalition Framework parameters and events. Each sub-section draws a 
conclusion about the specific effects of the variable. The influence of social capital 
variables is explored in the third section. For the five dominant network and tie 
characteristics (network closure, strength of ties, heterogeneity, broker’s position 
and levels of trust) an overview is provided of the perceived impact by involved 
actors. The sub-sections of this third section conclude with an overview of the key 
impacts of the specific variable. The fourth (and final) section draws conclusions 
regarding the influence of the framework variables.321 
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This first section examines the successive innovation stages of the Maltese eIDM 
system. For each innovation stage (initiation, development, implementation and 
diffusion), the most important actors involved, strategies applied and decisions 
made, are described. The last part of this section provides a summary of the key 
actors, strategies and decisions, and provides insight into the outputs and im-
pacts of the innovation process. 
8.1.1 Initiation phase
The foundation for e-Government projects was laid down in the Maltese Informa-
tion System Strategic Plan for public services in 1998.322 This plan (which builds on 
321 All websites mentioned in this chapter have been accessed between September and 
December 2009.
322 http://www.eu-esis.org/esis2prom/MTprom1.htm
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the IS Strategic Plan of 1990), proposed the primary efforts directed at a process 
of consolidation, maximisation and optimisation of the public sector information 
systems.323 The plan stressed that information systems and technology are not an 
end, but a means for achieving effective and efficient attainment of public service 
delivery and that a pragmatic approach should be taken. One of the interviewees 
stated about the onset of e-Government policy in Malta: ‘I have been involved [in 
e-Government policy] from the very beginning. In 1998, David Spiteri Gingell was 
the head of the Management Efficiency Unit within the Office of the Prime Minis-
ter. He was responsible for defining and taking forward the key initiatives recom-
mended in the Strategic Plan. He was also the chairman of the drafting committee 
for cyber legislation. He set up the legal framework in the data protection and 
electronic commerce act. […] We needed a political champion, and therefore 
David approached Austin Gatt, who back then was the parliamentary secretary 
of the prime minister. Gatt was interested in David’s plans, and some time later 
[1999] he became Minister for Justice and Local Government. Meanwhile, David 
and I prepared a white paper on e-Government.’324
This e-Government white paper was published in May 2000. In the document, the 
Maltese government announced their plans to implement a PKI-based electronic 
identity management system (Ministry for Investment, Industry and Information 
Technology, 2000).325 The document states that: ‘Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is 
the technology that is currently being adopted worldwide for the provision of on-
line security and personal authentication. […] Public Key Infrastructure is recog-
nised worldwide as the current most secure alternative for the provision of secure 
online services, and individual signature authentication and non-repudiation.’ The 
plan argues that the most optimal scenario for the Maltese situation would be 
a centralised PKI system, serviced by one certification authority (CA) that would 
attend to the certification of all individuals and organisations related to e-Gov-
ernment services. In addition, the Maltese government proposed in the plan to 
set up a policy management authority to establish policies, provide approval and 
make decisions on the nature and operations of the Government PKI (Ministry for 
Investment, Industry and Information Technology, 2000:29). 
With regards the use of smart cards, it is stated in the document that: ‘We should 
[...] explore the best way forward in the short term, which is likely that of data 
encryption and authentication without the use of smart cards, and study develop-
ments on the latter for potential introduction a few years down the line. Transac-
tion services to be implemented will therefore be accessible via PKI and use of the 
private key will entail the input of a PIN, or personal identification code. Work on 
the security features will be among the first tasks to be addressed.’ In their policy 
vision, the Maltese government did not exclude the possible future use of smart 
cards but chose a pragmatic approach at first with a less complex PKI system. The 
323 http://www.comnet-it.org/pubs/newsletter/issue5/review.html
324 For more information on Austin Gatt, see http://www.doi.gov.mt/EN/ministries_and_depart-
ments/justice.asp
325 Ministry for Infrastructure, Transport and Communications, ‘e-Government vision, 2000’, ht-
tps://mitc.gov.mt/MediaCenter/PDFs/1_e-Gov%20Vision%202000.pdf
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Maltese government decided to start an eID programme, which consisted of four 
phases of PKI implementation, in which a four-tier authentication assurance clas-
sification would be implemented.326 These four levels are: 
•	 Level 0: no authentication
•	 Level 1: restricted authentication (login, password and PIN)
•	 Level 2: confidential authentication (digital certificate)
•	 Level 3: maximum authentication (qualified digital certificate)
8.1.2 Development phase 
After the elections in April 2003, Austin Gatt became Minister of Information Tech-
nology and Investments at the Ministry for Investment, Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIIT). One of the respondents stated: ‘Between 2000 and 2003, there 
was a lot of friction. Gatt was Minister for Justice and Local Government and want-
ed to push e-Government. However, overall e-Government policy remained in the 
hands of the Prime Minister’s Office. […] Gatt’s move from the Ministry of Justice 
to MIIIT in 2003 created new momentum for e-Government, and since he [Gatt] 
was now in charge of IT policy again he could start pushing it.’ On 16 October 2003, 
Gatt announced that the Maltese government would start a programme to pro-
vide an electronic identity (eID) to each citizen in the country, designed to enable 
secure access to e-Government services.327 Gatt stated that the future electronic ID 
would enable Maltese citizens to access a number of interactive and transactional 
e-services, such as income tax or VAT payments, registration for social services and 
access to healthcare services. Citizens would also be able to access their personal 
data held by public administrations over the internet. The minister described this 
electronic identification system as the last pillar in the building of e-Government, 
and said it would give a decisive boost to the development of e-Services. He ar-
gued that the new system would not only be used by government but would also 
be taken up by private companies.
The eID programme commenced right after Gatt’s announcement and was led 
and coordinated by MIIIT. The first two authentication levels (0 and 1, see sections 
above) were developed in partnership with Microsoft and Exigy, a local IT solu-
tions company.328 One of the interviewees stated: ‘In 2003, MIIIT made the strategic 
choice to make Microsoft’s .NET Framework the standard for e-Government ap-
plications. […] Back then, Microsoft was not as big as it is today. MIIIT made a 
deal with Microsoft; Malta would buy all kinds of software from Microsoft, and 
Microsoft would develop the electronic identification system for free. Microsoft 
hired Exigy, a company with three employees, for the development of the eID 
system.’ Another respondent stated: ‘It was all new to us; we had to develop new 
software. There was great pressure from MIIIT’s head of staff of MIIIT to deliver as 
soon as possible. […] The Ministry for Social Policy was involved since they would 
be the first service provider to use the eID system.’ 
326 IDABC, European e-Government Services, ‘eID Interoperability for PEGS, National Profile 
Malta’, http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=31540
327 ICA 38th Conference, ICA Country Report, 2004, Malta, Cyprus, October 2004. 
328 http://www.epractice.eu/node/277428
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In spring 2004, a call for tenders was issued for companies interested in provid-
ing levels 2 and 3 of the eID programme, which consisted of the development 
of certificates and the registration and certification of eIDs.329 In June 2004, the 
Accerta consortium - consisting of Fenlex Corporate Services Ltd and the two IT 
services companies, Datatrak IT and Computime – was awarded the tender.330 The 
local councils were involved for the issuing of eIDs. In 1999, these local councils 
were established by law,331 and the government wanted to empower the councils 
by involving them in e-Government programmes.332 In December 2004, the first 
e-services were made available to citizens by the Ministry for the Family and So-
cial Solidarity, allowing citizens to access their social security records and make 
related transactions.333 The authentication level of this e-Service was 1 (developed 
by Microsoft and Exigy) and consisted of a login, password and PIN.
Although MIIIT’s initial idea was to have the Accerta consortium function both 
as certification authority and registration authority, according to several inter-
viewees, MIIIT decided in 2006 to delegate the establishment of a certification 
authority to the Malta Information Technology and Training Service (MITTS) Ltd. 
The reason for this was twofold: firstly, MIIIT expected that they could save costs 
(as the government was not aiming to make profit) and secondly, based on further 
consideration, they did not want a private entity to handle sensitive citizen data.334 
A few months later, the Registration Authority (RA) was also taken over by MITTS, 
since the initial division of responsibilities – in which local councils had a powerful 
role – appeared not to work properly (e.g. due to a lack of skills at the local level, 
according to interviewees).335 
8.1.3 Implementation phase
For the broad implementation of the eID solution, a revised agreement between 
the main stakeholders was made based on functional specifications336 and was 
treated as a programme consisting of several projects. One of the respondents 
stated: ‘After we decided to have both the certification and registration authorities 
329 http://www.fenechlaw.com/news/index.cfm?ID=11
330 http://www.fenechlaw.com/news/
331 Malta has 68 local councils – 54 on the mainland and 14 in Gozo, the sister island. In 
December 1999, the Local Councils Act was considerably revised and published as Act. No. 
XXI (1999), the Local Councils (Amendment) Act 1999. See http://www.lca.org.mt/pages/
iseSinglePages.asp?m=20, http://www.epractice.eu/node/277428, http://www.snapadminis-
tration.com/snapdatafiles/files/Exigy/633440372170182500.pdf
332 See also http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288315
333 http://www.msp.gov.mt/ministry/content.asp?id=684
334 http://www.snapadministration.com/snapdatafiles/files/Exigy/633440372170182500.pdf
335 Malta has 68 local councils – 54 on the mainland and 14 in Gozo, the sister island. In 
December 1999, the Local Councils Act was considerably revised and published as Act. No. 
XXI (1999), the Local Councils (Amendment) Act 1999. See http://www.lca.org.mt/pages/
iseSinglePages.asp?m=20, http://www.epractice.eu/node/277428, http://www.snapadminis-
tration.com/snapdatafiles/files/Exigy/633440372170182500.pdf
336 http://www.epractice.eu/node/277428
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within the government, we had to revise the agreements with our suppliers.’ The 
following division of tasks and responsibilities was made:337 
•	 MITTS Ltd was put in charge of setting up the PKI Certification Authority and 
later on also the Central Registration Authority in Valetta.
•	 Exigy Ltd was put in charge of the eID and portal development.
•	 Microsoft became the software provider.
•	 The Ministry for Investment, Industry and Information Technology (MIIIT – 
later the Ministry for Infrastructure, Transport and Communications) acted as 
programme managers and were the entity responsible for the propagation 
of eID use within the government.
In 2007, the Government Certification Authority MECS Ltd (Malta Electronic Cer-
tification Services Limited) was established by MITTS (on behalf of MIIIT), whose 
task, up to this day, is to create and assign non-qualified certificates based on PKI 
technology.338,339 In addition, two eID offices were established in September 2007 
in Valletta and Rabat340 to issue eIDs to citizens.341 In September 2007, MITTS also 
published the Certification Policy for non-qualified certificates, a document defin-
ing the requirements for the certificates.342 The Policy Management Authority was 
assigned charge of the Certificate Policy and is responsible for the administration 
of the Certificate Policy. The Certification Practice Statement (CPS) defines the 
practices and standards employed by MECS ltd for the issuing, withdrawing and 
publishing of digital certificates.343 
According to several interviewees, service providers were reluctant to start using 
the eID solution. One of them stated: ‘The Inland Revenue Department already 
had a solution in place. They used digital certificates for online services. […] Min-
ister Gatt did not want to stop this development, but of course they [Gatt and 
the Minister of Finance] spoke about harmonisation. We [Malta Financial Service 
Authority] also needed digital certificates and did not want to wait for MIIIT, so 
we decided to use the Inland Revenue Department’s certificates. We needed the 
certificates because we need to guarantee our clients a certain level of security 
when they sign documents. The certificates were from VeriSign. When MIIIT’s sys-
tem was ready, we started using it.’ Several other interviewees mentioned that in 
order to deal with the reluctance of service providers, the government published 
a circular obliging all ministries and municipalities to use the national eID system 
for electronic identification purposes. One respondent, for instance, explained: 
‘We had some important problems getting service providers involved. We did 
not involve the key stakeholders in time, and thus some of them were reluctant 
to join. But the Prime Minister’s Office published a circular and forced all service 
337 See also http://www.epractice.eu/node/277428
338 http://www.mca.org.mt/infocentre/openarticle.asp?id=907&pref=15
339 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32347, Non-Qualified.
340 https://mitc.gov.mt/page.aspx?pageid=81&dispLang=1
341 https://mygov.mt/portal/(fc0rymvr0go1ts45zubads45)/webforms/howdoigetaccesstomy-
gov.aspx
342 http://ictpolicies.gov.mt/docs/GMICT_P_0061_Certificate.pdf
343 http://repository.ca.gov.mt/Certification%20Practice%20Statement.pdf
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providers to use the eID solution to align themselves with the eID solution.’ And 
another interviewee: ‘A circular was published that said all government entities 
should use the eID. It was a package of some key components, such as eID, SMS 
gateway and payments.’344
After the circular was published, the joining up of service providers increased. 
In September 2007, Minister Austin Gatt of MIIIT unveiled the central portal to 
Maltese e-Government services, mygov.mt.345,346 through which several e-services 
were available:347
•	 Matters related to income tax and falling under the jurisdiction of the De-
partment of Inland Revenue, including electronic income tax returns, tax 
reduction forms, corporate tax returns, employers’ social security contribu-
tions.
•	 The sending of official examination results by the Department of Education 
to students via mobile telephony, as well as online applications for exams.
•	 Online submission of VAT returns, as well as facilities for viewing balances for 
tax periods and registration of VAT numbers through the VAT Department. 
•	 Online application and renewal of passports.
•	 Online filing of police reports.
•	 Online application and renewal of vehicle licences.
•	 Online application for building permits issued by the Maltese Environment 
and Planning Authority.
•	 A number of social services applications and statements launched by the 
Ministry or the Family and Social Solidarity.
•	 Online registry of companies, launched by MFSA which also caters for elec-
tronic incorporation of companies and electronic filing of company accounts. 
8.1.4 Diffusion phase
Since 2008, Maltese government has focused on a broader diffusion of the eID ap-
plication among service providers and a further development of the eIDM system. 
Preparations are being made by the Malta Information Technology Agency (MITA) 
(which replaced MITTS in 2008) and MITC (the Ministry for Infrastructure, Trans-
port and Communications, formerly MIIIT) to introduce electronic passports.348 
The contract to develop the electronic passports and border control system were 
awarded to the company De La Rue.349 According to MITC, these passports will 
include an RFID chip that stores people’s facial image, which will be secured using 
country signing certificates issued by the Country Signing Certification Authority. 
344 Circular 15/2007 from the Office of the Prime Minister giving direction on the ‘Usage of 
Electronic Identity Management Tools’. Circular 15/2007 contains the following directive: ‘The 
eID shall be considered to be the exclusive and single means of electronic authentication 
and signing for all and any government services.’ It thus ensures that e-Government users do 
not need a different authentication token for each service.
345 http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288319
346 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austin_Gatt
347 https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/modinis-idm/twiki/bin/view.cgi/Main/MalteseProfile
348 https://mitc.gov.mt/page.aspx?pageid=81&dispLang=1
349 http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=242441
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The successive phases of the project are intended to introduce Extended Access 
Control Passports, which will include fingerprint images, and the installation of a 
border control system capable of reading biometric passports from other coun-
tries. 
In 2009, a benchmark of the European Commission350 revealed that whereas the 
number of public services available online is high in Malta compared to other 
member states (Malta was ranked first on full online availability of online services), 
as is the sophistication of services, take-up by citizens seems to lag behind. The 
table below shows that in 2008 the take-up of e-Government services was below 
the EU27+ average.
One of the respondents stated about the take-up: ‘The take-up of e-services and 
eID is relatively low. Application for an eID requires individuals to physically go to 
an eID office, register and activate the eID at home, which is perceived by citizens 
as being cumbersome. User surveys have indicated that the burden inhibits the 
take-up of e-Government services.’ Government officials expect the take-up to 
increase when the electronic passports are introduced as these are mandatory in 
Malta. However, the ownership of an electronic passport does not automatically 
imply the use of the passport to obtain electronic services. Several interviewees 
have stated that take-up remains an important challenge of e-Government policy. 
Another study by the European Commission351 demonstrates that people who 
350 European Commission, Directorate General for Information Society and Media, (2009), 
‘Smarter, faster, better e-Government’, 8th Benchmark Measurement, Brussels. 
351 IDABC, (2009), ‘European e-Government Services’, Study on Mutual Recognition of eSigna-
tures: update of Country Profiles, Malta country profile, Brussels. The report also states that: 
‘To date, no specific e-Government applications using electronic signatures have been 
deployed.’
Table 7. e-Government sophistication and take-up in EU member states 2008, European Commission
 
 
  Mean  Lowest  Highest  Number of elections 
Finland  5.03  4.54  5.58  15 
Italy  4.91  3.76  6.97  14 
Denmark  4.51  3.50  6.86  21 
Belgium  4.32  3.45  6.51  17 
Spain  2.76  2.34  3.02  7 
Austria  2.48  2.09  3.73  16 
Malta  1.99  1.97  2.00  6 
 
Table 5. Lijphart 1999, effective number of parliamentary parties, 1945­96. 
 
Annual a counts of the government agency 
responsible for electronic identity cards 
Year  Income  Expenses 
2004  13,100,000 €   € 4,129,000 
2005   68,873,000 €  € 52,262,000 
2006  41,721,000 €  € 42,267,000 
2007  48,563,000 €  € 54,095,000 
2008  54,305,000 €  € 62,420,000 
 
Table 6. Annual accounts of the government agency responsible for eID cards 
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use the eID application do so predominantly for authentication and not for the 
signing of documents. The report states that: ‘The use of e-Signatures in Malta, 
although fully recognized at law, is still at its early stages. Whilst the Government 
of Malta has launched the eID as a software-based solution including a non-
qualified certificate based on PKI technology and capable of producing advanced 
electronic signatures, such certificate is mainly used for authentication purposes 
and not for signature purposes.’
Currently, the eIDM policy of the Maltese government focuses on cross-border in-
tegration. One of the key projects is the integration of the departmental systems 
into a common system, with a common infrastructure and administration across 
the government. This programme is being carried out largely by MITA. Today, 
local government (local councils) are involved only in certain tasks.352 One such 
task is the online option of renewing vehicle road licences, paying outstanding 
contraventions and checking when the next vehicle roadworthiness test is. The 
web application used for these tasks (called eVERA) is integrated into the Local 
Enforcement System (also managed by local councils) and allows on-duty traffic 
wardens to register and manage traffic contraventions of various kinds. 
8.1.5 Conclusions
There have been several dominant actors in the innovation process of the Mal-
tese eIDM system. The Management Efficiency Unit (MEU) within the Office of 
the Prime Minister developed the eIDM system’s plan and legal framework. From 
2003 to 2008, the Ministry for Investment Industry and Information Technology 
(MIIIT, and later on the Ministry for Infrastructure, Transport and Communications, 
MITC) was responsible for the management of the project. The Malta Information 
Technology and Training Service (MITTS), which was in charge of the setup of the 
PKI Certification Authority and the Central Registration Authority, and the Malta 
Information Technology Agency (MITA) took over the project management of 
MIIIT (now MITC) in 2008. 
Tasks and responsibilities were not the only things to shift between different gov-
ernment bodies. Key public officials involved also moved from one organisation 
to the other. Moreover, it seems that eIDM policy shifted to new organisations 
in tandem with the shift of public officials. For instance, both Minister Gatt and 
Mr. Grech (public official who held the final responsibility of the project) changed 
organisations but remained responsible for the eIDM project. Furthermore it ap-
pears that – compared to the eIDM strategy applied in the other cases (Austria, 
Belgium and Finland) – in Malta the strategy was relatively rudimentary and 
changed several times. Whereas the initial idea was that the certification and reg-
istration would be carried out by a private party, the Maltese government decided 
in 2006 to assign these tasks to a public organisation. In addition, several involved 
respondents stated that it was not clear to them during several stages of the in-
352 See also http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=31540
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novation what the exact features of the eIDM system were, neither the necessary 
steps to realise the solution. 
Regarding the innovation output it seems that the Maltese government has a 
fairly mature eIDM system in place and that many government services are avail-
able through the system. However, it appears that the use of the eIDM system 
lags behind expectations and that the impact of the system is therefore limited. 
Although there are no statistics on the use of the eIDM system publicly available, 
research on the take-up of electronic services and interviews on the perceived 
take-up of the eIDM system indicate that the take-up of the eIDM system is quite 
low. 
8.2 PARAMETERS AND EVENTS Of THE ADVOCACy 
COALITION fRAMEwORK
The influence of the Advocacy Coalition Framework parameters and events are 
explored in this section. An assessment is made for each parameter and event to 
discover whether and how the parameter or event affected the joint innovation 
process. 
8.2.1 Attributes of the good
The Maltese eIDM system (currently) consists of two levels. Level one has been 
built on Microsoft Windows Server 2003, and level 2 consists of a Public Key In-
frastructure hierarchy.353 Whereas level one consists of a relatively simple combi-
nation of username, password and PIN, the second level works with more com-
plicated non-qualified certificates. At the top or root of the PKI hierarchy of the 
second level, there is the ‘Government of Malta Root CA’, the purpose of which is 
to build trust in the underlying PKI hierarchy within the government domain. The 
self-signed ‘Government of Malta Root CA’ certificate certifies the private key of 
the ‘Government of Malta Intermediate CA’, the purpose of which is to segregate 
the lower tiers of the PKI hierarchy from the root. The ‘Government of Malta Inter-
mediate CA’ certificate certifies the private key of the ‘Electronic Identity CA’, the 
purpose of which is to issue the certificates for subscribers. 
The Malta Electronic Certification Services Ltd354 (MECS Ltd) is the trusted agent 
responsible for all the PKI hierarchy established on behalf of the government of 
Malta under an agreement between the government of Malta and MECS Ltd. Ac-
cording to this agreement, MECS Ltd agrees to provide the certificate services. 
The CPS regulating the certificates issued by the government of Malta states that 
the certificate provides a medium degree of assurance of the electronic identity 
of a subscriber. The certificate ensures proper authentication since the individual 
applying for the certificate must go to the appointed registration authority (RA) 
353 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32347
354 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32347
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in person for official registration before a certificate can be issued by the govern-
ment certification authority (CA). For applications pending validation, the person 
applying for the certificate must present his/her identity card for verification. 
Certificates are not issued to individuals acting on behalf of a legal person, are 
personal to the relevant subscriber and they are non-transferable. 
A person applying for a digital certificate must have previously obtained an Elec-
tronic Identity Account (eID), in accordance with the procedures and terms and 
conditions for obtaining such an account. Only Maltese citizens and residents can 
apply for an eID and digital certificate. An individual applying for an Electronic 
Identity Account must go in person to the appointed RA, taking along the follow-
ing documents:
•	 The order form, which must be duly filled in and signed.
•	 The applicant’s valid identity card, passport or equivalent official document.
The RA approves an application for an Electronic Identity Account upon the suc-
cessful identification and authentication of all required subscriber information. 
The Registration Authority rejects an Electronic Identity Account application if 
identification and authentication of all required subscriber information cannot be 
completed, or if the applicant fails to furnish supporting documentation upon 
request.
Once the applicant obtains the account, upon successful login to the mygov.mt 
portal, an online facility is provided to apply for a digital certificate. The certificate 
applicant is required to read and understand the subscriber agreement provided 
online, and the certificate application is completed once the terms and conditions 
are accepted. The certificate applicant then generates the key pair and sends a 
certificate request to the RA. The RA verifies the physical identity of the certificate 
applicant by ensuring the personal information provided for the Electronic Iden-
tity Account application is still true and correct. The RA sends its approval of the 
certificate application to the CA using the facilities provided by the CA upon the 
successful identification of the applicant. The RA may reject the application for 
a certificate if this may bring the CA or the government of Malta into disrepute.
Several interviewees have stated that because the required features of the eIDM 
solutions were not clear in the development phase of the application, this put 
pressure on the subsystem and hampered the innovation process. In other words, 
not the attributes of the innovation, but the lack of clarity on the attributes af-
fected the dynamics of the subsystem. As one of the respondents stated: ‘They 
[MIIIT] just did not know what they wanted. They did not have any knowledge on 
eID and this made the process really difficult. We never knew what the next step 
in the project would be. […] As the government changed plans all the time, the 
innovation process slowed down.’ 
Furthermore, various studies demonstrate that although the sophistication and 
availability of online services is relatively high in Malta, the use of eID to obtain 
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e-Government services is below the European average.355 These findings are con-
firmed by statements made by respondents. According to several interviewees, 
the limited take-up can be explained by the cumbersome process of obtaining an 
eID. One of the involved persons, for instance, stated: ‘The application for an eID 
requires individuals to physically go to an eID office, register and activate the eID 
at home, which is perceived by citizens as being cumbersome. User surveys have 
indicated that the burden is an inhibitor to the take-up of e-Government services.’
Overall, the lack of clarity during the development process regarding the attri-
butes of the solution appear to have slowed down the innovation process and the 
features of the system implied limited willingness of users to adopt the system 
during the implementation and diffusion process. 
8.2.2 Basic distribution of resources
Although formal documents regarding the financing of the eID are not available 
to the public, the interviews reveal the following allocation of resources: 
•	 Several respondents stated that for the development of level 1 authentica-
tion, MIIIT and Microsoft agreed that MIIIT would purchase a variety of 
software for around 3 million euros and that Microsoft would develop the 
level 1 authentication for free (the development costs of which were around 
700,000 euros).
•	 Interviews reveal that MIIIT and Accerta came to an agreement that Accerta 
would fund the implementation of the registration and certification author-
ity, and that Accerta would be paid in the take-up phase, namely 2 euros 
for each registration (with a total population of around 400,000 people, the 
maximum amount would be around 800,000 euros). 
The involved parties stated that the development of authentication level 1 was 
part of a broader deal between MIIIT and Microsoft in 2002. One of the interview-
ees stated: ‘The business case for Microsoft was that they would get an enterprise 
agreement for the whole Maltese government. In exchange for that we got the 
eID part for free. They actually funded the ID technology themselves. Microsoft 
brought in a local partner, Exigy, who customised the Microsoft software. […] The 
[eID] technology was developed by Exigy, and MITA got 50% of the intellectual 
property rights.’ Another interviewee stated: ‘Exigy was hired by Microsoft, who re-
invested [in eID] as they had a strategic alliance with the government. […] About 
3 million euros went to Microsoft and around 700,000 euros was reinvested by 
Microsoft in the eID project.’ A third interviewee reported about this deal with 
Microsoft: ‘I was never happy with the way it [the contract with Microsoft] was 
organised. It was not clear who was responsible for what. […] The funding was a 
by-product of something else. There was not a clear contract with Microsoft on 
the eID project.’ Interviews reveal that the chosen financial model had an effect on 
355 European Commission, Directorate General for Information Society and Media, (2009), 
‘Smarter, faster, better e-Government’, 8th Benchmark Measurement, Brussels. 
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the subsystem in the sense that the relationships were not clear and there were 
continuous negotiations. 
The financing of the Accerta consortium evoked several conflicts within the sub-
system. The Accerta consortium and the Maltese government agreed that the 
Accerta consortium would be paid 2 euros for every eID registration of a citizen. 
However, due to several problems, the take-up of citizens lagged behind expecta-
tions and thus also the financial pay-off for the Accerta consortium. One of the 
interviewees stated: ‘We invested: we went abroad for trainings, we learned about 
the technology and provided documentation, but we did not get paid for it. The 
payment would have been further down the line, when citizens would start to 
register. But the take-up was low and still is.’ Another involved person reported: 
‘The financial model was simple, we would be paid a few euros for each registra-
tion. […] When we made the deal we were quite confident that we would be paid 
and made some substantial investments. For two years, I spent about 40 to 60 
percent of my time, on the eID project without being paid. It was very frustrating, 
and our consortium was really trying to push the project, but it did not work out.’ 
This financial model led to some major conflicts between the consortium partners 
and the government, which in turn slowed down the innovation process. On the 
other hand, there was a major incentive for the consortium parties to realise a 
high number of registrations in a short period of time.
To summarize, the financial agreements made between the suppliers and the Mal-
tese government to develop and implement the eID solution led to uncertainties 
on both sides, to continuous negotiations and several conflicts. The constructions 
put pressure on the development team. On the one hand, the conflicts slowed 
down the innovation process, and on the other hand the financial model yielded 
a major incentive for suppliers to deliver as many registered users as possible, as 
quickly as possible. 
8.2.3  Fundamental cultural values 
Dominant values shared by the actors of the subsystem are best revealed by key 
documents written by subsystem actors. The most important document that re-
veals the underlying values of the eIDM innovation is the e-Government white 
paper, published in 2000.356 Mission statements in the document repeatedly men-
tion several core values. Firstly, it is recurrently argued in the white paper that the 
Maltese government wants to belong to the international group of front-runners. 
For example, the introduction to the paper states that: ‘There is a realisation that 
there can be no falling behind. […] Where is Malta situated in the current sce-
nario? Not in the front line, unfortunately, although the situation is not yet critical. 
We are several years behind most of our forthcoming European partners in the 
field of ICT and need to exponentially accelerate the process.’ And the following 
goal is formulated in the part of the document that outlines the vision (pages 4 
and 5): ‘Malta will be with the front-runners: Malta will be a fully-fledged member 
356 https://mitc.gov.mt/MediaCenter/PDFs/1_e-Gov%20Vision%202000.pdf
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of the global information society, capable of interacting and competing on equal 
footing with the rest of the world.’
Another core value revealed by the document is the perceived added value of 
e-Government and hence eIDM systems for Maltese citizens. In this respect, the 
most important public value mentioned is convenience for citizens. For example, 
the following contention regarding the future is made in the paper: ‘Citizens will 
benefit from one-stop, timely, high-quality and easily accessible electronic ser-
vices provided by both the Public and the Private Sector. The Government will 
provide its services over the Internet and Citizens will be served in the comfort of 
their homes at whatever time of day, while still opting to utilise traditional service 
channels if they so desire. Businesses will also offer their services to consumers 
over the Internet on a 24x7 basis.’ And more generally it is stated that: ‘The con-
venience that electronic services entail to the client, and their cost-effectiveness 
to the supplier, inevitably make the Internet a very attractive channel for service 
provision.’
Compared to the visions charted out in documents from other cases, the strong 
economic view applied in the paper is also significant. Although it is an e-Govern-
ment vision, major attention is paid to the future opportunities of e-Commerce, 
and the e-Government project is also perceived to contribute to a stronger Mal-
tese economy. For example, it states that: ‘This proposal charts out a Vision and 
strategy for attaining eGovernment in Malta – which is, ultimately, highly depen-
dent on the engendering of an Information Society and Information Economy in 
Malta.’ Furthermore, as regards e-Commerce it is argued that: ‘The emergence of 
e-Commerce is a critical issue facing our economy. Malta must become aggressive 
in determining the right conditions for e-Commerce, which is an important driver 
of economic growth. The 1999-2001 ISSP recognised this necessity and targeted 
the achievement of On-line Government as one of its major thrusts.’
Lastly, the paper repeatedly stresses the importance of cooperation between 
public and private parties. In addition, the government’s role is defined as a facili-
tating one and is rather limited. The introduction to the document, for example, 
states that: ‘It is emphasised that the achievement of these goals will require the 
concerted efforts of the Public and the Private Sector. The Government will be 
mainly concerned with ensuring the legal framework and the institutional set-ups 
required to create and promote the ideal environment. It will also adopt wide-
spread e-Commerce solutions in its business-oriented activity, such as procure-
ment, so as to encourage its widespread usage. The private sector will undertake 
the necessary activity in providing, as well as in adopting, the IT and business 
solutions that will be in widespread demand throughout the economy. In this re-
spect the venture leading Malta into the Information Age must be a Public/Private 
partnership.’ 
The interview reports reveal that these core values have had a significant influ-
ence on attempts to address the need for eIDM and the division of tasks between 
involved parties. One of the interviewees stated, for instance: ‘We [the Manage-
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ment Efficiency Unit – MEU] wanted to be among the most advanced technologi-
cal countries in the world. This was not only something we [MEU] highly valued, 
but also top officials. I guess, as a small country, we all strive to belong to the 
group of international leading parties. Not only government, but also businesses. 
[…] The fact that we found it important to be ranked among the top-10 European 
countries as regards e-Government and eIDM achievements provided a decisive 
boost to the project.’ The fact that the actors of the subsystem found it important 
to limit the role of government and seek a public-private partnership shaped the 
divisions of roles between parties of the subsystem. One of the interviewees, for 
instance, stated: ‘Initially the idea was that private parties would take care of the 
registration and certification. The motto was: what can be done by private parties, 
should be done by private parties. […] However, over time we [MITTS] came to 
the conclusion that this [public-private] construction was not working and took 
it over.’ 
In conclusion, core values have had a significant influence on the initiation of the 
eIDM and the initial division of roles between involved parties.
8.2.4 Basic legal structure
The main legal framework for the Maltese eID solution consists of the following 
legislation:357
•	 The Identity Card Act of 1975,358 which states that all Maltese citizens over the 
age of fourteen are required to have an identity card. Although the act does 
not have any provision relating specifically to the eID card, it is stated in the 
act that the identity card may ‘include a limited area where machine readable 
coded information may be inserted’, the formulation of which can serve as a 
basis for electronic card use.359 
•	 The Data Protection Act of 2001,360 which protects individuals against privacy 
violations by the processing of personal data and against any related mat-
ters. Under the Data Protection Act, an ID card number, which is a unique 
identifier for every person in Malta, in the absence of consent, can only be 
processed when such processing is clearly justified with regard to: a) the pur-
pose of the processing, b) the importance of a secure identification, and c) 
any other valid reason. 
•	 The Electronic Commerce Act,361 which entered into force in 2002, lays down 
the main regulatory framework encapsulating e-Commerce legislation and 
was modelled on the law for Electronic Transactions and the EU Directives 
for Electronic Commerce and Electronic Signatures. The e-Commerce Act es-
tablishes the legal equivalence of paper-based transactions with electronic 
ones, the parameters within which electronic contracts are to be concluded, 
357 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=31540
358 http://docs.justice.gov.mt/lom/legislation/english/leg/vol_6/chapt258.pdf
359 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=31540
360 http://www.dataprotection.gov.mt/dbfile.aspx/DPA.pdf
361 http://docs.justice.gov.mt/lom/legislation/english/leg/vol_13/chapt426.pdf
Noor BW 7.indd   188 08-09-10   12:07
THE MALTESE  E ID  
189
and the regulatory frameworks for the provision of electronic signature cer-
tification and intermediary services.
•	 The Electronic Communications (Income Tax) Regulations362 of 2002 consti-
tuting the legal framework to support the validity of some electronic ser-
vices that can be provided by the Inland Revenue Department. 
•	 The Public Contracts Regulations: Legal Notice No. 177 Public Contracts Regu-
lations 2005 and Legal Notice No. 178 Public Procurement of Entities operat-
ing in the Water, Energy, Transport and Postal Services Sectors Regulations, 
2005 both published in the Government Gazette No. 17775 dated 3rd June 
2005. These Legal Notices complete the legislative framework for the use of 
electronic signatures in public procurement and provide the opportunity to 
use electronic auctions and dynamic purchasing systems. 
•	 Circular 15/2007 from the Office of the Prime Minister containing the direc-
tive on the ‘Use of Electronic Identity Management Tools’. Circular 15/2007 
contains the following directive: ‘e-ID shall be considered to be the exclusive 
and single means of electronic authentication and signing for all and any 
government services’, and thus ensures that users of e-Government do not 
need a different authentication token for each service.
The large majority of respondents stated that there were no major discussions on 
the legal framework, but that the liability of the Maltese government has been 
an important issue. One of the respondents stated about this: ‘After some time 
we came to the conclusion that – from a liability perspective – it was not desir-
able if the RA or CA were private organisations. As a government, we would have 
ultimate responsibility for these organisations’ actions, and we were not confi-
dent about the arrangement we had with them. […] For us this was a major risk 
and therefore we decided to incorporate the RA and CA into government.’ One 
of the respondents stated about the legal framework: ‘He [David Spiteri, head of 
the Management Efficiency Unit in the late 1990s] was also the chairman of the 
drafting committee of cyber legislation. He set up the legal framework; the data 
protection and electronic commerce act. There were no major issues during the 
drafting of the legislation. […]The drafting process was swift and the legislation 
passed the chamber quite smoothly.’
Several interviewees stated that an important regulation that significantly affect-
ed the involvement of service providers was a circular from the Prime Minister’s 
Office that obliged all ministries and municipalities to use the national eID system 
for electronic identification purposes.363 One respondent, for instance, explained: 
‘We had some important problems getting service providers involved. We did not 
involve the most important stakeholders in time, and thus some of them were 
reluctant to join up. But the Prime Minister’s Office published a circular and forced 
362 http://docs.justice.gov.mt/lom/Legislation/English/SubLeg/372/23.PDF
363 Circular 15/2007 from the Office of the Prime Minister giving direction on the ‘Usage of 
Electronic Identity Management Tools’. Circular 15/2007 contains the following directive: ‘The 
eID shall be considered to be the exclusive and single means of electronic authentication 
and signing for all and any government services.’ It thus ensures that e-Government users do 
not need a different authentication token for each service.
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all service providers to use the eID solution to align themselves with the eID solu-
tion.’ And another interviewee: ‘A circular was published that said that all govern-
ment entities should use the eID. It was a package of some key components, such 
as eID, SMS gateway and payments.’
In conclusion, circular 15/2007 from the Office of the Prime Minister particularly 
impacted the dynamics of the subsystem in the sense that service providers 
became obliged to cooperate. In addition, liability issues affected the division 
of eIDM responsibilities since the government decided to shift certification and 
registration responsibilities from private to public authorities. 
8.2.5 Changes in socio-economic conditions and technology
During the development, implementation and diffusion process of the Maltese 
eID system, one of the most important changes in the socio-economic conditions 
of the Maltese society was the burst of the internet bubble in 2001. Although the 
annual GDP growth in 2002 was still 2.6%, in 2003 and 2004 it decreased to 0.3% 
and 0.4%, respectively.364 The Maltese economy recovered in the years 2004 to 
2007 with respective growths of 4.1%, 3.8% and 3.7%. 
A second, technology-oriented change was the evolution of the eIDM technol-
ogy applied. Whereas in the 1990s, several eIDM technologies were relatively im-
mature and had limited availability, today most of these technologies are widely 
used and mature. For instance, in the late 1990s, the costs of card readers were 
relatively high, they could only be purchased at a very limited number of com-
panies and the software that supported the card readers suffered from teething 
364 http://www.indexmundi.com/malta/gdp_real_growth_rate.html
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problems.365 Today, many companies sell card readers for much lower prices, and 
the use of card readers has substantially increased. 
A last major socio-economic change is the current economic crisis. Although the 
opinions of economists on the precise impact of the current economic crisis differ 
substantially, no one would argue that we have not been in a global economic 
recession since 2008. In Malta the GDP growth was 2,1% in 2008 and -2,2% in 2009 
(see figure 9 above).
The majority of respondents stated that the burst of the internet bubble did not 
affect the eID innovation process. One respondent, for instance, stated: ‘In the 
years after the internet bubble burst, in 2003 and 2004, deals were made with 
Microsoft and Accerta that they would deliver the development and implementa-
tion for free. This strong negotiation was not caused by the economic recession; 
it is just the way he [the top official responsible] works. Accerta would be paid 
in the take-up phase. So at that time there were no major government budgets 
for eID.’ Another respondent argued: ‘I do not think that the burst had any effect. 
The government always has a lack of resources, and it is just a matter of priorities. 
Gatt [Minister of Information Technology] was really pushing eID so it would be 
realised anyway. […] Our head of staff is a strong negotiator and achieved some 
good deals with the suppliers.’
Furthermore, according to the majority of interviewees, technological changes 
did not severely affect the innovation process since the Maltese government ap-
plied a pragmatic approach that allowed for the integration of new technologies. 
One respondent: ‘I really think this is an advantage of our approach. We had four 
levels of eID development, starting with no authentication at all, then a low-
security level solution, then the PKI solution and the integration of smart card 
technology was optional. The fact that we used this development model gave us 
the flexibility to adopt and incorporate new technologies.’
The majority of interviewees do not expect the current crisis to have a major im-
pact on the eID innovation process. One of them explained: ‘The contracts for the 
electronic passport have been arranged already. It is now a matter of carrying out 
the project. […] I do not think that any major investments have to be made in 
the coming years. […] What might have an impact is the fact that Gatt’s priorities 
have changed [now that he is Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Commu-
nication] and e-Government is not as important as it was at the beginning of this 
century.’
To summarize, the majority of respondents stated that the burst of the internet 
bubble did not have an effect on the project, nor do they expect the current eco-
nomic crisis to have an effect either. In addition, several interviewees stated that 
365 This was not only the case in Malta, but also in other countries. See, for instance, Srivastava 
(2005). 
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technological changes did not affect the innovation process since the Maltese 
government used a relatively open model.
8.2.6 Changes in public opinion
Public opinion on the Maltese eIDM system is most clearly voiced in the media, 
such as national newspapers. Over time, several newspapers have published ar-
ticles on the project. 
In the early years of the development of the Maltese eID system, there were not 
many newspaper articles on the project. L-orizzont366 published several, more 
general articles on e-Government. In November 2003, for example, the newspaper 
published an article on the reduction of the budgets of the local councils (among 
which the e-Government budgets), and in March 2004 there was a critical review 
of the internet access points established at the council level. The article argued 
that the councils had too little influence on the allocation of resources, that they 
should have the authority to decide for themselves how to spend their budget. 
According to the journalist, the councils would probably have chosen not to in-
vest in internet access points – which were not used by the public – but in other 
infrastructural projects. 
In 2006 and 2007, The Malta Independent367 published several articles on the posi-
tion of Malta in European e-Government benchmarks. In July 2006, the newspa-
per reported that Minister Gatt stated that Malta held second place in the ‘Online 
Availability of Public Services’ report regarding e-Government services and third 
regarding the sophistication of IT services. In September 2007, The Malta Inde-
pendent wrote that Malta had retained its leading EU ranking in the European 
Commission’s annual report on e-Government. In August 2007, the newspaper 
reported on a testimony of the top administrator Mr. Grech, who was responsible 
for e-Government policy (including the eIDM project), assistant to Minister Gatt 
and the chairman of the adjudicating committee for the IT tender at the Mater 
Dei Hospital. In light of his capacity as a public officer, one of the members of 
the committee was charged with accepting bribes, embezzlement and taking a 
private interest in the adjudication of tenders.
In 2008, several newspapers, including The Malta Independent, Malta Today368 and 
L-orizzont, reported on what they called ‘the MITTS scandal’ and the Labour Party’s 
call for Minister Gatt to resign. In September 2008, 20,000 email passwords were 
stolen from a government server at MITTS. Although the chairman of MITTS, Mr. 
Grech, and Minister Gatt initially denied that passwords were stolen, in October 
Gatt made a statement in Parliament admitting that they had indeed been stolen. 
Some newspapers questioned Gatt’s decision not to ask for Grech’s resignation 
since that would have been normal procedure for him with a top official under his 
366 http://www.l-orizzont.com/
367 http://www.independent.com.mt/
368 http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/2008/10/19/t8.html
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responsibility. In 2009 several newspapers, including The Maltese Independent, 
published some critical articles on the Maltese eID solution, for instance on the 
burden of obtaining the eID. 
According to the majority of respondents, public opinion did not substantially 
affect the eID innovation process. One of them, for instance, stated: ‘There was not 
much debate about the eID innovation. […] There were all kinds of other issues, 
for instance the hacking of the MITTS computers. This had an impact because 
politically it was highly sensitive. Security policy was enhanced at MITTS, but 
Gatt remained in power and the scandal did not affect the eIDM project.’ Several 
respondents stated that citizens are not very interested in eIDM or related issues, 
such as privacy. One respondent, for instance, reported: ‘Privacy, for instance, is 
not as much of an issue in Malta as it is in the UK. We have lived with identity 
cards for around 40 years and nobody is opposed to it. The government imposes 
cards on us, so we use them. […] Data protection law is not something the Mal-
tese citizen is interested in. It is more of an issue in other countries.’ And another 
interviewee: ‘Data protection is not an issue in Malta; nothing has been written 
about it. They [the Maltese citizens] perceive it as just another law, so there is not 
so much buzz around it. I can only recall about three articles on the subject, but 
these were not critical articles, just reporting. About the fact that eID was being 
launched, for example, or that some lawyer had won a privacy case. But there 
were no real arguments.’
In conclusion, no evidence has been found to suggest that articles on e-Govern-
ment and top officials involved in e-Government have significantly affected the 
dynamics of the subsystem of the eID innovation.
8.2.7 Systemic governing coalitions
During the innovation process, there have been several changes in the governing 
coalition. Firstly, while in the late 1990s the ministry responsible for e-Government 
policy was the Office of the Prime Minister, e-Government policy moved, after the 
2003 elections, to the Ministry for Investment, Industry and Information Technol-
ogy (MIIIT). Secondly, although the initial idea was to have local councils carry 
out the identification of citizens for the issuing of eIDs, MIIIT decided to centralise 
the registration (and thus identification) to two eID offices (in Valetta and Rabat) 
due to problems at the local councils. Thirdly, the central government decided 
to take over the certification and registration tasks that initially were assigned to 
private parties. Fourthly, in 2008 the e-Government policy went from the MIIIT to 
MITTS, which became MITA in 2008. The head of the e-Government unit of MIIIT, 
Mr. Grech, and his team also went to MITTS/MITA.
According to several interviewees, the shift of the e-Government policy from the 
Office of the Prime Minister to MIIIT implied a boost for e-Government projects 
as it reduced competition between ministries, and Minister Gatt showed great 
interest in e-Government. One of the respondents stated: ‘Between 2000 and 2003 
there was considerable friction. Gatt was Minister for Justice and Local Govern-
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ment and wanted to push e-Government. However, eGovernment remained at 
the Prime Minister’s office. […] Gatt’s move from the Ministry of Justice to MIIIT in 
2003 created new momentum for e-Government, and since he [Gatt] was now in 
charge of IT policy again he could start pushing it.’
Interviews reveal that the centralisation of the registration procedures may have 
created additional barriers for citizens to obtain an eID. One of the respondents, 
for instance, explained: ‘The original idea was that the local councils would iden-
tify citizens; however, they did not have the expertise or facilities. An average 
council has about five employees, and they just could not do the job. […] This 
centralisation has created an additional barrier for citizens to obtain an eID since 
they have to travel to Valetta or Rabat.’ 
In addition, several respondents stated that the government take-over of certifica-
tion and registration from private parties strengthened the government’s position 
in their relation to suppliers. An involved actor: ‘The fact that we [the government] 
got the CA and RA, strengthened our position in the innovation process. We re-
gained control. We had the upper hand again vis-à-vis our suppliers. At the onset, 
the balance of knowledge was in favour of Accerta, but following the decision [to 
make CA and RA a government task] we had the knowledge again. We hired an 
Irish company specialised in CA and RA to counterbalance the power of Accerta.’
The majority of respondents agreed that the shift of e-Government policy from 
MIIIT to MITTS (and later on MITA) did not substantially affect the innovation 
process as the head of the e-Government unit of MIIIT, Mr. Grech, and his team 
also went to MITTS/MITA. One of the interviewees, for instance, stated about this 
change: ‘Claudio became chairman of MITA and brought his team with him. For 
Claudio it was a promotion; he was politically appointed by Minister Gatt. In fact, 
the change did not affect the eID innovation process.’
To summarize, several changes in systemic governing coalitions affected the Mal-
tese eID innovation process. The decision to make MIIIT responsible for e-Govern-
ment policy reduced competition between ministries and allowed minister Gatt 
to put eID high on the political agenda. The centralisation of the identification 
process increased the threshold for citizens to obtain an eID. Furthermore, the de-
cision to make the CA and RA government authorities changed the relationships 
in the subsystem since the government gained control over the project. 
8.2.8 Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems
Over time, there were three subsystems, the decisions, policies or strategies of 
which were related to the Maltese eIDM project, namely: the subsystem of local 
authorities, the (national) political subsystem and the European subsystem. 
Firstly, regarding the subsystem of local authorities, the government stated in sev-
eral policy documents that it considers local governments to be the kingpins of 
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e-Government.369 In view of this, the Ministry for Justice and Local Government es-
tablished a Local Electronic Policy370 in 2002 aimed at offering accessibility to tech-
nology and service delivery via the front offices of local councils. The document 
entails a formal agreement between the councils and the central government. For 
instance, the policy made the following statements obliging local councils to do 
follow their directives: 
•	 In view of this, it is proposed to include Local Councils as a core agency i.e. an 
entity that although operates in total independence from Government, fol-
lows the policies, guidelines and standards issued by the Central Information 
Management Unit. […] The conformance with these policies, guidelines and 
standards will provide Local Councils with invaluable expertise and profes-
sional technological frameworks. It will also give Councils the access to the 
gov.mt domain on the Government network.
•	 Through the partnership, Local Councils will have to follow a generic service 
charter which will be prescribed in the final agreement, which will serve to 
set minimum service levels. Local Councils will be encouraged to extend 
these levels accordingly with their capability of improving range and level of 
service delivery.
•	 Local Councils which participate in the e-Government initiative will ensure 
that they will provide suitable accessibility to the e-Government services 
either through the set up of internet centres in their localities or through 
the utilisation of wired schools or through the placement of e-Government 
kiosks in key locations in the locality.
The policy was implemented through a partnership between the government 
and the local councils, whereby Councils opting to participate were granted a 
series of benefits related to the proliferation of the information society.
Within the second subsystem, the (national) political subsystem, several issues 
were raised related to eIDM. The eIDM project was mentioned in several chamber 
debates.371 In December 2004, the Labour Party posed questions about difficul-
ties with the online payment of television licences, which they considered a step 
backward in e-Government policy.372 In this debate, the Labour Party also posed 
questions about the progress of the eID project. The party said they did not re-
ceive any information about the second phase of the project, the implementation 
of non-qualified certificates. In November 2005, the Labour Party questioned the 
meeting of e-Government targets by MITI and asked how many Maltese citizens 
were using an eID.373 The Labour Party also addressed the lack of coherence in 
MITI’s e-Government policy. More questions on e-Government targets were 
posed by the Labour Party in November 2006.374 The party questioned the min-
369 http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288317
370 http://www.gov.mt/documents/Local%20Council%20Electronic%20Policy.pdf
371 See http://parliament.gov.mt/home
372 http://parliament.gov.mt/HorDocs/Leg10_2003/Debates/20041214_209d_par.doc, Seduta 
Nru. 209 It-Tlieta, 14 ta’ Diċembru, 2004.
373 http://parliament.gov.mt/HorDocs/Leg10_2003/Debates/20051110_316d_par.doc, Seduta 
Nru. 316, Il-Ħamis, 10 ta’ Novembru, 2005.
374 http://parliament.gov.mt/HorDocs/Leg10_2003/Debates/20061102_451d_par.doc, Seduta 
Nru. 451, Il-Ħamis, 2 ta’ Novembru, 2006.
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ister on the launch of the new government portal and 20 new e-services, which 
should have been implemented in early 2006. The Labour Party also criticised the 
absence of figures on eID use. The Labour Party praised the minister in September 
2007 for Malta’s second place in an EU benchmark.375 However, it also questioned 
the foundation for the ranking. In November 2007, the party posed questions 
about the realisation of two online services that a Capgemini benchmark claimed 
were online.376 On November 18, 2008, the Labour Party called on Minister Gatt to 
resign. The reason for this was the MITTS affair, the hacking of a MITTS server and 
theft of 20,000 email passwords and usernames.377
The third relevant subsystem is the European Commission. The European Com-
mission has been involved in eIDM issues since the late 1990s. The Information So-
ciety and Media department has an e-Government unit, whose name changed in 
2007 to ‘ICT for government and Public Services’. The unit organises regular meet-
ings with the e-Government subgroup representing all member states. In addi-
tion, the unit established expert groups, one of which is on eIDM. At the European 
level, there were several EU projects and directives on eIDM systems. In 1999, the 
European directive on electronic signatures went into force.378 The directive laid 
down the criteria that form the basis for the legal recognition of electronic signa-
tures. In 2004 and 2005, the European MODINIS Project aimed to assess, amongst 
other things, the status quo of eID systems in European member states and the 
exploration of possible European eID systems.379 In 2005, IDABC’s eID Interoper-
ability for PEGS programme of IDABC was launched, the objective of which was to 
analyse the eID and authentication interoperability requirements.380 In 2008, the 
STORK project was launched, which aims to establish a European eID Interoper-
ability Platform that will allow citizens to establish new e-relations across borders 
by presenting their national eID.381 In addition, Capgemini publishes an annual 
benchmark on e-Government progress in the European Union member states.
The majority of respondents stated that the influence of local councils on e-Gov-
ernment is relatively small. One of them argued, for instance: ‘Malta is a very small 
island, with only about 400,000 inhabitants. It is like a city. The councils are just 
375 http://parliament.gov.mt/Search/docs.aspx?d=Highlighter.aspx&e=DocId=21930&Index=D
%3a%5cHOR%5cHOR&HitCount=33&hits=158c+1a00+1a06+1a14+1b44+1c88+1d22+1e
c9+2665+2666+26e8+26e9+26f5+26f6+271d+2793+2805+2806+2819+2988+29a9+2a3
8+2ab6+2ac9+32e0+3426+3427+3663+3664+4974+4975+4c5d+4c62+, Seduta Nru. 555, 
It-Tlieta, 25 ta’ Settembru, 2007. 
376 http://parliament.gov.mt/Search/docs.aspx?d=Highlighter.aspx&e=DocId=22538&Index=D
%3a%5cHOR%5cHOR&HitCount=13&hits=108b+1a46+1e40+2ba3+2be6+31aa+34d1+363a
+363b+36d5+6d9b+6d9c+6eca+, Seduta Nru. 580, Il-Ħamis, 1 ta’ Novembru, 2007. 
377 http://parliament.gov.mt/Search/docs.aspx?d=Highlighter.aspx&e=DocId=24421&Index=
D%3a%5cHOR%5cHOR&HitCount=17&hits=16+2f+4c+7f+16f+1fab+2117+329f+5d57+80
91+85ea+891b+8937+893e+8957+8bc3+8c2c+, Seduta Nru. 57, It-Tlieta, 18 ta’ Novembru, 
2008.
378 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/l24118_en.htm
379 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/modinis/index_en.htm
380 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/6484
381 https://www.eid-stork.eu/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1
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front offices of the central government. They have about five employees and only 
operational tasks. Most of them do not develop their own e-Government policy.’
In addition, according to the majority of respondents, the chamber questions 
did not have a significant impact on the eID innovation. One of the respondents 
argued: ‘Of course the MITTS scandal impacted the MITTS organisation, policy 
and employees. However, it did not affect the eID innovation project as such. […] 
Gatt’s resignation could have impacted e-Government innovation since he was 
a real bulldozer and could make things happen, but he did not resign.’ However, 
several respondents stated that the strong ICT push by Minister Gatt, and the fact 
that both the Labour Party and National Party were ICT-minded, supported the 
eID innovation. One of them stated: ‘The political dimension worked in our favour: 
Minister Gatt is a political driver of IT in Malta. He was very close to the project 
as a champion, pushing resources, etc. In Malta, there is clear cross-party agree-
ment that IT is not a controversial subject, and that it does not get lost in political 
discussions. IT is important for the country.’
The majority of respondents agree that the European Commission and Malta’s 
entry into the European Union has had a supportive effect on e-Government 
and thus also eID. One of them stated: ‘Malta joining the European Union was a 
broadly shared political priority. Malta wanted to belong to the European Union 
and to show – in every respect, thus also e-Government – that they could handle 
it. That they were equally advanced as other member states.’ And someone else: 
‘European aspirations had a strong influence from a government point of view. We 
were quite actively participating in the EU process; it was a very strong driver. […] 
We defined e-Government purposes in such a way that we could be among the 
front-runners of the European Union by deploying as many eID-related services 
as possible.
In conclusion, it appears that neither the local authorities, nor the opposition 
party had a significant effect on the eIDM innovation. In addition, it seems that 
the minister responsible for IT pushed the eIDM innovation as well as European 
aspirations. 
8.2.9 Conclusions
Regarding the parameters of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, it appears that 
three specific aspects influenced the characteristics of the subsystem, the dynam-
ics of the subsystem and/or the outcome of the innovation. 
•	 The lack of clarity regarding the attributes of the solution slowed down the 
development process, and the potential features of the system generated 
among users a limited willingness to adopt the system. 
•	 On the one hand, conflicts about the funding model slowed down the innova-
tion process, and on the other hand the model resulted in a major incentive 
for the suppliers to deliver as many registered users as possible, as quickly as 
possible. 
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•	 Core values had a significant influence on the initiation of the eIDM system 
and the initial division of roles between involved parties.
•	 Circular 15/2007 from the Office of the Prime Minister impacted the dynam-
ics of the subsystem in the sense that service providers became obliged 
to cooperate. Liability issues affected the divisions of eIDM responsibilities 
because the government decided to shift certification and registration re-
sponsibilities from private to public authorities. 
•	 So far, there is no sound evidence suggesting that changes in socio-economic 
conditions and technology affected the dynamics of the subsystem. More-
over, the flexible model chosen allowed the integration of new technologies. 
•	 Changes in public opinion did not significantly affect the dynamics of the 
subsystem. However, the MITTS scandal shows that public opinion can have 
a significant influence on government policy. 
•	 The change of systemic governing coalitions affected the dynamics of the 
subsystem in the sense that the balance of power between players changed, 
and some actors were in a better position to impact the innovation. In addi-
tion, one of the changes in the systemic governing coalitions increased the 
threshold for citizens to obtain an eID.
•	 The IT minister’s push and European aspirations affected the dynamics of the 
subsystem.
8.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES
This section draws conclusions for each of the social capital variables regarding 
the influence the social capital characteristics have had on the dynamics of the 
subsystem and subsequently on the joint, technological innovation process. Each 
sub-section concludes with an assessment of the influence of the specific variable 
on the innovation process, outcome and/or impact.
8.3.1 Openness versus group closure
Interviews indicate that the network in particular was closed in the development 
phase since the involvement of service providers was limited. One of the respon-
dents: ‘Only the Ministry of Social Policy was actively involved. And in later stages 
the municipalities too, but they were not actively involved in the development. 
[…] We have learned the hard way that it would have been better to involve 
the service providers in the earlier stages of the innovation. When we wanted 
to implement the innovation, the service providers just said “we do not need it.” 
Some of them had their own solutions. […] Today, we invite key stakeholders to 
MITA meetings.’ Another respondent stated: ‘Some of them [service providers] 
had their own solution. But Gatt is a very strong minister. In order to realise one 
eID, we had to kill the eIDs of Finance and other ministries. We just said: “We do 
not care how much you spent, the competing systems are finished.” We did not 
want an enormously complicated situation. […] We made a list of policy issues 
and that went up to the minister, who went to the prime minister and then it went 
back to the top officials in the ministries.’ The limited take-up by service providers 
Noor BW 7.indd   198 08-09-10   12:07
THE MALTESE  E ID  
199
was solved by publishing a circular (15/2007) from the Office of the Prime Minister 
stating directives on the ‘Use of Electronic Identity Management Tools.’ Circular 
15/2007 puts the following directive forward: ‘The eID shall be considered to be 
the exclusive and single means of electronic authentication and signing for all and 
any government services,’ and it thus ensures that users of e-Government do not 
need a different authentication token for each service.
Although the local councils were involved in the implementation of the eID in-
novation, several respondents stated that the cooperation was highly discordant. 
One of them: ‘Yes, the municipalities were involved because initially they should 
have been the registration offices. There were many problems with the munici-
palities. To be honest, we bulldozed people around to get things done. But it did 
not work out. […] In my opinion it was also a political issue. The Labour Party 
councils did not want to cooperate. Often they said that the camera was not work-
ing or that the system was down. […] Eventually we decided to centralise the 
procedures.’ Another respondent: ‘Local councils were involved in some phases. 
But due to problems with photo making and how to solve these problems, I had 
to escalate it in the same way [as the reluctance of ministries to adopt the eID sys-
tem]. I went to Claudio and he discussed it with the minister. […] I explained why 
we could not continue with the local councils: we needed rigour in the progress 
for the next stage of certificates. We needed a secure environment. They could not 
be given the responsibility. […] We just said [to the local councils], tomorrow you 
will no longer exist [as an RA].’
In addition, various interview reports indicate that coalitions were built within 
the e-Government policy team of MIIIT. One of the involved persons, for instance, 
stated the following: ‘Before we held a meeting, we used to go for a cup of cof-
fee to discuss the important topics. We had to work around the project manager, 
because he went to his superior at the drop of a pin. The cooperation with the 
suppliers and MITTS was closer than with the MIIIT project manager. The coop-
eration with the suppliers and MITTS focused on solving problems, and things 
could escalate quite quickly with the project manager.’ The consortium parties 
also functioned as a strong coalition. One of the consultants reported: ‘For us, the 
strong cooperation [within the consortium] was very important. The government 
changed its goals, processes and rules all the time, so we really needed to stick 
together and defend our interests. We trusted each other to such an extent that 
we could speak on behalf of the consortium, without harming the interests of 
the other.’ And another consultant: ‘We already knew each other quite well. We all 
went to volleyball camp in Libya when we were university buddies. The synergy 
between the [consortium] partners was very good. They [Fenlex] were a young 
law firm and forward looking, which suited our approach.’
Some have argued that the political polarisation in Malta may affect innovation 
processes in the sense that when the opposition comes to power, the employees 
and structure of the administration will also change, which affects all kinds of (and 
thus also innovation) projects. One of the respondents, for instance, explained: ‘I 
was afraid of losing my job after the elections of 2008, but the Nationalist Party 
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remained in power. […] When the political colour of the cabinet changes after 
elections, so does the political colour of top administrators and policy makers. In 
Malta, the polarisation between parties is significant. […] There are various ex-
amples of structural changes [of the public administration] after elections. CIMU 
[Central Information Management Unit] was a very large organisation, but in 1996, 
after the elections, the socialists gained power and changed the structure.’ And: 
‘This division between groups [Nationalists and Labour] can also be found in the 
social classes and geographic structure of Malta. People with a lower income, liv-
ing in the south, tend to be socialists.’ Interviews reveal that group closure plays 
a role in the sense that those social and political groups are quite separated, tend 
not to integrate with each other or to reach consensus. 
In conclusion, group closure affected the joint innovation process in the sense 
that group closure mechanisms resulted in the limited involvement of actors out-
side the group and a limited willingness of these actors to join up in later phases. 
However, other factors, such as the regulatory framework (one of the parameters 
of the Advocacy Coalition Framework) obliged actors to become involved at later 
stages. 
8.3.2 Strength of the ties
As Malta is a relatively small country, various respondents argued that the social 
network in Malta is quite powerful. One of them explains: ‘In Malta, there is a 
strong social network, and if you look at the government as a social group, the 
reality is that you know everyone – probably about 90% of the group. Social in-
teraction is so tight that it requires very strict government procurement to limit 
the risks of abusing of strong ties. Therefore, Malta needs an open procurement 
process. […] On the other hand, this hampers the innovation process in the sense 
that you cannot easily choose the supplier you want, the way private organisa-
tions can.’ Another respondent stated about the tight Maltese network: ‘Malta is 
very small. People know the minister by his first name. I am family of the prime 
minister, and this really is a disadvantage. People are afraid that you will use your 
ties. I am not invited for meetings; they withhold information from me. […] There 
are accusations all the time. Currently, there is an issue going on about the prime 
minister accepting an invitation to attend a football match in England.’ 
In several cases, strong ties have been used to solve conflicts, for instance regard-
ing the financing of the Accerta consortium. The agreement between the Accerta 
consortium and the Maltese government was that the consortium would be paid 
2 euros for every eID registration of a citizen. With a total population of around 
400,000, the Accerta consortium stood to gain no more than 800,000 euros. How-
ever, due to several problems, citizen take-up lagged behind expectations, which 
also affected the Accerta consortium’s financial pay-off. One of the respondents: 
‘We were really fed up with the situation. We did not get paid for years. […] At a 
certain point, Tonio [who was a Fenlex partner back then] walked out of the room. 
There was a financial conflict between Tonio and Claudio. […] Our CEO [Datatrak, 
Joe Fenech Conti] and Claudio have a very strong relationship. Datatrak already 
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had carried out projects for him, for instance the development of the Local En-
forcement System. He talked to Claudio to settle things. […] Strong relationships 
are important; if we have a problem, we go to Joe and he talks to Grech or Gatt.’ 
Another person involved: ‘Joe is a friend of Claudio’s. This helps. But still, we were 
in a government and a political environment. We depended on government; it 
was not an equal relationship.’ Another respondent: ‘Tonio Fenech’s [CEO Fenlex] 
father was a minister, and he did not get along very well with Gatt and Grech. 
Therefore, Tonio could not talk informally with Gatt and Grech. Tonio was not in-
vited to high-level meetings, whereas Joe was.’
Interviews reveal that strong or medium ties were not intensively used to involve 
service providers. A respondent explained: ‘We did not use ties so much to in-
volve local councils. Moreover, we did not have good ties in the Labour council 
districts. We just decided to involve them and approach them.’ Ties did not play 
an important role in participation either when it came to other service provid-
ers. One of the interviewees stated: ‘We did not really have many ties with other 
service providers. Of course, on the political level there were ties, but not on the 
policy level. In addition, we focused on what we thought was important and not 
on what everybody else thought. […] An exception may have been the Ministry 
for Social Policy. At a political level, Gatt and Gonzi collaborated well and made 
an agreement [that the Ministry for Social Policy would use the eID developed 
by MIIIT]. […] Together, they [both ministers] launched the eID system and the 
social security services in 2003.’ The great majority of service providers, however, 
were not involved in the development phase. A more important factor regard-
ing the joining up of service providers was the circular 15/2007 from the Office 
of the Prime Minister, which contained the following directive: ’The e-ID shall be 
considered to be the exclusive and single means of electronic authentication and 
signing for all and any government services.’ 
Strong hierarchical ties have been used to escalate issues. The top official respon-
sible for e-Government had a strong relationship with the minister responsible 
for IT. One of the interviewees explained: ‘There were several instances when we 
had to escalate; but only if it was really of interest. At a certain point in time, the 
service providers started to resist joining up. We made a list of policy issues and 
that went all the way up to the minister, the prime minister and back to the top 
ministerial officials.’ And: ‘Local councils were involved in some phases. But due to 
problems with photo making and how to solve these problems, I had to escalate 
it in the same way [as the reluctance of ministries to adopt the eID system]. I went 
to Claudio and he discussed it with the minister. […] I explained why we could not 
continue with the local councils: we needed rigour in the progress for the next 
stage of certificates. We needed a secure environment. They could not be given 
the responsibility. […] We just said [to the local councils], tomorrow you will no 
longer exist.’
Respondents stated that they used existing strong and medium ties to gain stra-
tegic information. One of the interviewees explained: ‘I have been working for the 
government for over 16 years and know people from all kinds of ministries. This 
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is a huge advantage. They know me and my work and respect me. I have a lot of 
experience and therefore am more able to convince people. In addition, I know 
the people, their positions, their attitudes and their agendas. I am able to connect 
people, to match interests.’
To summarize, both weak and strong interpersonal ties affected the joint innova-
tion process in the sense that these ties were used to solve conflicts and access 
and gain strategic information.
8.3.3 Heterogeneity of the network
Several respondents explained that whereas people of the same party tend to 
cooperate, which yields a certain degree of homogeneity, this did not affect the 
eID innovation since both the Nationalists and the Labour Party agree on the im-
portance of information technology. One of them, for instance, stated: ‘In Malta, 
there is a clear cross-party agreement that IT is not a controversial subject and 
that it does not get lost in political discussions. IT is important for the country.’ 
Furthermore, a top official responsible for e-Government policy explained that he 
deliberately tried to create a team with like-minded people: ‘What is very impor-
tant for accelerating the innovation is to have time with the right people. To do 
this job [develop and implement eID system], I tried to establish a group of young, 
competent and ambitious people. Young people often want to prove that their 
capabilities are an asset for the organisation. They have an intrinsic drive. It is all 
about having the right team to conduct the work. That is the key driver.’ And: ‘Un-
fortunately, as a public officer, you can’t always pick the people you want to.’ How-
ever, there are no strong indications that the characteristics of the e-Government 
team involved in the Maltese eID innovation affected the innovation process. 
In conclusion, there is no sound evidence suggesting that the homogeneity of 
the group involved in the idea and development phase of the innovation process 
affected the characteristics of the innovation and subsequently the dissemination 
and take-up of the innovation.
8.3.4 Broker’s position
It seems that the top official responsible for e-Government, Mr. Grech, served as 
a broker between the administration and politicians, since he had a very strong 
tie with the responsible minister, Gatt, and his team of policy makers. He used 
this broker position predominantly to access and influence the policies of other 
ministries. However, there are not many other examples of actors who had and 
used their broker’s role to influence eID innovation. More significant in the Mal-
tese case is the position of parties totally new to the subsystem. One of the project 
managers, for instance, explained: ‘I just applied for the job [as project manager], 
and when I was chosen and started attending the meetings, I hardly knew anyone. 
They knew each other very well. And I did not know anything about encryption 
modules, not to mention the hardware. For me the key was to learn fast and to es-
tablish ties as soon as possible. It was a very tough environment. […] And then the 
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idea came up to hire expertise to counterbalance the knowledge of the suppliers. 
It was difficult, the specialisation was very rare. Through our ties with specialists 
in Belgium, we got in contact with Irish consultants. This specialist community 
is global and very small. They [the Irish consultants] were my guardian angels, 
because I was new in the field. They helped to strengthen my position.’
Several interviewees also reveal the impact a change of positions can have on the 
innovation process. For instance: ‘During the early stages of implementation, the 
chairman of MITTS, David Spiteri Gingell, took interest in the project. We reported 
to him and we started to use his ties, because he was very well connected with the 
government. He [Spiteri Gingell] was also the guy who had drafted the e-signature 
legislation. I started to use MITTS as a powerhouse and said that we were going to 
be the Certification Authority anyway. We opened a new company, MECS, Malta 
Electronic Certification Services, with David. He was a very inspiring leader. He 
left MITTS just before the project reached its final phase. This was quite a blow; 
we had to start all over when the new CEO came in.’ Another respondent had the 
following to say about the change of positions: ‘When we came back to the local 
councils [some time after the government had taken over the RA], it would have 
helped if people’s positions had changed, thereby normalising relationships. But 
in most cases, the same people were still there.’ Apparently, the changing of posi-
tions affects the continuity of the innovation, on the one hand, whereas on the 
other hand it can also create new opportunities for collaboration. 
Some of the respondents identified a conflict of interest, when a public official 
is involved in both government and private industry. Someone explained: ‘The 
chairman of MITA was also CEO of the private sector initiative Smart City. One 
week ago, he had to resign. In my opinion, there was a conflict of interest because 
he represented demand and supply simultaneously.’ Several newspapers have 
also mentioned a potential conflict of interest. Business Today reported:382 ‘The 
whole media fuss on Claudio Grech’s resignation is perhaps also partly due to the 
fact that neither the economy of Malta, nor that of Dubai is very promising at this 
moment in time. But it is not necessarily the only reason. For a long time prior to 
the launch of Smart City Malta, Grech was Austin Gatt’s right-hand man. He was 
also the chief government negotiator for the entire Smart City deal. After being 
appointed by Tecom, not by government, as Smart City Malta’s CEO, Grech was 
made chairman of MITA – government’s IT agency. Even after Austin Gatt’s reas-
surances about Grech’s position not implying any conflict of interest, the former 
Smart City Malta CEO still remains very much associated with government.’ Malta 
Today383 wrote: ‘This is not the first conflict of interest to hit Austin Gatt’s ministry, 
where chairmen of government boards are often private entrepreneurs in their 
own right. Claudio Grech, the former right-hand man of Austin Gatt, is today the 
chairman of the Malta IT Agency (MITA). He has rebutted suggestions that his 
role as CEO of Smart City Malta could lead to a conflict of interest. Another is Joe 
Fenech Conti, the CEO of Datatrak Holdings. Datatrak provides the IT infrastruc-
382 http://www.businesstoday.com.mt/2009/10/07/editorial.html
383 http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/2009/06/28/t3.html
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ture that processes speed camera pictures and gets a cut from the fines collected 
by speed cameras. But Fenech Conti is also the chairman of Roads Network Ltd, 
the government company that gives the green light for the installation of speed 
cameras.’
Finally some respondents referred to the fact that they use their strategic position 
as a gatekeeper of information. One of them stated: ‘The fact that you are the link-
ing pin between several persons or groups provides you with the power to control 
which information flows to which person. For instance, it can be in my interest for 
you not to know one of my relationships, and therefore I can decide not to bring 
you into contact with him. Conversely, I can also match the interest of several 
actors, the matching of which serves my own interest.’
To summarize, the changing positions of actors in the subsystem influenced the 
innovation process, and actors with a strategic position in the network were in a 
better position to influence the flow of information.
8.3.5 Interpersonal trust
Several respondents stated that the level of trust within the team working on the 
eID project was quite low. The lack of trust was mostly caused by uncertainty. One 
of the interviewees stated: ‘We never knew what would be the next step in the 
project. […] As the government changed plans all the time, the uncertainty for 
us as suppliers was high and the trust was low.’ And: ‘The government changed 
its goals, processes and rules all the time, so we really needed to stick together 
and defend our interests. We trusted each other to such an extent that we could 
speak on behalf of the consortium, without harming the interests of the other. But 
the trust between us and the policy makers was low as their behaviour was rather 
unpredictable.’ Lack of trust was also based on the fear for escalation. Someone 
explained: ‘Before we held a meeting, we used to go for a cup of coffee to discuss 
the important topics. We had to work around the project manager, because he 
went to his superior at the drop of a pin. […] We did not trust him [the project 
manager] because we feared escalation.’ And another interviewee: ‘The project 
manager would lobby, but we lobbied too. We forwarded our proposals to Clau-
dio and showed demos of how it should happen. This is how we were able to work 
around the situation [of lack of trust].’ 
The interviews reveal that in several instances the lack of trust can be compen-
sated by hierarchy. One of the respondents explained: ‘It is never healthy to 
damage the relationship with your superior, and therefore you cannot act in an 
opportunistic way. He or she is your superior and has the power to take reprisals 
for dishonest behaviour.’ Written documents were also used to compensate for 
the lack of trust. Someone explained: ‘Minutes were very important, because they 
functioned as an agreement between parties. The minutes made it clear what we 
would do and what we would not do. But there were many incidents. On several 
occasions, the minutes of the meeting were not sent to us, as promised. We know 
they were taken, but we did not get them, because it had to be copied to Claudio. 
Noor BW 7.indd   204 08-09-10   12:07
THE MALTESE  E ID  
205
There were delays, problems, but we needed this documentation (minutes), to 
show it to Claudio. We were sending our minutes to Claudio regarding the prob-
lems we were facing and why we were lagging behind. […] Because we did not 
receive the minutes, our trust decreased.’
It appears that the level of trust in the Maltese eID case was also influenced by 
the presence of interdependencies. ‘The fact that we [Datatrak and Fenlex] as sup-
pliers had the same interest strengthened our relationship. We had great trust in 
each other, also because we knew that the other would defend his and thus our 
interest. We had to do the job together.’ And someone stated the following on 
the relationship between suppliers and government: ‘We had a good relationship 
with Claudio. We did a lot of contracts for the government. But you have to be 
careful: do not step on toes. The relationship is very much based on “yes we can 
do that”, in other words based on dependency. We are not equal partners, we are 
subordinate. And in that sense you never know what they will do.’ It seems that in 
the relationships where partners were equal and had a shared interest, the trust 
was greater than in the relationships were there was one dominant partner and 
interests were divergent. 
In addition, the interviews reveal that trust is based on experience and reputation. 
One of the interviewees stated: ‘I have been working for the government for over 
16 years and know people from all kinds of ministries. This is a huge advantage. 
They know me and my work and respect me. […] People trust me because they 
have worked with me, know my work and know that I keep an appointment.’ 
Another respondent explained: ‘At a certain stage of the innovation, we did not 
trust the expertise of the suppliers anymore. The technical experts were no longer 
experts. They did not have the experience to do the job.’
The majority of respondents mentioned several ways in which they tried to build 
or maintain trust. One of the respondents, for instance, stated: ‘Then again I had 
to build up trust, which was a gradual process. […] In the beginning I did not trust 
them too much, because when people were redefining their role they saw me as 
a threat. They started to trust me when they saw that I had project management 
skills, learned fast and did not break appointments. […] The fact that they [people 
involved] had some bad experiences with the previous project manager may 
have played a role. I really had to gain trust.’ And someone else: ‘The mechanism 
is simple: when Claudio moves, he takes people with him that he trusts. When he 
went to MITA, he took me with him because he trusted me and valued my loyalty.’
In conclusion, the lack of interpersonal trust affected the joint innovation process 
in the sense that actors were less willing to take risks and were more cautious, 
which slowed down the innovation process. Low levels of trust were compen-
sated by hierarchy, contracts, interdependencies or aligned interests.
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8.3.6 Conclusions
The characteristics and dynamics of the subsystem seem to have significantly 
influenced the joint technological innovation. 
•	 Group closure affected the joint innovation process in the sense that it re-
sulted in a limited involvement of actors outside the group and a limited 
willingness of these actors to join up in later phases. However, other factors, 
such as the regulatory framework, obliged actors to become involved in later 
stages.
•	 Both weak and strong interpersonal ties affected the joint innovation process 
in the sense that these ties were used to solve conflicts, access and gain stra-
tegic information.
•	 There is no sound evidence that the homogeneity of the group involved in 
the innovation process affected the characteristics of the innovation and 
subsequently the dissemination and take-up of the innovation.
•	 The changing positions of actors in the subsystem influenced the innovation 
process, and actors with a strategic position in the network were in a better 
position to influence information flows.
•	 The lack of interpersonal trust affected the joint innovation process in the 
sense that actors were less willing to take risks and were more cautious, 
which slowed down the innovation process. Low levels of trust were com-
pensated by hierarchy, contracts, interdependencies or aligned interests. 
8.4 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
Regarding the parameters of the framework used for this research, the following 
aspects appear to have influenced the dynamics of the subsystem, the innovation 
outcome and/or impact: 
•	 The lack of clarity on the attributes of the solution slowed down the develop-
ment process, and the potential features of the system resulted in a limited 
willingness of users to adopt the system. 
•	 On the one hand, conflicts regarding the funding model slowed down the in-
novation process, and on the other hand the model yielded a major incentive 
for the suppliers to deliver as many registered users as possible, as quickly as 
possible. 
•	 Core values had a significant influence on the initiation of the eIDM and the 
initial division of roles between involved parties
•	 The circular 15/2007 from the Office of the Prime Minister impacted the dy-
namics of the subsystem in the sense that service providers became obliged 
to cooperate. Liability issues affected the division of eIDM responsibilities 
since the government decided to shift certification and registration respon-
sibilities from private to public authorities. 
•	 So far, there is no sound evidence suggesting that changes in socio-economic 
conditions and technology affected the dynamics of the subsystem. More-
over, the flexible model chosen allowed the integration of new technologies. 
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•	 Changes in public opinion did not significantly affect the dynamics of the 
subsystem. However, the MITTS scandal shows that public opinion can have 
a significant influence on government policy. 
•	 The change of systemic governing coalitions affected the dynamics of the 
subsystem in the sense that the balance of power between players changed, 
and some actors were in a better position to impact the innovation. In addi-
tion, one of the changes in the systemic governing coalitions increased the 
threshold for citizens to obtain an eID.
•	 The IT minister’s push and European aspirations affected the dynamics of the 
subsystem.
•	 Group closure affected the joint innovation process in the sense that it re-
sulted in the limited involvement of actors outside the group and a limited 
willingness of these actors to join up in later phases. However, other factors, 
such as the regulatory framework, obliged actors to become involved in later 
stages.
•	 Both weak and strong interpersonal ties affected the joint innovation process 
in the sense that these ties were used to solve conflicts, and access and gain 
strategic information.
•	 There is no sound evidence suggesting that the homogeneity of the group 
involved in the innovation process affected the characteristics of the innova-
tion and subsequently the dissemination and take-up of the innovation.
•	 The changing positions of actors in the subsystem influenced the innovation 
process, and actors with a strategic position in the network were in a better 
position to influence the flow of information.
•	 The lack of interpersonal trust affected the joint innovation process in the 
sense that actors were less willing to take risks and were more cautious, 
which slowed down the innovation process. Low levels of trust were com-
pensated by hierarchy, contracts, interdependencies or aligned interests. 
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9
Conclusions 
 
 
In this ninth chapter, conclusions are drawn about the central research question: 
How can an integrated model of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and social capi-
tal theory explain the occurrence of joined-up ICT innovations – in particular eIDM 
systems – in the public sector? In the first section, a cross-case analysis is conducted 
of the empirical cases (Austria, Belgium, Finland and Malta), where the integrated 
model (as proposed in the theoretical chapter 2, section 2.7) was applied. The three 
sub-sections of this section respectively provide (a) a comparison of the impact of 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework variables in the four cases, (b) a comparison of 
the social capital theory variables in the four cases, and (c) an overall explanation 
of the occurrence of the innovation based upon the integrated model. The second 
section of this chapter tests the theoretical propositions as advanced in section 
2.8 of chapter 2. Conclusions are drawn for each proposition to discover whether 
the empirical evidence points to an endorsement or rejection of the proposition. 
Section three outlines the limitations of the present research. Suggestions for 
changes to the model, with a view to increasing its explanatory value when ap-
plied at the meso level and to innovation processes are put forward in the fourth 
section of this chapter. Section five, describes future research challenges, and the 
chapter concludes with tangible policy recommendations in section six.
9.1 CROSS-CASE ANALySIS
The aim of this paragraph is to provide an answer to the central research question: 
How can an integrated model of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and social capi-
tal theory explain the occurrence of joined-up ICT innovations – in particular eIDM 
systems – in the public sector? The answer to the question is explored by means of a 
cross-case comparison of the impact of each variable of the integrated framework 
(as proposed in the theoretical chapter of this thesis) in the first two parts of the 
section (Advocacy Coalition Framework parameters and events in 9.1.1 and social 
capital theory variables in 9.1.2, respectively). Based on this comparison, conclu-
sions are drawn in the last part of this section (9.1.3) on the explanatory value of 
the model. The last sub-section draws conclusions about whether and how the 
model can clarify the innovation process, its outcome and impact, and thus pro-
vide an answer to the central question of the thesis. 
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9.1.1 Advocacy Coalition Framework parameters and events
Attributes of the good
The cross analysis of the case studies shows that in all cases evidence was found 
suggesting that the basic attributes of the good predominantly affected the adop-
tion (signing up and use) by citizens and hence the impact of the innovation. In Aus-
tria, Belgium and Finland, the take-up and/or use of the eIDM solution by citizens 
is rather low. Only 1.5% of the Austrian population had obtained a Bürgerkarte 
certificate by November 2009. Research carried out by Indigov showed that in 
2010 the use of the Belgium eID system was still very limited, with only 1.8% of the 
reference group (employed citizens) having used the system for signing electron-
ic forms and 3.3% for identification purposes. In Finland, around 5% had a FINEID 
card by December 2009 – a card enabling citizens to obtain electronic services. 
In all cases, the limited take-up and/or use of the innovation was related to the 
features of the innovation. Interviews and user surveys reveal that in particular the 
application of smart-card technology created certain thresholds for citizen use, 
such as the installation of card readers and software. The Finnish VETUMA innova-
tion is an illustrative example in this respect. The VETUMA service is a gateway 
that supports several eIDM applications, such as the TUPAS bank token, the FINEID 
card and a mobile identification system. The Finnish case shows that whereas the 
take-up and use of the FINEID card is low (around 5% of the population), the take-
up and the use of the TUPAS bank token is high (around 80% of the population). 
While the TUPAS token is relatively simple to use, since it is based on a username 
and password/token combination, the (more secure) FINEID card requires the in-
stallation of a card reader and specific software. Subsequently, the impact of the 
TUPAS system has been much greater than the FINEID card in terms of transaction 
numbers and increased efficiency. 
Two of the four cases (Belgium and Austria) indicate that the basic attributes of 
the good also impact the adoption of the system by service providers and thus the 
impact of the innovation. In Austria, several service providers stated that the com-
plexity of the Bürgerkarte solution implies substantial efforts to implement the 
system and that this – combined with the low average number of yearly interac-
tions between local government and citizens (1.2) – resulted in limited willingness 
to adopt the system. Service providers in Belgium are also reluctant to implement 
the solution because they find the system too complicated. Although municipali-
ties are legally obliged to issue BELPIC cards, the use of the card for identification 
purposes is voluntary. A study by Indigov revealed that in 2008 only 30% of the 
municipalities offered electronic services through the BELPIC system. Service 
providers in Malta were also reluctant to use the eID system developed by the 
Ministry for Investment, Industry and Information Technology (MIIIT). However, 
here the central issue was not the complexity of the system, but the fact that they 
already had another system in place or preferred to develop their own system. 
This was a reason for the Prime Minister’s Office to publish a circular (15/2007) and 
oblige (public sector) service providers to use the eIDM system as developed by 
MIIIT. Here, not the attributes, but the legal framework (another parameter of the 
framework) had the greatest impact on the adoption by service providers. 
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Furthermore, the cross analysis of the case studies reveals that basic attributes of 
the good impact the type and number of parties involved (and thus the composition 
of the subsystem). In two of the four cases (Austria and Finland), the choice for a 
certain concept implied the participation of specific players. At a certain point, the 
Austrian federal government chose to implement an open concept in the sense 
that the Bürgerkarte could be applied to any carrier (e.g. card or mobile phone). 
Due to this decision, there are up to ten card providers in Austria – as opposed to 
one – that have incorporated the Bürgerkarte function into their card (e.g. Social 
Security Agency, banks, universities, Austrian Computer Society). In Finland, the 
founding parties (four municipalities) deliberately chose to develop an eID gate-
way into which several eIDM systems can be integrated. Contrary to the solution 
chosen in other European member states, in Finland several eID applications can 
be used by citizens to obtain electronic services through the VETUMA gateway 
(e.g. FINEID card, TUPAS bank token, mobile identification). The consequence 
of this choice was that many eIDM providers were (and still are) involved in the 
innovation. However, both cases also demonstrate that although these parties 
participate, their role and subsequent influence on the innovation may be limited 
(e.g. card provision or supplier of eIDM application). 
Lastly, all cases have shown that the basic attributes of the good not only im-
pact the subsystem and innovation output and impact, but that the subsystem 
also significantly impacts the attributes of the good. Although the features of the 
innovation in the cases were partly determined by legislation (e.g. European e-
Signature directive), available technology (e.g. biometrics was still rather imma-
ture) and availability of resources (e.g. e-Government budgets), the preferences 
and the beliefs of the actors of the subsystem also greatly influenced the specific 
features of the innovation. The influence of the subsystem actors is perhaps most 
clear in the Austrian Bürgerkarte and the Belgian BEPLIC cases. In the Bürgerkarte 
case, the vision of a small group of experts from the Institute for Applied Informa-
tion Processing and Communications at the Graz University of Technology had 
a large impact on the exact attributes of the innovation. The Chief Information 
Officer of the Austrian federal government was head of this institute and involved 
certain cryptographic experts who had a significant influence on the design of 
the Bürgerkarte. In Belgium, several respondents stated that in the design phase 
around five key persons were involved, who highly determined the specifications 
of the BELPIC. Legal and technical experts of the University of Leuven, together 
with top officials of the Crossroads Bank and the National Register Department 
defined the BELPIC’s requirements. In conclusion, there is a direct relation be-
tween the visions and beliefs of the actors of the subsystem and the features of 
the innovation. 
Basic distribution of resources
The cross-case analysis shows that in three of the four cases (Austria, Finland 
and Malta), the funding of the innovation yielded recurrent negotiations between 
parties, and in several instances put pressure on the subsystem. In Finland and 
Malta, the suppliers of the eIDM solution were paid (amongst others) for each 
transaction (that is, each time a citizen uses the system). In Austria, the supplier 
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of certificates was paid for each certificate issued. Since the take-up and use by 
citizens remained behind expectations in all these countries (and consequently 
the revenues for the suppliers as well), the suppliers felt the need to renegotiate 
the funding model. Several respondents reported on extra meetings which were 
planned and the discordant character of those meetings. In all three cases, the 
negotiations put pressure on the subsystem. In some cases there were escalations 
and the innovation process slowed down because parties first wanted to solve 
the financial disagreement. However, the negotiations did not affect the direction, 
output or impact of the innovation in any of the three cases. Moreover, although 
the transaction or certificate-based funding model was a major incentive for sup-
pliers to achieve a high take-up and use by citizens, the suppliers were not able to 
substantially influence the adoption. Several suppliers organised road shows and 
public campaigns to convince service providers and citizens of the advantages, 
yet the take-up and use remained low. 
In two of the four countries (Austria and Finland), the cost for citizens to obtain the 
eIDM solution were perceived to have impacted the take-up by citizens and sub-
sequently the impact of the innovation. In Austria, Belgium and Finland, citizens 
have to pay for obtaining a certificate and/or smart card. In the early years of the 
Bürgerkarte launch, the costs for obtaining the card’s function, certificate and ac-
companying devices were around 100 euros. The Finnish FINEID card costs 48 eu-
ros, excluding the card reader. In both cases, respondents stated that these costs 
were/are an important barrier for citizens to obtain the solution. Moreover, in Fin-
land citizens can choose between several eIDM tokens, and the great majority of 
the population prefers the (cheaper and more user-friendly) TUPAS bank token. In 
Austria, the federal government decided to decrease the costs of the certificates 
to 15.60 euros and increase the costs of the e-Card by 10 euros.384 Yet, although 
many Austrian citizens have an e-Card, the take-up of the Bürgerkarte certificate 
is still low. This is caused, according to the large majority of respondents, by the 
few services available online, the attributes of the system (citizens need to install 
a card reader and software) and the low frequency of interaction between citizens 
and government (around 1.2 average interactions on an annual basis). In Belgium, 
the costs of the BELPIC card are between 10 and 15 euros, depending on the mu-
nicipality.385 However, since the card is mandatory in Belgium, the costs did not 
play a role in the take-up of the card. Although there has been criticism in national 
newspapers of the costs and the card’s period of validity, today almost all citizens 
have a BELPIC card. 
In the Finnish case, financial incentives have positively influenced the joining up 
of service providers and consequently the impact of the innovation. Although each 
service provider in Finland is essentially responsible for paying its own joining fee 
(2,400 euros) and transaction costs, the Ministry of Finance announced in 2007 
that they would pay these costs if service providers would join up before the end 
of the year. Interview reports reveal that for several service providers this was an 
384 http://a-sign.at/default.asp?ch=1&lang=GE&node=702
385 http://eid.belgium.be/nl/FAQ/Over_de_eID/index.jsp
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important incentive to accelerate their joining up. The central government duly 
noticed that this was an effective stimulus and consequently made the same 
announcements in 2008 and 2009. As a result, however, service providers’ belief 
in the temporary character of this financial arrangement began to wane. Other 
cases – in particular Belgium and Austria – show that (perceived) substantial in-
vestments that have to be made by service providers to implement the system 
is one of the reasons that they are reluctant to join up. The joining up of service 
providers affects the impact of the innovation in the sense that the more service 
providers are implementing the systems, the more electronic services become 
available through the innovation and the more efficiency gains (the initial pur-
pose of the innovation) can be achieved in service delivery.
Fundamental cultural values 
In all countries, certain core values have been drivers for the initiation of the in-
novation. In both Malta and Finland, actors of the subsystem perceived the be-
longing to the e-Government front-runners (nationally and internationally) as an 
important reason to start as early as possible with e-Government projects, such as 
eIDM. In Belgium and Austria, values such as increased efficiency, the simplifica-
tion of administrative processes and customer convenience contributed to the 
start of the eIDM projects. More specifically, in all countries certain beliefs and per-
ceptions – such as the undesirability of government fragmentation, the need to 
overhaul inert bureaucratic processes and administrations not keeping pace with 
social developments – resulted in certain tangible problem definitions (citizens 
being sent from pillar to post), and eIDM systems were perceived to be one of the 
solutions. In addition, in all countries (the one more than the other), technology 
was perceived as a means to achieve certain goals, and hence the approach was 
highly instrumental and managerial. In all cases, there was a strong belief in the 
capacity of technology to modernise government. 
In two of the four countries (Austria and Malta), the values and beliefs of the actors 
who initiated the innovation influenced the involvement of parties. The founding 
actors in the Austrian case were highly technology-oriented. The top official re-
sponsible for the Bürgerkarte innovation had a strong technical background, was 
head of and professor at the Institute for Applied Information Processing and Com-
munications at the Graz University of Technology, and involved specific technical 
specialists in the development team. The technological sophistication of the solu-
tion was one of the most important requirements set by the founding actors, and 
consequently experts specialised in advanced eIDM technology were involved. In 
Malta, one of the core beliefs was the importance of public-private partnerships. 
The key actors involved in the Maltese eID believed that ‘whatever can be left to 
the market should be left to the market’. Their strategy argued that e-Government 
(and thus also eIDM) will require the concerted efforts of the public and private 
sectors and that the government would be mainly concerned with ensuring the 
legal framework and institutional set-up required to create and promote the ideal 
e-Government environment. The highly valued cooperation between private and 
public parties was echoed in the eIDM project since registration and certification 
tasks were initially assigned to private parties (whereas in other European mem-
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ber states these are mostly public tasks). After some problems with the registra-
tion and certification processes, the central government decided that these tasks 
should be taken over by government agencies. 
Lastly, two of the four cases (Austria and Finland) provide strong evidence that 
prevailing values and beliefs of the subsystem shaped the features of the innova-
tion. The Austrian case is perhaps the most obvious example because the group 
responsible for the development of the innovation rated technical sophistication 
highly. Several respondents stated that the technical team was trying to push tech-
nological frontiers and that they felt that they were pioneering. This technological 
orientation, together with a broadly shared concern for privacy infringements, 
shaped the requirements for the Bürgerkarte innovation. The white paper, for 
instance, stated that the application of certain technologies – in particular asym-
metric cryptography, hash procedures and certification – can result in a highly 
secure application. The use of these technologies resulted in a rather complex 
system, which – in turn – led to a limited take-up by service providers and citizens 
(see also section on attributes of the good). In Finland, respondents rated factors 
such as usability and ‘convenience for citizens’ highly. This resulted, for instance, 
in the core requirement that citizens should be able to apply the eIDM system of 
their choice and that the VETUMA gateway should support several eIDM systems. 
This strategy lowered the threshold for citizens to obtain electronic services as 
they could make use of their bank authentication tools. The Finnish subsystem 
actors found it less important to develop a highly secure system, and hence the 
security level of the most widely used identification system – a combination of 
VETUMA and TUPAS – is low compared to other European member states. 
Basic legal structure
The cross-case analysis shows that in three cases (Belgium, Malta and Finland) 
legislation had a direct impact on the subsystem and- more particularly on the 
involvement of actors (restrictions for actors to join up and obligation for actors 
to join up). In Belgium, the law of 19 July 1991386 restricts the usage of the eIDM 
system by private sector parties, stating that private parties cannot access the 
National Register or use of the National Register number for internal information 
management.387 Exceptions are made for private organisations that received a 
specific mandate by law or by virtue of the committee or the National Register 
Department. The impact of the law of 19 July 1991 is that it essentially prevents pri-
vate sector service providers from joining up. In Malta, legislation had the oppo-
site effect. Because public sector service providers were not willing to start using 
the eIDM system (as they had their own system or preferred to develop their own 
system), the Prime Minister’s Office decided to publish a circular (15/2007) and 
oblige (public sector) service providers to use the eIDM system as developed by 
MIIIT. Thus, in Malta legislation stimulated take-up by service providers. In Finland, 
it was the procurement law that affected the subsystem in the sense that if an ICT 
system is to be used by several organisations, the law requires these organisations 
386 http://www.juridat.be/cgi_loi/loi_N.pl?cn=1991071931
387 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32297
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to jointly submit a call for tenders. Consequently, in the tendering phase, around 
60 municipalities were included in the contract. However, most of them became 
more actively involved in later phases of the innovation (diffusion phase). Lastly, 
in Malta liability legislation was the decisive factor for the central government to 
shift responsibility of the certification and registration tasks from the private to 
the public sector. In conclusion, legislation can both stimulate and impede the 
joining up of actors. 
In addition, the cross-case analysis demonstrates that in two of the four cases 
(Austria and Belgium), there were several instances in which legislation affected 
the take-up of the innovation by service providers and/or citizens. In Austria, the use 
of sector-specific numbers for citizen identification in government processes is 
laid down in an e-Government act.388 The main reason for the use of sector-specific 
numbers is the protection of citizens’ data. The Austrian e-Government Act states 
the following (paragraph 8): ‘In data files of controllers in the public sector, the 
identification of natural persons within the framework of the citizen card scheme 
may be represented only in the form of a sector-specific personal identifier.’ Based 
on this legislation, an identification procedure was developed that uses both a 
source PIN and sector-specific numbers that are encrypted. The majority of service 
providers interviewed stated that the use of this identification model implies sub-
stantial changes to back-office systems, and hence means substantial investments 
in relation to expected gains in efficiency, which in turn increases the reluctance 
of service providers to use the system. In Belgium, legislation has affected the 
take-up of the BELPIC card by Belgian citizens. The BELPIC card is mandatory in 
Belgium, and therefore almost all citizens have one. However, the use of online 
services and subsequent online identification is voluntary. Several studies have 
indicated that whereas there is a broad diffusion of the BELPIC card, its use for the 
obtaining of electronic services or signing of electronic forms is still very limited. 
Thirdly, two of the four cases (Austria and Belgium) show that the composition 
of the subsystem – more specifically the positions of or connections between 
key actors in the network – affected the drafting and enactment of legislation. In 
Belgium, one of the initiators of the BELPIC project was also chair of the Privacy 
Commission. Several respondents stated that the fact that this initiator combined 
both positions made him very effective in drafting the legislation and convinc-
ing members of the Privacy Commission and parliamentarians to adopt the legal 
basis for the eIDM system. In the Austrian case, the key persons involved in the 
development of the eIDM system and the electronic signature and electronic gov-
ernment legislation knew each other very well. Several respondents stated that 
the fact that they had strong professional ties resulted in an effective and efficient 
drafting and enactment of the legislation. In addition, the fact that the CEO of the 
Austrian Data Protection Commission was very well connected inside the Federal 
Chancellery made it more likely that a consensus would be reached that struck a 
balance between data protection and electronic service delivery. 
388 http://www.epractice.eu/files/media/media_928.pdf
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Changes in socio-economic conditions and technology
In all four cases, neither the interviews nor government expenditure budgets 
suggest that one of the main economic changes during the innovation processes – 
namely the burst of the internet bubble in 2001 – affected the innovation process. 
In all cases, respondents stated that the burst of the internet bubble did not have 
an effect. In three cases, budgetary decisions regarding how much to spend on 
the development of the eIDM system had already been made or the development 
process was already in full swing, which made the innovation process – accord-
ing to respondents – irreversible. In all countries, the e-Government budgets in-
creased in 2000, 2001 and 2002. Furthermore, in all cases the respondents expect 
the current economic crisis to have an impact on the innovation process since 
budgets will be cut, and this could influence the diffusion or direction of the in-
novation. In Finland, several interviewees, for instance, expect the economic crisis 
and subsequent efficiency measures to result in the decision to integrate several 
competing systems (e.g. the KATSO and VETUMA systems). In Malta, where there 
is one system in place, but where the government intends to enhance the system 
with smart-card and biometric technology, respondents expect that ambitions 
will be moderated. However, since there is no sound evidence regarding these 
anticipated impacts, the research remains inconclusive on this point. 
In one of the four cases (Belgium), technological developments were perceived to 
have an impact on the decisions to use certain technologies. In Belgium, the in-
creased use of certain new technologies (e.g. USB ports) implied that alterations 
had to be made to the chosen technical construction. Several respondents ex-
plained that extra meetings had to be organised and solutions had to be found 
to integrate new technologies. However, a comparison between the Belgian and 
the Maltese cases shows that the impact of new technologies may depend on 
the openness of the chosen technological model. Whereas in Belgium the strict 
technological choices made in the early phases of the innovation resulted in the 
limited flexibility to incorporate new technology, the ‘four-level’ development 
approach in Malta provided more possibilities to flexibly anticipate new techno-
logical developments. Furthermore, although respondents in both Belgium and 
Austria stated that they expect the take-up to increase, now that certain techno-
logical devices (such as card readers) are more available and user-friendly, cur-
rently there are no indications of this increased take-up. 
Changes in public opinion
There is no sound evidence in any of the cases that public opinion affected the 
innovation process of the eIDM system. Although several critical articles appeared 
in newspapers in all four countries, almost all respondents stated that – thus far - 
these articles did not have a substantial effect on the dynamics of the subsystem 
nor the innovation direction, outcome or impact. In Finland, for instance, various 
critical newspaper articles were published in 2008 based on a report by the Na-
tional Audit Office. The report stated that the development of online identifica-
tion and authentication for services to citizens had been inefficient due to the 
lack of central coordination and the presence of competition between several 
systems. The vast majority of respondents argued that there was not much discus-
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sion about the report within the group of actors, that it did not change the direc-
tion of the innovation, and subsequently did not affect the output or impact of 
the innovation either. In Austria, there were several critical articles on the limited 
take-up of the Bürgerkarte and the student protest on an e-Voting project that 
made use of the Bürgerkarte solution. However, the large majority of respondents 
stated that this criticism did not have an impact. Public opinion did not have an 
impact on the subsystem, innovation output or impact in Malta or Belgium either. 
However, it also has to be mentioned that these findings do not imply that public 
opinion – by definition – does not impact the dynamics of the subsystem, the in-
novation output or impact. In Malta, an example was found where public opinion 
(although it did not impact the eIDM innovation process) affected the informa-
tion strategy and policy of the Malta Information Technology and Training Service 
(MITTS) Ltd. In 2008, several newspapers (e.g. The Malta Independent, Malta To-
day and L-orizzont) reported on what they called ‘the MITTS scandal’; the theft of 
20,000 email passwords on a government server at MITTS. Although Minister Gatt 
and the top official Mr. Grech first denied that the passwords had been stolen, 
news reports forced them eventually to admit the incident, and the Labour Party 
called for Minister Gatt’s resignation. Although Minister Gatt did not resign, mea-
sures were taken to intensify security policies and practices at MITTS. It thus seems 
that – depending on the perceived gravity and degree of failure – politicians are 
held accountable and subsequently be forced to change policy. In addition, plans 
are currently being prepared in Finland to integrate the VETUMA and KATSO sys-
tem based upon the report of the National Audit Office, and therefore one could 
conclude that public opinion has provided input to a new eIDM strategy. 
Systemic governing coalitions
Only in one of the three cases (Malta) did changes in the systemic governing co-
alitions substantially change the structure of the subsystem and the direction of 
the innovation. In the other three cases, there were several personnel changes in 
teams involved in the development and/or implementation (Belgium and Austria) 
or changes in ownership of the innovation (Finland). However, these changes did 
not seem to affect the innovation output and/or impact. In Belgium, the large 
turnover of staff at both the National Register Department and Fedict did not 
significantly affect the dynamics of the subsystem, the division of responsibilities, 
innovation output or impact since the top official of the National Register Depart-
ment was in firm control over the project and has retained his position from the 
onset of the innovation to the present. The same goes for Austria, where the Chief 
Information Officer has been in firm control throughout the project. Although at 
a certain point ownership (and thus also the decision power) shifted in Finland 
from the Information Society Programme to the valt-IT unit of the Ministry of 
Finance, and later on to the State Treasury, this shift did not have a major effect 
since the innovation was already in the diffusion phase and the key remaining 
task was to stimulate the diffusion and further fine-tune the innovation. However, 
in Malta several changes to systemic governing coalitions did have an effect in 
several ways. Firstly, in the initiation phase the shift of the responsibility for e-
Government policy from the Prime Minister’s Office to the Ministry for Investment, 
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Industry and Information Technology (MIIIT) decreased the competition between 
the two ministries and enabled the IT-minded Minister Gatt to further define the 
eIDM strategy. Secondly, in the development phase the shift of the certification 
and registration tasks from private to public sector agencies helped MIIIT regain 
control over the project. This, in turn, affected the innovation direction in the 
sense that it yielded a fully public sector-owned eIDM system. 
Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems
In three of the four cases, the European subsystem seems to have impacted the 
strategies of the actors involved and the innovation outputs and impacts. In 
Belgium and Austria, the European electronic signature directive, the European 
policy on eIDM systems and involvement of subsystem actors in the European 
arena affected the strategies chosen and subsequently the innovation output and 
impact. In both countries, the involvement of subsystem actors during the prepa-
rations of the electronic signature directive in the 1990s was the cause for address-
ing the need for an eIDM system at the national level. The electronic signature 
directive, which focuses heavily on the use of (qualified PKI) certificates, has been 
incorporated into the Austrian and Belgian eIDM strategies and subsequent eIDM 
solutions that use qualified certificates and smart card technologies. In Malta, it 
was not the electronic signature directive, but their joining the European Union 
in 2004 that was an incentive for e-Government innovations in general. Several 
respondents stated that they wanted to show other European member states that 
they were equally advanced in electronic government and that this led to many 
e-Government projects, including the eIDM project. In addition, in two of the four 
countries (Austria and Malta), European benchmarks have been perceived as an 
important stimulus to speed up the eIDM innovation process. 
In one case (Belgium), the political subsystem has significantly influenced the 
direction of the strategy, output and impact. In the initiation phase of the BELPIC 
innovation, the idea was to integrate the SIS card of the Social Security with the 
BELPIC solution. The actors anticipated that this would reduce the administrative 
burden for citizens and simplify the social security and civil affairs administrative 
systems. However, when discussing this integration with politicians and identify-
ing the legislative changes that would be needed, some key politicians opposed 
the integration because they thought privacy issues would harm public support. 
Consequently, it was decided that the BELPIC solution would not be integrated 
into the SIS card. Over the years, there have been recurrent discussions in the 
political, administrative and public arena on the integration of the BELPIC and 
SIS card. Recent policy documents of the federal government state that one of 
the most important goals in the coming years regarding the BELPIC will be its 
integration with the social security card, which should stimulate use of the BELPIC. 
In three of the four cases, the impact of the local subsystem on the innovation 
direction, output and/or impact was low, and in one case (Finland) the innovation 
was – by contrast – initiated by the local subsystem. Although there have been 
several efforts in Austria, Belgium and Malta to strengthen the cooperation be-
tween federal and local government in e-Government projects, the participation 
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of local authorities in the eIDM innovations has been limited. In Austria, regions 
and municipalities only became involved in the diffusion phase and hence their 
influence on the design of the innovation has not been significant. In Belgium, 
municipalities were involved in the pilot phase of the innovation; however, their 
influence was negligible since the project was firmly steered by the National Reg-
ister Department. Several interviews revealed that although pilot communities 
had substantial criticism aimed at the system, the National Register Department 
concluded the pilot phase with a positive evaluation and recommendation to 
start the nationwide roll-out based on an unaltered strategy and policy. In Malta, 
the local authorities were only involved for a short period of time since the ini-
tial idea was for them to become the registration offices. However, the federal 
government changed policy and centralised these tasks. In Finland, the influence 
of – in particular four – municipalities was substantial since they initiated the 
project, defined the requirements of the system, and managed the tendering and 
development process. However, this cannot be perceived as impact from ‘other’ 
subsystems as they were part of the involved subsystem. 
9.1.2 Social capital variables
Group closure
In three of the four cases (Austria, Belgium and Malta), strong mechanisms of group 
closure were present in the initiation and development phases, which affected the 
dynamics of the group, innovation strategies, outcome and impact. In Belgium, the 
majority of respondents agreed that only a few stakeholders were involved in the 
initiation and development phases. As one of the respondents explained: ‘Only 
five people were in involved in the development stage of the technical and legal 
specifications. The decision makers knew the experts very well and knew that their 
visions on the needed technology matched. This really accelerated the process.’ In 
the development stage of the Bürgerkarte in Austria, the influence of the CIO and 
his Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications at the Graz 
University of Technology was profound. The CIO established a technical team to 
develop the solution and involved several employees from his institute. Various 
respondents stated that as a result of the CIO and his team’s dominance, the ap-
proach used for the Bürgerkarte was too technical, and insufficient attention was 
paid to the demand of service providers and citizens. In Malta, the Ministry for 
Investment, Industry and Information Technology (MIIIT) was very powerful in the 
initiation and development phases. Although several respondents stated that the 
MIIIT project team lacked expertise (and thus had limited power), they had firm 
control over the project since they had the ultimate decision power. In Finland, 
group closure mechanisms were less present. In the initiation and development 
phases, several municipalities and ministries were involved. However, here too, 
some municipalities stated that they did not feel equally represented in the initia-
tion and development phases. However, compared to the other cases, the group 
of founders was open and heterogeneous. In all four cases, the involvement of 
(representatives of ) citizens was very limited. 
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In three of the four cases (Austria, Belgium and Malta), respondents stated that 
because there were only a few stakeholders involved in the initiation and develop-
ment, the process was very efficient since it was relatively easy to reach consensus 
on the requirements of the eIDM system. An interesting example is Belgium, 
where various participants stated that they only needed one or two workshops 
to define the requirements. Moreover, this case provides several clear examples 
of the reproduction of ideas. Members of the team that carried out the feasibility 
study of the technical and functional specifications, for instance, stated that they 
were under pressure to confirm the strategy chosen by the National Register De-
partment. The confirmation of the chosen strategy enabled the National Register 
Department to convince the Cabinet of Ministers to adopt the system (and thus to 
progress with the innovation in the direction they desired). In other cases, respon-
dents stated that the fact that people involved in the initiation and development 
phases had a shared frame of reference supported the reaching of agreements 
and hence the decision making process. In Austria, several interviewees, for in-
stance, contended that the like-mindedness of employees of the ICT Strategy Unit 
created a general atmosphere of consensus on the goals, strategies and direction 
of the innovation, which eased decision making. 
In the three cases where group closure mechanisms were found (Austria, Belgium 
and Malta), effects on the innovation outcome and impact were also found. In all 
three cases, the take-up of the innovation by service providers was limited, where-
as in Finland (where more stakeholders were involved) many service providers 
joined up. In Austria only a few government organisations use the Bürgerkarte to 
provide their clients with online services. The large majority of respondents stated 
that at the local level the limited use of the system is caused by a lack of skills and 
insufficient knowledge of the system. In addition, service providers stated that the 
system does not meet their demand because it is perceived as being too complex 
for the few services that they can put online. Also the use of the Bürgerkarte by 
citizens is very limited. According to the majority of respondents and user surveys, 
this is due to the card’s complexity, administrative burden and infrequent use. 
In Belgium, the municipalities are obliged to issue the BELPIC card, though they 
are not obliged to provide electronic services through the card. In 2010, only 30% 
of the municipalities used the BELPIC for online services. The majority of respon-
dents agree that the system is too complex and the implementation costs too 
high in relation to the potential gains in efficiency. Similar to the Austrian case, in 
Belgium the use of the BELPIC for online services by citizens is very low. In Malta, 
the same patterns have been found. The involvement of service providers in the 
initiation and development phase has been very limited, as has the adoption of 
the system by service providers. However, here the government decided to oblige 
service providers to use the system for the provision of online services. It appears 
that, as in Finland, more service providers were involved, the system meets their 
demand better and therefore the adoption and subsequent impact of the system 
is much higher. 
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Strength of the ties
In all four cases, strong and medium ties have played an important role in the 
initiation and development phases, and ties appeared to be less relevant in the 
implementation and diffusion phases. More specifically, it appeared that strong 
and medium ties predominantly affected the dynamics of the system, i.e. the gain-
ing of strategic information, the involvement of actors, the influencing of opin-
ions, the formation of coalitions and the reaching of consensus. These dynamics, 
in turn, affected strategies, decisions, rules, resources and subsequently also the 
innovation outcome and impact. 
In all cases, actors have used strong and medium ties to access strategic informa-
tion in the initiation phase. The many examples show that the better connected 
actors are in a network (see also conclusions on broker’s position below), the more 
access they have to strategic information and the more able they are to influence 
the direction of the innovation. In Finland, one of the interviewees, for instance, 
stated: ‘The fact that I have such a large network within governments helps me to 
understand why parties do what they do. I know their motives, plans and strate-
gies. It also helps me to choose my own strategy.’ One of the respondents in the 
Maltese case, for instance, explained: ‘I have been working for the government for 
over 16 years and know people from all kinds of ministries. This is a huge advan-
tage. […] In addition, I know the people, their positions, their attitudes and their 
agendas. I am able to connect people, to match interests.’ Several interviewees 
in Austria and Belgium also pointed out that they used strong and medium ties 
to acquire strategic information on interdependencies, interests, agendas and 
decision-making power. 
In addition, the cross-case analysis demonstrates that strong and medium ties were 
used in all cases to involve actors in particular in the initiation and development 
phases of the innovation process. Ties were used to involve certain expertise (e.g. 
in Austria, Belgium and Malta), to involve card providers or eIDM providers (e.g. 
Austria and Finland) and to involve pilot municipalities (e.g. Belgium). The cross-
case analysis demonstrates that ties were used predominantly in the initiation 
and development phases for the involvement of actors and that in the imple-
mentation and diffusion phases ties were less relevant. In all cases, respondents 
involved in the diffusion phase stated that for service providers whether or not to 
join is a purely rational decision. In this phase, the attributes of the innovation are 
a given, and service providers explicitly strike up the balance of the innovation’s 
advantages and disadvantages, which forms the basis for the decision to adopt 
the system or not. It seems that actors more heavily rely on the opinion of peers in 
the initiation and development phase because in these stages the outcome and 
impact of the innovation are much more uncertain. In the diffusion phase there is 
much more evidence of the innovation’s potential impact, which is predominantly 
used for strategic decision making. 
In all cases several examples were found where strong and medium ties were used 
to influence opinions in the initiation and development phases. The CIO of Austria 
and his team members used strong and medium ties to influence the opinions 
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of members of the ICT Board in order to try to advance the Bürgerkarte innova-
tion. The ICT Board had decision-making power over several aspects concerning 
the Bürgerkarte, and hence the CIO and his team tried to influence the decision-
making process. The CEO of the Crossroads Bank in Belgium tried to influence the 
opinion of members of the Privacy Commission and politicians by using strong 
and medium ties. In Finland, actors of the mobile telecom industry tried to use 
their medium ties to influence the agenda of the Information Society Programme. 
In Malta, strong and medium ties were used by the minister responsible for the 
eIDM system to influence the opinion of other ministers on the eIDM innovation. 
However, these attempts to influence opinion did not always have an impact. In 
some instances the actor who wanted to influence an opinion succeeded and in 
other instances not. For example, a top official in Belgium deliberately used his 
strong ties to convince politicians to integrate the BELPIC with the SIS card. His 
efforts were in vain as some of the involved politicians feared privacy debates and 
therefore did not support the integration. 
In three of the four cases (Belgium, Malta and Finland), strong ties were used to 
form coalitions. In Malta, suppliers used their ties to combine their interests. The 
same pattern was found in Belgium where suppliers regularly met to discuss strat-
egies to protect their interests in their relation with the National Register Depart-
ment of the Ministry of the Interior. Finland may be the most illustrative example, 
where four municipalities deliberately formed a coalition to develop and promote 
their eIDM solution. Several Finnish respondents stated that the decision of the 
four municipalities to join forces was deliberate in the sense that they wanted to 
have enough critical mass to make their solution the nationwide solution. One of 
the interviewees, for instance, explained in this respect: ‘It was very important that 
Helsinki was on board [of the VETUMA innovation]. Because of their involvement 
we had a coalition that represented one fifth of the Finnish population. Central 
government could not say no to that. The central government did not have any 
choice, they had to come aboard.’ Overall, it appears that in cases where the in-
novation has been centrally initiated and developed, the formation of a coalition 
was less relevant than in the Finnish case, where there was no substantial central 
control over the project. 
All these cases contain examples of the use of strong ties to reach consensus on a 
subject. Although reaching consensus can be perceived as being akin to influenc-
ing opinions, there is a difference between the two in the sense that the process 
of consensus reaching is reciprocal. In both Austria and Belgium, strong ties were 
used to reach consensus on e-Government or related (e.g. privacy) legislation. In 
those cases, there was tension between protecting citizens’ data, on the one hand, 
and the implementation of the eIDM innovation on the other hand. In Austria, the 
strong tie between the CIO and the chair of the Data Protection Committee en-
abled them to reach consensus on the way citizens are identified in identification 
processes (by using a source PIN in combination with sector-specific numbers). In 
Malta and Finland, reaching consensus did not concern legislation but (respec-
tively) the funding and requirements of the innovation. In Malta, strong ties be-
tween a top official responsible for e-Government and the CEO of a supplier were 
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used to solve a conflict that arose about the funding of the development of the 
system. The cooperation between government practitioners and the supplier’s 
employees was in a deadlock because they seriously disagreed on the funding of 
the project. Both organisations escalated the problem to management, and the 
strong tie between two top officials was used to solve the problem. In Finland, 
strong ties were used in the initiation phase to reach consensus on the require-
ments of the innovation. Several respondents stated that the strong relationships 
between involved parties enabled them to openly discuss the requirements of the 
innovation and to define a concept acceptable to all. 
Heterogeneity of the network
In three of the four cases (Austria, Belgium and Malta), limited heterogeneity of 
the network resulted in innovations that did not optimally meet the demand of 
the service providers and citizens, and this resulted in a limited adoption of the 
innovations by those actors. Although the knowledge needed to technologically 
develop the innovations was available in all cases, information on the require-
ments of service providers and end users was lacking. As stated in the section on 
group closure, the development of the Bürgerkarte was heavily dominated by a 
small group of technical experts. In Belgium and Malta, top officials of one specific 
ministry had firm control over the project. Although social capital theory indicates 
that homogeneity may stimulate adoption in the sense that shared frames of ref-
erences may enhance diffusion processes, this was not the case in these countries. 
The network that developed the innovations in Austria, Belgium and Malta was 
different from the network that was to adopt the innovations. In these cases, one 
central ministry had a dominant role in the development, whereas the innova-
tions had to be diffused among other ministries, regions and municipalities. There 
is evidence that the frame of references of the initiating ministries were different 
from the frame of references of the other government institutes. For instance, 
whereas the Strategy Unit of the Federal Chancellery in Austria paid great atten-
tion to security and the use of new technologies, the regions and municipalities 
perceived this as needlessly complex. 
Broker’s position in the network
In all four cases, the actors with a broker’s position in the network were able to in-
fluence the dynamics of the network in the sense that they could broker informa-
tion and contacts between groups and hence also had a strong influence on the 
innovation strategy, decisions, output and impact. The most influential brokerage 
position was found in the Austrian case, where the CIO had a very central posi-
tion within the network and mediated between the interests of several involved 
parties; for instance between his institute IAIK at the Graz University of Technol-
ogy, A-SIT, the Federal Chancellery, the European Commission and some service 
providers, such as the Austrian Computer Society (where he chaired a working 
group) and the Social Security Agency (where he was advisor). The CIO acted as a 
bridge between the interests and information of separate networks and brought 
together people who were not connected yet. One of the actors explained about 
the position of the CIO: ‘When you have so many influential positions at the same 
time, you have a lot of strategic information about the interest of the parties, 
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which strengthens your position even more. You are able to steer the innovation 
in a certain direction. […] At certain moments in time you are able to connect 
people from diverse organisations and their interests.’ In addition, in the initiation 
phase of the BELPIC solution in Belgium, there was an actor who had a strong 
brokerage position as he was chair of the Privacy Commission, CEO of Fedict, CEO 
of the Crossroads Bank and lecturer at ICRIS. This actor used his broker’s position 
to mediate between the interests of the Privacy Commission and the BELPIC inno-
vation team. One of the respondents stated: ‘He [top administrator] was not only 
the CEO of Fedict and the Crossroads Bank, but also the chairman of the Privacy 
Commission. He knew the views held by members of the Privacy Commission and 
could anticipate those views by addressing all the issues which he thought would 
be raised.’ 
In three of the four cases (Austria, Belgium and Malta), there is evidence of the 
limited influence on the innovation process of people who had low connectivity 
within the network. An example was the position of the CEO of A-Trust in the 
Austrian Bürgerkarte case. Because A-Trust’s management changed several times 
during the project, and A-Trust was a private sector partner, they were only weakly 
connected to the other actors within the subsystem. They had less strategic in-
formation and hence less power to influence the direction of the innovation. The 
same mechanism was found in the Belgian BELPIC case, where the CEO of Fedict 
was replaced by a new CEO and where the project management also changed 
several times. Several interviewees stated that these changes decreased Fedict’s 
influence for some time. One of the respondents, for instance, explained: ‘I was 
totally new in the network and I became responsible for the eID project. That was 
quite a challenge. The people of the National Register Department acted like “why 
are you here?” The first meetings with the National Register Department were very 
difficult. I did not speak their language; I did not know the informal positions of 
all these people, and whether their opinions were important. It took some time 
for me to consolidate my position and gain influence.’ In Finland, the chair of the 
Information Society Programme was relatively new in the network of municipali-
ties who founded the VETUMA innovation. The Finnish case, however, also reveals 
that the limited ‘social network power’ of a less connected actor can be compen-
sated by (for instance) budgetary power. Although the chair of the Information 
Society Programme was not very well connected within the network, she was able 
to influence the direction of the innovation because she had access to its funding. 
Interpersonal trust
The cross-case analysis demonstrates that the level of trust in the network pre-
dominantly affected the dynamics of the network. In high-trust networks, the 
cooperation was perceived as being efficient, whereas in low-trust networks the 
limited interpersonal trust had to be compensated by control mechanisms, such 
as hierarchy and contracts. In addition, the cases reveal that the level of trust also 
more directly affected the innovation strategy in the sense that networks with a 
relatively high level of trust were more willing to take risks (e.g. apply more inno-
vative approaches). Lastly, the cases reveal that the level of trust was in particular 
relevant in the initiation and development phases and was less significant in the 
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implementation and diffusion phases, since in these latter phases the precise out-
come and impact of the innovation was less uncertain. 
In three of the four cases (Austria, Finland and Malta), a high level of trust was seen 
to be related to an efficient cooperation between parties. In Austria, the level of 
trust within the ICT Strategy Unit was perceived as very high. According to sev-
eral respondents, the high level of trust not only made a free flow of information 
possible – and thus an efficient consolidation of knowledge – but also yielded 
a limited need for formalisation and confirmation. One of the respondents, for 
instance, stated: ‘Of course, we had a warming up phase, but interpersonal trust 
grew very fast. In any case, the best idea prevailed, it did not matter who had the 
idea. We exchanged all information without restrictions. Since all the information 
was circulating, we were easily able to combine knowledge, define requirements 
and develop the solution. […] In addition, the process was efficient as we did not 
need to confirm and formalise agreements.’ In Finland, respondents also stated 
that the high level of trust between municipalities made the communication pro-
cess efficient. One of the interviewees, for instance, stated: ‘Because we had trust, 
we did not need to put everything on paper. Everybody knew that I worked in an 
informal way, not on paper. Some institutes expect you to have all agreements 
on paper, but we did not. For instance, the State Audit Office wanted everything 
on paper. It is their role to watch government organisations and thus to have a 
certain degree of distrust.’ And: ‘As we had a high level of trust, the communication 
was very direct, open and efficient. We did not need third trusted parties to medi-
ate and did not have long-winded discussions. There were no hidden agendas. 
We just said what we thought and tried to find solutions.’ In Malta, several respon-
dents explained that the high-trust relationship between the suppliers enabled 
them to act on behalf of each other, which decreased the time partners needed 
to spend on meetings. 
In three of the four cases (Austria, Belgium and Malta), the lack of trust was com-
pensated by hierarchy. In Austria, there was a low-trust relationship between the 
CEO of A-Trust (the certificate provider) and the CIO. This lack of trust was com-
pensated by the trust the CEO of A-Trust had in the CIO’s superior. For example, he 
stated: ‘I know the boss of Mr. Posch quite well. I do trust him [Mr. Posch’s boss]. 
When I do not agree with Mr. Posch I can go to his boss and arrange things.’ There 
were several examples in Malta where the superior trusted his subordinate since 
loyalty was guaranteed by the fact that the superior could take far-reaching mea-
sures if the subordinate acted in an unreliable way. One of the respondents, for 
instance, explained in this respect: ‘It is never healthy to damage the relationship 
with your superior, and therefore you cannot act in an opportunistic way. He or 
she is your superior and will have the power to take reprisals for dishonest be-
haviour. So of course I acted in the interest of Claudio in the eID project.’ A certain 
form of hierarchy can also exist between the supplier and his/her commissioner. 
In Belgium, the consultancy agency which carried out the feasibility study was 
highly dependent on the National Register Department and the Crossroads Bank. 
One of the respondents, for instance, stated: ‘Of course, [the top officials] trusted 
us. We were highly dependent on them. If we would have acted in an opportunis-
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tic way, we would not have been assigned any new projects. Both [top officials] 
were very important for us; they were high-level clients and our entrance into the 
e-Government market.’ 
In three of the four cases (Austria, Belgium and Malta), several examples were 
found of the compensation of distrust by written agreements. Whereas the devel-
opment team of the Bürgerkarte in Austria had no need for minutes to confirm 
agreements, in the federal ICT Board minutes were crucial. As one of the inter-
viewees stated: ’In the ICT Board, minutes were very important. The minutes were 
used as a kind of contract, a formal confirmation of the agreements reached. There 
were several instances where had to refer to the minutes.’ In Belgium, two actors 
with a limited level of trust in each other tried to divide tasks by drawing up what 
they called a co-existence agreement. One of them explained: ‘After a year of 
cooperation we made a formal co-existence agreement. We made a detailed de-
scription of the areas the Crossroads Bank would cover and the areas Fedict would 
cover. We did this to prevent a situation in which we would encroach on each 
other’s territory. I, for instance, got the social security sector, while he [top official] 
got the economic sector. We distributed this agreement to every minister so that 
they could not play us off against each other. Now we have a very strong coopera-
tion.’ And in Malta, the minutes made during the meetings between the Ministry 
for Investment, Industry and Information Technology and the Information Society 
were perceived as crucial. One of the respondents, for instance, stated: ‘Minutes 
were very important, because they worked as an agreement between parties. The 
minutes made it clear what we would do and what we would not do. But there 
were many incidents. Several times the minutes of the meeting were not sent 
to us as promised. We know they were taken, but we did not get them, because 
they had to be copied to Claudio. There were delays, problems, but we needed 
this documentation (minutes) in order to show it to Claudio. We were sending 
our minutes about the problems we faced to Claudio and why we were lagging 
behind. […] Because we did not receive the minutes, our trust decreased.’
In all cases, various respondents stated that a high level of trust in others made 
them more willing to take risks. In Austria, the stakeholders involved in the devel-
opment of the Bürgerkarte felt that they were acting in a politically sensitive and 
high-risk environment because the technology they were developing was new 
and the Bürgerkarte was high on the political agenda. The CIO responsible for the 
Bürgerkarte fell directly under the Federal Chancellor, and the project was closely 
watched by top officials and politicians. Several respondents who were part of 
the development team stated that the high level of trust within their team was 
needed because of the risks of project failure. In Belgium, some pilot municipali-
ties stated that there was a serious risk in the pilot phase of damage to the mu-
nicipality’s reputation if the project turned out to fail. However, the fact that top 
municipal officials had high-trust relationships with top officials of the National 
Register Department made them more willing to be involved as a pilot municipal-
ity. In Finland, high-trust relationships made parties willing to cooperate despite 
the fact that – even in the procurement phase – the funding model was not clear. 
All actors involved were strongly confident that the chair of the Information Soci-
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ety Programme would secure the funding. In conclusion, the cases demonstrate 
that partners are more willing to take risks if interpersonal trust is high. 
The cases also show that the level of trust was less relevant in later stages of the 
innovation. Most respondents of the cases involved in the diffusion stage – the 
phase in which the innovation is very mature and ready to be implemented na-
tionwide – stated that their choice to join up was a very deliberate and rational 
one, and not based on interpersonal trust. In the diffusion phase of the cases, 
more evidence of the advantages and the disadvantages of the innovation were 
available for service providers, and thus the uncertainty was lower. One of the 
involved actors explained this as follows: ‘At the onset of the innovation, the level 
of trust was important as there were more risks. The innovation could fail. The pro-
curement phase was also quite risky because the complex regulations meant that 
we did not know if we were doing it by the book. There were several uncertainties. 
In the diffusion phase, on the other hand, there was a clear-cut solution, and for 
the participating parties it was just a question of whether it was interesting to 
join or not. Trust in persons was not that important, but trust in the solution was.’ 
Someone else stated: ‘Interpersonal trust did not play a role in our decision to 
adopt VETUMA. What was important for our decisions though is that we trusted 
the quality of the solution, that we thought it to be the best solution to provide 
online services to our clients. As the description of the functions of the system was 
very clear and also the service delivered by Fujitsu [e.g. training and toolkit], there 
were not many uncertainties or risks for us.’ It seems that the importance of trust in 
persons shifts towards trust in the solution during the diffusion phase. 
9.1.3 Overall conclusions based upon the framework
The central question of this thesis is: How can an integrated model of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework and social capital theory explain the occurrence of joined-up 
ICT innovations – in particular eIDM systems – in the public sector? The previous 
sections provided a summary of the empirical findings regarding the impact 
of each of the separate variables of the integrated framework. In the following 
sections, the mutual influence of the elements of the model are discussed on a 
more abstract level. Each set of variables of the model (e.g. parameters, events, 
constraints and the policy subsystem), is reviewed to discover how these sets of 
aspects impacted each other. The following figure depicts the empirical evidence 
and mutual influence between sets of variables in the integrated framework (the 
figure is explained in more detail in the sections below):
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Relatively stable parameters generating constraints and incentives
Overall, the cross-case analysis shows that the parameters (left upper box in figure 
10 above) of the framework yield certain constraints and incentives for the eIDM 
innovation processes (central upper box). In three of the four cases (see also num-
bers between brackets in central upper box), the attributes of the eIDM solution 
provided thresholds for citizens and in two cases for service providers to join up. 
As the features of the solution in these cases did not meet the service providers’ 
and citizens’ demands, they were reluctant to adopt the innovation. The analysis 
of the distribution of resources demonstrates that in three of the four cases lim-
ited budgets and/or inadequate profit models led to recurrent negotiations and 
slowed down the innovation process. The negotiations, however, did not impact 
the innovation strategy, output or impact. In one case, temporary financial com-
pensation provided an incentive for service providers to participate. All cases pro-
vide evidence that the prevailing values of the policy subsystem (e.g. increased 
efficiency) provided the innovation with a window of opportunity. In two cases, 
legislation was a barrier for stakeholders to join up, and in one case a circular was 
a stimulus (moreover, obligation) for stakeholders to get involved. In conclusion, 
the analysis shows that the parameters can generate both constraints and incen-
tives and that these constraints and incentives affect the innovation process in 
the policy subsystem. 
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Figure 10. Empirical results depicted in the integrated model 
Figure 10. Empirical results depicted in the integrated model
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External (system) events influencing the innovation direction
In addition, the cross-case analysis reveals that events (left lower box) predomi-
nantly provide input for the innovation direction (central lower box). Although the 
evidence of the impact of events on the innovation process was less strong than 
the impact of the parameters (see case numbers between brackets in central low-
er box), in several instances events provided impulses for strategy change. In one 
of the cases, technological change affected the innovation strategy. New tech-
nologies (partly) overhauled the existing strategy as these new technologies were 
expected to be broadly used in the future and thus were incorporated into the 
strategy. In none of the cases public opinion significantly affected the eIDM inno-
vation process. However, this does not imply that public opinion – by definition – 
does not have an impact. One case was found in which public opinion – although 
it did not influence the eID innovation – resulted in new government policy. In 
addition, in one of the cases, changes in the governing coalitions resulted in the 
innovation being steered in a new direction. These changes were in the initiation 
phase and were substantial because ownership changed. The direction of the in-
novation was still relatively open, so the new owner could largely determine the 
(new) direction of the innovation. Lastly, the impact of the European subsystem 
was present in three of the four cases. The policy, directives and/or membership 
of the European Commission significantly influenced the eIDM strategies in these 
cases. In two of these cases, a European Commission directive brought life to a 
national eIDM project, and in one case, a country’s admission to the European 
Union acted as a boost for e-Government policy. Overall, the finding that events 
predominantly generate impulses for strategy change can be explained by the 
fact that new situations emerge that may change the perception of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the innovation. The parameters, by contrast, provide 
the contextual conditions for the innovation process. 
Policy subsystem affecting parameters and events
The cross-case analysis also shows that the impacts are less linear than initially 
depicted in the model. In several cases, there is evidence that the parameters and 
events not only affect the subsystem, but that the subsystem actors also (more di-
rectly and not only through strategy, outcome and impact) affect the parameters 
and events (see central upper arrow and central arrow). In two cases, the subsys-
tem actors had great influence on the basic attributes of the good because they 
were key to determining the specific features of the innovation. In other words, 
existing technological inventions and frameworks not only shaped the innovation 
strategies, output and impact, but the subsystem also affected the kind of tech-
nological inventions that were used and (further) developed. In addition, in two 
cases, the subsystem actors had a substantial and direct influence on existing leg-
islation because they were heavily involved in the drafting of new legislation. Fur-
thermore, there is evidence that the subsystem affected certain external events. 
In one case, for instance, public opinion did not only impact the strategy of the 
subsystem, but the actors of the subsystem also affected public opinion. Clear 
examples of spinning techniques were found, which were applied to positively 
influence public opinion. Lastly, in two cases, the subsystem had a significant 
impact on the eIDM policy of other subsystems, which – in turn – created new 
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opportunities for the subsystem. To summarize, it seems that the parameters and 
events not only affect the subsystem, but also vice versa, i.e. the subsystem affects 
the parameters and events. Thus the innovation process can be perceived as a 
process of mutual shaping rather than a linear process.
Separate parameters and events impacting each other
Another interesting finding revealed by the cross-case analysis is that the separate 
parameters and events may mutually impact each other (see arrows in left upper 
box and left lower box in figure 10 above). Here, too, the influence seems less 
linear and more dynamic. In two cases, there was strong evidence that the basic 
legal framework significantly affected the basic attributes of the good. In one 
case, the legislation required a certain level of security for data protection reasons. 
In addition, differences between fundamental values in several cases resulted in 
different legislation and requirements for the innovation. Whereas in Finland trust 
in government is relatively high and privacy generally not perceived as being 
threatened by government, in Austria trust in government is lower and privacy 
an important issue. These differences in fundamental values resulted in differ-
ent kinds of legislation (the e-Government legislation of Austria focusing much 
more attention on data protection) and in the security level of the innovation (the 
Bürgerkarte being much more secure than the most widely used tool, TUPAS, in 
Finland). Values and legislation also seem to impact the budgets governments 
allocate for eIDM solutions. Contrary to Finland, in Austria and Belgium large 
budgets were allocated to the development of a highly secure tool. Furthermore, 
there were indications that changes in socio-economic conditions may result in 
changes in public opinion. Empirical data indicate that citizen trust in (certain) 
private institutions has declined as a consequence of the current economic crisis. 
This decline in trust may affect public perceptions of the division of tasks between 
private and public, for instance, with regard to the management of electronic 
identities. Thus, changes in socio-economic conditions may result in the change 
of public opinion, which – in turn –may yield changes in systemic governing coali-
tions. In conclusion, the separate parameters and events may impact each other. 
Policy subsystem characteristics affecting subsystem dynamics
The cross-case analysis also shows that in all cases the network and tie character-
istics predominantly affected the dynamics of the subsystem (right box in figure 
10 above, upper arrow down). Although network dynamics are not explicitly men-
tioned in the original Advocacy Coalition Framework, the cases clearly show that 
some dynamics are strongly related to specific network and tie characteristics. For 
instance, in closed groups less interaction was needed to build a shared frame of 
reference for the innovation. In addition, existing strong and medium ties were 
predominantly used to shape group dynamics, e.g. to acquire strategic informa-
tion, involve actors, influence opinions, form coalitions and reach consensus. It 
appeared that – depending on the risks, uncertainties and interests underlying 
the interaction – stronger or weaker ties were used. For instance, weak ties were 
used more often to acquire strategic information than to form coalitions. Further-
more, heterogeneity predominantly generated a certain cognitive distance, which 
required the development of a mutual understanding and thus more interaction. 
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The cross-case analysis also demonstrates that brokers are more able to influence 
group dynamics because they can brokerage between information and contacts. 
The most powerful brokers were those who also had a strong hierarchical posi-
tion. In addition, groups where power was more equally divided generated more 
examples of coalition building. Overall, the evidence indicates that the network 
and tie characteristics predominantly determine the dynamics of the network, 
which – in turn – may result in certain decisions, output and impact. 
Subsystem characteristics reinforcing themselves
Evidence from the case studies also shows that the network and tie character-
istics may affect the composition of the network (curved arrow in the right box). 
For instance, existing ties, trust relationships and broker’s positions were used 
to involve parties that suited the group of initiating actors, and group closure 
mechanisms and homogeneity resulted in the limited involvement of actors with 
diverging frames of reference and/or interests. Apparently, it was not uncommon 
for actors to involve other actors whom they already knew and whose interests 
were worth supporting. This involvement of actors with a shared frame of refer-
ences and interests generated group closure mechanisms in the sense that the 
actors primarily reproduced the ideas of the group. In conclusion, it seems that 
any network involved in an innovation may strengthen its own characteristics and 
generate a certain degree of homogeneity and/or closure. 
Subsystem dynamics resulting in innovation strategies, decisions, outputs and im-
pacts
Finally, the cross-case analysis shows that group dynamics result in certain strat-
egies, decisions, appointments, outputs and/or impact (arrows down in right box, 
figure 10). For instance, three of the four cases showed that group closure mecha-
nisms led to a limited involvement of service providers and citizen representa-
tion, that little negotiation was needed to define the strategy and reach decisions 
regarding the requirements of the innovation since the frames of references and 
the interests of participating stakeholders were very much in line. However, these 
cases also show that the impact of the innovation was limited since it did not 
meet the demand of service providers, and citizens and their subsequent take-up 
and use was low. In one case, the network was more open to (other) service pro-
viders, which generated more consensus building and more interaction to define 
the strategy and to make decisions. In this case, the impact of the innovation was 
higher since more service providers and citizens adopted the innovation. 
In conclusion, the integrated model of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and 
social capital theory as proposed in the theoretical chapter of this thesis (section 
2.7), and the application of the model to four cases, shows that the variables of 
the model significantly contribute to the explanation of the occurrence, process, 
output and impact of the development of joint eIDM systems by separate govern-
ment institutions. There is for all variables identified in the framework evidence 
of impact. Overall, it seems that the parameters and the network and tie charac-
teristics have the most significant and direct impact on the innovation process, 
output and impact. The empirical test of the model also shows that the relations 
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between variables of the model are less linear than initially anticipated. The rela-
tion between variables appears to be more direct, constant and mutual, which 
makes the joint innovation process a complex and dynamic system of interrelated 
actors, conditions, incentives and events, and they, in turn, constantly influence 
each other. This insight into the interrelation of variables generates tentative sug-
gestions for alterations to the model, which will be examined in section 9.3 of this 
chapter. However, the next section (9.2) first tests the validity of the theoretical 
propositions. 
9.2 VALIDITy Of PROPOSITIONS
This section draws conclusions for each of the propositions regarding the rejec-
tion or confirmation of the proposition. 
Social capital theory can substantially enrich the Advocacy Coalition Framework in 
the sense that it reveals the effect of network characteristics and dynamics on the in-
novation process.
The cross-cases analysis of the case studies confirms this proposition because the 
analysis demonstrates that social capital variables provide better insight into the 
characteristics of the actors, their ties and the network than the original Advocacy 
Coalition Framework. The characteristics of the actors (e.g. expertise, position), 
their ties (strength, level of trust) and the networks (closure, heterogeneity, bro-
ker’s positions) generate certain network dynamics (e.g. negotiations, coalition 
formation, consensus building, and agreement), which affect the innovation 
strategy, decisions, output and impact. Social capital theory provides an opera-
tionalisation of the subsystem and hence makes social variables more explicit. It 
reveals that coalitions are most present in systems where power is equally divided 
and that coalitions are less fixed than perceived in the original Advocacy Coalition 
Framework. The latter point is in line with the findings of Kim et al. (2008) and Cair-
ney (1997), who demonstrated that all kinds of coalitions can potentially emerge, 
including coalitions between actors who do not share deep-core beliefs. In ad-
dition, social capital theory unveils the dynamics of the network over time and 
the differences in relevance of the dynamics in the early stages of the innovation 
process when compared to the diffusion stages of the innovation. All cases point 
to the fact that in the initiation and development phases, social factors (e.g. ties, 
trust, broker’s position) are more important than in latter phases, which largely 
endorses the research of Nesta et al. (2004), who found that the characteristics of 
the network vary in each innovation stage. 
Moreover, social capital theory can help address some of the persistent criticisms 
against the original Advocacy Coalition Framework. One of the most dominant 
objections regarding the framework is that it fails to differentiate between more 
important and less important policy actors in a certain policy area because it does 
not distinguish between insiders and outsiders (e.g. Maloney, 1994). In addition, 
various scholars stated that the framework does not account for the possibility 
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that a policy domain may be structured by harmonious relationships among par-
ticipants (e.g. Maloney, 1994; Kim, 2008). A third fundamental criticism is that the 
original framework considers the subsystem to be essentially stable over time, 
which does not do justice to the dynamics of the subsystem (e.g. Schlager, 1995). 
Because social capital theory, as applied in this thesis, identifies all actors related 
to the innovation (both within and outside the core group), reveals the (in)stabil-
ity of the relationships (e.g. the strength of the ties and the level of trust) and 
investigates group dynamics over time (in several innovation phases), the primary 
criticism of the model can be addressed and countered. 
Yet, testing the model empirically also reveals the need for a further conceptu-
alisation and operationalisation of social capital variables and mechanisms. This 
finding supports the academic demand for advancing social capital theory (e.g. 
Franke, 2005; Kasaa, 2007; Dolfsma et al., 2009). Although the social capital vari-
ables identified in this thesis and integrated into the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work provide a basic overview of relevant network and tie characteristics, the 
cases show that other factors (e.g. decision-making power, interests, hierarchic 
and financial interdependencies) also play an important role. Several of these fac-
tors are explicitly addressed in traditional network theories (e.g. Pfeffer and Salan-
cik, 1978; Kickert and Van Vught, 1984). It is a theoretical challenge to complete the 
typology of actor, tie and network characteristics and further explore the effects 
of these characteristics on the innovation dynamics. 
Group closure encourages the reproduction of ideas and hence provides limited ac-
cess to new ideas and strategies and limits the creation of innovations. 
The empirical data reveal that it is not the limited access to new ideas and 
strategies, as suggested in literature (e.g. Teske et al., 1994; Uzzi, 1997; Newman 
et al., 2001; Hulsink, 2008), but the limited access to the demand of users (ser-
vice providers and citizens) that hampered the innovation process. Whereas in 
social capital literature the emphasis is on the (re-)combination of cutting-edge 
knowledge (e.g. creation of revolutionary new technologies or radical scientific 
breakthroughs), in the four cases studied the adoption of the various systems by 
service providers and end-users was a central prerequisite for innovation impact. 
This latter finding supports the growing body of literature on user-driven innova-
tion (e.g. Tuomi, 2002; Von Hippel, 2005) that emphasises the role of the end-user. 
It is also in line with the more generally perceived need for a more user-centred 
design of e-Government services. Many scientists claim that the creation and 
implementation of electronic public services is primarily guided by supply-side 
motivations and that technology rather than user needs are decisive in public 
sector innovations (e.g. Schedler and Summermatter, 2007; Kunstelj et al., 2007, 
Verdegem and Verleye, 2009).
In addition, a revolutionary new combination of knowledge was not needed in 
the cases studied. The eIDM technology had already been largely developed and 
applied in the private sector. Moreover, government practitioners had access to 
the most advanced eIDM experts and involved them in their network. The main 
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goal of the administrations was to customise technology and broadly implement 
it in the public sector. Consequently, it was not the access to totally new ideas, 
but the access to potential adopters that was critical in the innovation process. In 
three cases, the involvement of service providers and (representatives of ) citizens 
was lacking, which resulted in a limited translation of their demand into the at-
tributes of the innovation and subsequently a low take-up and usage. In these 
cases, there was evidence of a strong reproduction and consolidation of ideas 
by participating actors (e.g. see Bourdieu, 1983). These networks were selective 
in adopting new members and tried to bring together individuals who shared 
a certain frame of reference and set of interests, which eventually resulted in a 
limited innovation adoption and impact (which is in line with the reproduction 
mechanisms as described by e.g. Teske et al., 1994, Newman, 2001). 
Group closure stimulates the diffusion of innovations that are highly compatible with 
the norms and values of the closed group.
In the four cases studied, there was no evidence that group closure mechanisms 
stimulated the innovation process in the diffusion phase, as one might expect 
from some of the literature (e.g. Van der Vliest, 2009). Several studies indicated 
there is more imitative behaviour in closed groups with strong belief systems – 
and thus innovations can diffuse quickly once some of the members adopt the 
innovation (e.g. Rogers, 1995; Van der Vliest, 2009). In the cases studied for this re-
search, the potential adopters of the innovation did not belong to the closed sub-
system that developed the system, however, and therefore this mechanism can-
not be found. Yet, the cases did reveal that actors with a shared frame of reference 
were more able to reach agreements in the initiation and development phases. 
Respondents from several cases stated that their working in a small group with 
like-minded people eased the decision-making process, regarding the technical 
and functional specifications of the innovation (which is in line with e.g. Greve 
and Salaff 2001), for example. Moreover, in some cases only people with a shared 
frame of reference were involved in order not to disturb the development process. 
Weak ties extend to a larger number of individuals and thus information on innova-
tions can be spread among a larger number of people when passed through weak 
rather than strong ties. 
This proposition cannot be endorsed by the cases studied, nor can cases confirm 
the line of reasoning of several social capital scientists (e.g. Granovetter, 1973; Gre-
gerson and Johnson, 2001; Lundvall, 2006). All cases showed that in the diffusion 
phase ties were largely irrelevant. In all cases, the majority of service providers 
stated that the decision to adopt the system was a deliberate and rational choice 
based on information gathered from websites, conferences and road shows. The 
spreading of information occurred through the internet and official campaigns, 
rather than through ties. Based on the information gathered from websites and/
or conferences, service providers and citizens weighed the pros and the cons of 
the innovation and decided whether to adopt it or not. Decisive factors for actors 
to adopt the system or not were the costs and the usability of the innovation. 
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However, it has to be said that the advantages and disadvantages of adopting 
the eIDM system were quite straightforward and clear to the potential adopters; 
in other words the uncertainty was relatively low. When the true impact of an in-
novation is less certain (e.g. the use of a new drug), people may rely more heavily 
on ties (which is contended by e.g. Hulsink et al., 2008). 
Strong ties may stimulate the creation and adoption of highly uncertain innovations. 
The four cases partially confirm this proposition. As stated in the previous section, 
ties were irrelevant in the diffusion phase (during which the innovation is adopt-
ed). However, the empirical evidence also shows that ties play a significant role 
in the initiation and development phases of the innovation. In all cases, strong, 
medium and weak ties significantly influenced the subsystem dynamics in the 
early phases of the innovation. Ties were used for several purposes, for instance to 
gain strategic information, involve actors, influence opinions, form coalitions and 
reach consensus. The strength of the tie used appears to have depended on the 
risks, uncertainties and interests underlying the interaction. For instance, weaker 
ties were used to acquire strategic information than for forming coalitions. This 
finding is in line with Lin (2001), who argues that the characteristics of the tie (e.g. 
strength of the tie) used by a person to access certain resources depends on the 
interests of that person. For instance, weak ties may be more relevant for finding a 
new job, whereas strong ties may be more useful for solving a precarious problem. 
The empirical data also points to the neutrality of ties in the sense that ties were 
used both to stimulate and to impede the innovation, depending on the inter-
est of the actor. This latter finding points to the endorsement of the argument in 
literature that social capital is a neutral concept and has to be approached techni-
cally rather than normatively (e.g. Lin, 2008). Several scientists have pointed to a 
‘negative’ use of social capital (e.g. Schuller, 2000; Warren, 2008), cases in which 
high levels of trust and strong ties have generated interactions and behaviour 
that are generally perceived as being undesirable. Most scholars refer, in this re-
spect, to the Mafia, sects, racist organisations or to the Timothy McVeigh case, for 
example, in which a United States army veteran used ties with bowling associates 
to prepare the Oklahoma City bombing (e.g. Schuller, 2000; Warren, 2001; Warren, 
2008). 
Heterogeneity of the subsystem enhances the innovative capacity of the subsystem.
As the innovation studied for this research did not require an unusual combina-
tion of creative ideas, this proposition cannot be endorsed. The development of 
eIDM solutions in the four cases studied did not require the involvement of a wide 
variety of expertises. Moreover, the knowledge needed to develop the solution 
was already quite well developed and mature. In the present cases, it was not 
the invention of new ideas but the application of (proven) ideas that was crucial. 
What was important for the innovation impact, however, was the involvement of 
the (heterogeneous) group of potential adopters. As stated in the section above 
on group closure, this heterogeneity was limited and therefore the impact of the 
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innovation was as well. The cases also show that the heterogeneity of potential 
adopters is primarily crucial in the initiation and development phases, because 
the attributes of the innovation are determined in these phases. In later stages of 
the innovation, heterogeneity was not a decisive factor for the innovation process. 
This finding is in line with Nesta et al. (2004), who argue that the characteristics of 
the network (e.g. heterogeneity) vary in each innovation stage.
Brokers have a significant influence on the direction innovation takes and can hamper 
or stimulate the innovation process.
The evidence from the cases confirms this proposition since all cases demon-
strated the power position brokers have as they can broker between information 
and contacts, and – depending on their goals and interests – they can use their 
position to impede or support the innovation process. The findings are in line with 
Burt (1992), who stresses brokers’ competitive advantage, and Hulsink et al. (2008), 
who state that brokers can act as bridges between persons and knowledge. Sev-
eral cases showed that brokers combine strategic information and involve spe-
cific stakeholders to influence the innovation direction. The cases demonstrate 
that this variable is predominantly influential in the initiation and development 
process. In these phases, the direction of the innovation is still uncertain and the 
broker’s position is used to influence the direction. The cases also indicated that 
more coalition building occurs in networks where there is not one central broker 
or person with hierarchical control. Several groups of stakeholders built coalitions 
around specific solutions, which subsequently competed with each other. 
Trust supports high-risk innovation processes and can be partly compensated by in-
terdependencies, control mechanisms and/or contractual arrangements. 
The cross-case analysis unveils that the ambiguous character of the trust variable 
makes its impact versatile and difficult to grasp. However, the empirical data also 
show that the proposition is largely confirmed. Firstly, the empirical data demon-
strate that the higher the uncertainty, risks and/or interests at stake, the higher 
level of interpersonal trust between actors is needed to jointly innovate. This con-
firms the premise of Nooteboom (2006) that collaborative innovation may require 
a certain level of trust because it implies substantial risks and uncertainties for in-
volved actors (see also Chiles and McMackin, 1996). In addition, less interpersonal 
trust between actors seems to be needed in situations where the interests of the 
actors involved are essentially similar and/or they are strongly interdependent. 
Shared interests and/or interdependencies means partners will act in the inter-
est of the other in light of their shared interest and/or because they may expect 
repercussions from the other. Furthermore, a lack of interpersonal trust can be 
compensated by hierarchy and/or contractual arrangements.389 This finding is in 
line with Adler (2001), who described several structures where cooperation takes 
389 Hierarchy can be perceived as a form of interdependency since a superior can take (far-
reaching) measures in response to his subordinate’s opportunistic behaviour. Contractual 
arrangements can be considered as legal interdependencies since opportunistic behaviour 
will have legal consequences.
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place, namely market, hierarchy and/or trust constellations. Some cases demon-
strated that innovation processes in a low-trust environment were less efficient 
than in a high-trust environment (the latter required less communication, consul-
tation and formalisation), which confirms Adler (2001), who argues that trust has 
the unique capacity to enable the coordination of knowledge-intensive activities 
(such as innovation) within and between organisations. 
In all cases, trust was particularly relevant in the initiation and the development 
phases and less relevant in the implementation and diffusion phases. As stated 
in previous sections, the uncertainty and mutual interdependency in the initia-
tion and development phases are higher since the precise outcome and impact 
of the innovation process is largely unknown at that stage. In the implementation 
and the diffusion phases, the trust in the solution (based on a consideration of 
the pros and the cons) becomes more important. In the early stages, the level of 
trust predominantly affected the dynamics of the subsystem and the innovation 
strategies. In subsystems with a low level of trust, more confirmation and formali-
sation was needed, and overall the innovation process was perceived as slower 
than in networks with a high level of trust. In addition, networks with a high level 
of interpersonal trust were more willing to take a risky innovative approach than 
networks with a low level of interpersonal trust. These findings are consistent with 
Edelenbos and Klijn (2007), who compared several definitions of trust and found 
that vulnerability and risks were two of the three key foundations for the need for 
interpersonal trust. 
Furthermore, some cases show that a distinction should be made between the 
strength of the tie and the level of interpersonal trust, and consequently the cases 
contradict scholars who identify trustworthiness as a precondition for social capi-
tal (e.g. Ahn and Ostrom, 2008). There were several instances in the cases where 
the strength of the tie was high – when actors saw each other on a daily basis, 
for example – but the level of trust low. In one case, a policy maker worked with 
a top official of a ministry on a daily basis, but the trust the policy maker had 
in the top official was limited. In addition, this example showed that the level of 
trust between two persons is variable since – vice versa - the superior trusted his 
subordinate because he knew that he would act in his interests. Overall, the com-
bination of high trust and strong tie in the cases was more present than low trust 
and strong tie, possibly because people prefer to have a high-trust relationship 
with the people they intensively work with. In conclusion, contrary to what some 
scholars contend, a high level of trust is not – by definition – a characteristic of 
strong ties. 
9.3 LIMITATIONS Of THE RESEARCH
There are several limitations to the current research. The most important limita-
tions emanate from the qualitative approach of the research. Although the in-
depth case study approach does more justice to the complexity and the immense 
variation of factors identified by the Advocacy Coalition Framework, it also implies 
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that only a limited number of innovation examples can be studied. The concrete 
mechanisms of social capital (and other) variables found in the present study can-
not be generalised with regard to all public sector innovations. The cases studied 
concern the joint development and implementation of eIDM systems by (mostly) 
public sector parties, and hence the influence of variables can differ in other types 
of innovation or even in other cases of eIDM innovations, which fundamentally 
differ from the (most similar) cases as studied in this thesis. However, because 
of its explorative character the research yields the identification of new (mostly) 
social capital variables and causal effects. Moreover, the cases have contributed 
to the falsification of propositions that have a claim of universality (see, for in-
stance, the finding on the proposition on the strength of weak ties). In conclusion, 
although the occurrence and relevance of variables has to be further tested in 
quantitative empirical tests, the qualitative insights of the present study provide 
the foundation for the direction of these tests. 
Another limitation of the research may be the fact the cases studied have a 
time frame of a decade or more. A general criticism of studies that encompass 
a chronological examination of events in the – more distant – past is that inter-
views are less reliable since people are not able to accurately recall events that 
occurred ten (or more) years ago. However, in all cases studied many sources were 
examined, such as policy documents, newspapers, chamber documents, technical 
descriptions of the innovation, legislation, annual reports – which were used to 
confront and challenge statements by respondents. In other words, the studying 
of interview reports, documents and publications enabled triangulation and thus 
the endorsement of findings by multiple sources. In addition, a total number of 
54 interviews were carried out, interview reports have been compared and only 
interview results found in several interviews have been used. 
9.4 SUGGESTIONS fOR ALTERATIONS TO AND fUTURE 
APPLICATION Of THE MODEL
Several suggestions for changes to the model and its future application can be 
made based on the empirical findings. Firstly, the empirical test demonstrates 
that the model can be used to explain not only policy change, but also eIDM 
innovation processes in public sector environments. However, there are some 
crucial differences between innovation processes and policy change. As stated 
before, the most important difference is the locus of the change. Whereas policy 
is generally adopted by policy makers, top officials and politicians, the adopters 
of innovations are often government practitioners at the operational level, citi-
zens and/or businesses. This difference in the locus of change has consequences 
for the scope of the study. For instance, if the subject of the study is the shift 
of traditional to sustainable policy programmes, the subsystem analysis may be 
limited to the policy level. However, when the subject of the study is the transition 
from paper-based to electronic patient records, for example, the so-called street-
level bureaucracy, citizens and businesses should be involved as well. In other 
words, innovation processes not only capture policy making, but also the change 
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of practices, which implies that the scope of innovation studies is by definition 
broader than policy change. When applying the model to investigate innovation 
processes, the operational level should be taken into account as well. 
Secondly, the cases have shown that the application of the model at the meso 
level provides valuable and tangible insights into the factors that influence in-
novation processes. The application at a meso level, however, also implies that 
the aspect ‘long-term coalition opportunity structures’, which Sabatier added to 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework in 2007, cannot be part of the model as it is a 
macro variable. Sabatier et al. have introduced this element to do justice to the di-
versity of democratic systems, such as the Westminster model in the United King-
dom and the more consensual system in the Netherlands. In a meso application 
of the model, however, researchers can take this variable into account by selecting 
cases with a variety of democratic systems. As a result, the diversity would not be-
come apparent on a macro, but on a meso level. The present research has shown 
that differences in national democratic systems yield diverse compositions of the 
policy subsystem. For instance, in Westminster models, the composition appeared 
to be less heterogeneous than in consensual models. By selecting countries with 
both a Westminster model and a consensual model (as is done in this study), both 
mechanisms dominant in a majoritarian system (e.g. central steering) and a con-
sensual system (coalition formation) will be captured by the study. 
A third finding, which offers a lead for further development of the model is the 
fact that the model does not seem to capture one important variable. In two of 
the four cases, there were indications that the characteristics and skills of leading 
actors in the subsystem affected the dynamics of the subsystem and subsequent-
ly the innovation strategy, output and impact. In Malta, several respondents, for 
instance, stated that the leadership style of the minister responsible for e-Govern-
ment – for example his skills to negotiate, convince and manage – contributed 
significantly to the speed and direction of the process. This finding seems to be in 
line with the large body of literature on leadership and (public sector) innovation, 
in which leadership is generally perceived as one of the explanatory variables for 
the occurrence of innovations (e.g. Borins, 1998, 2002). One way of incorporating 
this variable into the model would be to distinguish not only between networks 
and ties, but also between actor characteristics. One of the variables of the sub-
system actors could be the characteristics and skills of actors who initiate and 
manage the innovation. 
The last, and probably most important, finding that provides suggestions for 
changes to the model is the conclusion that the relationship between variables is 
surprisingly direct, constant and mutual when applied at the meso level. The em-
pirical data shows that although in the initial model the subsystem affects param-
eters and events through innovation impacts, the subsystem directly impacts the 
parameters and events (and not only through innovations) more than anticipated. 
Subsystem actors, for instance, greatly influenced the attributes of the innovation, 
were involved in the drafting of new legislation and attempted to influence public 
opinion. The cases also show that the variables constantly affect each other, as op-
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posed to their being a succession of events (influences of variables), as depicted 
by the arrows in the initial model. For instance, financial parameters influenced 
the dynamics of the subsystem during the whole process. Furthermore, the many 
empirical examples indicate that variables mutually influence each other. All cases 
point to a mutual influence between parameters, events and the subsystem. In 
conclusion, the relationship between variables is far more dynamic and chaotic 
than depicted in the model, and a major challenge for future research will be to 
further unravel the interrelations between variables. 
9.5 RESEARCH CHALLENGES
The prior sections set the stage for the definition of future research challenges 
in this section. As the above perhaps made clear, both theoretical elaboration 
and empirical testing is needed to further advance the model. Four insights are 
needed to enhance the explanatory value of the model. The first is the assessment 
of whether all variables are captured by the model. Although the present study 
shows that a large majority of the factors that determine an innovation process, 
output and impact are captured by the model, there are indications that some 
factors may be missing. One of these factors is ‘actor characteristics’, as mentioned 
in the previous section. Secondly, although the first attempt to further concep-
tualise the policy subsystem has been made in the present study, a further op-
erationalisation of the subsystem is needed. All social capital elements studied in 
this thesis have proven to have explanatory value. However, the study also reveals 
that some other factors – such as decision-making power, interests, hierarchy and 
interdependencies – may play a decisive role in innovation processes and need 
further theoretical elaboration. The third challenge is to gain more insight into 
the significance of the variables. The empirical data generated by the present 
study indicate that external events may be less influential than the parameters 
of the model. In addition, the network and tie characteristics seem to be most in-
fluential in the four cases studied. An improved understanding of the significance 
of variables may contribute to estimations of the feasibility of future innovation 
strategies. Fourthly, more insight into the interconnection between variables is 
needed. In other words, which factor affects other factors? The empirical data of 
the present study show that factors are highly interrelated; however, it does not 
identify all the causal relationships between variables. 
A critical review of innovation theories can help identify the missing variables. 
The inclusion of ‘leadership and innovation’ theories, for example, can generate 
more insight into actors’ behaviour and influence, and these insights can enrich 
the current model. Theories by Borins (1998, 2002), for example, can be applied to 
the model, translated into tangible variables and incorporated into the model. In 
addition, an examination of theories on the influence of actor positions, interests 
and interdependencies can help to further build the typology of network, tie and 
actor characteristics and hence operationalise the subsystem of the model. Quali-
tative empirical tests can be conducted to further the understanding of mecha-
nisms underlying the social dynamics of the innovation process. The current study 
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has revealed many mechanisms (e.g. involvement of parties, coalition formation 
and consensus building), but there may be more mechanisms that this study fails 
to capture. Quantitative empirical tests can be used to reveal the significance of 
the variables and their interrelations. By studying one causal relation (e.g. the im-
pact of public opinion on the change of innovation strategies) in a large number 
of cases, the correlation and the significance of the interrelation between the 
variables can be assessed. Lastly, since the model in this thesis has been applied 
to a very specific type of innovation, namely the joint development of eIDM sys-
tems by several (mostly) public sector actors, it has to be investigated whether 
the model needs adjustments when applied to other types of innovations. In con-
clusion, the key challenge for future research is to further improve the model by 
conducting both theoretical and empirical (qualitative and quantitative) research. 
9.6 POLICy RECOMMENDATIONS
The initial impetus for studying the factors that determine the innovation process 
of eIDM systems in four countries was the more general and widely accepted 
assumption that Western governments face some important deficiencies in es-
tablishing joint-up innovations and that the cause of these problems has until 
now remained unclear. In the past decade, public sector innovation literature has 
been rather biased towards managerial and organisational explanations of these 
difficulties. This thesis widens the theoretical lens by incorporating social factors 
which may affect innovation processes. As this is a relatively new area, lessons may 
be found here with substantial added value for policy-makers. Consequently, this 
section focuses on how social capital can help achieve public sector innovations. 
The cross-case analysis has shown that social capital variables, such as network 
and tie characteristics, significantly influence the innovation process, in particular 
the initiation and development of the innovation. Group closure, for instance, 
may yield limited involvement, the reproduction of ideas and a limited take-up 
of the innovation by service providers and citizens. In addition, brokers in the 
network seem to have greater influence on the innovation direction than others. 
The interview reports also reveal that these social capital characteristics are rather 
implicit, as is the decision to use social capital or not. Moreover, the large majority 
of interviewees stated that they had not deliberately considered the characteris-
tics of the ties (e.g. level of trust, strength of the tie) and composition of the net-
work (e.g. heterogeneity and broker’s positions) and its effect on the innovation 
process. A more deliberate consideration of these social capital elements could, 
however, contribute to the efficiency of the innovation process, the innovation 
output and impact. 
Insight into actor, tie and network characteristics enables policy makers to (to-
gether with other considerations, such as availability of resources) assess the 
feasibility of an innovation. The cases in the present research show that networks 
with certain characteristics (e.g. a low level of trust, one dominant party, limited 
heterogeneity) also demonstrate certain difficulties in the innovation process (e.g. 
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need for constant formalisation, limited incorporation of user demand). Before 
initiating an innovation, or joining an innovation, policy makers could consciously 
assess the social features of the network and subsequently estimate the extent to 
which it is likely that certain innovation goals will be achieved (and thus whether 
the innovation will pay off). Moreover, founding innovators can more deliberately 
compose the group of people involved in the initiation and development phase. 
Founders can ensure that the background of actors involved is heterogeneous 
enough to achieve the most interesting knowledge combination, that there are 
people involved with ties to other relevant subsystems (e.g. politicians), that they 
have access to information about the demand of service providers and end users. 
When there is limited trust, this can be addressed and measures can be taken, 
such as the intentional building of trust or (in the worst case) replacement of ac-
tors by others. In other words, a more deliberate consideration of social factors, 
and the question of whether they will stimulate or hamper the innovation pro-
cess, can contribute to a better assessment of the public value that will be created 
and the desirability to invest in an innovation. 
However, it is also important to point to the dark side of social capital here. Litera-
ture and the cases in the present research indicate that social capital – the set of 
social relationships through which resources are available – is neutral and can be 
employed for good or for worse. Although social capital can deliberately be used 
by policy makers to further innovation, interpersonal relationships can also be 
used to obstruct innovations. There are various examples in the relevant literature 
of actors using ties for illegal activities, such as fraud or corruption. Social capital 
is a neutral concept – like financial or cognitive capital – the positive or negative 
effect of which is determined by creating a balance between the values of the 
subsystem actors and values generally accepted within the society. This research 
presented examples of government practitioners who were passionately driven 
by the feeling that they had to contribute to society, and in other cases govern-
ment practitioners found the speed of the process more important than comply-
ing with tendering procedures. Both used their ties to achieve their goals. The 
cases also show that there are several instruments and/or measures for ensuring 
that the actors’ behaviour conforms to what society generally considers desir-
able. One of the most important measures may be the transparency of actions, 
strategies and decisions; by creating transparency, it would become easier to hold 
government officials and politicians accountable for behaviour that conflicts with 
the common good. 
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Summary 
 
Over the past few decades, joined-up or cooperative models of government have 
become the dominant ‘Leitbild’ in public administration literature. Scholarly 
contributions repeatedly underline the generic premise that in today’s complex 
society government institutions will only be able to achieve public value if they in-
creasingly cooperate. According to many scholars, separate government agencies 
have to align existing practices. Moreover, they have to cooperatively innovate - 
to jointly design and create future services and concepts. Specific academic atten-
tion is paid to ICT innovations because ICTs are generally perceived to be essential 
for achieving better public services and increased democratic participation. 
The scholarly devoted attention to joined-up ICT innovation is echoed in govern-
ment policies. Strategic plans of several Western governments reveal a recurring 
demand for tangible cross-agency ICT projects. Almost all European member 
states, for instance, unveiled programmes to create online one-stop shops – digital 
points of access where citizens and businesses can obtain the services of several 
government agencies. Yet, evaluation studies also show that governments face 
substantial problems putting joined-up ICT innovations into place. Several barriers 
have been identified, such as the incompatibility of system architectures, diverg-
ing financial interests and fear of privacy infringements. 
When taking stock of the literature that tries to explain the occurrence of joined-
up ICT innovation, however, it seems that some pieces of the complex puzzle are 
missing. Despite the rich body of scholarly contributions, explanatory models are 
dispersed across disciplines. To achieve a more comprehensive understanding, an 
overarching model is needed that integrates factors from several scientific view-
points. The Advocacy Coalition Framework provides this overview as its parameters 
cross-cut scientific disciplines. Although the framework was initially developed to 
explain ‘policy change’, a confrontation with innovation literature reveals a large 
overlap of factors indicating that the model can also be applied to ‘innovation’. 
Scholars who scrutinised the Advocacy Coalition Framework found that the model 
has some limitations. Over the years, the criticism predominantly concentrated on 
the framework’s social subsystem. This social subsystem captures a set of the net-
work’s sociological characteristics (e.g. coalitions, policy beliefs and broker’s role) 
that can affect the change process. Several researchers stated that the subsystem 
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characteristics are defined on an abstract (network) level and hence remain rather 
vague. Social capital theory can be used to further operationalise the subsystem 
because it unravels tangible social characteristics at the system, relational and 
individual level. For instance, it reveals the heterogeneity of the network, the 
strength of the ties between the persons involved and the positions and resources 
of persons in the network. 
Three aforementioned ingredients are central in the present thesis: (a) difficul-
ties in joined-up ICT innovations in the public sector (b) the use of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework to explain those difficulties and (c) social capital theory to 
enhance the framework. Together, these elements lead to the central research 
question of this thesis: How can an integrated model of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework and social capital theory explain the occurrence of joined-up ICT innova-
tions in the public sector?
Since the concept of ‘joined-up ICT innovations in the public sector’ is too broad 
to be studied in one PhD project, the unit of analysis is confined to a specific ICT 
innovation, namely electronic Identity Management (eIDM) systems. An eIDM sys-
tem is a means to electronically and officially prove one’s identity in interactions 
with institutions. It enables end-users, for instance, to access secure databases, 
to sign electronic documents and to digitally obtain products. eIDM systems are 
the chosen subject of study because many governments perceive them to be key 
enablers for sophisticated communication with citizens and businesses. In addi-
tion, in most countries the development of an eIDM system is a joint effort of 
separate government entities as their aim is to cooperatively create one system 
for all public services. 
In present thesis, an integrated model of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and 
social capital theory has been developed and applied to four European cases of 
joined-up eIDM innovations in the public sector, namely in Austria, Belgium, 
Finland and Malta. The empirical test yields several insights into key barriers and 
drivers for joined-up eIDM innovations. Firstly, in all cases, certain factors had sig-
nificantly more impact than other factors. The features of the eIDM system and 
the beliefs and values of the actors involved, for instance, appeared in all cases to 
have more impact on the innovation process than socio-economic changes and 
public opinion. 
Secondly, in all cases social capital variables significantly influenced the social dy-
namics of the subsystem and subsequently the innovation outcome and impact. 
For instance, group closure mechanisms resulted in a reproduction of ideas and 
hence a limited incorporation of the requirements of service providers and end-
users into the eIDM design. In addition, actors with a broker position were in a 
far better position to influence the innovation direction than actors with a less 
strategic position. And, in all cases the actors were more willing to take risks – e.g. 
to apply a more innovative approach – in a high-trust environment. 
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The empirical test of the integrated model demonstrates that it is eligible to ex-
plain the occurrence of joined-up eIDM innovations. The model provides a broad 
overview of all kinds of contextual factors and detailed insight into social capital 
variables, their relevance and impact. However, the empirical evidence also yields 
some suggestions for alterations and future applications of the model. Because it 
was applied on a meso (sectoral) level, variables were more interrelated than in 
the original Advocacy Coalition Framework, which is generally applied on a macro 
level. In addition, the empirical test shows that a further operationalisation of the 
social subsystem is needed since the precise impact of some characteristics (e.g. 
interests, hierarchy and interdependencies) remained rather unclear.
Policy recommendations predominantly concern the awareness of the social envi-
ronment in which an innovation takes place. Policy makers can more deliberately 
explore the social features of the network and change social settings in order to 
increase the public value of an innovation. However it should be emphasised that 
social capital – like other forms of capital, such as financial resources – is neutral; it 
can be used for good or for worse. As the cases show, social ties are used both by 
people dedicated to achieving improved services and people who are primarily 
driven to maintain their position. One of the most important measures to ensure 
that social capital is used in a way that fits social values is transparency. By creat-
ing transparency of actions, strategies and decisions, it would become easier to 
hold government officials and politicians accountable for behaviour that conflicts 
with common interests. 
Overall, one can conclude that the integrated model as proposed in the present 
thesis provides a sound starting point for the development of a more generic 
model to explain joined-up ICT innovation in the public sector. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
 
De afgelopen decennia zijn geïntegreerde of coöperatieve overheidsmodellen het 
dominante “Leitbild” geworden in de bestuurskundige literatuur. Wetenschap-
pelijke bijdragen benadrukken herhaaldelijk dat in de complexe samenleving 
van vandaag overheidsinstituties alleen publieke waarde kunnen genereren als 
zij samenwerken. Volgens veel wetenschappers moeten overheidsinstellingen 
de uitvoering van hun taken aan elkaar aanpassen. Sterker nog, zij moeten ge-
zamenlijk innoveren – samen toekomstige diensten en concepten ontwerpen 
en creëren. Specifieke academische aandacht richt zich op ICT innovaties omdat 
ICTs over het algemeen worden beschouwd als essentieel voor het bereiken van 
betere publieke diensten en toegenomen democratische participatie. 
De wetenschappelijke aandacht voor gezamenlijke ICT innovaties klinkt door in 
het overheidsbeleid. Strategische plannen van verschillende westerse overheden 
laten een terugkomende vraag voor concrete en organisatieoverstijgende ICT 
projecten zien. Bijna alle Europese lidstaten hebben bijvoorbeeld programma’s 
gelanceerd om online “centrale overheidsloketten” te creëren – digitale contact-
punten waar burgers en bedrijven diensten van verschillende overheidsinstanties 
kunnen afnemen. Echter, uit evaluatiestudies wordt duidelijk dat overheden sub-
stantiële problemen ondervinden bij het gezamenlijk realiseren van ICT innovaties. 
Verschillende barrières zijn benoemd, zoals het niet op elkaar aansluiten van sys-
teemarchitecturen, afwijkende financiële belangen en vrees voor inbreuk op de 
persoonlijke levenssfeer. 
Wanneer de literatuur over gezamenlijke ICT innovaties wordt overzien, blijkt 
echter dat enkele stukjes van de complexe puzzel missen. Hoewel er een rijke hoe-
veelheid aan wetenschappelijke bijdragen is, zijn verklarende modellen sterk 
versnipperd tussen de disciplines. Om een diepgaander inzicht te krijgen is een 
overkoepelend model nodig dat factoren van verschillende wetenschappelijke 
perspectieven integreert. Het Advocacy Coalition Framewerk biedt dit overzicht 
omdat de parameters verschillende wetenschappelijke disciplines doorkruisen. 
Hoewel het Advocacy Coalition Framework in eerste instantie was ontwikkeld om 
beleidsverandering te verklaren, laat een confrontatie van het model met innova-
tie literatuur een grote overlap van factoren zien. Dit wijst erop dat het model ook 
kan worden gebruikt om innovatie te verklaren. 
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Wetenschappers die het Advocacy Coalition Framework bestudeerd hebben, 
vonden enkele beperkingen van het model. In de loop der jaren concentreerde de 
kritiek zich vooral op het sociale subsysteem van het raamwerk. Dit sociale sub-
systeem bevat een set van sociologische kenmerken van het netwerk dat betrok-
ken is bij de innovatie (e.g. coalities, beleidsovertuigingen en intermediaire rollen) 
en die het veranderingsproces kunnen beïnvloeden. Verschillende onderzoekers 
stellen dat de karakteristieken van het subsysteem op een abstract (netwerk) ni-
veau gedefinieerd zijn en daardoor vaag blijven. Omdat sociaal kapitaal theorie 
specifieke sociale kenmerken ontrafelt op het systeem, relationele en individuele 
niveau kan het worden gebruikt om het subsysteem verder te operationaliseren. 
Het geeft bijvoorbeeld inzicht in de heterogeniteit van het netwerk, de sterkte 
van de relaties tussen betrokken personen en de posities en bronnen van perso-
nen in het netwerk. 
Drie bovengenoemde ingrediënten staan centraal in deze dissertatie: (a) pro-
blemen met gezamenlijke ICT innovaties in de publieke sector, (b) het gebruik 
van het Advocacy Coalition Framework om deze moeilijkheden te verklaren en 
(c) sociaal kapitaal theorie om het raamwerk te versterken. Samen leiden deze 
elementen tot de centrale onderzoeksvraag van deze dissertatie: Hoe kan een ge-
integreerd model van het Advocacy Coalition Framework en sociaal kapitaal theorie 
gezamenlijke ICT innovaties in de publieke sector verklaren?
Omdat het concept ‘gezamenlijke ICT innovaties in de publieke sector’ te breed 
is om te bestuderen in één promotieproject, is de analyse eenheid afgebakend 
tot een specifieke ICT innovatie, namelijk elektronische identiteitsmanagement 
(eIDM) systemen. Een eIDM systeem is een instrument om – in interacties met 
instituties - iemands identiteit elektronisch en officieel te bewijzen. Het systeem 
maakt het voor gebruikers bijvoorbeeld mogelijk om toegang te krijgen tot bevei-
ligde databases, om elektronische documenten te ondertekenen en om digitale 
producten te verkrijgen. eIDM systemen zijn gekozen in dit proefschrift omdat 
veel overheden deze systemen als belangrijke randvoorwaarde beschouwen voor 
geavanceerde communicatie met burgers en bedrijven. Daarnaast is de ontwik-
keling van een eIDM systeem in de meeste landen een gezamenlijk initiatief van 
verschillende overheidsinstanties omdat zij één systeem voor alle publieke dien-
sten willen creëren. 
In deze dissertatie is een geïntegreerd model van het Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work en sociaal kapitaal theorie ontwikkeld en toegepast op vier Europese cases 
van gezamenlijke eIDM innovaties in de publieke sector, namelijk: België, Finland, 
Malta en Oostenrijk. De empirische test genereerde verschillende inzichten in 
belangrijke barrières en stimuli voor gezamenlijk eIDM innovaties. Ten eerste 
hadden bepaalde factoren in alle cases substantieel meer impact dan andere 
factoren. De kenmerken van het eIDM systeem en de overtuiging en waarden 
van de betrokken actoren hadden bijvoorbeeld in alle cases meer impact op het 
innovatie proces dan sociaaleconomische veranderingen en de publieke opinie. 
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In de tweede plaats hadden sociaal kapitaal variabelen in alle cases een grote 
invloed op de sociale dynamiek in het subsysteem en vervolgens ook op het re-
sultaat en de impact van de innovatie. De geslotenheid van groepen resulteerde 
bijvoorbeeld in een reproductie van ideeën en daardoor ook een beperkte ver-
werking van de eisen van dienstenverleners en eindgebruikers in het eIDM ont-
werp. Daarnaast hadden actoren met een intermediaire rol tussen verschillende 
partijen aanmerkelijk meer invloed op het innovatie proces dan actoren met een 
minder strategische positie. En, in alle cases waren betrokken actoren meer bereid 
om risico’s te nemen – bijvoorbeeld door een innovatiever concept toe te passen 
– in een omgeving waar het inter-persoonlijk vertrouwen hoog was. 
De empirische test van het geïntegreerde model laat zien dat het geschikt is om ge-
zamenlijke eIDM innovaties te verklaren. Het model biedt een breed overzicht van 
allerlei contextuele factoren en een gedetailleerd inzicht in sociaal kapitaal vari-
abelen, hun relevantie en impact. Daarnaast vloeien er uit het empirisch bewijs 
ook verschillende suggesties voort voor verandering en toekomstig gebruik van 
het model. Omdat het op een meso (sectoraal) niveau is toegepast, zijn de vari-
abelen bijvoorbeeld onderling sterker gerelateerd dan in het originele Advocacy 
Coalition Framework – dat meestal op een macro niveau wordt toegepast. Daar-
naast laat de empirische test zien dat een verdergaande operationalisatie van het 
sociale subsysteem nodig is omdat de precieze impact van sommige kenmerken 
(bijvoorbeeld belangen, hiërarchie en afhankelijkheden) onduidelijk blijft. 
Beleidsaanbevelingen betreffen vooral bewustwording van de sociale omgeving 
waarin een innovatie plaatsvindt. Beleidsmakers kunnen de sociale kenmerken 
van het netwerk doelbewust verkennen en sociale constellaties veranderen om 
de publieke waarde van een innovatie te verhogen. Het is echter belangrijk om te 
benadrukken dat sociaal kapitaal – zoals andere kapitalen als financiële middelen 
– neutraal is; het kan ten goede en ten kwade worden ingezet. Zoals de cases 
laten zien, worden sociale relaties zowel door personen gebruikt die toegewijd 
werken aan een verbetering van diensten als door personen die vooral gedreven 
worden door het behoud van hun positie. Eén van de belangrijkste instrumen-
ten om er voor te zorgen dat sociaal kapitaal wordt gebruikt op een manier die 
strookt met maatschappelijke waarden, is transparantie. Door transparantie van 
acties, strategieën en besluiten te creëren kunnen overheidsfunctionarissen en 
politici makkelijker verantwoordelijk worden gehouden voor gedrag dat in strijd 
is met het publieke belang.
Concluderend kan men stellen dat het geïntegreerde model zoals gepresenteerd 
in deze thesis een gedegen startpunt biedt voor de ontwikkeling van een alge-
mener model om gezamenlijk ICT innovaties in de publieke sector te verklaren. 
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INTERVIEw fORMAT 
INTRO
•	 Professional background
•	 Role and in which innovation stage involved
PART 1 – TIE ASSESSMENT
•	 Organisations involved in each stage
•	 Persons involved in each stage
•	 For each person identified (use of template with categories) in each innova-
tion stage:
−	 Strength of the tie 
−	 Level of trust
PART 2 – QUESTIONS INTERVIEW
Innovation process
•	 Key decisions in innovation phases (initiation, development implementation 
and diffusion)
•	 Key strategies in innovation phases
•	 Important agreements reached between parties in innovation phases
•	 Innovation output (e.g. evidence features of the system, take-up by service 
providers, take-up by citizens/businesses, actual use, number of transac-
tions)
•	 Innovation impact (e.g. evidence of administrative burden reaction, user 
satisfaction)
Stable parameters
•	 Attributes of the eIDM system (e.g. security level, technology used) 
•	 Distribution of resources (e.g. budgets needed to finance the development, 
implementation and diffusion) 
•	 Fundamental values (e.g. what are the major advantages and/or disadvan-
tages of the system)
•	 Legislation (e.g. data protection, e-Government act) 
•	 Impact of parameters on subsystem
Events and disruptions
•	 Changes and disruptions (burst of the internet bubble, political interven-
tions (radical policy change), critical incidents (hacking of government com-
puters), European directives 
•	 Changes in public opinion (e.g. public support or objections to the system) 
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•	 Changes in systemic governing coalitions (e.g. change of responsibilities, 
ownership of the system)
•	 Policy decisions and impacts from other systems (e.g. European Union)
•	 Impact of events and disruptions on subsystem
Subsystem
•	 Specific aims in each innovation stage 
•	 Interests of parties involved (e.g. political interests, conflicting interests, in-
terests at stake) 
•	 Risks and difficulties (e.g. technological, legal difficulties) 
•	 Interdependencies within network (e.g. dependencies on knowledge, deci-
sions, cooperation) 
•	 Resources needed and divided in innovation stages (e.g. knowledge, exper-
tise, adoption by critical mass, funding) 
•	 Relation between characteristics of the network (see sociogram) and dy-
namics in the subsystem (decisions, strategies, consensus reaching, appoint-
ments)
SUGGESTIONS FOR DOCUMENTS
SUGGESTIONS FOR OTHER PERSONS TO BE INTERVIEWED
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CATEGORISATION STRENGTH Of TIES AND LEVELS Of TRUST
Degrees of strong – weak ties (emotional intensity/intimacy and amount of time spend 
together)
1. Very strong tie 
−	 Intense private contact (family, friends) and/or
−	 Very frequent and intensive professional contact (every week, very intensive 
collaboration)
2. Strong tie
−	 Being informed about the personal situation of the other and
−	 Frequent professional contact (once every two-three weeks) and possibly
−	 Occasional private contact 
3. Medium 
−	 Professional contact (once a month/two months) or
−	 Former intensive relationship (former strong tie)
4. Weak tie
−	 A few times met
−	 Possibility of calling each other
Levels of trust
1. Very high
−	 Strong belief that the other will act in an honest way
−	 High level of reciprocity 
−	 Strong mutual interdependencies (financial, knowledge, reputation)
−	 Confidence-building, sound reputation 
2. High
−	 Belief that the other will act in an honest way
−	 Reciprocity (favour for favour)
−	 Mutual interdependencies (financial, knowledge reputation)
−	 Good reputation, and possibly
−	 Transferable trust
3. Medium
−	 Belief that the other will act in an honest way
−	 One-sided interdependency
−	 No particular reputation as regards trustworthiness
4. Low
1. Not assured of the honesty of the other (could be opportunistic)
2. Behaviour of the other difficult to predict
3. (Possibly: opportunistic reputation)
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LIST Of PERSONS INTERVIEwED
Austria
•	 Head of E-Government Innovation Centre, Graz
•	 Project manager at the E-Government Innovation Centre, Graz
•	 Federal Chief Information Officer of the Austrian Government
•	 Former head of the technical unit of the ICT Strategy Unit of the Federal 
Chancellery
•	 Former technical specialist of the ICT Strategy Unit of the Federal Chancel-
lery
•	 Former public relations officer of the ICT Strategy Unit of the Federal Chan-
cellery
•	 Chairwoman of the Austrian Data Protection Commission
•	 Head of the e-Government Department of the Federal Chancellery
•	 Former project leader of Bürgerkarte implementation at University of Vienna 
•	 Manager at the Austrian Computer Society
•	 Manager at the Austrian Social Security Agency
•	 Head of the Centre for e-Government of the Danube University Krems
•	 Managing director of A-Trust
Belgium
•	 Manager of the Civil Affairs department of the municipality of Tongeren
•	 Researcher at the research group ESAT/Cosic at the Catholic University of 
Leuven
•	 System architect at Steria, Belgium
•	 Project manager of eID at Zetes, Belgium
•	 Senior consultant of the consultancy company CSC Computer Sciences
•	 Chairman of Fedict, the Federal ICT Public Service
•	 Policy-maker at the National Register Department
•	 Coordinator of the National Register Department’s eID regional office
•	 Administrator General of the Crossroads Bank for the Social Security
•	 Former programme manager of eID at FEDICT
•	 Manager of the Civil Affairs department of the municipality of Leuven
•	 Former technical specialist of eID at FEDICT
•	 Senior manager of Deloitte Enterprise Risk Services 
Finland
•	 eID programme manager at the valt- IT unit of the Ministry of Finance
•	 Senior advisor at the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities
•	 Former project manager of eID for the municipality of Espoo
•	 Project manager of eID at the State Treasury Department of the Ministry of 
Finance
•	 Project manager of eID of the municipality of Vantaa
•	 Project manager of eID of the municipality of Espoo
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•	 CEO of the Finnish Federation for Communication and Teleinformatics
•	 IT advisor of the city of Helsinki
•	 Former programme director of the Information Society Programme of the 
Prime Minister’s Office
•	 Former eID programme developer Fujitsu
•	 IT manager of the municipality of Lahti 
•	 Former Secretary General at the Ministry of the Interior
•	 eID project manager of the National Board of Education
•	 Former sales director of Fujitsu
Malta
•	 Former project leader of eID at the Ministry for Investment, Industry and 
Information Technology
•	 Department manager of the Project Management Office, Malta Information 
Technology Agency
•	 Partner at Fenech & Fenech Advocates
•	 IT and Communications policy manager at the Ministry for Infrastructure, 
Transport and Communications
•	 Business Development Manager of LOQUS Group
•	 Director of Exigy
•	 Executive director of Exigy
•	 Director of the compliance unit of the Malta Financial Service Authority
•	 Senior desk officer of the Malta Financial Service Authority
•	 Deputy registrar of the Malta Financial Service Authority
•	 Chief Operations Officer at Datatrak
•	 Chairman of the Malta Information Technology Agency
•	 Former project leader of eID at the Malta Information Technology Agency
•	 Project leader of eID at the Malta Information Technology Agency
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